See Sooner, Act Faster

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Wharton's George Day and co-author Paul Schoemaker discuss their new book on how companies can safeguard themselves against disruption in the digital age. 📂 Management

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  1. our guests today are George D and Paul Schumacher George is an emeritus professor of marketing at Wharton and a
  2. senior fellow at the Mac Institute for innovation management Paul founded and has been the CEO and chairman of
  3. decision strategies International and he's also served on the faculty at Wharton and at the University of Chicago
  4. we are speaking with them today about their new book see sooner act faster how vigilant leaders thrive in an era of
  5. digital turbulence George and Paul thank you so much for joining us today acknowledged at Wharton thanks for
  6. having our pleasure George maybe we can start with you what do you mean by vigilance and why is it so important
  7. well let's start with individual vigilance which is a heightened sense of alertness and we take that and bring it
  8. up to the full organization and the idea of a leadership team which is our our primary focus
  9. that's vigilant is one that's characterized by candor high curiosity openness because they receive a lot of
  10. weak signals and they're open to them and and interestingly we have found in the ten years we've been working
  11. together on this that whenever an organization missed a weak signal of either a threat or an opportunity that
  12. there was someone in the organization that in fact knew about it but the leadership team didn't know about it so
  13. we built on that kernel to come up with this notion of a vigilant organization in in short one that is able to see
  14. sooner and the the the the reference point is the rivals both potential and current I could just add to that what
  15. what's the payoff for a vigilant organization in terms of being more vigilant tennis rivals and
  16. sanctioned rivals so the payoff we've were very fortunate to have some colleagues in Europe do a study based
  17. upon part of our survey and they actually ask the question what is the payoff but as contrasted with much
  18. management research which is cross-sectional they actually defined vigilant and vulnerable organizations
  19. those that continually are surprised and wrong-footed and they tracked 85 large European multinationals over eight years
  20. and the payoff was that the Vigilant organizations had an increase in market capitalization that was double the
  21. increase in market cap of the vulnerable organizations to find the way we do it which is you know investment in
  22. foresight capabilities and leadership commitment what is vigilance so important especially at a time of
  23. digital turbulence as you see in the subtitle of your book yes I think because you have these different
  24. combinations of technologies they may be emerging technologies and already developed technologies but when they
  25. coalesce to make something possible and could be a new electronic digital product it could be over it could be air
  26. B&B did they people don't see it coming quickly because it is not in the traditional mold and it may not be in
  27. the space that where people are looking so that the feature of these digital technologies and after they are
  28. disruptive but not always would be that they don't respect industry boundaries the way normally is the case they do
  29. allow for very fast scaling so these light asset kind of things and they become new entrants who don't want to
  30. compete with the old business model but they bring in a new one and to to destroy maybe did the old one or find
  31. a hybrid of these things but each of these technologies it may be five four six seven technologies if you think of
  32. autonomous cars as twenty different technologies now to predict when everything is at the right point of
  33. reliability cost functionality in order to make the car function and forget for a moment regulations that is very hard
  34. to predict so it seems that these happens suddenly in fact there's a long gestation period but this combinatorial
  35. complexity or well that is an express exponential explosion if you have twenty thirty technologies that make coalesce
  36. how do you get a fix on that so is that the reason why turbulence is so hard to predict yeah I think there's an
  37. unpredictable element to it and and so your vigilance has to respect the fact that it cannot all be analytically
  38. predicted as you you mentioned a very interesting term in your earlier comment which is vulnerable organizations I'm
  39. sorry vulnerable organize oh yes yeah and I was wondering what factors matter most in explaining the difference
  40. between vigilant organizations and vulnerable ones so the the vigilant organizations we've already talked about
  41. now why would you be vulnerable well we have discovered that in this study that we talked about where the market cap
  42. increase was so much lower for the vulnerable organizations that vulnerability starts at the top and it's
  43. that's a consequence of the leadership team being a very short term oriented operational stick to the knitting to use
  44. the old term and very comfortable in their familiar surveys so they don't step outside the bounds of their
  45. industry they don't challenge themselves they stay within their comfort space and
  46. as a consequence there's not a lot of curiosity they don't invest in foresight which is the second big factor
  47. they don't do for example discipline searches for our opportunities using techniques like
  48. lead user analysis they tend to be more inside-out thinkers that is say okay I've got this capability this resource
  49. what do I do with it now and so that sets them up to be always reacting and that's the definition of a
  50. vulnerable organization it's always in react mode it never has a chance to get ahead Paul do you have something to add
  51. about why why it is that if organizations need to be vigilant all the time that vulnerability seems to be
  52. the norm do you have some of your thoughts yeah because I think the day-to-day pressures really command a
  53. lot of attention it's almost like grass Ohm's law of planning where you know that the the less important stuff drives
  54. out the more important stuff which has to do with the longer term which always can wait people think but in fact of
  55. course you using a precious time it has to do where the attention goes attention
  56. now we focus in our book on the leadership team we don't think it's one person one CEO a board member who can
  57. say this is how you become vigilant we ask the question what master leadership team do at the corporate level
  58. divisional level functional level SBU level in order to be vigilant and they become vulnerable the moment they get
  59. sucked into either protecting turf or the politics of organizations and they don't really fully anticipate once you
  60. have a shorter term focus how much how the scenarios for the future may be very different from the status quo and those
  61. are discomfort level with that the version two ambiguity so people that want to go there so what they have to do
  62. is often counterintuitive you have to almost say as a leadership team so what are the anomalies what is happening in
  63. our environment that people are curious about they wonder why is this happening and most of the time that's white noise
  64. people people themselves who maybe observe that a price is increased or that something happens they want to
  65. raise it unless they have a good rationale for it so you need a leader sort of what's Andy quoted at Intel sort
  66. of through this paranoia that you're looking for the reasons why things may break and that you're also willing to
  67. challenge the current model when he became CEOs was well-known of course then he challenged the business model
  68. and he said if we had taken over this company through an acquisition would we really stay on the current
  69. course and here legitimates now questions about whether they have the right business model still but in light
  70. of signals that are weak so in signals a weak it's hard to build a strong case that you should make a
  71. bold move so George is building upon what Paul just said could we talk a little bit about some of the features
  72. that define a vigilant organization and if you have an example or two of companies that demonstrate that I think
  73. that would be great yeah there's a lot of nonprofit as well as for-profit but I will start with Adobe which is a
  74. masterful example of a vigilant organization because way back we all remember the shrink-wrapped image
  75. building photoshop capability and when I talk to my students about shrink-wrapped
  76. software they say what what they don't understand that concept but it was only 15 years ago that that's the way
  77. software was sold and you bought your software and you got full rights to it Adobe could see over the horizon
  78. actually ahead of almost all their rivals that cloud storage was going to dramatically change the way images are
  79. stored and made available and so they made the decision to shift to a subscriber based model where all the
  80. content was lodged in the cloud and and of course their customers objected strenuously because they liked having a
  81. physical object is it what's this cloud up here we we don't feel comfortable having our images out
  82. of our control but they persisted because they were confident with what they had done in testing the proposition
  83. and what why we use the term see sooner then act faster acting faster is doing probin learn studies a lot of
  84. experimentation and buying real options it doesn't mean acting in the full sense
  85. of jumping into the market it's getting yourself ready so when the time is right
  86. you have all the pieces in place and Adobe did that superbly but in another domain entirely
  87. I think the Canadian government was very farsighted in realizing that the future
  88. digital technologies was going to be inextricably linked to artificial intelligence and they made 10 years ago
  89. a major commitment to investing in keeping the science at home as in Canada and making it very attractive for people
  90. to come from the states to Canada they took a lot of the risk out but this required some pretty farsighted
  91. vigilance in our term and a lot of initial investments to get proof of concept make people comfortable with it
  92. and now we see the payoff in fact it's interesting you mentioned the Canadian government because we some time ago
  93. featured the vector Institute and interviewed page Dickey from there who explains some some of these things in in
  94. detail Paul you referred to in your earlier comments the importance of reading weak signals and I was wondering
  95. you know why is it so important to for companies and leadership teams to pick up on weak signals what exactly does
  96. that mean and again like George could you give any examples of companies that have done it well yeah so the first
  97. question is what is a weak signal and I would say it's something that on its own
  98. doesn't have a lot of meaning but if it is combined either by understanding in the context of the signal
  99. or by combining it with other signals through triangulation that in fact holds a lot of informational value so it
  100. requires a culture that is curious about anomalies or things that are contrary to
  101. expectations so one pharmaceutical company to give an example was working on and dermatological drug and they ran
  102. and standard controlled experiments and the volunteers had to come in for medical check-ups and the person who
  103. registered them and noticed that some of these were very cheerful more so than others and this is a woman and she
  104. mentioned that the secretary to the people running the trial and they were also sufficiently curious it starts with
  105. this culture of curiosity that they wanted to look into this and as you can imagine it turned out that many of these
  106. cheerful folks happen to be in the treatment group not in the control group and even though this particular drug
  107. failed as a dermatological drug it became a very successful antidepressant now how often is it the case that weak
  108. signals from customers or from volunteers from inside the organization die at the point where it is seen it
  109. stays in the reception area right rather than make it all the way up the organization and so it would show you
  110. need champions for weak signals otherwise they will just die and they won't be noticed I do think that the
  111. future foreshadows itself and there's many warnings but it's not presented on a gold platter it's distributed you know
  112. to lay out your organization and beyond the organization some of the signals may
  113. be in other industries and if you go too far out it may become very complex or what Canada this is a great example when
  114. Japan tried to do something along many decades ago in anticipating its future mitii and sort of industrial policies
  115. they had identified artificial intelligence and supercomputers as the two big pillars and that turned out to
  116. be not so easy to do because they were very far into the future so it's a very fine balance between where can you still
  117. not only understand it but act on it in and responsible you know financially speaking waves interesting let's be be
  118. ready to act when the time is right yes and that was probably the problem with Japan let's go back to the the digital
  119. turbulence problem which it just increases the amount of data and information the last date I saw was our last
  120. information was that the amount of data is doubling every 18 months that means the signal to noise ratio is
  121. deteriorating rapidly so the important week signals the threats and opportunities are often
  122. shrouded in all of the noise and so we spend a lot of time in the book helping leadership teams think about how to
  123. allocate that scarce resource of attention and then focus on a few areas that will be ultimately extremely
  124. critical and so we have come up with the concept of guiding questions one of the
  125. six or eight questions that you've got to keep your eyes on and make sure the whole organization is aware of them and
  126. these questions come out of looking at where you missed things in the past diagnosing the future I mean diagnosing
  127. the present and anticipating the future and so we come up with two or three questions that the whole organization is
  128. aware of is widely communicated you have task forces working on them for example
  129. a medical device company some years ago was very concerned about the likelihood that a drug would displace the function
  130. of a peacemaker and it's not implausible and they were very concerned about it so they said their guiding question was
  131. what drug pharmaceutical drug could possibly displace an obsolete our our product and so they created a task force
  132. they made it highly visible all of the weak signals on that particular topic flowed into this one central node and
  133. interestingly just as a sidebar they learned an enormous amount about the drug industry and they found some
  134. amazingly effective drugs to enhance the capabilities of not only their their stents would say also sold but of the
  135. peacemakers that's in great that's a great story so based on everything both of you have
  136. said so far I wonder if I could ask each of you how can companies become more vigilant or as you put it in your book
  137. how can a company increase its vigilance quotient the quality won't start with that yeah I think a very good starting
  138. point is to and if I may just comment briefly on what George was saying what was in the medical example striking is
  139. that it was many signals having receptors where they can be interpreters so it's seldom that it was one weak
  140. signal but it is this combination and the CEO of DuPont was famously in the news for having identified early before
  141. the you know the Great Recession three different signals of a cash flow problem with the customer in Japan and then the
  142. the hotel in Wilmington DuPont hotel not being fully occupied and unusually low and GM not being able to give production
  143. numbers to them as they normally would he triangulated these and they all happened at different times not within
  144. the context at all of may there be a recession or whatever and he said are we gonna hit a wall and saw that early so
  145. that is the hard part to do so one I think is to really identify cases where people were prescient in some sense they
  146. saw the future and as importantly look at the past so we start with an audit and say let's look at what you missed in
  147. the past must be years what you saw early was it more a threat it's an opportunity and when we did that with
  148. olympus for example there were things that they've really excellent that they saw underwater cameras at opportunity
  149. before others did but there were other things that there endoscopes which were high-end endoscopes would be replaced by
  150. the displaced by disposable endoscopes they were like there was a blind spot and at Shell we did this one I worked at
  151. the Planning Group in shell in London and we said well what is shell missed and it turns out they miss of course
  152. stuff in economics but they don't miss a lot and systematically in in in the other domains except for one in public
  153. relations and media they didn't have a good sense they had to Brent's Peres Fiasco at one point in the North Sea
  154. there in Nigeria they had made payments to schools that ended up in the pockets of corrupt officials and then they
  155. overstated though their oil reserves just have to big companies look very bad and I had a vnp lost his job over that
  156. issue so once you start to study the profile you identify well is the organization systemically weak and once
  157. you understand that you can then say well how can we fix that and of course the past doesn't predict the future in
  158. that sense unless you have a starting point and then the other way maybe George can talk about that we have tests
  159. lots of surveys to measure the requisite conditions for being vigilant in place and we have survey that has you know 30
  160. questions that and we have benchmarks tokens which that can be compared so those are Diagnostics that can help so
  161. we offer at the the end of the book a an action agenda that is consistent with all the examples we talked about there's
  162. a lot of research but especially our research says there's two big factors and that is leadership commitment to
  163. vigilance it's highly visible signal to the organization and then significant investments in foresight activities so
  164. leadership commitment is signaled by the amount of time you spend for example thinking about the future and an a
  165. vulnerable organization will spend less than 20% vigilant organisations spend up
  166. to 50 percent of the leadership time thinking about the future they also Network very widely they're
  167. open they signal that they're ready and open to weak signals Andy Grove was a magician at that he gave permission to
  168. people at the way out on their periphery to come to him directly with a concern and and that kind of openness
  169. curiosity and candor is is critical because it vigilance is a team sport and then you follow that with very visible
  170. investments in foresight activities including what we find is the 3m and companies of that sort invest an
  171. enormous amount in looking for opportunities they don't wait for them to come but they use lead user analysis
  172. to pursue interesting needs of their lead customers they do a lot of experiments and they have a lot of
  173. investments in small startups for example that might have a but go back to the medical device company they invested
  174. a lot in small stakes in many many companies to get visibility into what was the next generation rather than
  175. having it appear as a product they knew the basic science and then they communicated that widely through the
  176. organization and finally just one of the things that is so consistent through all
  177. of our studies and examples is that when information is not shared you're vulnerable yeah now we've talked a lot
  178. about for-profit companies and I wonder if vigilance and vulnerability are also applicable to other kinds of
  179. organizations like nonprofits foundations and so on yeah yes sir we also samples in particular foundations
  180. American foundations with the help of the Council on Foundations and also Credit Union's American credit unions
  181. the corporate study was actually global in this world a lot of time of global companies but we do can see a comparison
  182. and indeed the weight that some of these factors that we mentioned in terms of vigilance differ but and it differs as a
  183. function of size and the difference of a function of how the degrees of freedom if you're highly regulated as credit
  184. unions are there is of course less scope for really farsighted leadership foundations likewise for some small
  185. Community Foundation's some other MacArthur Foundation's very big and so there is a lot of
  186. you need you need to understand the contingent factors why when is a certain foresight capability a certain
  187. attitudinal shift critical in that sector so it's hard to sort of have here's the recipe the five things they
  188. always work they work but two different degrees and so I think you cannot I think it says still a research topic
  189. about why vigilance varies and what are the determinants of it because it depends on time place culture all these
  190. kinds of things George would you like to add but one interesting finding was that
  191. the large foundations had the same attributes and and the the vulnerable foundations and the vigilant foundations
  192. were very similar to our sample of global organizations but only for the large foundations the small community
  193. foundations with the restricted mandate may be only in a region say southeastern
  194. Pennsylvania with a very limited periphery the that they had a totally different as Paul said those very
  195. restricted entities didn't have much need for vigilance because they they knew what they had to do they had very
  196. few resources and so we we only really began to appreciate how applicable the model was when we started looking at the
  197. big foundations I'd like to end with one question for each of you that is that let's imagine there is a CEO who comes
  198. to you and says what's your one piece of advice to make my company's leadership team more vigilant what would be your
  199. top recommendations Paul I would say reward it if you see it and share the best practices and and instill a culture
  200. of curiosity and hypothesis testing George the litmus test is openness and and so
  201. that's almost the other side of the curiosity coin but you also have to be open and make it clear to the
  202. organization that you're open to weak signals nagging concerns anomalies that you can't explain
  203. rather than having them bottled up in the at the point of contact with the marketplace for example or the
  204. technologists people feel comfortable forwarding that up and that openness is is in a critical part of the curiosity
  205. well George Paul thank you so much for speaking with knowledge it working about your book it's been a pleasure talking
  206. with you likewise thanks as always for more insight from knowledge at Wharton please visit knowledge Wharton UPenn edu
  207. [Music] you

Brief Summary

George D and Paul Schumacher discuss organizational vigilance and leadership strategies in their book, focusing on adapting to digital turbulence.

Key points

  • The Importance of Vigilance. Vigilance in organizations is crucial for spotting threats and opportunities early.
  • Vulnerable Organizations. Vulnerability often stems from leadership's short-term focus and lack of curiosity.
  • Weak Signals Matter. Identifying weak signals can lead to significant insights and opportunities.
  • Vigilance as a Team Effort. Effective vigilance requires collaboration and openness within leadership teams.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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