Cartels: A Hidden Evil in the Marketplace
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📂 Public Policy 🏷️ Research
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- i'm here at wharton professor Joe Harrington to talk about his paper what can a duration of discovered cartels
- tell us about the duration of all cartels welcome professor I'm glad to be here so tell us about your paper well it
- starts with the issue of collusion and the probably was best stated by recently deceased Justice Antonin Scalia who
- referred to collusion as the supreme evil of antitrust so collusion is all about the fact that firms which we count
- upon to compete for the business of customers and in doing so result in lower prices better products and the
- like in some industries they decide that that leads to profits that are too low and so what they do is they engage an
- unlawful coordination of their behavior they decide to set of driving prices down in order to get customers business
- a sigh well well how about we all set artificially high prices share the market and we'll all earn high profits
- and so collusion is a real challenge has become particularly so in the last several decades I would say 30 years ago
- if you asked an official the Antitrust Division the Department of Justice they whether there are any global cartels
- other than the type like OPEC they would have said no but the fact is we observed
- many global cartels as well as many domestic cartels in in the last couple decades so a challenge in terms of
- understanding cartels you know asking well how many unlawful cartels are there out there you know how bad are they how
- much do they raise prices how long do they last we face a challenge which is common to criminal behavior which is
- these criminals want to hide themselves so what we observe are just those cartels that are unfortunate enough to
- be discovered and convicted so a challenge gets to be which is well we know how many discover cartels are out
- there we know how long they last we know how high a price they said but is that representative of the actual latent
- population of all cartels so where this again kind of specifically for example manifest self in terms of a policy
- challenge is suppose the Antitrust Division puts in place a new program and they want to know is it kind of is it
- proving to be beneficial is it actually helping to reduce the presence of collusion well all we can
- observe is what's happening to the kind of population that of discover cartels so if for example we observe more
- discover cartels is that because the program maybe is working to make discovery more likely and that's good or
- maybe is counterproductive maybe what's doing is actually creating more cartels and that's why there's more discover
- cartels so that's kind of the starting point to this research which is trying to determine what is it what it is we
- can learn about the underlying latent you know Universal cartels from those that we actually discover and
- specifically what the research is concerned with is the issue of the duration of cartels so we can measure
- and there have been many studies that have measured how long discovered cartels last these studies if the
- average duration ranges from five to eight years depending on the study and the issue as well as that kind of a good
- proxy for the duration of all cartels and so what this research is designed to do is to try to provide a kind of a
- method to kind of getting at you know how much bias there might be in looking at discover cartels with regards to the
- universe of cartels so what are some key takeaways of the paper well the the paper kind of to answer that question
- they say that the paper kind of big stew contributions first what it does is it puts forth a theoretical framework
- that's kind of think through these issues and understand well when will bias occur in what direction and what in
- the way it does this it constructs a model of the birth death and discovery of cartels and and one of the things
- that it shows and this is in the context of if you read many papers and the literature some economists will say that
- well the measured duration of discover cartels is an over estimate of the actual true duration and some will say
- it's an underestimate and so what we want to do is put forth a theoretical framework where we can say precisely you
- know when is it an over under estimate what drives that and so what we find is that if cartels differ a lot in terms of
- their the likelihood that they'll collapse once again think about the death here of
- a cartel you know Cardinals born it could just internally collapse as we've observed with sometimes lawful cartels
- like OPEC which is right now now that you know not very functional of and so it could just die that way it could be
- discovered and its conviction would lead to its collapse so we can think about cartels is differing in these two key
- characteristics what's the likelihood of collapsing at say in a year what's likely to being discovered in a year if
- cartels tend to vary really largely in terms of the likelihood of collapse what we find is that the measured duration of
- discover cartels is an over estimate of the true duration and the reason the intuition is that if you have a cartel
- that's really very stable with a low chance to collapse it just hangs around for a long time and has plenty of
- opportunities to be discovered cartels that are short live will tend to die and avoid discovery so so the bias in that
- case will work towards saying that well if we measure for example the average duration discovered cartels to be lets
- say six years that that probably is an over estimate now there's other assumptions you can make whereby you
- give buys go in the other direction so but but one contribution and takeaways is to be able to kind of frame these
- issues so we can understand okay what drives bias the other contribution and more where I think the the key takeaway
- is is to then uses framework to get a measure about the extent of this bias how big is it so we take this framework
- and we use data on convicted cartels by the Antitrust Division from say 1961 to cartels that were born from 61 to 80 4
- and we can use that data to get a map first of all if you just you could just measure the average duration of these
- convicted cartels and it's a five point eight years but we can use this framework then get a sense of how big is
- the bias with regards to the duration of action all the cartels those also those
- that are undiscovered and what we find is that and I think one of the surprising kind of results is that the
- bias is actually is not that large we find kind of a kind of high likelihood the duration
- average duration of all cartels probably ranges from about five point two to six
- point eight years right so what are some practical implications of your research
- I think probably the most subsidy one is regards to evaluating policy you know it's a I think there's been a lot of
- policy innovations by various competition authorities one of the big challenges is determining well are they
- helping in the fight against cartels you know are they resulting in fewer cartels
- reducing the overcharge resulting in lower duration and I said the challenge here is that we don't directly measure
- those things so it's not like with some types of crime where we can measure the crime rate because all the crimes are
- reported in case the cartels it is criminal but those who are harm don't necessarily know that they've been
- harmed they don't know that they paid excessively for this good so so that's a real policy challenge and they could be
- more concrete about this probably the biggest innovation in policy in fighting cartels in the last 30 years has been
- the revision of the corporate leniency programme by the Antitrust Division so this is kind of an age-old idea with
- conspiracies which is that if someone from the conspiracy comes forward cooperates with the authorities they'll
- be absolved the government penalties okay so this was a program that was in place starting in nineteen seventy eight
- but it had certain design flaws to it was rarely used 93 it was revised I was made kind of you know kind of
- structurally sound and immediately the leniency application started coming in so it's been certainly successful as
- measured by the number leniency applications it's been adopted by many other jurisdictions probably more than
- 50 countries and unions have a leniency programme but still the question is well
- but is it affecting the actual population of cartels and that's a difficult question so one of the things
- we want to do here is with this kind of approach is it can provide a method to try to measure the impact of a program
- such as the leniency programme to specifically address the question of has it for example resulted in cartels be
- enough shorter duration that would be an immediate benefit from that and so so that's
- something we plan to do kind of in the next step of this research project we've looked at using this model to measure
- the underlying duration of cartels with data prior to the revision leniency programme and that was somewhat do to
- kind of data limitations but a new data set has recently become available and that will encompass cartels that were
- born and died after the advent of leniency programme and so we can redo the analysis and then see well what has
- happened to the duration of cartels kind of before and after the leniency programme this won't be able to tell a
- kind of causality story but I think it will provide some kind of kind of needed data to speak to the issue of well what
- impact are these programs having what conclusions of any surprised you I think the biggest one was that there wasn't as
- much bias as I would have expected I think that's been a a running concern of of economists and policymakers in this
- context but the bias is definitely there we definitely find evidence of it but it's not as large as one would have
- thought so so let's Viswa yup I think some of the conclusions drawn based upon what were known to be biased estimates
- probably most of them are robust because of the fact that we find the device isn't actually that large so what sets
- your research apart from prior work in this area well I think this is a topic which people kind of talked about and
- mentioned as they engage in the analysis saying well okay our data is probably biased because it's just discovered
- cartels and and those could be very different from the universe of cartels you could easily imagine that well we're
- just discovering the ones that are you know that very ineffective and that's why they're being discovered of or as I
- said before we could be discovering the ones that are really stable and effective and so they're around for a
- long time with lots of opportunities to be discovered that was kind of recognized and mentioned and then people
- just went forward and just kind of did their work as if the the data was not biased this is really the first study to
- say well let's see what we can actually say the extent to the bias and is it really
- that large and to what extent can we kind of compensate for it you know in our conclusions so how will you follow
- up this research well I think right now what we're going to be doing as I said it's going to be a follow-up empirical
- analysis kind of looking at date using data from the post leniency programme era so C would get some sort of
- assessment about whether duration has been impacted by Lindsay program I think where one can also make advances in
- terms of the theoretical framework right now the framework itself is kind of sparse in terms of how it models the
- birth death and discovery of cartels but there's kind of a developing literature
- in economics on how to how to model birth you know what determines whether or not a cartel is created you know what
- in kind of inspires managers to say well let's not compete anymore let's collude
- what causes cartels to collapse there's a kind of a rather large does body work on that and unless so in terms of what
- leads to discovery but I think trying to take it into account those those structures get a richer structure to
- embed that within our framework so we can tell kind of a richer story about the kind of the life cycle cartels from
- when they're born and when they die well thank you very much for joining us it's
- a pleasure been in being here you
Brief Summary
Wharton professor Joe Harrington discusses cartel duration, collusion, and the implications of antitrust policies, including the corporate leniency program.
Key points
- Understanding Collusion. Professor Harrington discusses the nature of collusion and its impact on markets.
- The Challenge of Cartels. Harrington explains the difficulties in measuring the true extent of cartels.
- Implications of Research. The research aims to evaluate the impact of antitrust policies on cartel duration.
Episode highlights
- Understanding CollusionProfessor Harrington discusses the nature of collusion and its impact on markets.“Collusion is all about the unlawful coordination of behavior.”0:17Apr 28, 2016
- The Challenge of CartelsHarrington explains the difficulties in measuring the true extent of cartels.“We face a challenge common to criminal behavior: they want to hide themselves.”1:36Apr 28, 2016
- Implications of ResearchThe research aims to evaluate the impact of antitrust policies on cartel duration.“Are they resulting in fewer cartels?”7:09Apr 28, 2016
Tension
45/ 100Some tension

