Market Power and Financial Risk in U.S. Payments Systems: A Conversation Joshua C. Macey
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Episode Description
Co-directors Peter Conti-Brown moderated a discussion with University of Chicago Law School's Joshua C. Macey on his new Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation (WIFPR) white paper, “Market Power and Financial Risk in U.S. Payments Systems.” The panelists talk about the U.S. payments system. ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.
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Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
- welcome to the third webinar of whisper work on initiative on financial policy and regulation
- today we are happy to have Josh Macy from the University of Chicago he's going to talk about Market power and
- Financial Risk in U.S payment systems um whisper is a new initiative that is at the intersection of Law and finance
- and part of our activities is to organize webinars based on white papers on issues at the frontier of interest of
- financial policy and we're very happy to have Josh I'll turn it over to Peter my
- co-director to introduce Josh thanks so much uh what did the light have with us Professor Josh Macy uh Josh
- has a an unusual set of uh uh talents and expertise he's really the Liam Neeson of uh the Academy I spent
- his life developing an unusual set of skills which has come into use on on questions at the intersection of
- infrastructure uh Finance distress with a particular focus in energy markets and
- in our case today the payment system uh his his expertise unusual though it is becomes incredibly relevant when we're
- talking about questions of stability and structure and so we are today this stability we're talking about is
- financial stability the structures we're talking about are payment systems or uh
- in the plural as Josh will explain and the questions he seeks to resolve are what Josh has described in other context
- is a kind of regulatory dilemma how to optimize within a set of constraints where the constraints are not only
- constrained by resources but are constrained bilaterally through a trade-off Josh I'm going to turn it over
- to you to give a presentation to elucidate some of the the structural questions uh and and trade-offs between
- stability and concentration in the payment system or in the payment systems and then we'll take questions from the
- audience as many as as we can get to uh that etai and I and ETA and I will pose our own
- questions and pull in those questions from the audience and have what we hope will be a lively conversation so with
- that Josh take it away uh thanks Peter I'm really happy to be here uh and and really happy people want
- to want to hear a little bit about uh my thoughts on financial infrastructure and
- payments so um this paper this this what I'm working on reflects some ideas I've been having
- uh many with uh some in a project I'm working on with Dan re and Jeff Yang and some in a project I'm hopefully working
- on with you um about uh uh uh how sort of financial infrastructure and especially so so there's a
- move in the legal Academy to think about utilities as a coherent um entity that Financial utilities share
- some uh basic economic features their networks their platforms their economies of scale and uh one of the themes of my
- work is that um different utilities look different in different contexts either because the institutional regime that
- underlies a particular utility creates unique economic challenges and this is what I'm thinking about here is an
- example of that so uh I'm thinking about many of the trade-offs between economies of scale
- that are arguable and network effects that are arguably needed to provide a quality payment system competition that
- is arguably needed to promote access and spur Co SP for Innovation and uh Financial stability and the way these
- things interact with each other so in my opinion you want three different things
- in a payment system the first one is stability uh payment systems are vital infrastructure they're like roads or
- Bridges or the internet or transmission lines or whatever infrastructure you think that's necessary to operate a
- modern economy um in the payments context there are two types of stability that seem to me to be
- important one is the first one is technological you actually want the system to work uh the participants that
- maintain and operate a payment system have to provide a safe secure and reliable way of transferring money or
- other Financial assets the other one still within the the stability part is uh Financial stability you want a
- payment system to be resilient such that it remains both liquid and solvent in the face of idiosyncratic and systemic
- threats to its micro-prudential safety and soundness so the second big goal in that we have in payment systems is
- investment and this too I think of as having uh two meanings you want investment in day-to-day processes that
- are that that allow you to maintain whatever infrastructure is needed to maintain a reliable and convenient
- payment system and then you want Innovation uh you want a payment system you want Market participants or
- financial intermediaries to invest in new technologies and services to improve the quality of services that they
- provide and then the third and this is the one I've had the hardest time in my own mind articulating is sort of related
- to access us but it's really related to competition and Market power issues and you want a payment system uh so and then
- here too there are a couple different meanings but you want different Financial intermediaries to be able to
- connect to the payment system you can think of this as a horizontal Market power issue that if you if a certain
- subset of financial institutions controls access to the famous system they may be able to charge different
- types of horizontal taxes to those that are excluded um and and this can come in the form of
- sort of obvious um price increase sort of uh uh just transaction fees such as we see in
- foreign exchange markets or it may arguably occur in the form of taking advantage of the float if that occurs in
- the in in in uh in delays um and the second part really of access is I think the ordinary way we think of
- it which is that you want the intermediaries that are already connected to the system to provide
- access to customers so that and so this is what sort of when we think about ideas of financial inclusion I think the
- ideas you want um the payment system to be widely accessible to people so if we have you
- know concerns that underbanked are don't have access to the payment system are related to this and I'm increasingly
- concerned I guess that it is difficult to achieve all of these goals at the same time uh at least with respect to
- purely private or predominantly private systems and that this gives rise to hard
- and potentially intractable trade-offs for policy makers so if you consider the trade-off between Financial stability
- and investment to ensure Financial stability you need a variety of familiar regulatory interventions to protect
- Financial intermediaries against microprudential risks this typically involves establishing a a legally
- defined regulatory perimeter that limits the which entities are given access and then subjecting those
- intermediaries to burdensome often well Justified but still burdensome Prudential regulation
- um you know to further promote micro-prudential safety and soundness financial intermediaries are provided
- with access to Central Bank emergency lending facilities and other forms of State support that arguably give the
- entities within the closed system an advantage compared to potential competitors
- um and then related challenges here are that uh Payment Systems must manage uh other risks such as anti-money
- laundering compliance and so the the combination of closed access and these burdensome even if well-justified
- regulations um as well as state support uh can create potentially insurmountable
- barriers to new entry um where these barriers insulate incumbent Financial intermediaries from
- competition the effect can be to sort of um weaken incentives to make technological
- and other Investments that are needed to build maintain and upgrade the payments
- infrastructure to which uh those intermediaries enjoy exclusive access uh when you combine that with significant
- economies of scale and large Network effects that incumbent uh enjoy these barriers can further undercut incentives
- of new interests to invest in the development and new and and potentially more efficient systems
- so the second trade-off is between network access and stability um because of the barriers to entry I I
- just mentioned a real competitor will probably come from outside of the existing regulatory perimeter
- um we've seen this already uh you know and this could be because customers leave funds in our retail provider such
- as venmo or PayPal that can sort of come in and challenge an incumbent or it could be because people flock to a
- certain stable coin or it could be because a large company perhaps a social media company that already has a larger
- network is able to enter the payment space um but without a well-defined regulatory
- perimeter and strong Prudential regulation I I sort of worry that new entrants um will be free to enter and compete in
- the marketplace so these entrants may be at a competitive disadvantage and they operate without the financial safeguards
- we think of as important for the the system um in the short run this can have a couple different effects that might be
- hard to predict it could spur investment but over the long term I think you can still expect pronounced economies of
- scale and network effects to lead to a natural monopoly um and so even if if we do see
- meaningful competition I think uh at least I would expect a new equilibrium in which the market is dominated by a
- small number of of large networks um and then the if if this these new networks uh don't have strong Prudential
- regulation any correlated failures could potentially uh themselves become a threat to financial stability so to the
- extent we're comfortable allowing new entry um either where we have to extend the
- bank regulatory perimeter or or we have to um uh accepted that uh Finance systemic risks that we're not
- currently sort of comfortable with and obviously this is quite evident in the emerging crypto system and so the third
- and final trade-off I think is between network access and investment um in the presence of a well-defined
- regulatory perimeter and a strong credential regulation uh policy makers can subsidize investment in payment
- infrastructure but if you successfully subsidize in this way um policy makers have to make a choice
- about what types of access and investment they want to promote um if policy makers want to promote
- private investment um that suggests they should tightly control access giving rise to these
- Market power concerns um uh and so if you to the extent you close access uh you are a source of a of a subsidy that
- further increases the advantages to incumbents and a arguably a mechanism by which policy makers uh are able to
- Target and enforce uh Network improvements um if policy makers promote Open Access
- I think this requires direct public investment and payment infrastructure um and so here uh Open Access can lead
- to Market fragmentation and you might be concerned about potential under investment so to sort of just quickly
- say a few closing thoughts I think um it's quite common to complain about uh you know how slow American and uh
- Payment Systems around the world are how problems to access our problematic um in the cross-border context payments
- are both slow and they're they're the transaction fees are large and I think that you it's possible to think of these
- different problems and that that we always talk about in payment systems as consistent with the underlying issues I
- just described so we frequently see little innovation in payment systems that seems consistent with a market in
- which dominant platforms are confident that they already enjoy a big head start they have a big Network they're barriers
- to creating a new network people may be reluctant to use a payment system that does not receive financial support from
- Regulators so why would the platform investor innovate when it already controls the entire market and it's
- confident that new entrants are at a severe disadvantage we also have seen that financial institutions charge High
- overdrafts fees and otherwise make large profits off of the underbanked that too
- seems consistent with um some Market power issues and the same thing can is arguably occurring in the
- cross-border context so in a in a very little literal sense um I hate it when people throw around
- the word trilemma uh inaccurately I'm like 80 sure this is accurate uh but I think this gives rise to some form of a
- trilemma because if you are a regulator and you're not an either you know fed now and and different uh in a
- public options are delayed either because of the lack of a will or political pushback or incompetence A
- Better Private system involves either Regulators choosing to one in trench Bank Market power if they want the
- existing system to work they exacerbate these differences uh two accept a new source of systemic risk if they don't if
- they are are comfortable with competition they have to the possibility that Facebook
- develops a payment system means uh possibly expanding the bank regulatory perimeter in case something goes wrong
- there and third and finally um uh countenancing the fact that they're that that if you don't want to expand the
- bank regulatory perimeter upstarts could be a source of of of of risk we should be concerned about
- very good thanks uh Josh so generative and offer so many questions one of the things that we try to do in whisper in
- in intervening in policy debates is at least sketch a path for what a policy response would be and I think in your
- paper you've just told us uh everything's on fire everything is terrible there's no real clear way to uh
- get us through tell me why I'm wrong about that if it were a true uh trilemma or even to resist as you appropriately
- do that framing we might be looking at an optimization function that has some sort of equilibrium that might tell us
- that we are at that equilibrium and let me to bring it to to kind of uh where um the rubber hits the road let me
- describe what I see to be that equilibrium and you tell me whether or not you agree with it and if you don't
- what the policy response should be to notice toward a different place on that optimized Frontier the way that I see it
- is that payments uh domestically are dominated by some very large rails and resist the terms you know oligopoly
- because they look pretty different so one is ACH overwhelmingly used it has a public-private or origin story but is
- now uh largely private fed wire a public rail overwhelmingly dominates on uh on dollar values and then of course we have
- the card rails uh Visa Mastercard and an American Express private um and and these are these kinds of
- incumbents are real issues that have been raised about all of them about both Financial stability and concentration
- that's kind of where we are today but at the same time we have things and I know
- that you and Dan already have written about this we have things like plaid coming in and and saying we want to have
- a using open Banking and a lot of different um uh uh approaches to uh to uh generating new opportunities for fintech
- entrance so far we're not seeing a lot of instability there we have huge efforts in the crypto space to say we're
- going to try something brand new outside of a banking or payments uh regulatory perimeter uh and so the future is uh is
- not yet here we're inventing it day by day and so we have this equilibrium where we're dominated by some very large
- incumbents both public and private and then we also have a pretty big fervor at the periphery saying let's innovate here
- and we're not seeing the instability that you're talking about yet so so it seems to me one case could be made is
- that we actually kind of fixed most of the problems that you're describing um it's a pretty vibrant place in turn
- from as far as Innovation is concerned and that um the incumbents are going to continue because of pressure from the
- periphery to either acquire their competitors beat them uh or lose and become dinosaurs to so many previous
- incumbents have done so yeah what is wrong about what I just described so I don't think that much is wrong but let
- me ask a quick follow-up question and I'll provide hopefully an answer when you say
- um is the Innovation you're talking about is I understand it it's happening sort of half of it can be understood at
- the retail level which may be pushing and half of it is occurring um as the as as banks that
- as firms that are are powerful at the wholesale level um have said we're going to to to
- improve the inner bank system and and have at least made some efforts to do that sorry is are those the two domains
- you're primarily yeah I would say I would say where the Innovation seemed to be coming right now are much less
- wholesale or much less retail uh venmo possibly accepted and much more retail Plumbing of the system business to
- business interbank but otherwise too so thinking about you know we pay which isn't really interbank as much as it is
- um built on on a commercial infrastructure rather than a banking one yeah so so put retail to the side I
- think that's the real Innovations are happening behind in places where where folks on the street simply won't won't
- see so I I hope I didn't say uh or or I give the impression that I think everything is
- Doom and Gloom and that it's impossible to improve on any of these metrics but um
- so so in my mind I think that the core takeaway for me of of or the the benefit of this framework is
- understanding in my mind that the importance of public pressure in some form um because I think that
- um and I want to push back a little bit on whether the reforms we're seeing are quite as as uh uh uh great as as you
- implied but at a high level I think that the sort of my primary takeaway of thinking about these various dilemmas is
- that some amount of Federal Reserve in the U.S and Central Bank involvement is very very important and this is I I see
- how was a question which I think we can uh I'll try to get to after this one um that's really interesting
- um but there's been Even If the Fed hasn't moved towards uh uh you know a central
- bank digital currency or fed now as quickly as some people would like I think that the wholesale system is
- facing pressure and the uh uh zealousness with which they've pushed against that could imply that and
- this is something you've written about the threat of competition from the government is itself I think important
- in this context um I am not quite as optimistic that we'll get rid of the market power issues
- in the sort of new whole Bank dot uh wholesale system um but but I I suppose we'll just sort
- of have to have to wait um uh I know um I I suspect people on this call have thought about that as much as I have but
- um uh I don't I mean it seems to me that what you are saying is that they're different sort of
- one-off policy interventions that have facilitated investment and Innovation uh despite the fact that these economic
- issues exist and to the extent that's happening I agree um to the extent uh uh uh
- um and then I don't know in the cross-border context if if if anything that you said uh uh uh just
- because I haven't um I still think we're seeing very large you know arguably this this trilemma is
- most pertinent in the cross-border context where there's the least ability of central banks to to Spur uh to to
- oversee uh the kind of thing we're talking about but um I guess that's a longer way than I intended of saying I
- don't know that we're disagreeing but I didn't take let me uh follow up on that first of all let me
- remind people in the audience that you can submit questions in Q a we already have a couple of questions and we'll get
- to them in in a few minutes um before that let me just ask a follow-up question to what Peter was
- discussing so so it's very interesting how you lay out this trilemma and we are used to thinking about dry lemmas in
- other areas and as you mentioned it's always tempting to go back to that kind of framework uh and I think you describe
- the trade-off and some of them are familiar for example thinking about the trade-off between stability and
- competition uh well would you like the payment system to end up what is kind of the optimal point so if you think about
- a triangle what do you think is the is the optimal point and and where where do you see such a system
- implemented uh either around the world or in the past or what what what do you think we should try yeah
- um I think I don't think we should allow I I think we we my preference would be for
- the regulatory perimeter to apply to the payment system so as a threshold my own
- view is we should not to the extent a new payment system emerges it should not be one operated by entities that are not
- subject to Prudential regulations that don't have access to to to um you know Central Bank lending and so
- I think I think I I this this I think is actually closely related to Peter's question where I I
- think that we should not think assume that an oligopoly is the wrong form of Market structure but that
- um uh either a public option which the US has in many respects today uh but one that that
- um or aggressive oversight to prevent Market power abuses is helpful and so I think
- um uh so I I don't know that I think the current system is is um completely horrible just as much as I
- think that it creates opportunities to impose taxes on smaller firms on underbanked and uh that can either be
- fixed by a meaningful public option that occurs in a larger percentage of the payment space
- or it can occur by more zealous supervision um and so those are the two and this
- gets to um you know I think Howell's question is is related to this because so Howell asked
- um does the framework apply outside the U.S to countries like Brazil or India uh
- where you've seen Innovation either with government support but sometimes with private Innovation and as I understand
- it um and and how you should correct me if I'm wrong in both Brazil and China we saw
- massive amounts of government support and it's in Kenya that we saw tremendous innovation in the absence of
- government support and I my sort of off-the-cuff reaction to that is that in Kenya there was a huge appetite for
- better services and so people did it in the fintech space but I don't know that that under that sort of uh reduces the
- the the need for government support I sort of take all of those I so I would respond to that by saying I think and
- this is this this relates to etai's question um I have concerns that there are possibilities for Market power abuses in
- the payment system especially in the cross-border system that there are certain areas where
- there's little government supervision Beyond prudent and at least in the market power context and so I'd like a
- positive sort of uh aggressive investment in public options and and supervision that when Financial
- Regulators are looking at payments they don't simply look at the safety side but
- they also look at the market power side which I think as far as I'm aware has not been the
- focus of uh most Financial Regulators involved in payments just to clarify uh the question that
- Josh was referring to is from Howard Jackson because the audience is not seeing the Q a and the question was uh
- can you say anything about how your framework applies to other countries like Brazil or India or China or Kenya
- or even the EU member states all of which have seen payment Innovation sometimes with government support but
- sometimes with private innovation sorry about that I'll read the question from yeah and we can we can pose them to
- you Josh too so you don't have to worry about it you are uh you're our guest so we'll uh um we'll put them put these
- pictures to you and you can you can swing at them let me ask we have another great question from Anna galpern coming
- up in a minute and encourage all the rest to pose any questions that you have uh let me ask another question first and
- then we'll get to Anna's question um Josh how does this framework that you've developed and I I think the the
- place where it's most powerful is in putting in direct conversation this question of concentration and stability
- a give and get uh from uh from infrastructure concentration and if we were to think about about
- payments infrastructure as as Public Utilities or even as utilities and think about it
- in that lens as many people have encouraged us to do then our thinking looks just a lot
- different than the public-private Divide looks looks very different they're private corporations have shareholders
- in some sense um but but really the the regulatory schematic is so so dominant so
- overwhelming and they don't you don't really think of it as free enterprise the the regulation is on on rates and on
- ways that uh conversations can even occur it's just a highly choreographed set of Institutions but we don't have
- that in payments we do have concentration in some aspects of some user bases but in other ways and crypto
- of course is a great example of it but it's not only the only example it's sort of a wild and wonky world out there so
- so I I guess I have I have two questions we can build them out over the rest of our of the half hour that uh that we
- have because let me start with this this first one given how much the payments World shifts right even in the last
- decades the ways that we Internet payment system uh at virtually every level has has changed significantly
- um what does your framework tell us about things like uh the efforts to have more public payment options uh or or to
- um you know to force uh the you know private sector to give up its intellectual property to be
- um developed by by the public sector the great example of that of course is is Brazil
- um uh and other efforts are underway um does it have anything to say about that have you does it do you do you say
- do you think yes uh given the uh the um the tensions that we see between concentration and stability that we
- should see more public ownership and provision of payment rails less of it or is that an orthogonal discussion it's
- not an orthogonal discussion um foreign I don't think it's an easy question so my concern certain with full government
- control or if you're going all the way towards what you were talking about is um
- in some context central banks have been good about innovating in another context
- I might say domestically they have not been as good at that and so um to the extent that there are entities
- with some profit motive that have a threat of competition there are some benefits to Innovation but I at least
- think I think that more government control it it shouldn't be surprising that that China and Brazil
- acted the way that they did um I think given that that free the way that I think of payments in in this
- framework that um you have a trade-off between stability and Innovation and safety and
- it requires an enormous amount of administrative oversight to make sure that a privately run system doesn't
- abuse take advantage of that upon one metric which might be a situation in which public control is is helpful
- um but I'm cautious about that because I don't feel all that that confident I agree
- with all of the premises and and I want to um it's not a conclusion I feel I I am
- completely comfortable reaching at this point so not to dodge the question but I
- think sort of uh in many respects it makes sense I think uh but but that whether it's normatively good or bad
- depends upon a lot of assumptions about State capacity uh both to supervise private systems and to to manage the
- public system okay let's take the question then from Anna um honor galpern from Georgetown writes
- one note on your trilemma conundrum investment and Innovation are means not goals investment in what for what
- Innovation for innovation's sake ditto for competition it's not good in itself and she wonders whether you are over
- investing in the mechanics at the risk of missing the elephant in the room which is the US dollar which amounts for
- much of the fed's position and I would add of course that's uh 70 of the global economy is dollarized directly or
- indirectly indirectly the famous saying from from John Connolly uh Richard Nixon's Secretary of Treasury when the
- gold window was slammed shut is the dollar is our currency but he said Tower Partners your problem so if that's the
- case if the US dollar is the American currency but a global problem then isn't all of this about dollar dominance in in
- places where we don't have an international or Reserve or Regional Reserve currency
- um is this does this trilemma just sort of melt away yeah this is a super interesting question I think um
- again a lot of the the I think the the dilemmas are most evident in the cross-border context and one of the
- things on this question is getting it I think is one of the biggest um uh reasons that cross-border issue is
- not bigger than it currently is is because such a high percentage of transactions can occur on fedwire
- because the dollar has such a strong position um and so I guess I think I I don't I think it's probably
- certainly worth acknowledging that I I think of the the US Dollars position as arguably
- um at least in the payments context reducing some of the issues because it allows essentially interoperability by
- having everyone opt to use dollars um but I I still think um and and Innovation uh you're I agree
- with how on a on a phrase the question I do think and so maybe I need to rethink
- how I phrase this the many Payment Systems today especially across border and U.S systems are not as fast or
- reliable as they maybe should be and so those are the types of Investments that I I think
- um uh reflect this but you're right we it's not that you want Innovation it's that
- when a system could be better either more reliable or faster you want Innovation to to get there in a safe and
- reliable way um but I don't I think you're right to point out that Innovation for
- innovation's sake is the wrong way to think about it so one interesting Dimension that comes
- out of your paper you didn't talk about it that much in your presentation is the role of the Central Bank and uh
- thing that everyone is discussing right now the Central Bank digital currency um and I I wonder if you can elaborate
- on this a little more because there is certainly a good amount of skepticism out there that this is going to be uh
- the the arrangement of the future yet I think that you you certainly see it as part of the equilibrium
- yeah I um I I should have been prepared for this question because it's the obvious
- question uh to ask because you know everyone can say oh a CBD CD Central Bank digital currency would be great and
- yet um I I'm not convinced the the rollout has been it is going to be successful
- whether it will occur at all I I it doesn't seem to um uh you know I know the FED just released
- a report on the pros and cons of a U.S Central Bank digital currency I guess when I think of it I think of it as a as
- I guess what I thought when I wrote that I thought of it as almost a metaphor for
- we need more to the extent we want better Payment Systems we need more involvement from
- the central bank I I don't think a CBD the Central Bank digital currency is necessarily I I
- this I'm really going to dodge because I just don't think that Aina uh Central Bank digital currency is there's
- evidence that in the US it's fixing our payments problems and so I I think I need uh should be careful about what I
- say there it's it's uh if if we could snap our fingers and have one tomorrow it would be maybe helpful
- on the margins but I don't even think it would solve everything I I mentioned at
- the beginning all right well now we're going to enter the stage of the webinar where we uh turn the fire up and we
- don't let you pull your feet away from it so we'll see if we can uh we can get you to
- um to uh to be Concrete in in these in this context so you and Dan already have written a couple of articles that are
- um focused on on a different part of this of this kind of issue about payments infrastructure uh and and about
- the both the public and private aspects of it the centralization questions and so I want to bring those those
- um uh contributions into dialogue here so I'm thinking here about dtcc and so in the Securities and capital markets
- infrastructure context and then also a newer piece on plaid so thinking about this as it refers to open Banking and I
- think that there's a version of these ideas and we can um uh you know uh post uh to I think there's a way for us to
- post attendees the links to those papers which I'll try to do in just a second um
- but I want you to think through the policy implications For What You observe about payments infrastructure and
- financial infrastructure everywhere and that is uh in in thinking about uh what do we learn about the way we are uh
- doing less well than we could do but for specific policy interventions with respect to financial infrastructure and
- I'm going to give you three examples I want you to respond just just to tell if you had either uh the the Congress
- institutional in front of you or the white house or the central bank or the SEC and you could say do this or stop
- doing that it's kind of in a rapid fire way and here are the three the questions
- that I'd ask you to to comment on the first is are we today in the question of uh of uh clearing on on stock uh trades
- especially where we might be is the dtcc model which is bank owned or sorry broker owned is that model which evolves
- it through you know and most of what I've learned about this I've learned from you and Dan data through a very
- specific path dependence but it is where we are is is that where we could be are
- there efficiency gains or Equity gains or fairness gains that we could get uh with a specific policy uh introduction
- or is this just kind of the least bad set of parameters that we already have so the first weekend is on stock trades
- and the capital markets is this dttc yep dtcc model uh Centric model the best the
- second is in fintech Innovation the very fact that we're getting these upstarts the Plaid is the example new site that
- Visa tried to buy and the Trump doj prevented them from doing so does that represent uh something that policy
- makers thinking about your framework or not should encourage or discourage right
- is there some policy uh intervention that we want to see and the third is is right here in in your current paper and
- that is thinking about the status quo with respect to retail cards words so just thinking Visa Mastercard American
- Express on the credit side are there changes that you would want to see made that would put us in a better Frontier
- however you define that so Capital markets open banking cards the first two I won't Dodge at all
- um uh the second third uh we'll see um dtcc you know I think Dan and I wrote this paper and a lot of people so so the
- thesis of the paper is um there was an attempt by really Congress but mandated the SEC to
- have interoperability requirements such that nscc and DTC would be required to interoperate with
- regional competitors the Pacific Clearing Corporation the Securities Clearing Corporation of Philadelphia and
- the idea in Congress was very explicit about this was to mandate was to preserve competition and clearing and
- depository markets and what what we argue our thesis is that the interoperability agreements were in many
- respects the means by which uh a single depository in a single clearing Securities Clearinghouse obtains their
- monopolies and the reason for that is the interfaces themselves involved fixed costs though by Statute nscc was
- required to Bear those costs so more importantly um the interfaces allowed nscc to dictate
- the pace of innovation as our argument in that um when nscc said we want to be faster the regional guys had to do the
- same and they couldn't afford to keep up with those Investments and the second point is that it reduced and maybe
- eliminated altogether product differentiation the nature of the market really meant that
- the Pacific Clearing Corporation just had to say we'll have a variety of ways of communicating with nscc but we're
- really just using an SCC system and so given that market system it doesn't really make sense to have competition
- and so people some people not everyone hopefully rather than said oh we need to do all these reforms to nscc because
- it's poorly designed and I don't think that's the right response I think it's an interesting history and a
- maybe in some respects a cautionary tale about how interoperability can work in certain highly unusual bespoke
- cardiosyncratic circumstances but I think I don't I you know this goes back to Anna's question it's not clear to me
- what there were I think there were moments in the early 2000s when there was a possibility that
- um because the New York Stock Exchange and and the American Stock Exchange were primary owners of of
- nscc that there was a possibility of um Arrangements that benefited them but since then we've reformed governance and
- I don't know that nscc is all that bad so I I I don't think I would want it it's not clear that we would want
- all that much to be different in in that context I'm open to the possibility it's
- more the the story that I find interesting um this goes back you know I'm uh maybe
- a better uh I don't know my political instincts would be all that good I like to understand things but not not
- necessarily like talk to policy makers um in fintech Innovation I think so the question could be should we have
- allowed visa to buy plaid that's a really hard question but but but you can also think of it as just
- um we have significant Innovation right now in card services and and and and and and
- largely because of sort of how of apis and this is you know this has implications
- for open banking but what what um Dan and I are trying to think through is is what are the
- trade-offs involved here and are what we we sort of posit is that um apis to connect banks are themselves
- likely to be a natural monopoly and we see evidence of this with plaid though uh having such a large market share
- though the possibility that um uh you there might be some pushback against that even so I I would think that if
- something replay you know from Visa's perspective I can understand why plaid seems like an existential threat we need
- one sort of plaid and and I don't think I can predict at this point if Visa had planned to acquire
- plaid to kill it I think uh that would have been a problem I'm not sure that's what was would have happened if Visa
- said this is the future of you know Card Services may be a thing of the past or more you know possibly
- um we are going to be completely at the mercy of plaid and we'd rather build that out uh I don't know that that seems
- like a situation in which there might have been it might have been okay and I I think I don't know how Regulators
- should have handled that I think the issue is that um plaid has real scale economies that
- that are understandably a threat to visa and and and so from an Anti-Trust perspective I think
- um I don't think it's an an easy case but I think the trade-off is clear which is that you want a company it may simply
- be that there's one and then you're concerned both about plaid moving into related markets other abuses of of a
- dominant position and that just returns us to the same situation uh we're in in payments today
- um the third question was what was the third question is um the one that we're thinking about
- right now oh I was thinking about the context for cards so um what what do we do in um so I'm
- moving it through your three papers the two of the Dan and here yeah um and on this one I want you to apply
- it to uh retail credit so uh do the card networks are we at an optimized Frontier
- from a policy perspective do we need to break them up do we need to have a public option as it should be fee
- regulation or fee caps I mean how how or or are we like with dtcc we're uh we're
- at the the way we've evolved this place still permits for all the kinds of innovation
- um without instability um at the at the periphery and that the incumbents are still uh well optimized
- what's your take on that um I think cards are hard for a couple reasons one um you know that
- various Merchants reluctance to take American Express because of higher fees seems to suggest or uh that that
- um there are Network effects and scale economies I think that there are you know it's a
- highly concentrated market and you have concern about high fees there is much more competition
- for credit cards as PayPal and Pla and venmo have have emerged such that um I think five years ago I think
- uh supervision of fees might have been very important I think it's becoming less important as the the market
- develops um I wouldn't break them up one one interesting Dimension that comes out of your paper is uh I would say
- related to a firm like Facebook and the possibility that Facebook will develop its own currency
- and as you mentioned on the one hand this is good for competition on the other hand uh when you think about
- financial stability if you want to maintain stability it implies that the FED will have to expand
- its regulatory perimeter and start dealing with firms that are not purely financial institutions that's another
- thing I was looking for you to expand on a little more so so is the issue here just the fact that these are not
- financial institutions or are you worried about expanding the regulatory perimeter more uh more broadly than that
- I mean we're dealing with such questions all the time as you know Banks activities are moving into non-banks and
- the FED is constantly debating how much uh of the previous regulations and uh uh
- you know assistance should apply to these institutions uh and the question is how do you see it in this context
- my concern is expanding the bank regulatory perimeter now if if um if you have genuine real-time payments
- then it's less of a concern because you're not holding you're not either the counterparty credit risk is lower but my
- my concern is that is is you know in some ways there are no new problems in finances like this is all we learn from
- crypto is is that we keep discovering the the the financial issues that that people who study Financial regulation
- have thought about for 50 years and with Facebook it seems you know like a classic case of a firm that might try to
- offer cheaper and may offer you know in some senses faster services or something
- like that but will then become a source of of stability concerns and so in if it
- turns out that something goes wrong it seems inevitable that Facebook would get support from uh you know in this world I
- guess is it meta now or something um uh uh and and so it's the there's nothing new Under the Sun or or in this
- context I think and and the concern you know it's entirely possible and if you think I am missing something please let
- me know but my concern is just the oldest one which is that we have some entity that operates outside the the the
- the the Bank regulatory perimeter doing engaging in services that uh compete that do the same things and are
- precisely the reasons we have a bank regulatory perimeter and so if things do go wrong I worry about
- um uh and you know this this this leads to sort of interesting like in modern thought scenarios such as
- um would the FED be subsidizing certain types of social media companies because there would be an implicit uh uh subsidy
- in the event that something went wrong which is just sort of fun to think about that I don't know if it's related to uh
- Financial concerns beyond the the original one of extending um uh uh government support
- Josh I want to pull in your expertise from another of your field domains and that's bankruptcy
- how do we think about um payments inference infrastructure distress and resolution
- so the way that the law thinks about it is that you know these are companies and
- if they go bankrupt they'll be subject to the bankruptcy code there are exemptions for certain kinds of
- financial contracts mostly not relevant here um unless you are uh deemed to be uh
- significant uh Financial Market infrastructure uh systemically important so Sif moves systemically important
- Financial Market utilities um in which case you'd go through a specialized process outlined in
- Dodd-Frank regulated by the FED but um most of the kinds of payments infrastructure we're talking about is
- not so designated and so should we think about resolution and distress for venmo
- or PayPal for example differently than we would think about the you know the distress of uh of you know General Mills
- or or Twitter uh or or Tesla um resolution of payments infrastructure in a different domain and more like we do
- for example in thinking about energy infrastructure or or systemically important financial institutions or
- things like that um this is why I think it's risky that people leave funds and PayPal and Dan's
- written about the you know the issue the ordinary bankruptcy processes just follows absolute priority Rule and
- unsecured creditors are paid after everyone except shareholders and so the the problem we're worried about if if a
- non-sif you know uh designated entity becomes insolvent is that people who've left who have left funds in PayPal uh
- will probably be wiped out um and if people don't leave if if if people leave money in a retail payments
- provider such that it seems to look like a bank uh this could become highly problematic now
- um what they're they're I I think there are two interesting Parts about how we resolve
- Financial Market utilities that are relevant to this the first is that it's basically a license to at the margins
- play around with absolute priority rule right you can pay some people who would be paid after others before other people
- this might give rise to moral hazard issues but it's important for preserving stability the other is that there's
- greater possibility of of of of of assistance from the government to make people whole now they're we can quibble
- about the legality of that but I'll just take a like legal realistic approach for
- a second and think we're likely to see government support if if this happens and well I guess maybe with GM and
- Chrysler bankruptcy is no different but like assuming that that that's not the case for a second uh
- um and so I I think you know the the insolvency risk of a payment system outside of the
- regulatory perimeter highlights many of the dangers that um you know if people don't know about it I
- think when if Twitter goes bankrupt um people's livelihoods are not at stake now in some sense if you leave your
- money in PayPal you are on notice in that PayPal's terms of service are very very clear about the risks you run but I
- don't think anyone who uses PayPal thinks of it that way and so I think it's paternalistic but I think
- um uh there is if if if to the extent that PayPal or or venmo um is a significant store of people's
- assets I think we need to to figure out how to deal with this um but the right approach is also
- complicated I mean one approach is just to say people can't leave money and you know PayPal can't be a bank when people
- leave money in it that's a problem and it's a problem for precisely this reason I'm
- reluctant in the absence of of treating PayPal as a bank for the the in a sort of micro potential sense that it would
- be subject to Prudential regulations and capital requirements and and and all of
- the sort of whole gamut of things to just say um will support PayPal but I don't think
- that um we should let out so I think we need to address this ex-ante at an earlier point
- in time than when PayPal is insolvent because otherwise I don't you know it seems like it becomes a political
- question of of um whether we should just in some respects bail out PayPal by paying you
- know presumably if this goes wrong um the payment provider that is insolvent has taken risks with funds
- stored in PayPal or venmo or whatever and those those those risks turned out poorly which is why the
- The Entity can't pay and if that's happening it we should probably think of them as banks in a sense that they're
- like taking deposits and doing stuff with those deposits whether it's lending or investing um and so I think we should
- these are issues and and that that we we we should probably think about uh before
- this happens because it seems you know whether a bankruptcy like this is a source of
- large systemic risk it would almost certainly uh harm the livelihood of people who who may uh be adversely
- affected in a way that seems preventable and so the ways to deal with that seem to be you can't store funds here or you
- have to um be very very careful you know you could treat it like a money market mutual fund or something such that
- you're careful about the types of activities that that payment systems are engaged in
- um so I think we I guess I think we probably know how to think about that but I I mean do you think there are
- separate insolvency issues that are separate from the ones I just talked about no I don't I don't think so I think it
- is a question of there's there's a political economy around insolvency when you're talking about access to money
- that becomes extremely bank-like in their and their uh and their policy so so venmo presents I think a very
- troubling uh example of this in a way that other payments infrastructure would not but a Visa went down or a MasterCard
- went down um you know what that would mean in terms of the ability of the economy to
- run um suggest a kind of political reaction that sounds he made a joke about GM and
- Chrysler but that's exactly the issue right is that but it's different rather than having a major constituency of
- employees and counterparties and uh and and others who are demanding political action we would have a sense of if we
- cannot sustain this uh this thing that has such a public face to it then the crisis is going to become panic in a
- self-fulfilling way and so there lies the political intervention that's a form of implicit subsidy and and that makes
- you think okay you should price it and impose it on um on the institution that is so um that
- benefits in that way or you should say no such subsidy um we would handle this in different
- ways and then that makes me think that there should be some sort in the same way that we require
- um Banks to have contingent uh funding plans as part of their their examination cycle
- um maybe we should have something like that but facing the government so if we're not if we're not going to say that
- we're going to guarantee basic payments infrastructure in a panic and what are we saying instead and I think that's the
- way I would think about it but I'm not sure how much I would say I would want bankruptcy code exceptions to be written
- to have like a the equivalent of a title to a Dodd-Frank process uh as a as an analog to bankruptcy or is a uh you know
- bankruptcy fails than this um I don't know that's that's kind of the way I would think about it yeah and
- I think you're getting it two issues that are somewhat distinct the first is just um to what extent does this look
- like Banking and the other is um to what extent is this just extremely important in some sense that we're going
- to force reorganization instead of liquidation I mean with GM and Chrysler there was a real possibility of
- liquidation and that was the it wasn't that bankruptcy it was impossible it was that you had to you know the the
- government felt political pressure to to help labor jump the line and I think that analogy to
- courage is is apt um but the ordinary bankruptcy process you might and you might have a subsidy
- but it doesn't mean ordinary bankruptcy as uh not pot you can declare bankruptcy
- reorganize you still have payments there should be no disruption to activity you
- just may need help with funding for some period of time um and I think that's different than
- when people stand to lose money that they've left in a in a payment system okay fascinating issues I think we came to
- the top of the hour we could probably continue to talk about it for a long time but this is a time to
- end so thank you very much Josh it was a pleasure to read the paper and talk to you about it and I hope that the
- audience Uh current and future will benefit from it as well it was really uh fun to talk to you all
- and I uh thanks for having me thanks Josh and thanks everyone
Brief Summary
Josh Macy discusses financial stability, investment, and competition in U.S. payment systems, highlighting regulatory challenges and future implications.
Key points
- Market Power and Financial Risk. Josh Macy discusses the intersection of market power and financial risk in payment systems.
- The Regulatory Dilemma. Exploring the trade-offs between stability, investment, and access in payment systems.
- The Trilemma of Payment Systems. Exploring the balance between stability and competition in payment systems.
- Government Control in Payments. Discussing the implications of government control versus private sector innovation.
- Central Bank Digital Currency Skepticism. Evaluating the potential impact of Central Bank digital currencies on payment systems.
- Regulatory Challenges Ahead. Exploring the need for regulatory frameworks as financial activities move into non-bank sectors.
Episode highlights
- Market Power and Financial RiskJosh Macy discusses the intersection of market power and financial risk in payment systems.“His expertise becomes incredibly relevant when we’re talking about stability and structure.”1:32Nov 28, 2022
- The Regulatory DilemmaExploring the trade-offs between stability, investment, and access in payment systems.“This gives rise to hard and potentially intractable trade-offs for policymakers.”6:50Nov 28, 2022
- The Trilemma of Payment SystemsExploring the balance between stability and competition in payment systems.“It's always tempting to go back to that kind of framework.”22:11Nov 28, 2022
- Government Control in PaymentsDiscussing the implications of government control versus private sector innovation.“I think more government control shouldn't be surprising.”30:02Nov 28, 2022
- Central Bank Digital Currency SkepticismEvaluating the potential impact of Central Bank digital currencies on payment systems.“I'm not convinced the rollout has been successful.”35:03Nov 28, 2022
- Regulatory Challenges AheadExploring the need for regulatory frameworks as financial activities move into non-bank sectors.“We’re dealing with such questions all the time as banks move into non-banks.”47:50Nov 28, 2022
- The Future of Financial RegulationDebating how to handle the regulatory perimeter in the context of new financial entities.“My concern is expanding the bank regulatory perimeter now.”48:06Nov 28, 2022
- The Risks of Payment SystemsDiscussing the insolvency risks of payment systems like PayPal and Venmo, and the implications for users.“If people leave money in a retail payments provider, it could become highly problematic.”52:39Nov 28, 2022





