Market Power and Financial Risk in U.S. Payments Systems: A Conversation Joshua C. Macey

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Co-directors Peter Conti-Brown moderated a discussion with University of Chicago Law School's Joshua C. Macey on his new Wharton Initiative on Financial Policy and Regulation (WIFPR) white paper, “Market Power and Financial Risk in U.S. Payments Systems.” The panelists talk about the U.S. payments system. ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.

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  1. welcome to the third webinar of whisper work on initiative on financial policy and regulation
  2. today we are happy to have Josh Macy from the University of Chicago he's going to talk about Market power and
  3. Financial Risk in U.S payment systems um whisper is a new initiative that is at the intersection of Law and finance
  4. and part of our activities is to organize webinars based on white papers on issues at the frontier of interest of
  5. financial policy and we're very happy to have Josh I'll turn it over to Peter my
  6. co-director to introduce Josh thanks so much uh what did the light have with us Professor Josh Macy uh Josh
  7. has a an unusual set of uh uh talents and expertise he's really the Liam Neeson of uh the Academy I spent
  8. his life developing an unusual set of skills which has come into use on on questions at the intersection of
  9. infrastructure uh Finance distress with a particular focus in energy markets and
  10. in our case today the payment system uh his his expertise unusual though it is becomes incredibly relevant when we're
  11. talking about questions of stability and structure and so we are today this stability we're talking about is
  12. financial stability the structures we're talking about are payment systems or uh
  13. in the plural as Josh will explain and the questions he seeks to resolve are what Josh has described in other context
  14. is a kind of regulatory dilemma how to optimize within a set of constraints where the constraints are not only
  15. constrained by resources but are constrained bilaterally through a trade-off Josh I'm going to turn it over
  16. to you to give a presentation to elucidate some of the the structural questions uh and and trade-offs between
  17. stability and concentration in the payment system or in the payment systems and then we'll take questions from the
  18. audience as many as as we can get to uh that etai and I and ETA and I will pose our own
  19. questions and pull in those questions from the audience and have what we hope will be a lively conversation so with
  20. that Josh take it away uh thanks Peter I'm really happy to be here uh and and really happy people want
  21. to want to hear a little bit about uh my thoughts on financial infrastructure and
  22. payments so um this paper this this what I'm working on reflects some ideas I've been having
  23. uh many with uh some in a project I'm working on with Dan re and Jeff Yang and some in a project I'm hopefully working
  24. on with you um about uh uh uh how sort of financial infrastructure and especially so so there's a
  25. move in the legal Academy to think about utilities as a coherent um entity that Financial utilities share
  26. some uh basic economic features their networks their platforms their economies of scale and uh one of the themes of my
  27. work is that um different utilities look different in different contexts either because the institutional regime that
  28. underlies a particular utility creates unique economic challenges and this is what I'm thinking about here is an
  29. example of that so uh I'm thinking about many of the trade-offs between economies of scale
  30. that are arguable and network effects that are arguably needed to provide a quality payment system competition that
  31. is arguably needed to promote access and spur Co SP for Innovation and uh Financial stability and the way these
  32. things interact with each other so in my opinion you want three different things
  33. in a payment system the first one is stability uh payment systems are vital infrastructure they're like roads or
  34. Bridges or the internet or transmission lines or whatever infrastructure you think that's necessary to operate a
  35. modern economy um in the payments context there are two types of stability that seem to me to be
  36. important one is the first one is technological you actually want the system to work uh the participants that
  37. maintain and operate a payment system have to provide a safe secure and reliable way of transferring money or
  38. other Financial assets the other one still within the the stability part is uh Financial stability you want a
  39. payment system to be resilient such that it remains both liquid and solvent in the face of idiosyncratic and systemic
  40. threats to its micro-prudential safety and soundness so the second big goal in that we have in payment systems is
  41. investment and this too I think of as having uh two meanings you want investment in day-to-day processes that
  42. are that that allow you to maintain whatever infrastructure is needed to maintain a reliable and convenient
  43. payment system and then you want Innovation uh you want a payment system you want Market participants or
  44. financial intermediaries to invest in new technologies and services to improve the quality of services that they
  45. provide and then the third and this is the one I've had the hardest time in my own mind articulating is sort of related
  46. to access us but it's really related to competition and Market power issues and you want a payment system uh so and then
  47. here too there are a couple different meanings but you want different Financial intermediaries to be able to
  48. connect to the payment system you can think of this as a horizontal Market power issue that if you if a certain
  49. subset of financial institutions controls access to the famous system they may be able to charge different
  50. types of horizontal taxes to those that are excluded um and and this can come in the form of
  51. sort of obvious um price increase sort of uh uh just transaction fees such as we see in
  52. foreign exchange markets or it may arguably occur in the form of taking advantage of the float if that occurs in
  53. the in in in uh in delays um and the second part really of access is I think the ordinary way we think of
  54. it which is that you want the intermediaries that are already connected to the system to provide
  55. access to customers so that and so this is what sort of when we think about ideas of financial inclusion I think the
  56. ideas you want um the payment system to be widely accessible to people so if we have you
  57. know concerns that underbanked are don't have access to the payment system are related to this and I'm increasingly
  58. concerned I guess that it is difficult to achieve all of these goals at the same time uh at least with respect to
  59. purely private or predominantly private systems and that this gives rise to hard
  60. and potentially intractable trade-offs for policy makers so if you consider the trade-off between Financial stability
  61. and investment to ensure Financial stability you need a variety of familiar regulatory interventions to protect
  62. Financial intermediaries against microprudential risks this typically involves establishing a a legally
  63. defined regulatory perimeter that limits the which entities are given access and then subjecting those
  64. intermediaries to burdensome often well Justified but still burdensome Prudential regulation
  65. um you know to further promote micro-prudential safety and soundness financial intermediaries are provided
  66. with access to Central Bank emergency lending facilities and other forms of State support that arguably give the
  67. entities within the closed system an advantage compared to potential competitors
  68. um and then related challenges here are that uh Payment Systems must manage uh other risks such as anti-money
  69. laundering compliance and so the the combination of closed access and these burdensome even if well-justified
  70. regulations um as well as state support uh can create potentially insurmountable
  71. barriers to new entry um where these barriers insulate incumbent Financial intermediaries from
  72. competition the effect can be to sort of um weaken incentives to make technological
  73. and other Investments that are needed to build maintain and upgrade the payments
  74. infrastructure to which uh those intermediaries enjoy exclusive access uh when you combine that with significant
  75. economies of scale and large Network effects that incumbent uh enjoy these barriers can further undercut incentives
  76. of new interests to invest in the development and new and and potentially more efficient systems
  77. so the second trade-off is between network access and stability um because of the barriers to entry I I
  78. just mentioned a real competitor will probably come from outside of the existing regulatory perimeter
  79. um we've seen this already uh you know and this could be because customers leave funds in our retail provider such
  80. as venmo or PayPal that can sort of come in and challenge an incumbent or it could be because people flock to a
  81. certain stable coin or it could be because a large company perhaps a social media company that already has a larger
  82. network is able to enter the payment space um but without a well-defined regulatory
  83. perimeter and strong Prudential regulation I I sort of worry that new entrants um will be free to enter and compete in
  84. the marketplace so these entrants may be at a competitive disadvantage and they operate without the financial safeguards
  85. we think of as important for the the system um in the short run this can have a couple different effects that might be
  86. hard to predict it could spur investment but over the long term I think you can still expect pronounced economies of
  87. scale and network effects to lead to a natural monopoly um and so even if if we do see
  88. meaningful competition I think uh at least I would expect a new equilibrium in which the market is dominated by a
  89. small number of of large networks um and then the if if this these new networks uh don't have strong Prudential
  90. regulation any correlated failures could potentially uh themselves become a threat to financial stability so to the
  91. extent we're comfortable allowing new entry um either where we have to extend the
  92. bank regulatory perimeter or or we have to um uh accepted that uh Finance systemic risks that we're not
  93. currently sort of comfortable with and obviously this is quite evident in the emerging crypto system and so the third
  94. and final trade-off I think is between network access and investment um in the presence of a well-defined
  95. regulatory perimeter and a strong credential regulation uh policy makers can subsidize investment in payment
  96. infrastructure but if you successfully subsidize in this way um policy makers have to make a choice
  97. about what types of access and investment they want to promote um if policy makers want to promote
  98. private investment um that suggests they should tightly control access giving rise to these
  99. Market power concerns um uh and so if you to the extent you close access uh you are a source of a of a subsidy that
  100. further increases the advantages to incumbents and a arguably a mechanism by which policy makers uh are able to
  101. Target and enforce uh Network improvements um if policy makers promote Open Access
  102. I think this requires direct public investment and payment infrastructure um and so here uh Open Access can lead
  103. to Market fragmentation and you might be concerned about potential under investment so to sort of just quickly
  104. say a few closing thoughts I think um it's quite common to complain about uh you know how slow American and uh
  105. Payment Systems around the world are how problems to access our problematic um in the cross-border context payments
  106. are both slow and they're they're the transaction fees are large and I think that you it's possible to think of these
  107. different problems and that that we always talk about in payment systems as consistent with the underlying issues I
  108. just described so we frequently see little innovation in payment systems that seems consistent with a market in
  109. which dominant platforms are confident that they already enjoy a big head start they have a big Network they're barriers
  110. to creating a new network people may be reluctant to use a payment system that does not receive financial support from
  111. Regulators so why would the platform investor innovate when it already controls the entire market and it's
  112. confident that new entrants are at a severe disadvantage we also have seen that financial institutions charge High
  113. overdrafts fees and otherwise make large profits off of the underbanked that too
  114. seems consistent with um some Market power issues and the same thing can is arguably occurring in the
  115. cross-border context so in a in a very little literal sense um I hate it when people throw around
  116. the word trilemma uh inaccurately I'm like 80 sure this is accurate uh but I think this gives rise to some form of a
  117. trilemma because if you are a regulator and you're not an either you know fed now and and different uh in a
  118. public options are delayed either because of the lack of a will or political pushback or incompetence A
  119. Better Private system involves either Regulators choosing to one in trench Bank Market power if they want the
  120. existing system to work they exacerbate these differences uh two accept a new source of systemic risk if they don't if
  121. they are are comfortable with competition they have to the possibility that Facebook
  122. develops a payment system means uh possibly expanding the bank regulatory perimeter in case something goes wrong
  123. there and third and finally um uh countenancing the fact that they're that that if you don't want to expand the
  124. bank regulatory perimeter upstarts could be a source of of of of risk we should be concerned about
  125. very good thanks uh Josh so generative and offer so many questions one of the things that we try to do in whisper in
  126. in intervening in policy debates is at least sketch a path for what a policy response would be and I think in your
  127. paper you've just told us uh everything's on fire everything is terrible there's no real clear way to uh
  128. get us through tell me why I'm wrong about that if it were a true uh trilemma or even to resist as you appropriately
  129. do that framing we might be looking at an optimization function that has some sort of equilibrium that might tell us
  130. that we are at that equilibrium and let me to bring it to to kind of uh where um the rubber hits the road let me
  131. describe what I see to be that equilibrium and you tell me whether or not you agree with it and if you don't
  132. what the policy response should be to notice toward a different place on that optimized Frontier the way that I see it
  133. is that payments uh domestically are dominated by some very large rails and resist the terms you know oligopoly
  134. because they look pretty different so one is ACH overwhelmingly used it has a public-private or origin story but is
  135. now uh largely private fed wire a public rail overwhelmingly dominates on uh on dollar values and then of course we have
  136. the card rails uh Visa Mastercard and an American Express private um and and these are these kinds of
  137. incumbents are real issues that have been raised about all of them about both Financial stability and concentration
  138. that's kind of where we are today but at the same time we have things and I know
  139. that you and Dan already have written about this we have things like plaid coming in and and saying we want to have
  140. a using open Banking and a lot of different um uh uh approaches to uh to uh generating new opportunities for fintech
  141. entrance so far we're not seeing a lot of instability there we have huge efforts in the crypto space to say we're
  142. going to try something brand new outside of a banking or payments uh regulatory perimeter uh and so the future is uh is
  143. not yet here we're inventing it day by day and so we have this equilibrium where we're dominated by some very large
  144. incumbents both public and private and then we also have a pretty big fervor at the periphery saying let's innovate here
  145. and we're not seeing the instability that you're talking about yet so so it seems to me one case could be made is
  146. that we actually kind of fixed most of the problems that you're describing um it's a pretty vibrant place in turn
  147. from as far as Innovation is concerned and that um the incumbents are going to continue because of pressure from the
  148. periphery to either acquire their competitors beat them uh or lose and become dinosaurs to so many previous
  149. incumbents have done so yeah what is wrong about what I just described so I don't think that much is wrong but let
  150. me ask a quick follow-up question and I'll provide hopefully an answer when you say
  151. um is the Innovation you're talking about is I understand it it's happening sort of half of it can be understood at
  152. the retail level which may be pushing and half of it is occurring um as the as as banks that
  153. as firms that are are powerful at the wholesale level um have said we're going to to to
  154. improve the inner bank system and and have at least made some efforts to do that sorry is are those the two domains
  155. you're primarily yeah I would say I would say where the Innovation seemed to be coming right now are much less
  156. wholesale or much less retail uh venmo possibly accepted and much more retail Plumbing of the system business to
  157. business interbank but otherwise too so thinking about you know we pay which isn't really interbank as much as it is
  158. um built on on a commercial infrastructure rather than a banking one yeah so so put retail to the side I
  159. think that's the real Innovations are happening behind in places where where folks on the street simply won't won't
  160. see so I I hope I didn't say uh or or I give the impression that I think everything is
  161. Doom and Gloom and that it's impossible to improve on any of these metrics but um
  162. so so in my mind I think that the core takeaway for me of of or the the benefit of this framework is
  163. understanding in my mind that the importance of public pressure in some form um because I think that
  164. um and I want to push back a little bit on whether the reforms we're seeing are quite as as uh uh uh great as as you
  165. implied but at a high level I think that the sort of my primary takeaway of thinking about these various dilemmas is
  166. that some amount of Federal Reserve in the U.S and Central Bank involvement is very very important and this is I I see
  167. how was a question which I think we can uh I'll try to get to after this one um that's really interesting
  168. um but there's been Even If the Fed hasn't moved towards uh uh you know a central
  169. bank digital currency or fed now as quickly as some people would like I think that the wholesale system is
  170. facing pressure and the uh uh zealousness with which they've pushed against that could imply that and
  171. this is something you've written about the threat of competition from the government is itself I think important
  172. in this context um I am not quite as optimistic that we'll get rid of the market power issues
  173. in the sort of new whole Bank dot uh wholesale system um but but I I suppose we'll just sort
  174. of have to have to wait um uh I know um I I suspect people on this call have thought about that as much as I have but
  175. um uh I don't I mean it seems to me that what you are saying is that they're different sort of
  176. one-off policy interventions that have facilitated investment and Innovation uh despite the fact that these economic
  177. issues exist and to the extent that's happening I agree um to the extent uh uh uh
  178. um and then I don't know in the cross-border context if if if anything that you said uh uh uh just
  179. because I haven't um I still think we're seeing very large you know arguably this this trilemma is
  180. most pertinent in the cross-border context where there's the least ability of central banks to to Spur uh to to
  181. oversee uh the kind of thing we're talking about but um I guess that's a longer way than I intended of saying I
  182. don't know that we're disagreeing but I didn't take let me uh follow up on that first of all let me
  183. remind people in the audience that you can submit questions in Q a we already have a couple of questions and we'll get
  184. to them in in a few minutes um before that let me just ask a follow-up question to what Peter was
  185. discussing so so it's very interesting how you lay out this trilemma and we are used to thinking about dry lemmas in
  186. other areas and as you mentioned it's always tempting to go back to that kind of framework uh and I think you describe
  187. the trade-off and some of them are familiar for example thinking about the trade-off between stability and
  188. competition uh well would you like the payment system to end up what is kind of the optimal point so if you think about
  189. a triangle what do you think is the is the optimal point and and where where do you see such a system
  190. implemented uh either around the world or in the past or what what what do you think we should try yeah
  191. um I think I don't think we should allow I I think we we my preference would be for
  192. the regulatory perimeter to apply to the payment system so as a threshold my own
  193. view is we should not to the extent a new payment system emerges it should not be one operated by entities that are not
  194. subject to Prudential regulations that don't have access to to to um you know Central Bank lending and so
  195. I think I think I I this this I think is actually closely related to Peter's question where I I
  196. think that we should not think assume that an oligopoly is the wrong form of Market structure but that
  197. um uh either a public option which the US has in many respects today uh but one that that
  198. um or aggressive oversight to prevent Market power abuses is helpful and so I think
  199. um uh so I I don't know that I think the current system is is um completely horrible just as much as I
  200. think that it creates opportunities to impose taxes on smaller firms on underbanked and uh that can either be
  201. fixed by a meaningful public option that occurs in a larger percentage of the payment space
  202. or it can occur by more zealous supervision um and so those are the two and this
  203. gets to um you know I think Howell's question is is related to this because so Howell asked
  204. um does the framework apply outside the U.S to countries like Brazil or India uh
  205. where you've seen Innovation either with government support but sometimes with private Innovation and as I understand
  206. it um and and how you should correct me if I'm wrong in both Brazil and China we saw
  207. massive amounts of government support and it's in Kenya that we saw tremendous innovation in the absence of
  208. government support and I my sort of off-the-cuff reaction to that is that in Kenya there was a huge appetite for
  209. better services and so people did it in the fintech space but I don't know that that under that sort of uh reduces the
  210. the the need for government support I sort of take all of those I so I would respond to that by saying I think and
  211. this is this this relates to etai's question um I have concerns that there are possibilities for Market power abuses in
  212. the payment system especially in the cross-border system that there are certain areas where
  213. there's little government supervision Beyond prudent and at least in the market power context and so I'd like a
  214. positive sort of uh aggressive investment in public options and and supervision that when Financial
  215. Regulators are looking at payments they don't simply look at the safety side but
  216. they also look at the market power side which I think as far as I'm aware has not been the
  217. focus of uh most Financial Regulators involved in payments just to clarify uh the question that
  218. Josh was referring to is from Howard Jackson because the audience is not seeing the Q a and the question was uh
  219. can you say anything about how your framework applies to other countries like Brazil or India or China or Kenya
  220. or even the EU member states all of which have seen payment Innovation sometimes with government support but
  221. sometimes with private innovation sorry about that I'll read the question from yeah and we can we can pose them to
  222. you Josh too so you don't have to worry about it you are uh you're our guest so we'll uh um we'll put them put these
  223. pictures to you and you can you can swing at them let me ask we have another great question from Anna galpern coming
  224. up in a minute and encourage all the rest to pose any questions that you have uh let me ask another question first and
  225. then we'll get to Anna's question um Josh how does this framework that you've developed and I I think the the
  226. place where it's most powerful is in putting in direct conversation this question of concentration and stability
  227. a give and get uh from uh from infrastructure concentration and if we were to think about about
  228. payments infrastructure as as Public Utilities or even as utilities and think about it
  229. in that lens as many people have encouraged us to do then our thinking looks just a lot
  230. different than the public-private Divide looks looks very different they're private corporations have shareholders
  231. in some sense um but but really the the regulatory schematic is so so dominant so
  232. overwhelming and they don't you don't really think of it as free enterprise the the regulation is on on rates and on
  233. ways that uh conversations can even occur it's just a highly choreographed set of Institutions but we don't have
  234. that in payments we do have concentration in some aspects of some user bases but in other ways and crypto
  235. of course is a great example of it but it's not only the only example it's sort of a wild and wonky world out there so
  236. so I I guess I have I have two questions we can build them out over the rest of our of the half hour that uh that we
  237. have because let me start with this this first one given how much the payments World shifts right even in the last
  238. decades the ways that we Internet payment system uh at virtually every level has has changed significantly
  239. um what does your framework tell us about things like uh the efforts to have more public payment options uh or or to
  240. um you know to force uh the you know private sector to give up its intellectual property to be
  241. um developed by by the public sector the great example of that of course is is Brazil
  242. um uh and other efforts are underway um does it have anything to say about that have you does it do you do you say
  243. do you think yes uh given the uh the um the tensions that we see between concentration and stability that we
  244. should see more public ownership and provision of payment rails less of it or is that an orthogonal discussion it's
  245. not an orthogonal discussion um foreign I don't think it's an easy question so my concern certain with full government
  246. control or if you're going all the way towards what you were talking about is um
  247. in some context central banks have been good about innovating in another context
  248. I might say domestically they have not been as good at that and so um to the extent that there are entities
  249. with some profit motive that have a threat of competition there are some benefits to Innovation but I at least
  250. think I think that more government control it it shouldn't be surprising that that China and Brazil
  251. acted the way that they did um I think given that that free the way that I think of payments in in this
  252. framework that um you have a trade-off between stability and Innovation and safety and
  253. it requires an enormous amount of administrative oversight to make sure that a privately run system doesn't
  254. abuse take advantage of that upon one metric which might be a situation in which public control is is helpful
  255. um but I'm cautious about that because I don't feel all that that confident I agree
  256. with all of the premises and and I want to um it's not a conclusion I feel I I am
  257. completely comfortable reaching at this point so not to dodge the question but I
  258. think sort of uh in many respects it makes sense I think uh but but that whether it's normatively good or bad
  259. depends upon a lot of assumptions about State capacity uh both to supervise private systems and to to manage the
  260. public system okay let's take the question then from Anna um honor galpern from Georgetown writes
  261. one note on your trilemma conundrum investment and Innovation are means not goals investment in what for what
  262. Innovation for innovation's sake ditto for competition it's not good in itself and she wonders whether you are over
  263. investing in the mechanics at the risk of missing the elephant in the room which is the US dollar which amounts for
  264. much of the fed's position and I would add of course that's uh 70 of the global economy is dollarized directly or
  265. indirectly indirectly the famous saying from from John Connolly uh Richard Nixon's Secretary of Treasury when the
  266. gold window was slammed shut is the dollar is our currency but he said Tower Partners your problem so if that's the
  267. case if the US dollar is the American currency but a global problem then isn't all of this about dollar dominance in in
  268. places where we don't have an international or Reserve or Regional Reserve currency
  269. um is this does this trilemma just sort of melt away yeah this is a super interesting question I think um
  270. again a lot of the the I think the the dilemmas are most evident in the cross-border context and one of the
  271. things on this question is getting it I think is one of the biggest um uh reasons that cross-border issue is
  272. not bigger than it currently is is because such a high percentage of transactions can occur on fedwire
  273. because the dollar has such a strong position um and so I guess I think I I don't I think it's probably
  274. certainly worth acknowledging that I I think of the the US Dollars position as arguably
  275. um at least in the payments context reducing some of the issues because it allows essentially interoperability by
  276. having everyone opt to use dollars um but I I still think um and and Innovation uh you're I agree
  277. with how on a on a phrase the question I do think and so maybe I need to rethink
  278. how I phrase this the many Payment Systems today especially across border and U.S systems are not as fast or
  279. reliable as they maybe should be and so those are the types of Investments that I I think
  280. um uh reflect this but you're right we it's not that you want Innovation it's that
  281. when a system could be better either more reliable or faster you want Innovation to to get there in a safe and
  282. reliable way um but I don't I think you're right to point out that Innovation for
  283. innovation's sake is the wrong way to think about it so one interesting Dimension that comes
  284. out of your paper you didn't talk about it that much in your presentation is the role of the Central Bank and uh
  285. thing that everyone is discussing right now the Central Bank digital currency um and I I wonder if you can elaborate
  286. on this a little more because there is certainly a good amount of skepticism out there that this is going to be uh
  287. the the arrangement of the future yet I think that you you certainly see it as part of the equilibrium
  288. yeah I um I I should have been prepared for this question because it's the obvious
  289. question uh to ask because you know everyone can say oh a CBD CD Central Bank digital currency would be great and
  290. yet um I I'm not convinced the the rollout has been it is going to be successful
  291. whether it will occur at all I I it doesn't seem to um uh you know I know the FED just released
  292. a report on the pros and cons of a U.S Central Bank digital currency I guess when I think of it I think of it as a as
  293. I guess what I thought when I wrote that I thought of it as almost a metaphor for
  294. we need more to the extent we want better Payment Systems we need more involvement from
  295. the central bank I I don't think a CBD the Central Bank digital currency is necessarily I I
  296. this I'm really going to dodge because I just don't think that Aina uh Central Bank digital currency is there's
  297. evidence that in the US it's fixing our payments problems and so I I think I need uh should be careful about what I
  298. say there it's it's uh if if we could snap our fingers and have one tomorrow it would be maybe helpful
  299. on the margins but I don't even think it would solve everything I I mentioned at
  300. the beginning all right well now we're going to enter the stage of the webinar where we uh turn the fire up and we
  301. don't let you pull your feet away from it so we'll see if we can uh we can get you to
  302. um to uh to be Concrete in in these in this context so you and Dan already have written a couple of articles that are
  303. um focused on on a different part of this of this kind of issue about payments infrastructure uh and and about
  304. the both the public and private aspects of it the centralization questions and so I want to bring those those
  305. um uh contributions into dialogue here so I'm thinking here about dtcc and so in the Securities and capital markets
  306. infrastructure context and then also a newer piece on plaid so thinking about this as it refers to open Banking and I
  307. think that there's a version of these ideas and we can um uh you know uh post uh to I think there's a way for us to
  308. post attendees the links to those papers which I'll try to do in just a second um
  309. but I want you to think through the policy implications For What You observe about payments infrastructure and
  310. financial infrastructure everywhere and that is uh in in thinking about uh what do we learn about the way we are uh
  311. doing less well than we could do but for specific policy interventions with respect to financial infrastructure and
  312. I'm going to give you three examples I want you to respond just just to tell if you had either uh the the Congress
  313. institutional in front of you or the white house or the central bank or the SEC and you could say do this or stop
  314. doing that it's kind of in a rapid fire way and here are the three the questions
  315. that I'd ask you to to comment on the first is are we today in the question of uh of uh clearing on on stock uh trades
  316. especially where we might be is the dtcc model which is bank owned or sorry broker owned is that model which evolves
  317. it through you know and most of what I've learned about this I've learned from you and Dan data through a very
  318. specific path dependence but it is where we are is is that where we could be are
  319. there efficiency gains or Equity gains or fairness gains that we could get uh with a specific policy uh introduction
  320. or is this just kind of the least bad set of parameters that we already have so the first weekend is on stock trades
  321. and the capital markets is this dttc yep dtcc model uh Centric model the best the
  322. second is in fintech Innovation the very fact that we're getting these upstarts the Plaid is the example new site that
  323. Visa tried to buy and the Trump doj prevented them from doing so does that represent uh something that policy
  324. makers thinking about your framework or not should encourage or discourage right
  325. is there some policy uh intervention that we want to see and the third is is right here in in your current paper and
  326. that is thinking about the status quo with respect to retail cards words so just thinking Visa Mastercard American
  327. Express on the credit side are there changes that you would want to see made that would put us in a better Frontier
  328. however you define that so Capital markets open banking cards the first two I won't Dodge at all
  329. um uh the second third uh we'll see um dtcc you know I think Dan and I wrote this paper and a lot of people so so the
  330. thesis of the paper is um there was an attempt by really Congress but mandated the SEC to
  331. have interoperability requirements such that nscc and DTC would be required to interoperate with
  332. regional competitors the Pacific Clearing Corporation the Securities Clearing Corporation of Philadelphia and
  333. the idea in Congress was very explicit about this was to mandate was to preserve competition and clearing and
  334. depository markets and what what we argue our thesis is that the interoperability agreements were in many
  335. respects the means by which uh a single depository in a single clearing Securities Clearinghouse obtains their
  336. monopolies and the reason for that is the interfaces themselves involved fixed costs though by Statute nscc was
  337. required to Bear those costs so more importantly um the interfaces allowed nscc to dictate
  338. the pace of innovation as our argument in that um when nscc said we want to be faster the regional guys had to do the
  339. same and they couldn't afford to keep up with those Investments and the second point is that it reduced and maybe
  340. eliminated altogether product differentiation the nature of the market really meant that
  341. the Pacific Clearing Corporation just had to say we'll have a variety of ways of communicating with nscc but we're
  342. really just using an SCC system and so given that market system it doesn't really make sense to have competition
  343. and so people some people not everyone hopefully rather than said oh we need to do all these reforms to nscc because
  344. it's poorly designed and I don't think that's the right response I think it's an interesting history and a
  345. maybe in some respects a cautionary tale about how interoperability can work in certain highly unusual bespoke
  346. cardiosyncratic circumstances but I think I don't I you know this goes back to Anna's question it's not clear to me
  347. what there were I think there were moments in the early 2000s when there was a possibility that
  348. um because the New York Stock Exchange and and the American Stock Exchange were primary owners of of
  349. nscc that there was a possibility of um Arrangements that benefited them but since then we've reformed governance and
  350. I don't know that nscc is all that bad so I I I don't think I would want it it's not clear that we would want
  351. all that much to be different in in that context I'm open to the possibility it's
  352. more the the story that I find interesting um this goes back you know I'm uh maybe
  353. a better uh I don't know my political instincts would be all that good I like to understand things but not not
  354. necessarily like talk to policy makers um in fintech Innovation I think so the question could be should we have
  355. allowed visa to buy plaid that's a really hard question but but but you can also think of it as just
  356. um we have significant Innovation right now in card services and and and and and and
  357. largely because of sort of how of apis and this is you know this has implications
  358. for open banking but what what um Dan and I are trying to think through is is what are the
  359. trade-offs involved here and are what we we sort of posit is that um apis to connect banks are themselves
  360. likely to be a natural monopoly and we see evidence of this with plaid though uh having such a large market share
  361. though the possibility that um uh you there might be some pushback against that even so I I would think that if
  362. something replay you know from Visa's perspective I can understand why plaid seems like an existential threat we need
  363. one sort of plaid and and I don't think I can predict at this point if Visa had planned to acquire
  364. plaid to kill it I think uh that would have been a problem I'm not sure that's what was would have happened if Visa
  365. said this is the future of you know Card Services may be a thing of the past or more you know possibly
  366. um we are going to be completely at the mercy of plaid and we'd rather build that out uh I don't know that that seems
  367. like a situation in which there might have been it might have been okay and I I think I don't know how Regulators
  368. should have handled that I think the issue is that um plaid has real scale economies that
  369. that are understandably a threat to visa and and and so from an Anti-Trust perspective I think
  370. um I don't think it's an an easy case but I think the trade-off is clear which is that you want a company it may simply
  371. be that there's one and then you're concerned both about plaid moving into related markets other abuses of of a
  372. dominant position and that just returns us to the same situation uh we're in in payments today
  373. um the third question was what was the third question is um the one that we're thinking about
  374. right now oh I was thinking about the context for cards so um what what do we do in um so I'm
  375. moving it through your three papers the two of the Dan and here yeah um and on this one I want you to apply
  376. it to uh retail credit so uh do the card networks are we at an optimized Frontier
  377. from a policy perspective do we need to break them up do we need to have a public option as it should be fee
  378. regulation or fee caps I mean how how or or are we like with dtcc we're uh we're
  379. at the the way we've evolved this place still permits for all the kinds of innovation
  380. um without instability um at the at the periphery and that the incumbents are still uh well optimized
  381. what's your take on that um I think cards are hard for a couple reasons one um you know that
  382. various Merchants reluctance to take American Express because of higher fees seems to suggest or uh that that
  383. um there are Network effects and scale economies I think that there are you know it's a
  384. highly concentrated market and you have concern about high fees there is much more competition
  385. for credit cards as PayPal and Pla and venmo have have emerged such that um I think five years ago I think
  386. uh supervision of fees might have been very important I think it's becoming less important as the the market
  387. develops um I wouldn't break them up one one interesting Dimension that comes out of your paper is uh I would say
  388. related to a firm like Facebook and the possibility that Facebook will develop its own currency
  389. and as you mentioned on the one hand this is good for competition on the other hand uh when you think about
  390. financial stability if you want to maintain stability it implies that the FED will have to expand
  391. its regulatory perimeter and start dealing with firms that are not purely financial institutions that's another
  392. thing I was looking for you to expand on a little more so so is the issue here just the fact that these are not
  393. financial institutions or are you worried about expanding the regulatory perimeter more uh more broadly than that
  394. I mean we're dealing with such questions all the time as you know Banks activities are moving into non-banks and
  395. the FED is constantly debating how much uh of the previous regulations and uh uh
  396. you know assistance should apply to these institutions uh and the question is how do you see it in this context
  397. my concern is expanding the bank regulatory perimeter now if if um if you have genuine real-time payments
  398. then it's less of a concern because you're not holding you're not either the counterparty credit risk is lower but my
  399. my concern is that is is you know in some ways there are no new problems in finances like this is all we learn from
  400. crypto is is that we keep discovering the the the financial issues that that people who study Financial regulation
  401. have thought about for 50 years and with Facebook it seems you know like a classic case of a firm that might try to
  402. offer cheaper and may offer you know in some senses faster services or something
  403. like that but will then become a source of of stability concerns and so in if it
  404. turns out that something goes wrong it seems inevitable that Facebook would get support from uh you know in this world I
  405. guess is it meta now or something um uh uh and and so it's the there's nothing new Under the Sun or or in this
  406. context I think and and the concern you know it's entirely possible and if you think I am missing something please let
  407. me know but my concern is just the oldest one which is that we have some entity that operates outside the the the
  408. the the Bank regulatory perimeter doing engaging in services that uh compete that do the same things and are
  409. precisely the reasons we have a bank regulatory perimeter and so if things do go wrong I worry about
  410. um uh and you know this this this leads to sort of interesting like in modern thought scenarios such as
  411. um would the FED be subsidizing certain types of social media companies because there would be an implicit uh uh subsidy
  412. in the event that something went wrong which is just sort of fun to think about that I don't know if it's related to uh
  413. Financial concerns beyond the the original one of extending um uh uh government support
  414. Josh I want to pull in your expertise from another of your field domains and that's bankruptcy
  415. how do we think about um payments inference infrastructure distress and resolution
  416. so the way that the law thinks about it is that you know these are companies and
  417. if they go bankrupt they'll be subject to the bankruptcy code there are exemptions for certain kinds of
  418. financial contracts mostly not relevant here um unless you are uh deemed to be uh
  419. significant uh Financial Market infrastructure uh systemically important so Sif moves systemically important
  420. Financial Market utilities um in which case you'd go through a specialized process outlined in
  421. Dodd-Frank regulated by the FED but um most of the kinds of payments infrastructure we're talking about is
  422. not so designated and so should we think about resolution and distress for venmo
  423. or PayPal for example differently than we would think about the you know the distress of uh of you know General Mills
  424. or or Twitter uh or or Tesla um resolution of payments infrastructure in a different domain and more like we do
  425. for example in thinking about energy infrastructure or or systemically important financial institutions or
  426. things like that um this is why I think it's risky that people leave funds and PayPal and Dan's
  427. written about the you know the issue the ordinary bankruptcy processes just follows absolute priority Rule and
  428. unsecured creditors are paid after everyone except shareholders and so the the problem we're worried about if if a
  429. non-sif you know uh designated entity becomes insolvent is that people who've left who have left funds in PayPal uh
  430. will probably be wiped out um and if people don't leave if if if people leave money in a retail payments
  431. provider such that it seems to look like a bank uh this could become highly problematic now
  432. um what they're they're I I think there are two interesting Parts about how we resolve
  433. Financial Market utilities that are relevant to this the first is that it's basically a license to at the margins
  434. play around with absolute priority rule right you can pay some people who would be paid after others before other people
  435. this might give rise to moral hazard issues but it's important for preserving stability the other is that there's
  436. greater possibility of of of of of assistance from the government to make people whole now they're we can quibble
  437. about the legality of that but I'll just take a like legal realistic approach for
  438. a second and think we're likely to see government support if if this happens and well I guess maybe with GM and
  439. Chrysler bankruptcy is no different but like assuming that that that's not the case for a second uh
  440. um and so I I think you know the the insolvency risk of a payment system outside of the
  441. regulatory perimeter highlights many of the dangers that um you know if people don't know about it I
  442. think when if Twitter goes bankrupt um people's livelihoods are not at stake now in some sense if you leave your
  443. money in PayPal you are on notice in that PayPal's terms of service are very very clear about the risks you run but I
  444. don't think anyone who uses PayPal thinks of it that way and so I think it's paternalistic but I think
  445. um uh there is if if if to the extent that PayPal or or venmo um is a significant store of people's
  446. assets I think we need to to figure out how to deal with this um but the right approach is also
  447. complicated I mean one approach is just to say people can't leave money and you know PayPal can't be a bank when people
  448. leave money in it that's a problem and it's a problem for precisely this reason I'm
  449. reluctant in the absence of of treating PayPal as a bank for the the in a sort of micro potential sense that it would
  450. be subject to Prudential regulations and capital requirements and and and all of
  451. the sort of whole gamut of things to just say um will support PayPal but I don't think
  452. that um we should let out so I think we need to address this ex-ante at an earlier point
  453. in time than when PayPal is insolvent because otherwise I don't you know it seems like it becomes a political
  454. question of of um whether we should just in some respects bail out PayPal by paying you
  455. know presumably if this goes wrong um the payment provider that is insolvent has taken risks with funds
  456. stored in PayPal or venmo or whatever and those those those risks turned out poorly which is why the
  457. The Entity can't pay and if that's happening it we should probably think of them as banks in a sense that they're
  458. like taking deposits and doing stuff with those deposits whether it's lending or investing um and so I think we should
  459. these are issues and and that that we we we should probably think about uh before
  460. this happens because it seems you know whether a bankruptcy like this is a source of
  461. large systemic risk it would almost certainly uh harm the livelihood of people who who may uh be adversely
  462. affected in a way that seems preventable and so the ways to deal with that seem to be you can't store funds here or you
  463. have to um be very very careful you know you could treat it like a money market mutual fund or something such that
  464. you're careful about the types of activities that that payment systems are engaged in
  465. um so I think we I guess I think we probably know how to think about that but I I mean do you think there are
  466. separate insolvency issues that are separate from the ones I just talked about no I don't I don't think so I think it
  467. is a question of there's there's a political economy around insolvency when you're talking about access to money
  468. that becomes extremely bank-like in their and their uh and their policy so so venmo presents I think a very
  469. troubling uh example of this in a way that other payments infrastructure would not but a Visa went down or a MasterCard
  470. went down um you know what that would mean in terms of the ability of the economy to
  471. run um suggest a kind of political reaction that sounds he made a joke about GM and
  472. Chrysler but that's exactly the issue right is that but it's different rather than having a major constituency of
  473. employees and counterparties and uh and and others who are demanding political action we would have a sense of if we
  474. cannot sustain this uh this thing that has such a public face to it then the crisis is going to become panic in a
  475. self-fulfilling way and so there lies the political intervention that's a form of implicit subsidy and and that makes
  476. you think okay you should price it and impose it on um on the institution that is so um that
  477. benefits in that way or you should say no such subsidy um we would handle this in different
  478. ways and then that makes me think that there should be some sort in the same way that we require
  479. um Banks to have contingent uh funding plans as part of their their examination cycle
  480. um maybe we should have something like that but facing the government so if we're not if we're not going to say that
  481. we're going to guarantee basic payments infrastructure in a panic and what are we saying instead and I think that's the
  482. way I would think about it but I'm not sure how much I would say I would want bankruptcy code exceptions to be written
  483. to have like a the equivalent of a title to a Dodd-Frank process uh as a as an analog to bankruptcy or is a uh you know
  484. bankruptcy fails than this um I don't know that's that's kind of the way I would think about it yeah and
  485. I think you're getting it two issues that are somewhat distinct the first is just um to what extent does this look
  486. like Banking and the other is um to what extent is this just extremely important in some sense that we're going
  487. to force reorganization instead of liquidation I mean with GM and Chrysler there was a real possibility of
  488. liquidation and that was the it wasn't that bankruptcy it was impossible it was that you had to you know the the
  489. government felt political pressure to to help labor jump the line and I think that analogy to
  490. courage is is apt um but the ordinary bankruptcy process you might and you might have a subsidy
  491. but it doesn't mean ordinary bankruptcy as uh not pot you can declare bankruptcy
  492. reorganize you still have payments there should be no disruption to activity you
  493. just may need help with funding for some period of time um and I think that's different than
  494. when people stand to lose money that they've left in a in a payment system okay fascinating issues I think we came to
  495. the top of the hour we could probably continue to talk about it for a long time but this is a time to
  496. end so thank you very much Josh it was a pleasure to read the paper and talk to you about it and I hope that the
  497. audience Uh current and future will benefit from it as well it was really uh fun to talk to you all
  498. and I uh thanks for having me thanks Josh and thanks everyone

Brief Summary

Josh Macy discusses financial stability, investment, and competition in U.S. payment systems, highlighting regulatory challenges and future implications.

Key points

  • Market Power and Financial Risk. Josh Macy discusses the intersection of market power and financial risk in payment systems.
  • The Regulatory Dilemma. Exploring the trade-offs between stability, investment, and access in payment systems.
  • The Trilemma of Payment Systems. Exploring the balance between stability and competition in payment systems.
  • Government Control in Payments. Discussing the implications of government control versus private sector innovation.
  • Central Bank Digital Currency Skepticism. Evaluating the potential impact of Central Bank digital currencies on payment systems.
  • Regulatory Challenges Ahead. Exploring the need for regulatory frameworks as financial activities move into non-bank sectors.

Episode highlights

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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