How to Stop States from Borrowing Too Much Money
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📂 Public Policy 🏷️ Research
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- I'd like to welcome Vinton Buccola do knowledge at work man he is a professor of legal studies and business ethics
- here and he's written an interesting paper about excessive state debt and a new approach to this problem there's a
- worry a concern that some state debt around the world I guess could end up in default creating lots of problems for
- investors and capital markets and Vince I'd like to leave it to you to explain what this paper is about and what some
- of the findings were sure thanks Steven so this paper or this position brief is based on a paper published in the Duke
- Law Journal it takes up the problem of state over borrowing and I mean here states of the United States Illinois
- California and so on and the paper really has to conclusions for policymakers one of them is negative or
- sort of pessimistic and one of them is maybe more optimistic so I'll just take this one at a time i'll stop the the
- pessimistic findings so in the aftermath of the financial crisis a number of policymakers politicians and scholars
- saw in the leverage or over-leveraged of a number of american states like Illinois New Jersey California some of
- the same moral hazard or too big to fail thinking that was part of the cause any
- way of the financial crisis in Wall Street the idea is that the institution note can over borrow knowing that if
- things get bad enough there's a federal back stop there and therefore lenders are more willing to extend and
- overextend credit so these thinkers in most prominent was probably my colleague and friend at the law school here at
- Penn David Skeel proposed a bankruptcy mechanism a new law that would allow states in addition to cities and towns
- which can already file for bankruptcy this would allow states to file and they thought this might relieve turn off the
- spigot by allowing there to be a mechanism that would give creditors a haircut the idea would be to forestall a
- federal bailout so the negative conclusion of my paper is that the bankruptcy mechanism won't
- work to reduce state borrowing and the basic problem is an old very old legal doctrine called sovereign immunity this
- doctrine dates at least into the 19th century and the idea is that because the American states are thought of as
- sovereigns they can reject any claims on to pay debts they can simply walk away from them so in other words they don't
- need a bankruptcy mechanism and the way this works is that if someone Sue's a state for a debt say on a bond the state
- can decline to be sued so there's no remedy and the upshot is that states can already walk away from deaths if they
- want to they don't need bankruptcy mechanism and they won't opt in to one unless they're given sweeteners let me
- ask you what are what were the main conclusions of your research as you looked into this but also as a preface
- to that is there a history of states defaulting has it happened in what have been the results yeah so the earliest
- state defaults were in the 19th century a wave of financial panics caused state defaults in the 1840s 1870s after the
- Civil War the most recent state default was Arkansas is during the Depression I think it was 1933 but I might be wrong
- on the exact date so yeah there is you know I think people tend to think that the states are risk-free and they're not
- they haven't historically been and and the the law is solid in the sense that there's no legal repercussions there are
- obviously reputational consequences to default but but not legal so what were your main takeaways from your research
- sure I think there they really are twofold one is that a kind of any kind of ex post mechanism a kind of illegal
- mechanism that tries to work on borrowing after the fact after things have done bad is not going to work and
- the second takeaway relates to an idea I develop in the paper called tax credit borrowing which is a way to get around
- the this problem of sovereign immunity that I'm that I mentioned and the tax credit borrowing may have
- um more hope or more promise than a bankruptcy mechanism and what is that exactly sure so the idea of tax credit
- borrowing is that you that a state borrows just like it or not I would think of a bond the prompt the state
- problems is to pay a coupon annually however periodically they want but instead of promising an outlay of cash
- the state promises a tax credit some credit that can be applied against a tax bill owed to the state and the idea this
- really is just to circumvent that sovereign immunity doctrine I was mentioning under the settled law
- sovereign immunity only applies to a state as a defendant in court it does not apply to a state as a plaintiff in
- court so the logic of tax credit borrowing is that the owner of the bond say or the obligation can assert the
- right to decrease taxes and if the state doesn't like that or wants to default will say the state must sue rather than
- be sued and by toggling the plaintiff defendant distinction as sort of trivial as that sounds maybe to a non-lawyer you
- get a radically different result that's interesting so a company obviously would
- have to have substantial business interest in that state in a substantial tax obligation in order for that to to
- make sense is that often who's investing is in it sort of big investors with institutions in New York and so forth um
- you know it with municipal and state that there actually are a lot of individuals or owners so the way I
- really foresee Tax Credit barn working is that the tax credit would coupon say would just be sort of an option on for
- the holder so in the ordinary run of business the taxpayer that I'm sorry the holder of the obligation just gets paid
- as an ordinary bond but the taxpayer or the holders one would have an option to use it as an offset against a tax bill
- so it would only come into play if a state was let's say teetering financially and wanting to default in
- this way so is the other thing I'm wondering is would that would that be a sweetener for states to be able to to to
- get a lower interest rates or is that federal back app already providing something
- equivalent yeah so I the short answer is I think it would allow states to borrow
- more cheaply it's a way of creating a lower risk state instrument there are 22 observations that one is we're not sure
- how much of over barling really is attributable to moral hazard that's too big to fail idea i think actually tax
- credit borrowing would help researchers like myself get a better purchase on how
- much of over borrowing is really caused by that sort of moral hazard and how much is due to other political failures
- you know and then the last thing I'd add about the text credit borrowing is not not just about allowing states to borrow
- at cheaper interest rates there are a lot of constituents what you might say creditors of states who are not
- bondholders I'm thinking employees with retirement plans and so on who could really use a little safety I would
- probably be willing to give up a little juice for for our consider for for the safety of a return down the line I think
- their tax credit borrowing is you know I introduce it in this paper as a mechanism to reduce the over borrowing
- incentive at the state level but I think it has other potential uses so states could see this as a way to lower their
- financial costs I'm if they if they so chose I think that's right yeah sorry interesting as you looked into this
- where their conclusions or findings that surprised you yeah 11 rise is an historical I thought that I was coming
- up with this mechanism out of sort of scratch but as I conducted research I found out that the state of Virginia I
- guess the Commonwealth of Virginia actually used tax credit borrowing in the aftermath of the Civil War in the
- 1870s so some lawyers in Richmond were smart enough to figure this out and in fact Virginia tried to repudiate these
- tax credits and they were upheld in the courts so that was a big surprise we have some precedent yeah that's right
- what are some of the other practical implications for this that maybe have them covered just yet so I think for
- for investors and for employees at the state level it's important to know this is not this is not unique or new from my
- work but it's important to know that states can walk away from their obligations a lot of general obligation
- bonds and according to some constitutions state pension obligations are said to be backed by the state's
- Full Faith and Credit it's a common language and a lot of people assume that means it's impossible for the state to
- default you should know it's not impossible and states have done it before they will probably do it again
- okay so that would be one of the misperceptions that the public may have about these kinds of things that because
- it hasn't happened since the 30s that that it's unlikely to happen and it does it does seem like an unlikely thing and
- yet if you can provide a guarantee against it and at the same time incentivize States to perhaps lower
- their borrowing closet that that's an interesting thing and how much might Lauren cause be lowered is it a quarter
- percent an eight percent anyway to any way to judge that you know I'm not sure and I'm probably would not be the best
- at figuring this out I think the case is that the better the financial situation
- of a given state the less this tax credit borrowing mechanism matters so if there's a prudent highly solvent state
- it's not going to change borrowing costs at all but then again I'm we're not so concerned about that states motive on so
- it's more an issue as a state is under increasingly dire financial situation this the tax credit bar will have a
- bigger impact I don't know how to quantify that any states around right now that are in that position Illinois
- okay Illinois Illinois is not doing is not doing well its Supreme Court has in the past couple of years issued rulings
- that make it look difficult to restructure pension obligations there which are a major driver of costs and
- the city of Chicago is in financial trouble as well if you're trying to understand the fiscal picture at state
- and municipal levels you often in some ways need to look at together because states can offload some
- of their own obligations to the to their own municipalities or if municipalities
- are doing badly the state can back them up if both of state and its major municipalities major cities are
- simultaneously on the rocks financially that's a bad picture all right what what
- else about this whole idea would be interesting to know that we haven't talked about or have we covered it ah
- we've covered this research okay I'm what what I'm doing now is watching watching what's happening in Puerto Rico
- it's not a state but in and so the sovereign immunity doctrine i mentioned doesn't apply there but it'll be
- interesting to see what happens there there's some question whether puerto ricans going to be a warm-up for
- illinois we'll have to see and presumably they could offer some sort of a coupon that was in effect a tax break
- for let's say certain investors that that had enough business there that they be able to offset the tax obligation i
- think that's right okay well thanks for coming in thank for an interesting stuff
- you [Music]
Brief Summary
Vinton Buccola discusses state debt, bankruptcy mechanisms, and introduces tax credit borrowing as a potential solution to over-borrowing issues.
Key points
- The Problem of State Debt. Vinton Buccola discusses excessive state debt and its implications for investors and markets.
- Bankruptcy Mechanism Ineffectiveness. Buccola explains why a proposed bankruptcy mechanism won't help reduce state borrowing.
- Tax Credit Borrowing Explained. A new approach to circumvent sovereign immunity and reduce state borrowing costs.
- Historical Context of State Defaults. A look at the history of state defaults and their implications for the future.
- Misconceptions About State Defaults. Buccola addresses public misconceptions regarding the risk of state defaults.
Episode highlights
- The Problem of State DebtVinton Buccola discusses excessive state debt and its implications for investors and markets.“There’s a concern that some state debt could end up in default.”0:17Feb 28, 2017
- Bankruptcy Mechanism IneffectivenessBuccola explains why a proposed bankruptcy mechanism won't help reduce state borrowing.“The bankruptcy mechanism won't work to reduce state borrowing.”2:15Feb 28, 2017
- Tax Credit Borrowing ExplainedA new approach to circumvent sovereign immunity and reduce state borrowing costs.“Tax credit borrowing may have more promise than a bankruptcy mechanism.”4:30Feb 28, 2017
- Historical Context of State DefaultsA look at the history of state defaults and their implications for the future.“States can walk away from their obligations.”9:04Feb 28, 2017
- Misconceptions About State DefaultsBuccola addresses public misconceptions regarding the risk of state defaults.“It’s not impossible for the state to default.”9:21Feb 28, 2017
Tension
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