Why Central Banks Must Gage Asset Bubbles -- and Stability

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When it comes to global financial crises, planning must focus on the future, not the past, says Wharton’s Franklin Allen. More: http://knlg.net/1pq2bct 📂 Finance & Accounting;Public Policy 🏷️ Great Recession;Research

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  1. so the research I'm going to talk about is is part of a long agenda it it's to do with the way that central banks and
  2. governments intervene in the economy so for the last 20 or 30 years central banks have by and large focused on
  3. fighting inflation after we had the big shocks in the 1970s that was the major problem and
  4. that's what they've spent their main efforts doing some other some of the central banks like the Federal Reserve
  5. have a dual mandate so in addition to worrying about inflation they also have to worry about
  6. unemployment now the way that this has been implemented in most countries either explicitly or implicitly is that
  7. the central bank has focused on inflation and it's usually granted formal independence from the government
  8. and the idea there is to stop it lowering interest rates just before an election and making the economy boom but
  9. then inflation going up and so on so that was an idea that has been widely accepted for some
  10. time now Financial stability was in the mix but it was usually regarded as something that was secondary so that was
  11. dealt with either by the central bank or in many countries such as the UK or Japan by a separate Financial Services
  12. Authority or FSA and they would deal with problems to make sure that there were no difficulties in transmitting monetary
  13. policy because Banks were having problems so the way they did that was to stop uh Banks taking risks one by one so
  14. they would look at each bank and make sure that they weren't doing doing risky things and the idea was that that would
  15. stop any problems in the financial system fiscal policy was done separately by the treasury or the
  16. finance ministry depending on the country so we could break up all these different parts of the way the
  17. government and central banks intervened and they could all do their job separately now the problem is that what
  18. the crisis has shown is that that system didn't work properly and what we need to
  19. do I argue in this research is to think carefully about how we should proceed going forward and I think it may well be
  20. that we need to change the architecture of the structure of policymaking and have a much more holistic view because
  21. all of these things I think are intertwined Financial stability isn't secondary it's a primary target in the
  22. same way that inflation fighting is we also have to worry about the fiscal side because that also is a important part of
  23. the mix so I think the most important is that central banks need to worry about the effects of their policies on asset
  24. prices we used to think of asset prices as being independent of of what they do to a large degree but I think what the
  25. housing bubble Illustrated was that they can have a big effect and if things go wrong in the sense that they rise
  26. quickly and get out of line and then collapse that can trigger a whole set of very
  27. unfortunate events and that's what we saw during the crisis now when they lower interest
  28. rates it has an effect on house price but it potentially has many other effects and one of the problems that
  29. they now face is that interest rates are going to go up at some point and when they go up it's important that they go
  30. up slowly enough that we don't have a big fall in prices of long-term bonds mortgages and so on which will get us
  31. back into a crisis in just the same way that house prices led to a fall in the price of securitized mortgages and so on
  32. so that's the second big takeaway they need to worry about that the third I think is that as I say they have to
  33. start thinking holistically because when they run up debt in large amounts and interest rates go up again there may
  34. also be a fiscal problem and that can also be significant so I think the country that
  35. is a is a very good illustration of some of these issues is Japan Japan had a massive property and stock bubble back
  36. in the late 80s and early '90s and then since then they've had 25 years of low interest rates and very slow growth now
  37. they're trying to get out of that by having these three arrows of abenomics the first arrow is monetary
  38. policy and what they're trying to do is to create inflation and the way they're doing that
  39. is by having large amounts of quantitive easing now their target is to get inflation up to 2% now it's currently
  40. around zero or negative or before the they implemented it started implementing it a year ago it was around that now
  41. most of our theories suggest that if inflation goes go up by 2% nominal interest rates should go up by about
  42. 2% now that creates a number of problems the first is that there's a potential Financial stability problem because the
  43. banks hold many long-term assets like mortgages government bonds loans and so forth and if interest rates go up their
  44. value Falls so last April the bank of Japan in its Financial stability review looked at the effect of 100 Point
  45. basis sorry 100 basis point rise in interest rates on the assets held by Banks the large banks are fine they
  46. don't hold too much and and they're reasonably well hedged the regional Banks and the small banks have a bigger
  47. problem 100 basis point rise has the potential to knock their asset values by an amount that would wipe out 30 to 40%
  48. on average of their tier one Capital 200 basis point rise would do twice that so 60 to
  49. 80% now that's clearly a problem their solution to that was we're going to extend the current
  50. regulations which allow them to not mark their assets to Market of course that was one of the big problems in the
  51. subprime crisis people didn't know where the subprime securitized mortgages were
  52. and so everybody came under suspicion and I think that this is potentially a problem in Japan so that's the first
  53. issue the second issue is that if interest rates do go up by 2% then they're going to have a fiscal
  54. problem because they have over 200% of GDP in Gross debt and about 135 140% in net debt now in recent years people have
  55. focused more on the net debt but an important issue in this case is what's the maturity of the gross debt versus
  56. the Net debt and particular the assets that offset the gross debt now much of that is the money held by the Central
  57. Bank the the foreign exchange reserves and that's invested by and large short term I don't think we have a good idea
  58. of precisely what the maturities of all these debts are but one of the things that's hen going to happen over the long
  59. term is if interest rates go up 2% then then on the gross side their funding costs are going to go up by four or 5%
  60. of GDP uh on the net debt they're going to go up by uh roughly two and a half to
  61. 3% those are both very large num so even the 3% is is a large amount in terms of
  62. actually raising revenue to pay those those uh amounts and so that's going to create a fiscal problem which they
  63. already have and which the tax rise that came into effect on April 1st is designed to offset but this is again
  64. similar order of magnitude kind of problem to their uh deficit problem that they've been running for many many years
  65. now so that's the second issue now may be that interest rates don't rise and in fact there isn't much evidence so far of
  66. that happening so the current yields on 10-year J jgbs Japanese government bonds
  67. is about 60 basis points so they haven't ticked up last year uh just after the start of of these policies they did go
  68. up a little bit to 90 to 100 basis points but they're now backed down now what that seems to suggest is that the
  69. market is not so sure that these inflation policies are going to work now if they don't work there's another
  70. problem which is if inflation is at uh 2% and long-term interest rates are at 60 basis points or
  71. or less then there's a negative yield on these very large quantities of assets and that raises the issue of will people
  72. take their money out of the country and put them in higher yielding assets so they avoid the negative yield and that's
  73. another problem they face so if the interest rates and inflation rates both go up by
  74. 2% then there is a an effect in the sense that the the value of the debt will be eroded in real terms and in that
  75. sense it'll be easier but it's still the case that the cost of raising the taxes
  76. is is large and at the beginning that's a large burden so that there's a again a
  77. complex ated tradeoff which needs to be taken into account in designing these policies so what I think these things
  78. illustrate is that there's a holistic problem that you can't just focus on one particular Target and forget about
  79. everything else the whole set of policies has to be consistent and the current architecture of the
  80. policy entities is not well designed to deal with those kinds of problems I I think the first key takeaway is
  81. that we need to worry a lot more about financial stability and worrying about St Financial stability is very different
  82. from worrying about inflation the reason is we can't just separate it out in the way that we've
  83. done in the past we have to have a holis view of policies by central banks and governments and treasuries they're all
  84. closely interrelated when it comes to financial stability and the reason is that systemic risk is a very complex and
  85. involved phenomenon and it pops its head up in many different ways so let me talk a little bit about
  86. systemic risks because I think it's very important in this whole issue systemic risk has at least five components the
  87. first component is panics traditionally I think that's the way people thought about financial crisis that there were
  88. good equilibrium bad equilibrium good equilibrium people keep their money in the bank everything's fine but if you
  89. think other people can take their money out of the bank then you better get your
  90. money out too because they only have a limited amount of liquidity and if there are going to be problems in the bank you
  91. want to make sure that you get your money out first panics are a big problem but as
  92. we've seen in the current crisis they're not the only problem what we saw here was Falls in asset prices and in
  93. particular Falls in real estate prices that lies at the heart of many Financial crises if you go back
  94. historically and that was the case particularly here in the US but also in Spain and in Ireland that was really
  95. what drove them but there are many other reasons for asset price Falls rises in interest rates are
  96. one the flash crash is another example Sovereign default is another example so many many and what we need to do is to
  97. understand all those different aspects but that doesn't exhaust the list of forms of systemic risk contagion is
  98. another one if we have one financial institution go down then others with claims on it may also be affected and we
  99. may get a whole domino effect a second form of contagion is if you see a bank like Leman default then you may think
  100. that other Banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley which at some level do similar kinds of things may also be
  101. threatened and then may be a problem for those Banks and of course that's what we
  102. saw during the crisis if they hadn't been granted access to the fed's discount window then many people believe
  103. that they may also have have gone down the third type of contagion is a very important one which is that many
  104. countries which weren't that exposed to subprime crisis had massive Falls in GDP after Leman defaulted so Japan is
  105. one example they had a 10% fall in GDP in the subsequent year even though their Banks weren't involved with subprime and
  106. in fact stayed fairly strong throughout the whole episode Another example is Finland which
  107. also had a a GDP drop of about the same magnitude trade played a part in that but again it's interesting that these
  108. effects are so large we don't really understand that very well Fourth Kind of systemic risk is
  109. problems in the financial architecture what many people refer to as the plumbing um so many markets like the
  110. interbank market sto working very well uh there were repo runs and so on uh and problems in uh derivatives markets and
  111. things like that the fifth kind of systemic risk is problems in the foreign exchange
  112. markets uh or foreign exchange liabilities that Banks and firms have that wasn't a problem in in this uh
  113. crisis because the central banks did a very good job having foreign exchange uh swaps but it was a big problem for
  114. example in the Asian crisis so we still have to keep worrying about it so I think
  115. the relationship between fighting systemic risk and the kinds of policies that are
  116. needed to do that this inter relationship is not quite as obvious particularly when we started on this
  117. research as it is becoming as as we get more and more into it Central Bank Independence is at the heart of
  118. the whole way that monetary and fiscal policy has run at the moment and although there have been calls that it
  119. maybe too much because much of what central banks currently do is fiscal in nature I
  120. think it still isn't quite appreciated how the whole set of policies needs to be coordinated in in
  121. the way that I I think will be done going forward so I think policy makers as I say they need to coordinate much
  122. more and they can't do things separately in the way that the architecture is designed to implement they need to worry
  123. about for example the effects of interest rates on government deficits now in many countries we have debt to
  124. GDP over 100% every 1% rise in interest rates potentially means that there's going to in the long run at least be a
  125. 1% increase in the deficit so that's an important issue we need to have policy makers worry about the effects of their
  126. policies on asset prices this is not something that they currently do that much but that was at the heart of the
  127. start of the financial crisis because we had this big run up in prices and then the collapse which triggered the
  128. subprime mortgage problem s and the other mortgage problems and then that in turn triggered a whole set of problems
  129. in the financial system so one of the major systemic risks that's there at the moment I would
  130. say is a rise in interest rates and at the moment the question is why should that
  131. happen interest rates are low in most parts of the world and so it seems as the central banks can control it and
  132. gradually raise them I think that's true but the thing that's changing is China in China many entrepreneurs and firms
  133. are willing to pay much higher interest rates than we see in the US and Europe or Japan so they're paying 15 20% now
  134. part of that is a risk premium a default premium but the real interest rate rates
  135. on average so accounting for default problems and inflation in China are it seems much higher now at the moment that
  136. is not affecting the rest of the world because China has very stringent Capital controls but they're going through a set
  137. of policies to ease those Capital controls the start of that is an experimental phase which is going to be conducted to
  138. a large extent in the Shanghai free trade zone which has now been going for a few months what they're doing there is
  139. experimenting with policies to allow firms to financial firms Banks and other um financial institutions to go overseas
  140. and start uh having products based on overseas but also they're going to allow foreign institutions to come in to make
  141. the Chinese Financial system much more competitive when they do relax Capital controls which presumably will be done
  142. quite slowly then there'll be an inflow of capital into China and an outflow and
  143. one of the big questions is what's that going to do to the exchange rate and so forth and one of the interesting things
  144. is that they've been allowing the R&B to fall which hasn't happened for a long time and I think this is part of this
  145. preparation for opening up the financial system now one of the interesting aspects of China's economy today is that
  146. trade isn't nearly as important as it used to be people quote the gross figure which is usually about a third of GDP is
  147. is exports but that includes a lot of things that were imported and embedded in the products so for example energy or
  148. raw materials a few years ago the net trade was about 10% so still significant now
  149. it's down to about 2% or thereabout so trade is not that important the traditional justification for the vast
  150. foreign exchange reserves that they have in China of 3.8 trillion now was that this was to make sure their exporters
  151. were competitive but they don't need that anymore because it's such a small part of of the economy
  152. because the rest of the economy has grown so much so what China is doing is investing lots of money in low yielding
  153. assets while at the same time their entrepreneurs are paying very high rates of 15 20% and as we unwind these Capital
  154. controls what we're going to see is that there's going to be an effect on global
  155. interest rates in my view as China is now such a large part of the global economy and this is the part that the
  156. central banks are going to find difficult to control because as long-term rates go up globally driven by
  157. the uh real rates in China then this is potentially a problem so the question as
  158. always in finances how much will people anticipate these changes if they don't anticipate these changes very much then
  159. the period where this will be relevant could be stretched out over years but if they anticipate that this is going to
  160. happen then it could be shorter than that and I think that that that's where one of the risks
  161. lies so one of the interesting issues is quite the extent to which the central bank and government have everything
  162. under control and as we saw in the financial crisis most governments most central
  163. banks just missed it and one of the big worries that I think many people have is
  164. whether they'll miss the next one too or whether now everything is under control
  165. and I think one of the things that our research is trying to to do is to get governments and
  166. central banks and policy made because to think ahead and not just try to react to
  167. what happened last time and just put in place measures that will control that particular aspect of the
  168. phenomenon what they need rather to do is worry about what is the general nature of the problem in this case
  169. systemic risk and how may it rare its ugly head going forward what we're trying to do here is is to as
  170. I say look at the inter relationships between various different policies so between banking regulation
  171. monetary policy fiscal policy the whole mix of all these policies typically what
  172. we do and there are good reasons for doing it is look at each one separately when you do try to do it as a whole it
  173. necessarily becomes complex we need to understand systemic risk much better and so a lot of it will
  174. be looking at the individual components of systemic risk trying to understand any additional components that are out
  175. there and drilling down into each uh area separately and then going back and trying to look at the holistic picture
  176. again [Music]

Brief Summary

Central banks must adopt a holistic approach to manage inflation, financial stability, and systemic risks effectively.

Key points

  • Rethinking Financial Stability. Financial stability must be prioritized alongside inflation, as they are intertwined issues.
  • Japan's Economic Challenges. Japan's long struggle with low growth and interest rates highlights systemic risks in financial policy.

Tension

55/ 100Some tension

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