The Global Bank Regulatory System Remains Crippled

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Episode Description

New bank regulations coming out of Basel III "almost certainly will not" prevent another global financial crisis, similar to the one the world is still recovering from, says Richard J. Herring, Wharton finance professor.

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  1. What's the likelihood that anything like what your committee would like to see is
  2. going to happen? I assume it's not very likely. Well, I the whole thing almost ran a ground in uh the end of last year
  3. because the French figured out that they were not going to be remotely able to make it. So, they were going to block
  4. the whole ratio and consequence the committee added all of these uh mitigating features that that made it uh
  5. much much less useful to the extent it ever was. Um but the US still has a chance to go its own way and the US does
  6. have a fairly powerful voice in these uh matters because it it remains the banking center, the largest economy and
  7. financially by far the most important economy. Um but whether we will have the courage to do that um remains unclear
  8. given the rules that the Basel committee is now looking at the more watered down
  9. version after some lobbying by countries on behalf of their banks um who the banks may not have been able to to to
  10. meet the requirements. Will what comes out of this in any way um would would it be able to prevent the kind of crisis
  11. that we had last year? Almost certainly not. Um the problem with these very detailed measures is that they really
  12. invite regulatory arbitrage and they affect bank behavior in ways that are not always predictable but almost always
  13. undo the intent of the the ratio. Uh so we're kind of fooling ourselves to have something we think out there is that is
  14. going to be a protection which really doesn't afford much of a buffer at all. Okay. So 20 countries sat down roughly
  15. 20 under the Bosel umbrella and said we want to come up with ways to prevent the
  16. kind of financial crisis that happened last time and in fact they're not coming up with a way that would prevent the
  17. crisis. Well, if you were more optimistic, you'd say this is the first step on the way to finding a way to to
  18. deal with liquidity. And it is true that they'd never really explicitly dealt with liquidity before. Uh, and it
  19. probably was a good time to think about it, but I don't think what they came up with was uh going to be an answer that
  20. will be very helpful. Okay. So, they watered down liquidity rules, no pun intended. Yes. And they also pushed it
  21. out to to where full compliance is in 2019 or so. Yes. Which means we better not have another problem over the next
  22. for sure. They're they're counting heavily on the fact that that uh everything is all fixed for the moment
  23. which certainly doesn't look so likely in Europe. But what they've done as they have in several other things is to give
  24. very generous phase in periods for so that any bank that is inconvenience at the moment will have a lot of time to
  25. adjust. So I think the rule is currently written and this also is one of the softenings that took place in in
  26. January. So that uh banks have to meet 60% of the ratio I think by 2016 maybe 2015 I'm yeah and then they have to do
  27. another 10% a year. So it's about 2020 before it happens. Now that has two implications. One is that the inference
  28. you made that if something happens in between we're in trouble. But the other is a political factor. The more time you
  29. have in these phasein periods, the more lobbying pressures you have for further softening of the rules. They're not
  30. likely to get tougher. They're only going to get weaker. So the new rules are highly unlikely to prevent the kind
  31. of crisis that we saw last time. Do they offer anything? In other words, do they
  32. at least serve as an early warning system? Might they help set off some alarm bells, canary in the coal mine
  33. kind of thing um that at least would help us to start to whip the emergency action a little bit sooner? Or is this
  34. the kind of thing that it just spirals out of control so fast that if you don't have something right away that grabs
  35. hold of it, then um you know what happens months later is not very helpful. You've defined the essence of a
  36. liquidity problem. Liquidity is not one of those slow agonizing creeps toward the edge of
  37. disaster. It happens in a flash. And um the more dependent banks become on short-term funding, either
  38. collateralized or just borrowing and wholesale markets, the more vulnerable they are to these really rapid uh
  39. declines. uh with the credit side, regulators have a bit more control. They can sort of ignore deterioration in
  40. credit and accountants have been very accommodating in in helping that uh that process. So that forbearance is is
  41. fairly common. But once the market understands that deterioration has taken place and begins to be reluctant to roll
  42. over their liabilities, there has to be immediate action or the institution is simply
  43. gone. [Music]

Brief Summary

The episode critiques Basel committee regulations on liquidity and their potential ineffectiveness in preventing future financial crises.

Key points

  • The Basel Committee's Challenge. 20 countries aim to prevent future financial crises, but their efforts may fall short.
  • Liquidity Rules Watered Down. New liquidity rules are softened, raising concerns about future financial stability.
  • The Urgency of Action. Immediate action is crucial to prevent rapid declines in financial institutions.

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