A Conversation with Larry Summers on Legislative Interventions in the Economy
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Episode Description
Watch Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University Lawrence H. Summers discuss law-making and legislative interventions in the economy. This conversation is hosted by Anna Gelpern, Professor of Law at Georgetown University, as part of the Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation’s 5th Conference on Law and Macroeconomics, which took place on October 20-21, 2022. ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.
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- folks welcome um I'm Anna galper and I teach law Georgetown uh and I am beyond thrilled
- to introduce our uh final uh featured speaker um Professor Larry Summers Who's the who
- a needs no introduction but hey um is uh Charles Elliott professor and president Emeritus at Harvard former
- treasury secretary and from my perspective probably the most stimulating free associator and funnest
- person to brainstorm with of all I know um we are thrilled to lure him to this conference and very grateful
- to have an opportunity to ask some questions um and perhaps free associate together some
- so um if you have a question please put it in the Q a not in the chat we will try
- to leave some uh q a sometime for the Q a towards the end of the conversation um and to those watching us on TV
- um now or later sorry you can't ask the questions um okay um Larry well again thank you so much
- for joining us um and if you don't mind uh let's Jump Right In because you know only so much time
- um so first I want to ask you uh a couple of current events uh questions but really the focus for us
- is to figure out to what extent we can make the relationship between the study of
- macroeconomics and macroeconomic policy and uh law lawmaking practice of Law and
- legal scholarship um in conversation productive conversation with each other um with that
- um I was excited to see that you had nice things to say about the inflation reduction act uh my excitement which is
- not so much for the merits of the legislation but your angle on it um and what it tells us about the law so
- you said that uh you know it's a good bit of legislation it promises stories revenues help boost Supply and key areas
- reduced prices and thereby on net have a uh uh help reduce inflation over time so
- to what extent does something like this a model for lawmaking um and more broadly other legislative
- and Regulatory interventions in the economy and it's good to be with you um when you and I first uh met
- um I was uh Senate confirmed official in the treasury Department and a fairly young one and you were a young lawyer in
- the treasury Department and you brought um wisdom not just saying what was legal
- and what was illegal but figuring out how we could do things that we wanted to do in the most efficient and the most
- protective uh way and I learned a lot about the positive functioning of lawyering
- um from my experiences uh working with you look I think the inflation reduction Act
- is good law I think it's good law because I think the benefits of substantially uh subsidizing a variety
- of renewable Technologies exceed the costs I think there are measures included in
- the bill that will cause taxpayers to get a better deal when they buy Pharmaceuticals and cause Health Care to
- be more widely available for disadvantaged Americans and I think there's some vitally
- important investments in uh turning the IRS around and I think those are all good things
- I think the cumulative impact of the bill is likely to be to reduce a little bit
- the inflation rate by reducing Energy prices through more Supply by reducing pharmaceutical prices through better
- bargaining power and through some reductions over time in the government budget deficit which uh
- reduced demand at a time when the economy is overheated I don't think if you were describing the
- primary impacts or primary thrusts of the bill you probably would have titled it the inflation reduction act and that
- was a reflection of the moment and uh the various political imperatives involved but I think it was a good thing
- uh for our country uh to uh do I think no one should be under an illusion that that bill can be the center of a
- national effort to control inflation I think that such an effort has to be centered on monetary policy and insofar
- as there are other policies they are probably Regulatory and uh tariff uh policies of a Kind primarily not
- addressed in uh the inflation reduction Act well this is super helpful and and and
- and generous now um on you mentioned and thank you regulatory um should regulation then be more
- counter-cyclical than it is right so I I think [Music] um I think something I mostly disagreed
- with in the law and macroeconomics movement is a desire to center of the analysis of a variety of
- microeconomic policies around macroeconomic considerations and there's always a question when you
- envision any change what you hold uh what you hold constant if I if I want to analyze the effect of
- moving my left foot forward on my Locomotion I have to make an assumption about what my right foot is going to do
- and we sort of make a natural Assumption of what's going to happen is my right foot is going to move along with uh a
- walking motion and there's a question when we consider a regulatory action um say you mandated that firms hire more
- people and one line of analysis would be that that would have a multiplier effect
- because the firms would pay people uh would pay the extra workers they hired and uh those workers would spend money
- and those workers would spend money and you'd have a multiplier effect and you'd
- stimulate the economy a different view would be that the FED has a view about how much aggregate
- demand it wants to achieve and it targets the aggregate demand level that it wants to achieve and so if
- other things happen those will be offset by the FED because it's still targeting the same aggregate
- uh demand level so if you have a room with a thermostat and you open the window a little bit
- you will not change the temperature of the room you will change how much the heating
- system uh operates and I think inside I'm not deeply familiar with it but insofar as I've
- been exposed to the law and macroeconomics movement it has a tendency to forget that lesson
- and it has a tendency as as I see it to and by the way I'm not authoritative about what's true but I am authoritative
- about what I perceive um the um has a tendency to forget that lesson now you know you can argue that
- sometimes we're at the zero lower bound and sometimes policy operates with lags and so it's more complicated than I just
- said but I think as a general matter if we ignored aggregate demand effects when
- we thought about regulatory questions we would get it more right than if we try to always analyze the aggregate
- demand consequences so for example when people in the financial industry say that we're cutting back on lending by
- imposing excessive Capital regulations on financial institutions I mostly disregard that because if
- that's causing a shortage of demand I imagine we'll have lower interest rates as a consequence uh of that so while
- there are some particular exceptions that one can do I think that far more Mischief is accomplished
- by allowing Keynesian aggregate demand effects to enter the conversation about micro policies
- than any benefits that ever result so let's pull back a little bit and this is extremely helpful and also kind of
- defining the terms on the bright side online macroeconomics movement Trend ethos whatever we want to call it
- um is at least at this stages sort of open enough to definition that I think we can play around quite freely
- um with that but and really the big question to my mind and I certainly don't have a monopoly on this is sort of
- how to we engage with macroeconomic Concepts and um several of the things you mentioned
- uh actually raised interesting kind of legal institutional questions so let's say you know regulations should not
- um primarily uh Target aggregate demand maybe not even you know take account of it let's just rely on the FED but then
- the FED does not operate in an Institutional vacuum nor does the ECB nor does you know so of what I'm
- the way the transmission mechanisms right operate quite differently well I okay wait like Europe and the US did
- very different things about unemployment in the middle of covet right sort of the
- how we deal with recessions crises downturns institutionally either makes things
- easier or more complicated for let's say the fed and and not even just easier I think I really I I think I
- pretty much disagree with everything you just said all right I I think that the right assumption for microeconomic
- analysis is that the level of demand is determined and it's determined by monetary policy out of some set of
- considerations having to do with unemployment having to do with inflation having to do with financial stability
- whatever and that any effects on those things that come from your microeconomic policies are going to be sterilized
- and so I don't think in rooms with thermostats it's very interesting to think about the impact of uh opening the
- window on the temperature or or having a fire or uh putting on a sweater or anything right I mean it's all the
- things like that so that doesn't mean it's not an important question whether you should open the window right you
- should decide the question about opening the window on the basis of whether you think the air is going to be fresher on
- the basis of what you think is going to happen to the electricity bills if you do it on uh the basis of weather bad
- stuff's gonna blow in uh when you open the window but not base not based on anything much about the temperature of
- the room so I don't know whether the approach of paying people on employment insurance or the approach of paying
- people to paying firms to retain uh their uh workers or the approach which of those approaches is the was the right
- one to respond to the downturn but my judgment about that would be based on which would be
- microeconomically efficient in finding the right balance between on the one hand promoting labor Mobility which is
- good and on the other hand preventing the severance of important attachments um which is bad and those would be the
- considerations that I would think was important not one of them will lead to more demand in the economy or less
- demand in the economy and therefore do more recession prevention than the other solar like got it but it also I think it
- depends on whether you're you know sort of operating the windows or are you know
- are in charge of the thermostat right and what you're doing in the room relies on the thermostat working
- properly so right and I think the I think all who designs I'm sorry so who designs the thermostat
- who pushes the buttons you know like the easy thing I I think almost every time somebody tries to do a microeconomic
- policy that is Promised on some theory of some flaw in the way the macroeconomic things work
- we're much more likely to see a confused mistake than an affirmative benefit so macro Prudential regulation eh
- no macro Prudential regulation if the reason we're doing macro Prudential well I'm Sorry by macro Prudential regulation
- do you mean variable Capital requirements and the like variable Capital requirements
- that should be based on judgments about preventing Banks from failing and that it's inefficient and costly when Banks
- fail not based on prevent not based on maximizing employment by maintaining continuous aggregate by
- maintaining continuous aggregate demand in fact I'm pretty skeptical of macro Prudential regulation because my general
- view is that by and large the smartest macro traders in the world can't time markets and so I'm highly
- highly skeptical that politically motivated 150 000 a year bureaucrats will be able to time uh markets and so
- when people are deciding whether there's a speculative bubble or not and then adjusting the capital requirement or
- whatever I think they're much more I think there is likely to be wrong as uh to be right and I'm pretty familiar with
- the academic literature on this which is a bunch of regressions showing that when
- credit expansion is high then you're more likely to have a bubble and stuff like that and my reaction is if those
- regressions were so terrific and were so substantially predictive there would be
- people who would be able to make huge sums of money shorting Bubbles and going long troughs based on those regressions
- and mostly there aren't and I think that's because there are a variety of sort of epistemological problems of what
- constitutes certainty but I have no objection in principle to macro Prudential uh regulation I would note
- that the poster child for macro Prudential regulation in 2006 and 2007 was Spain which had roughly the worst
- egregious overbuilding of uh capital I would note that Alan Greenspan was a pretty shrewd guy and he declared
- irrational exuberance in the stock market when the Dow was at 6300 and proceeded to double over the next uh to
- over the next two years I think four next uh four years um so I sort of skeptical of the
- Enterprise but insofar as it's a useful Enterprise it's an Enterprise that's about the micro economic efficiency of
- the financial intermediation sector not the efficacy of counter-cyclical aggregate demand management okay
- um so and also something that you said earlier about uh the bankers complaining about high Capital requirements Etc et
- cetera so that that it's sort of it this position strikes me as going with that yeah
- it's a position that um by and large um I think it is better to have more focused policies with more specific
- outcomes accountability for outcomes close to those policies so this in general for example I tend to think that
- we have a whole set of tax and transfer instruments in the society if it were up
- to me I would make them more generous um but we have all of those instruments and so if somebody says
- how should we regulate trains and somebody says well we should do x with trains because that will benefit poor
- people I tend to think no if we want to benefit poor people more we should do different
- taxes and transfers and the taxes and transfers we do reflect some political equilibrium and if we do something with
- railroad policy that has a major change has a Major Impact it will intend it will tend to be in political equilibrium
- offset by other things so I tend to prefer my prefer the conduct of microeconomic policy to be focused on
- efficiency within its sphere so let's talk about can we just spend a nanosecond on thermostat design
- right it's all macroeconomic policy it's all in one place but we have a wide variety of Central
- Bank designs um both uh you know objectives mandates instruments uh you know most recently
- there was a paper in the conference on um uh you know the TPI the transmission protection instrument
- um I may be mingling the you know of the ECB um there are certain things that to play
- eyes and maybe two lawyer lay eyes um don't necessarily look like adjusting the thermostat
- um but look more like messing around with the room right and my sense is that their the design of central banks and
- the instruments that the central banks deploy um differ quite a lot and so does that is
- that uh just sort of noise to your mind does that matter does it matter that the
- fed's authorities were expanded in some ways you know constrained in other ways and Dodd-Frank right does it matter that
- the ecb's Mandate is what it is does it matter the way the banking Union you know fits in with the ecb's
- um monetary policy mandate I'm just trying to get it I think there are a few different things
- to say there okay the first is that institution design is profoundly important the rules on what Boards of
- directors do in companies and what powers and authorities they have in what ways shareholders can and cannot select
- challenge Boards of directors are very important and it's something similar is true with respect to public institutions
- so the questions to which the federal Federalist Papers were addressed were profoundly important questions and an
- important part of legislation is the design of Institutions will a regulatory Authority be an independent agency or
- will it report to the president will it have one chairman one person in charge of it like the EPA or will it have a
- council of five people like the SEC these are all immensely important questions and there's a body of learning
- um about how to think about those kinds of questions and it's more of a legal body of learning than an economic body
- of learning so I'm not that knowledgeable about it but I think it's an immensely important question
- there's a second broad set of questions which is in a Democratic Society where you have
- independent institutions how should one think about the remit of those institutions and which choices are
- delegated to Independent institutions and which choices need to be politically accountable and that's the subject of a
- very good book Paul Tucker has written called unelected Power focusing on central banks but also considering a
- wide variety of institutions my general view there is that institutions that are
- independent um Independence needs to be reciprocal that if the president doesn't get to
- tell the FED what to do about monetary policy the FED should not be using its moral authority to tell the president
- what to do about climate change or criminal justice uh policy in general I think that independent that
- power should be more circumscribed to areas where there's an important Dynamic consistency problem which is what led to
- the creation of the independent institutions so I am pretty spectacularly unenthood I was
- extremely unenthusiastic when the Minneapolis fed chose to participate in the debate over some kind of education
- referendum in uh Minneapolis when uh central banks seek to um get involved in green issues
- if there's anything that's going to cause Banks to fail their supervisory authorities should pay attention to them
- but I don't think the fact that there's some conceivable Nexus between um an issue and a bank failing means
- that central banks should get centrally involved in environmental policy I think
- the idea that for example a central bank that is doing corporate QE should favor green bonds rather than non-green
- bonds is an appalling one um because I don't think that's I don't think making those choices is the
- appropriate uh remit of uh uh of uh Central central banks um so and then there's a yeah
- just I just want to ask about this particular so then on again going back to the sort of thermostat setup the
- Central Bank buys all of the bonds no amount you know green purple yellow with polka dots
- but then say the fiscal Authority or The Regulators adjust to the extent that this has undesirable
- effects on environmental policy on distribution etc etc is that is sort of the division of the institutional
- division of labor ensures that we're not all confused with feedback effects and various kind of Dynamics I think
- something I think yeah I think I think something like that I mean there there are complicated cases to sort out
- um I think we kind of make a model in the United States um we had moments like the first few
- years of the Obama Administration where the Fed was proudly doing QE and explaining that selling long-term debt
- and buying back short-term debt was going to stimulate the economy in a desirable way and the treasury was
- proudly announcing that it was taking advantage of low long-term interest rates to term out the debt and was
- issuing less short-term debt and more long-term debt and between the two of them there were some Brokers making
- money and the whole thing didn't seem to me to make any sense it seemed to me the
- United States ought to have one debt management policy and there ought to be some mechanism for arriving at the one
- uh debt management uh policies I think there are hard cases as there always are you know just like in private life there
- aren't just competitors and mergers they're people there are firms that in some spheres compete and in other years
- cooperate and part of what good lawyers do is structure agreements and policies that in an imperfect world of greedy
- people cause that to work out as well as it can be worked out and I think that kind of thinking is important in uh the
- public sector as well and and just what you just said though I mean it really does get to
- at least in my view what lawyers tend to be very good at which is you know figuring out where the institutional
- structure leads us to stumble all over one another and saying all right you know fire exit to the right
- um but it's not just sort of the traffic tweaks right it's building design that I think matters and
- in some ways it's a more challenging um yeah I think it's I I think that's I think that's right I I I sort of believe
- in social science and I I tend to I tend to find and maybe this is unfair and reflects the limits
- of uh my knowledge whereas I I find your pronouncements on debt to be uh substantially informed by empirical
- study of a substantial range of debt restructurings and what happened and what didn't happen and when it worked
- better and when it worked worse I find a substantial part of legal scholarship on these matters to consist
- somewhat more of identifying what various thinkers have said at various points and the author offering an opinion as to
- what the author thinks is best with less grounding in uh the world of experience so where
- um #bless you and thank you and um the uh I do think that we need to uh fix up your pipeline of legal
- scholarship somewhat even though I'm I find myself to be a an unwitting beneficiary of the distortions in that
- I'm sure that's I'm sure that's right and I I welcome all uh I I welcome all of that but I
- think it's um you know I was uh I was involved in the creation of the cfpb and uh the Consumer
- Financial products Bureau and there were a set of questions should it have one had should it be should it report to the
- President should it be independent how should its budget be set there were a set of institutional design questions
- and I would say I was concerned to get empirical Knowledge from the carefully considered experience of the
- hundred or so government agencies that exist and as of that time I was not hugely
- impressed by the body of empirical evidence on the question as distinct from consideration of the wise but that was
- 13 years ago and I may have been poorly advised at uh that time we just need to we need to curate that Pipeline and
- um I would like to take them this moment to tell all the people who are dming texting and emailing me God love you to
- put questions in the Q a um where you will get uh preference um and uh again with massive thanks to
- all my friends Larry you're uh eight being insightful and provocative as expected but I'm also being a
- disproportionate beneficiary of that so Caleb um Nygaard is uh asking a very interesting question here about the
- recent scandals that the FED um and uh this question of uh structural governance reform
- um that is percolating perhaps more actively than uh than it uh has been um are there any structural changes that
- you might recommend and then we have um a few more questions here but let's start with fed uh
- structure and uh and reform I would um probably allow the uh Board of Governors to appoint
- the presidents of the regional feds and I would probably um cause the current Boards of directors
- of the regional feds to be um advisory boards because I think the I I think it's just hard to it's just
- really hard to understand why um Bankers should be involved in the governance of their regulators
- and you know the extreme case which has been fixed was when the board chairman of Goldman sat when he was before the
- financial crisis when the New York fed had three categories of directors Banker directors business directors and public
- interest directors and the chairman of the board of the Goldman Sachs Corporation was a public interest
- director that was a kind of extreme absurdity and that is no longer the case but I still think there's a kind of
- private sector involved business private sector involved in its own regulation that I think is inappropriate so I would
- put more responsibility for the whole Federal Reserve System on the governors and I would take the various governance
- structures surrounding the regional feds and I would make them into a Advisory Board type structures I would not
- um I would I would not um favor the proposals to make uh presidents of regional feds subject to
- Senate confirmation because I think if anything the FED is too atomized right now after all if we
- can make decisions about War and Peace with one Secretary of Defense why do we make why do we need to have a committee
- of 13 voting on monetary uh policy um I think the reason we have a committee is because given that the job
- is given that uh the agency is independent and not subject to political oversight you can't give it to just one
- person um because suppose they go wrong and so in a sense the function of having a
- committee is to act as a check and balance on that but that requires that there be a committee but not that each
- member of the committee be overly uh empowered so in general I think the FED where there's a kind of moderately
- strong quite strong presumption of deference to the chairman is a more effectively functioning institution than
- the bank of England where the chairman is more like the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court kind of first among equals
- but sometimes they get out voted and that's just kind of the way it happens and you've sort of got a jury of people
- each of whom gets one vote who make their decision so that would be the change I would make uh in administration
- so this is fast in a number of ways including because it tells our historian friends uh about you know it sort of um
- the importance of um their work on things like the FED founding and the FED structure and the
- historical path dependence and the political factors animating this beyond the functional uh reasons that you've
- articulated and I wanted to commend to the folks of uh Post in the Q a by um my dear friend and co-host Rosa
- lastra on kind of some of these factors in the European context of course but I want to turn to a set of questions on
- uh fiscal policy in particular and um then ask a uh kind of a culture uh slash Personnel governance question but
- then I am not letting this go without turning to IMF and World Bank and the international uh economy which is in uh
- area that obviously is uh uh of great concern to both of us and so just planting that
- um on fiscal policy I guess there are two sets of questions um one is uh the what you're describing in terms of
- again Windows thermostat uh May well be the platonic ideal but in a world where um the thermostat is broken or the
- window locks are broken right instead of where one channel is shut off isn't that the unusual case where the
- other channels should somehow try to figure out how to compensate and then I would add so how should legal designs
- and mandates and institutions that have accommodate that possibility if at all or should we just force a crisis in
- order to force reform in other words shouldn't we should we not try to compensate for the dysfunction in one
- channel um through the if the IMF isn't working should the World Bank shouldn't be doing
- its job and vice versa or by any means necessary that's sort of one translation but the other is
- you know why um and I'm reading uh so uh this is based on Alex uh mechanics question here
- um and then yair listiken uh asks why should there be any role for fiscal policy macro stabilization given fed
- offset why shouldn't fiscal policy also strive to get it right on micro grounds entirely without worry about macro
- considerations isn't this in line with the thermostat analogy so look let me say a few things I
- um first of all Anna just show everybody who's listening is clear I made a judgment coming on here that I hope is
- appropriate that I would most usefully contribute to your dialogues if I said what I really thought based on what I
- based on what I know recognizing that I this is not a literature in which I've been uh fully immersed and with the view
- that a clearly stated opinion even if wrong is a more useful Target for inquiry than a bunch of polite mush
- absolutely so I have tried to very much take that position I actually think that
- yair kind of got it right um the basic premise of clintonomics was exactly that the basic premise of
- clintonomics was that for a set of microallocative reasons even though the economy was somewhat sluggish at the
- beginning of 1993 the right thing to do in order to have lower Capital costs lower interest rates and more investment
- was to reduce the budget deficit even though ceteris paribus that might be contractionary
- um but that the FED would the fed and the markets would offset that so for the most part I would apply the logic and I
- think in the vast majority of normal times fiscal policy should not be used as a stabilization uh policy instrument
- I think there is a particular extreme in case around uh the zero lower bound and
- possibly a particular extreme case around circumstances where interest rates being too low or too high would
- have various other kinds of distortionary effects which might cause one to deviate from uh that Doctrine but
- that that is not um but that is uh not uh the uh usual case and that the more usual case is
- that fiscal policy decisions should not be made on uh aggregate demand and macroeconomic stabilization grounds I
- think there's a kind of common fallacy in this area which is macroeconomic policy is not being
- carried on very well or we don't like the way it's being carried on therefore we should try to use these
- other instruments to serve macroeconomic objectives you know if you think the FED is too
- contractionary I don't think that's particularly a reason to forgive student loan debt in
- order to stimulate demand because I think if the fed's too contractionary that will also influence
- its response to the fact that you stimulated Demand with uh your student loans so it's back to uh the thermostat
- and I think one has to be careful and this is a kind of General point where you sort of have to
- use your judgment if you're a smart creative person you're likely in any context to be able
- to think of some reason why the thermostat analogy is not perfect but you also have to think about all the
- flaws that come in terms of less Focus diverted accountability all of those uh things when you start
- licensing all arguments on all subjects so it's like the idea that I think is a common feature of naive economics
- courses particularly taught by progressives which is you should only have a you should only have government
- intervention if there's a market failure but if you have a market fee or anything
- goes and anytime something if if something is bad for my health will make you sad that's an externality and that's
- a market failure and when you go down that road you get a um you can easily get on a very slippery
- slope to an enormously interventionist approach about which I think one should be cautious recognizing that there are a
- variety of failures that come uh from public sector interventions as well as private sector uh interventions so Larry
- I want to say that I'm really grateful and I think we all are recognizing that um you know this is not only have you
- got into an sort of unknown uh um field shall we say but one that doesn't that may or may not exist in quite the
- form than it will end up in so really I do appreciate and I think we all are engaging in kind of the finding the
- elephant project in good faith and um absolutely and I I think you know I think to be clear I think the
- institution design aspects of all this are the most institutional design and institutional conduct
- are I think to me the most interesting and profound of these questions to take for example a question that it seems to
- me that a group of policy-oriented lawyers ought to be good at thinking about where
- I have never seen good systematic thought uh how should one think about transparency
- to take a setting apart from the public sector why don't transparency is good firms have information
- why don't we require them to share their information every day or every week rather than just do a quarterly
- statement and presumably it's because we think at a certain point too much information
- becomes noise um well you know there's the same set of questions around the fed maybe the Fed
- chair he sees every piece of data market participants would be really interested
- in knowing what he thought about it it would give them more predictability and more clarity if they knew maybe the Fed
- chair should have a press conference every Monday but probably not but what are the set of
- considerations and how should one think about those aspects of the conduct of policy
- um to take another example in the FED context I've always found it mysterious that
- when I was treasury secretary and you and others would gather and we would discuss a policy issue we always
- regarded it as important that our discussions be private and we regarded as inappropriate if either a summary was
- provided of our discussions apart from whatever decision I announced as secretary
- um if a full discussion of a summary of our deliberations were provided or if several years later
- a full transcript of our meeting was provided we would have regarded that as appalling
- I think the Supreme Court would regard it as appalling uh if it was suggested that with a 10-year lag all judicial
- conferences be recorded and made available to historians and Scholars who wanted to better understand
- the basis of Supreme Court decision making and yet it's somehow taken as axiomatic
- that it's appropriate for the minutes of the FED to be given in partial form after three weeks and after five years
- for them to be made public maybe that's the right thing to do because there's something different about the FED but I
- don't know what it is and how those kinds of decisions should be designed and thought through seems like an
- enormously important question uh well secretary Summers it's quite fascinating that
- in the process of you know freelancing and us re-associating to some extent I think you've gotten a couple of PhD
- dissertation topics out there um for which we are grateful and also you've given some of the friends who've
- written in these areas um uh another reason to tweet out their research but um I want to ask two
- completely unrelated questions um in the um 63 seconds we've got remaining because I'm getting kicked out of my
- hotel room quite literally um and we've imposed on your time one is how do we deal with
- um group think at central banks um and is there a reform project there and two is
- um should we ditch or radically reform the Bretton Woods system after what you've described as a massively
- disappointing outcome of the annual meetings and you can take either both or neither depending on how much time you
- want to uh spend on the Bretton Woods institutions I think it's more a matter of they need to
- make different policy decisions that are wiser and better rather than that there needs to be a new
- set of Articles of agreement or a new institution um established um and I think so I think it's a matter
- of the judgments that uh those ins those institutions um are uh are making not sure that the problem in
- central banks is group think rather than wrong thing um I obviously have thought over over
- the last year that the U.S central bank has not so much recently but in the in the in the
- 12 months from uh May uh April or May of 2021 to April or May of 2022 I haven't been shy about saying that I thought our
- Central Bank lost its way I don't think they lost their way because they were unaware of what I was
- saying or unaware of the arguments that I was making I just think they were wrong and so I don't know whether and I
- think it's another good research question how to think about um group think versus
- um you know excessive Group Thing versus successive wrong thing and are they the
- same thing I am aware of the streams of research suggesting that more diverse groups of
- decision makers make wiser to make wiser decisions I'm not hugely convinced by all of that
- uh by all of that research and I think there are a lot of different dimensions of uh diversity that go into it and I
- suspect that an important element is missing in all the experimental work which is that if I'm a group of if I'm
- part of a decision-making group two elements are really important one is that there be a variety of perspectives
- and they all get feeded in and the other is that people can be completely candid
- relaxed and willing to change their minds with each other and there tends to be some tension
- between those two things if you let me be advised by three people who I've known for 20 years I'm probably there's
- probably going to be more risk of group think but I'm probably going to be more comfortable putting forth an idea and
- then withdrawing it and I suspect that some of the experiments are done in ways that
- capture the benefit but don't really capture some of the potential cost of force and choice so
- you could say for example corporate board of directors will always be better if you insist on you know
- every oil company deliberation will be better if you insist on there being a staunch
- environmental Advocate pressed and that that's a reasonable argument most of the
- time when it's considered the fact that probably if you do that given the nature
- of human nature you will substantially increase the probability that something will be leaked from the
- meetings um probably Bears on um how that will impact on the deliberations so I I'm open to the idea
- that there should be some set of policies to uh resist a group thing but I'm I don't regard that at all as being
- a uh proven case
Brief Summary
Larry Summers discusses macroeconomics, the Inflation Reduction Act, regulatory practices, and central bank governance.
Key points
- Introduction of Larry Summers. Anna Galper introduces Larry Summers, highlighting his impressive credentials and excitement for the discussion.
- Summers on Inflation Reduction Act. Larry Summers shares his views on the Inflation Reduction Act, emphasizing its potential benefits.
- The Role of Independent Institutions. Summers discusses the importance of institutional design and independence in policymaking.
- The Role of Lawyers in Governance. Lawyers excel at structuring agreements in an imperfect world of competition and cooperation.
- Reforming the Federal Reserve. Proposals for reforming the governance of the Federal Reserve are discussed, emphasizing the need for accountability.
- Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Stabilization. A debate on the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization and its implications for governance.
Episode highlights
- Summers on Inflation Reduction ActLarry Summers shares his views on the Inflation Reduction Act, emphasizing its potential benefits.“I think the inflation reduction Act is good law.”3:59Nov 28, 2022
- The Role of Independent InstitutionsSummers discusses the importance of institutional design and independence in policymaking.“I think that independent power should be more circumscribed to areas where there’s an important Dynamic consistency problem.”26:19Nov 28, 2022
- The Role of Lawyers in GovernanceLawyers excel at structuring agreements in an imperfect world of competition and cooperation.“Good lawyers structure agreements that cause that to work out as well as it can.”29:51Nov 28, 2022
- Reforming the Federal ReserveProposals for reforming the governance of the Federal Reserve are discussed, emphasizing the need for accountability.“I would probably allow the Board of Governors to appoint the presidents of the regional feds.”35:00Nov 28, 2022
- Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic StabilizationA debate on the role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilization and its implications for governance.“Fiscal policy decisions should not be made on aggregate demand and macroeconomic stabilization grounds.”44:21Nov 28, 2022
- Transparency in Federal Reserve OperationsThe need for transparency in the Federal Reserve's operations is questioned, highlighting the balance between information and noise.“Why don’t we require them to share their information every day?”48:35Nov 28, 2022
- Groupthink in Central BanksThe discussion raises concerns about groupthink in central banks and the need for diverse perspectives in decision-making.“I don’t know whether excessive groupthink versus successive wrong thing are the same thing.”54:18Nov 28, 2022
- The Risk of GroupthinkExploring the potential risks associated with group decision-making processes.“There's probably going to be more risk of group.”55:37Nov 28, 2022





