Cartels: A Hidden Evil in the Marketplace

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  1. i'm here at wharton professor Joe Harrington to talk about his paper what can a duration of discovered cartels
  2. tell us about the duration of all cartels welcome professor I'm glad to be here so tell us about your paper well it
  3. starts with the issue of collusion and the probably was best stated by recently deceased Justice Antonin Scalia who
  4. referred to collusion as the supreme evil of antitrust so collusion is all about the fact that firms which we count
  5. upon to compete for the business of customers and in doing so result in lower prices better products and the
  6. like in some industries they decide that that leads to profits that are too low and so what they do is they engage an
  7. unlawful coordination of their behavior they decide to set of driving prices down in order to get customers business
  8. a sigh well well how about we all set artificially high prices share the market and we'll all earn high profits
  9. and so collusion is a real challenge has become particularly so in the last several decades I would say 30 years ago
  10. if you asked an official the Antitrust Division the Department of Justice they whether there are any global cartels
  11. other than the type like OPEC they would have said no but the fact is we observed
  12. many global cartels as well as many domestic cartels in in the last couple decades so a challenge in terms of
  13. understanding cartels you know asking well how many unlawful cartels are there out there you know how bad are they how
  14. much do they raise prices how long do they last we face a challenge which is common to criminal behavior which is
  15. these criminals want to hide themselves so what we observe are just those cartels that are unfortunate enough to
  16. be discovered and convicted so a challenge gets to be which is well we know how many discover cartels are out
  17. there we know how long they last we know how high a price they said but is that representative of the actual latent
  18. population of all cartels so where this again kind of specifically for example manifest self in terms of a policy
  19. challenge is suppose the Antitrust Division puts in place a new program and they want to know is it kind of is it
  20. proving to be beneficial is it actually helping to reduce the presence of collusion well all we can
  21. observe is what's happening to the kind of population that of discover cartels so if for example we observe more
  22. discover cartels is that because the program maybe is working to make discovery more likely and that's good or
  23. maybe is counterproductive maybe what's doing is actually creating more cartels and that's why there's more discover
  24. cartels so that's kind of the starting point to this research which is trying to determine what is it what it is we
  25. can learn about the underlying latent you know Universal cartels from those that we actually discover and
  26. specifically what the research is concerned with is the issue of the duration of cartels so we can measure
  27. and there have been many studies that have measured how long discovered cartels last these studies if the
  28. average duration ranges from five to eight years depending on the study and the issue as well as that kind of a good
  29. proxy for the duration of all cartels and so what this research is designed to do is to try to provide a kind of a
  30. method to kind of getting at you know how much bias there might be in looking at discover cartels with regards to the
  31. universe of cartels so what are some key takeaways of the paper well the the paper kind of to answer that question
  32. they say that the paper kind of big stew contributions first what it does is it puts forth a theoretical framework
  33. that's kind of think through these issues and understand well when will bias occur in what direction and what in
  34. the way it does this it constructs a model of the birth death and discovery of cartels and and one of the things
  35. that it shows and this is in the context of if you read many papers and the literature some economists will say that
  36. well the measured duration of discover cartels is an over estimate of the actual true duration and some will say
  37. it's an underestimate and so what we want to do is put forth a theoretical framework where we can say precisely you
  38. know when is it an over under estimate what drives that and so what we find is that if cartels differ a lot in terms of
  39. their the likelihood that they'll collapse once again think about the death here of
  40. a cartel you know Cardinals born it could just internally collapse as we've observed with sometimes lawful cartels
  41. like OPEC which is right now now that you know not very functional of and so it could just die that way it could be
  42. discovered and its conviction would lead to its collapse so we can think about cartels is differing in these two key
  43. characteristics what's the likelihood of collapsing at say in a year what's likely to being discovered in a year if
  44. cartels tend to vary really largely in terms of the likelihood of collapse what we find is that the measured duration of
  45. discover cartels is an over estimate of the true duration and the reason the intuition is that if you have a cartel
  46. that's really very stable with a low chance to collapse it just hangs around for a long time and has plenty of
  47. opportunities to be discovered cartels that are short live will tend to die and avoid discovery so so the bias in that
  48. case will work towards saying that well if we measure for example the average duration discovered cartels to be lets
  49. say six years that that probably is an over estimate now there's other assumptions you can make whereby you
  50. give buys go in the other direction so but but one contribution and takeaways is to be able to kind of frame these
  51. issues so we can understand okay what drives bias the other contribution and more where I think the the key takeaway
  52. is is to then uses framework to get a measure about the extent of this bias how big is it so we take this framework
  53. and we use data on convicted cartels by the Antitrust Division from say 1961 to cartels that were born from 61 to 80 4
  54. and we can use that data to get a map first of all if you just you could just measure the average duration of these
  55. convicted cartels and it's a five point eight years but we can use this framework then get a sense of how big is
  56. the bias with regards to the duration of action all the cartels those also those
  57. that are undiscovered and what we find is that and I think one of the surprising kind of results is that the
  58. bias is actually is not that large we find kind of a kind of high likelihood the duration
  59. average duration of all cartels probably ranges from about five point two to six
  60. point eight years right so what are some practical implications of your research
  61. I think probably the most subsidy one is regards to evaluating policy you know it's a I think there's been a lot of
  62. policy innovations by various competition authorities one of the big challenges is determining well are they
  63. helping in the fight against cartels you know are they resulting in fewer cartels
  64. reducing the overcharge resulting in lower duration and I said the challenge here is that we don't directly measure
  65. those things so it's not like with some types of crime where we can measure the crime rate because all the crimes are
  66. reported in case the cartels it is criminal but those who are harm don't necessarily know that they've been
  67. harmed they don't know that they paid excessively for this good so so that's a real policy challenge and they could be
  68. more concrete about this probably the biggest innovation in policy in fighting cartels in the last 30 years has been
  69. the revision of the corporate leniency programme by the Antitrust Division so this is kind of an age-old idea with
  70. conspiracies which is that if someone from the conspiracy comes forward cooperates with the authorities they'll
  71. be absolved the government penalties okay so this was a program that was in place starting in nineteen seventy eight
  72. but it had certain design flaws to it was rarely used 93 it was revised I was made kind of you know kind of
  73. structurally sound and immediately the leniency application started coming in so it's been certainly successful as
  74. measured by the number leniency applications it's been adopted by many other jurisdictions probably more than
  75. 50 countries and unions have a leniency programme but still the question is well
  76. but is it affecting the actual population of cartels and that's a difficult question so one of the things
  77. we want to do here is with this kind of approach is it can provide a method to try to measure the impact of a program
  78. such as the leniency programme to specifically address the question of has it for example resulted in cartels be
  79. enough shorter duration that would be an immediate benefit from that and so so that's
  80. something we plan to do kind of in the next step of this research project we've looked at using this model to measure
  81. the underlying duration of cartels with data prior to the revision leniency programme and that was somewhat do to
  82. kind of data limitations but a new data set has recently become available and that will encompass cartels that were
  83. born and died after the advent of leniency programme and so we can redo the analysis and then see well what has
  84. happened to the duration of cartels kind of before and after the leniency programme this won't be able to tell a
  85. kind of causality story but I think it will provide some kind of kind of needed data to speak to the issue of well what
  86. impact are these programs having what conclusions of any surprised you I think the biggest one was that there wasn't as
  87. much bias as I would have expected I think that's been a a running concern of of economists and policymakers in this
  88. context but the bias is definitely there we definitely find evidence of it but it's not as large as one would have
  89. thought so so let's Viswa yup I think some of the conclusions drawn based upon what were known to be biased estimates
  90. probably most of them are robust because of the fact that we find the device isn't actually that large so what sets
  91. your research apart from prior work in this area well I think this is a topic which people kind of talked about and
  92. mentioned as they engage in the analysis saying well okay our data is probably biased because it's just discovered
  93. cartels and and those could be very different from the universe of cartels you could easily imagine that well we're
  94. just discovering the ones that are you know that very ineffective and that's why they're being discovered of or as I
  95. said before we could be discovering the ones that are really stable and effective and so they're around for a
  96. long time with lots of opportunities to be discovered that was kind of recognized and mentioned and then people
  97. just went forward and just kind of did their work as if the the data was not biased this is really the first study to
  98. say well let's see what we can actually say the extent to the bias and is it really
  99. that large and to what extent can we kind of compensate for it you know in our conclusions so how will you follow
  100. up this research well I think right now what we're going to be doing as I said it's going to be a follow-up empirical
  101. analysis kind of looking at date using data from the post leniency programme era so C would get some sort of
  102. assessment about whether duration has been impacted by Lindsay program I think where one can also make advances in
  103. terms of the theoretical framework right now the framework itself is kind of sparse in terms of how it models the
  104. birth death and discovery of cartels but there's kind of a developing literature
  105. in economics on how to how to model birth you know what determines whether or not a cartel is created you know what
  106. in kind of inspires managers to say well let's not compete anymore let's collude
  107. what causes cartels to collapse there's a kind of a rather large does body work on that and unless so in terms of what
  108. leads to discovery but I think trying to take it into account those those structures get a richer structure to
  109. embed that within our framework so we can tell kind of a richer story about the kind of the life cycle cartels from
  110. when they're born and when they die well thank you very much for joining us it's
  111. a pleasure been in being here you

Brief Summary

Wharton professor Joe Harrington discusses cartel duration, collusion, and the implications of antitrust policies, including the corporate leniency program.

Key points

  • Understanding Collusion. Professor Harrington discusses the nature of collusion and its impact on markets.
  • The Challenge of Cartels. Harrington explains the difficulties in measuring the true extent of cartels.
  • Implications of Research. The research aims to evaluate the impact of antitrust policies on cartel duration.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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