See Sooner, Act Faster
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Wharton's George Day and co-author Paul Schoemaker discuss their new book on how companies can safeguard themselves against disruption in the digital age. 📂 Management
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- our guests today are George D and Paul Schumacher George is an emeritus professor of marketing at Wharton and a
- senior fellow at the Mac Institute for innovation management Paul founded and has been the CEO and chairman of
- decision strategies International and he's also served on the faculty at Wharton and at the University of Chicago
- we are speaking with them today about their new book see sooner act faster how vigilant leaders thrive in an era of
- digital turbulence George and Paul thank you so much for joining us today acknowledged at Wharton thanks for
- having our pleasure George maybe we can start with you what do you mean by vigilance and why is it so important
- well let's start with individual vigilance which is a heightened sense of alertness and we take that and bring it
- up to the full organization and the idea of a leadership team which is our our primary focus
- that's vigilant is one that's characterized by candor high curiosity openness because they receive a lot of
- weak signals and they're open to them and and interestingly we have found in the ten years we've been working
- together on this that whenever an organization missed a weak signal of either a threat or an opportunity that
- there was someone in the organization that in fact knew about it but the leadership team didn't know about it so
- we built on that kernel to come up with this notion of a vigilant organization in in short one that is able to see
- sooner and the the the the reference point is the rivals both potential and current I could just add to that what
- what's the payoff for a vigilant organization in terms of being more vigilant tennis rivals and
- sanctioned rivals so the payoff we've were very fortunate to have some colleagues in Europe do a study based
- upon part of our survey and they actually ask the question what is the payoff but as contrasted with much
- management research which is cross-sectional they actually defined vigilant and vulnerable organizations
- those that continually are surprised and wrong-footed and they tracked 85 large European multinationals over eight years
- and the payoff was that the Vigilant organizations had an increase in market capitalization that was double the
- increase in market cap of the vulnerable organizations to find the way we do it which is you know investment in
- foresight capabilities and leadership commitment what is vigilance so important especially at a time of
- digital turbulence as you see in the subtitle of your book yes I think because you have these different
- combinations of technologies they may be emerging technologies and already developed technologies but when they
- coalesce to make something possible and could be a new electronic digital product it could be over it could be air
- B&B did they people don't see it coming quickly because it is not in the traditional mold and it may not be in
- the space that where people are looking so that the feature of these digital technologies and after they are
- disruptive but not always would be that they don't respect industry boundaries the way normally is the case they do
- allow for very fast scaling so these light asset kind of things and they become new entrants who don't want to
- compete with the old business model but they bring in a new one and to to destroy maybe did the old one or find
- a hybrid of these things but each of these technologies it may be five four six seven technologies if you think of
- autonomous cars as twenty different technologies now to predict when everything is at the right point of
- reliability cost functionality in order to make the car function and forget for a moment regulations that is very hard
- to predict so it seems that these happens suddenly in fact there's a long gestation period but this combinatorial
- complexity or well that is an express exponential explosion if you have twenty thirty technologies that make coalesce
- how do you get a fix on that so is that the reason why turbulence is so hard to predict yeah I think there's an
- unpredictable element to it and and so your vigilance has to respect the fact that it cannot all be analytically
- predicted as you you mentioned a very interesting term in your earlier comment which is vulnerable organizations I'm
- sorry vulnerable organize oh yes yeah and I was wondering what factors matter most in explaining the difference
- between vigilant organizations and vulnerable ones so the the vigilant organizations we've already talked about
- now why would you be vulnerable well we have discovered that in this study that we talked about where the market cap
- increase was so much lower for the vulnerable organizations that vulnerability starts at the top and it's
- that's a consequence of the leadership team being a very short term oriented operational stick to the knitting to use
- the old term and very comfortable in their familiar surveys so they don't step outside the bounds of their
- industry they don't challenge themselves they stay within their comfort space and
- as a consequence there's not a lot of curiosity they don't invest in foresight which is the second big factor
- they don't do for example discipline searches for our opportunities using techniques like
- lead user analysis they tend to be more inside-out thinkers that is say okay I've got this capability this resource
- what do I do with it now and so that sets them up to be always reacting and that's the definition of a
- vulnerable organization it's always in react mode it never has a chance to get ahead Paul do you have something to add
- about why why it is that if organizations need to be vigilant all the time that vulnerability seems to be
- the norm do you have some of your thoughts yeah because I think the day-to-day pressures really command a
- lot of attention it's almost like grass Ohm's law of planning where you know that the the less important stuff drives
- out the more important stuff which has to do with the longer term which always can wait people think but in fact of
- course you using a precious time it has to do where the attention goes attention
- now we focus in our book on the leadership team we don't think it's one person one CEO a board member who can
- say this is how you become vigilant we ask the question what master leadership team do at the corporate level
- divisional level functional level SBU level in order to be vigilant and they become vulnerable the moment they get
- sucked into either protecting turf or the politics of organizations and they don't really fully anticipate once you
- have a shorter term focus how much how the scenarios for the future may be very different from the status quo and those
- are discomfort level with that the version two ambiguity so people that want to go there so what they have to do
- is often counterintuitive you have to almost say as a leadership team so what are the anomalies what is happening in
- our environment that people are curious about they wonder why is this happening and most of the time that's white noise
- people people themselves who maybe observe that a price is increased or that something happens they want to
- raise it unless they have a good rationale for it so you need a leader sort of what's Andy quoted at Intel sort
- of through this paranoia that you're looking for the reasons why things may break and that you're also willing to
- challenge the current model when he became CEOs was well-known of course then he challenged the business model
- and he said if we had taken over this company through an acquisition would we really stay on the current
- course and here legitimates now questions about whether they have the right business model still but in light
- of signals that are weak so in signals a weak it's hard to build a strong case that you should make a
- bold move so George is building upon what Paul just said could we talk a little bit about some of the features
- that define a vigilant organization and if you have an example or two of companies that demonstrate that I think
- that would be great yeah there's a lot of nonprofit as well as for-profit but I will start with Adobe which is a
- masterful example of a vigilant organization because way back we all remember the shrink-wrapped image
- building photoshop capability and when I talk to my students about shrink-wrapped
- software they say what what they don't understand that concept but it was only 15 years ago that that's the way
- software was sold and you bought your software and you got full rights to it Adobe could see over the horizon
- actually ahead of almost all their rivals that cloud storage was going to dramatically change the way images are
- stored and made available and so they made the decision to shift to a subscriber based model where all the
- content was lodged in the cloud and and of course their customers objected strenuously because they liked having a
- physical object is it what's this cloud up here we we don't feel comfortable having our images out
- of our control but they persisted because they were confident with what they had done in testing the proposition
- and what why we use the term see sooner then act faster acting faster is doing probin learn studies a lot of
- experimentation and buying real options it doesn't mean acting in the full sense
- of jumping into the market it's getting yourself ready so when the time is right
- you have all the pieces in place and Adobe did that superbly but in another domain entirely
- I think the Canadian government was very farsighted in realizing that the future
- digital technologies was going to be inextricably linked to artificial intelligence and they made 10 years ago
- a major commitment to investing in keeping the science at home as in Canada and making it very attractive for people
- to come from the states to Canada they took a lot of the risk out but this required some pretty farsighted
- vigilance in our term and a lot of initial investments to get proof of concept make people comfortable with it
- and now we see the payoff in fact it's interesting you mentioned the Canadian government because we some time ago
- featured the vector Institute and interviewed page Dickey from there who explains some some of these things in in
- detail Paul you referred to in your earlier comments the importance of reading weak signals and I was wondering
- you know why is it so important to for companies and leadership teams to pick up on weak signals what exactly does
- that mean and again like George could you give any examples of companies that have done it well yeah so the first
- question is what is a weak signal and I would say it's something that on its own
- doesn't have a lot of meaning but if it is combined either by understanding in the context of the signal
- or by combining it with other signals through triangulation that in fact holds a lot of informational value so it
- requires a culture that is curious about anomalies or things that are contrary to
- expectations so one pharmaceutical company to give an example was working on and dermatological drug and they ran
- and standard controlled experiments and the volunteers had to come in for medical check-ups and the person who
- registered them and noticed that some of these were very cheerful more so than others and this is a woman and she
- mentioned that the secretary to the people running the trial and they were also sufficiently curious it starts with
- this culture of curiosity that they wanted to look into this and as you can imagine it turned out that many of these
- cheerful folks happen to be in the treatment group not in the control group and even though this particular drug
- failed as a dermatological drug it became a very successful antidepressant now how often is it the case that weak
- signals from customers or from volunteers from inside the organization die at the point where it is seen it
- stays in the reception area right rather than make it all the way up the organization and so it would show you
- need champions for weak signals otherwise they will just die and they won't be noticed I do think that the
- future foreshadows itself and there's many warnings but it's not presented on a gold platter it's distributed you know
- to lay out your organization and beyond the organization some of the signals may
- be in other industries and if you go too far out it may become very complex or what Canada this is a great example when
- Japan tried to do something along many decades ago in anticipating its future mitii and sort of industrial policies
- they had identified artificial intelligence and supercomputers as the two big pillars and that turned out to
- be not so easy to do because they were very far into the future so it's a very fine balance between where can you still
- not only understand it but act on it in and responsible you know financially speaking waves interesting let's be be
- ready to act when the time is right yes and that was probably the problem with Japan let's go back to the the digital
- turbulence problem which it just increases the amount of data and information the last date I saw was our last
- information was that the amount of data is doubling every 18 months that means the signal to noise ratio is
- deteriorating rapidly so the important week signals the threats and opportunities are often
- shrouded in all of the noise and so we spend a lot of time in the book helping leadership teams think about how to
- allocate that scarce resource of attention and then focus on a few areas that will be ultimately extremely
- critical and so we have come up with the concept of guiding questions one of the
- six or eight questions that you've got to keep your eyes on and make sure the whole organization is aware of them and
- these questions come out of looking at where you missed things in the past diagnosing the future I mean diagnosing
- the present and anticipating the future and so we come up with two or three questions that the whole organization is
- aware of is widely communicated you have task forces working on them for example
- a medical device company some years ago was very concerned about the likelihood that a drug would displace the function
- of a peacemaker and it's not implausible and they were very concerned about it so they said their guiding question was
- what drug pharmaceutical drug could possibly displace an obsolete our our product and so they created a task force
- they made it highly visible all of the weak signals on that particular topic flowed into this one central node and
- interestingly just as a sidebar they learned an enormous amount about the drug industry and they found some
- amazingly effective drugs to enhance the capabilities of not only their their stents would say also sold but of the
- peacemakers that's in great that's a great story so based on everything both of you have
- said so far I wonder if I could ask each of you how can companies become more vigilant or as you put it in your book
- how can a company increase its vigilance quotient the quality won't start with that yeah I think a very good starting
- point is to and if I may just comment briefly on what George was saying what was in the medical example striking is
- that it was many signals having receptors where they can be interpreters so it's seldom that it was one weak
- signal but it is this combination and the CEO of DuPont was famously in the news for having identified early before
- the you know the Great Recession three different signals of a cash flow problem with the customer in Japan and then the
- the hotel in Wilmington DuPont hotel not being fully occupied and unusually low and GM not being able to give production
- numbers to them as they normally would he triangulated these and they all happened at different times not within
- the context at all of may there be a recession or whatever and he said are we gonna hit a wall and saw that early so
- that is the hard part to do so one I think is to really identify cases where people were prescient in some sense they
- saw the future and as importantly look at the past so we start with an audit and say let's look at what you missed in
- the past must be years what you saw early was it more a threat it's an opportunity and when we did that with
- olympus for example there were things that they've really excellent that they saw underwater cameras at opportunity
- before others did but there were other things that there endoscopes which were high-end endoscopes would be replaced by
- the displaced by disposable endoscopes they were like there was a blind spot and at Shell we did this one I worked at
- the Planning Group in shell in London and we said well what is shell missed and it turns out they miss of course
- stuff in economics but they don't miss a lot and systematically in in in the other domains except for one in public
- relations and media they didn't have a good sense they had to Brent's Peres Fiasco at one point in the North Sea
- there in Nigeria they had made payments to schools that ended up in the pockets of corrupt officials and then they
- overstated though their oil reserves just have to big companies look very bad and I had a vnp lost his job over that
- issue so once you start to study the profile you identify well is the organization systemically weak and once
- you understand that you can then say well how can we fix that and of course the past doesn't predict the future in
- that sense unless you have a starting point and then the other way maybe George can talk about that we have tests
- lots of surveys to measure the requisite conditions for being vigilant in place and we have survey that has you know 30
- questions that and we have benchmarks tokens which that can be compared so those are Diagnostics that can help so
- we offer at the the end of the book a an action agenda that is consistent with all the examples we talked about there's
- a lot of research but especially our research says there's two big factors and that is leadership commitment to
- vigilance it's highly visible signal to the organization and then significant investments in foresight activities so
- leadership commitment is signaled by the amount of time you spend for example thinking about the future and an a
- vulnerable organization will spend less than 20% vigilant organisations spend up
- to 50 percent of the leadership time thinking about the future they also Network very widely they're
- open they signal that they're ready and open to weak signals Andy Grove was a magician at that he gave permission to
- people at the way out on their periphery to come to him directly with a concern and and that kind of openness
- curiosity and candor is is critical because it vigilance is a team sport and then you follow that with very visible
- investments in foresight activities including what we find is the 3m and companies of that sort invest an
- enormous amount in looking for opportunities they don't wait for them to come but they use lead user analysis
- to pursue interesting needs of their lead customers they do a lot of experiments and they have a lot of
- investments in small startups for example that might have a but go back to the medical device company they invested
- a lot in small stakes in many many companies to get visibility into what was the next generation rather than
- having it appear as a product they knew the basic science and then they communicated that widely through the
- organization and finally just one of the things that is so consistent through all
- of our studies and examples is that when information is not shared you're vulnerable yeah now we've talked a lot
- about for-profit companies and I wonder if vigilance and vulnerability are also applicable to other kinds of
- organizations like nonprofits foundations and so on yeah yes sir we also samples in particular foundations
- American foundations with the help of the Council on Foundations and also Credit Union's American credit unions
- the corporate study was actually global in this world a lot of time of global companies but we do can see a comparison
- and indeed the weight that some of these factors that we mentioned in terms of vigilance differ but and it differs as a
- function of size and the difference of a function of how the degrees of freedom if you're highly regulated as credit
- unions are there is of course less scope for really farsighted leadership foundations likewise for some small
- Community Foundation's some other MacArthur Foundation's very big and so there is a lot of
- you need you need to understand the contingent factors why when is a certain foresight capability a certain
- attitudinal shift critical in that sector so it's hard to sort of have here's the recipe the five things they
- always work they work but two different degrees and so I think you cannot I think it says still a research topic
- about why vigilance varies and what are the determinants of it because it depends on time place culture all these
- kinds of things George would you like to add but one interesting finding was that
- the large foundations had the same attributes and and the the vulnerable foundations and the vigilant foundations
- were very similar to our sample of global organizations but only for the large foundations the small community
- foundations with the restricted mandate may be only in a region say southeastern
- Pennsylvania with a very limited periphery the that they had a totally different as Paul said those very
- restricted entities didn't have much need for vigilance because they they knew what they had to do they had very
- few resources and so we we only really began to appreciate how applicable the model was when we started looking at the
- big foundations I'd like to end with one question for each of you that is that let's imagine there is a CEO who comes
- to you and says what's your one piece of advice to make my company's leadership team more vigilant what would be your
- top recommendations Paul I would say reward it if you see it and share the best practices and and instill a culture
- of curiosity and hypothesis testing George the litmus test is openness and and so
- that's almost the other side of the curiosity coin but you also have to be open and make it clear to the
- organization that you're open to weak signals nagging concerns anomalies that you can't explain
- rather than having them bottled up in the at the point of contact with the marketplace for example or the
- technologists people feel comfortable forwarding that up and that openness is is in a critical part of the curiosity
- well George Paul thank you so much for speaking with knowledge it working about your book it's been a pleasure talking
- with you likewise thanks as always for more insight from knowledge at Wharton please visit knowledge Wharton UPenn edu
- [Music] you
Brief Summary
George D and Paul Schumacher discuss organizational vigilance and leadership strategies in their book, focusing on adapting to digital turbulence.
Key points
- The Importance of Vigilance. Vigilance in organizations is crucial for spotting threats and opportunities early.
- Vulnerable Organizations. Vulnerability often stems from leadership's short-term focus and lack of curiosity.
- Weak Signals Matter. Identifying weak signals can lead to significant insights and opportunities.
- Vigilance as a Team Effort. Effective vigilance requires collaboration and openness within leadership teams.
Episode highlights
- The Importance of VigilanceVigilance in organizations is crucial for spotting threats and opportunities early.“Vigilance is a heightened sense of alertness.”0:44Jan 10, 2020
- Vulnerable OrganizationsVulnerability often stems from leadership's short-term focus and lack of curiosity.“Vulnerability starts at the top.”5:48Jan 10, 2020
- Weak Signals MatterIdentifying weak signals can lead to significant insights and opportunities.“Weak signals can hold a lot of informational value.”13:06Jan 10, 2020
- Vigilance as a Team EffortEffective vigilance requires collaboration and openness within leadership teams.“Vigilance is a team sport.”21:53Jan 10, 2020
Tension
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