Basel III and Risky Banking Behavior: Too Little, Too Lenient, Too Late?
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Episode Description
KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON ARCHIVES: As the world haltingly recovers from the recession, regulators are struggling to modify the financial system to prevent another crisis. The latest effort: stricter capital requirements to help prevent large banks from collapsing under the weight of unexpected losses. While the new proposals -- called Basel III -- are designed to reduce risk-taking by assuring that banks continue lending in a weak economy, Wharton Finance professors Richard Herring, Franklin Allen, and others are skeptical that the new proposals will accomplish this goal.
More on this interview: https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/basel-iii-and-risky-banking-behavior-too-little-too-lenient-too-late/
#basel3 #banking #wallstreet #financialcrisis π Finance & Accounting
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- [Music] We're meeting today with Wharton Finance Professor Richard Harring to discuss the
- recently approved Basel 3 Accords and how they will affect international bank capital requirements. Thanks for joining
- us today. My pleasure. I guess we should start by saying that the Bosel Committee
- does not refer to it as Basel 3. They have studiously avoided the term. uh they'd rather think of it as just sort
- of a addition to Basel 2, kind of like a Windows program that is issued as 2.4 or
- something. Um but it is uh in many ways a marked change. Um it's tidying up some
- mistakes that they made in Basel 2, which isn't to say that they've actually corrected them. Um but it also is
- reflective of a new world governance system for uh the international financial system. Um before last year
- really uh the top level governing body was the group of 10 leading countries and those included only one Asian
- country Japan and they were all wealthy countries. Um, it was actually 11 because they put Switzerland in because
- it's it's a financial center, but apart from that, it was really a G10 creature and it was a G10 central banks and the
- Basel committee reported the G10 and um that made sense when it was formed in 1974 because those countries did control
- about 80% of uh world financial activity. But the whole balance of economic power and wealth has shifted to
- Asia in a dramatic way over the last few years. So that it no longer really made
- sense to make rules for the world financial system with a group that was that unrepresentative. Um so we now have the
- group of 20 that includes um all of the brick countries Brazil, Russia um uh India and China as well as Indonesia and
- other leading uh developing countries. So we have about the same proportion of world financial activity covered
- actually a whole lot more of the world's population and um a whole lot more of the world's economic output. Um but it
- does make for a much more heterogeneous group. It was surprising in a way that they
- were able to agree on what they wanted to do with the financial system because it's usually much more difficult to to
- reach consensus in a heterogeneous group than a small one that's homogeneous. But
- last year um they met in Pittsburgh. Um it was uh it's hard for them to meet because they're a target for everybody.
- And so Pittsburgh is kind of a nicely protected place because you can sort of close down the bridges and and uh have
- it uh uh safe. And I think Obama wanted to show off a US city that had kind of regenerated itself. But they actually
- came out with a very clear set of things they wanted to improve with the world financial system and they created a
- body. They transformed the financial services forum into the financial services board that was charged with
- really carrying out those things and dividing it among the existing structures we have. Well, the Basel
- committee which used to be basically the G10 plus Luxembourg in Switzerland has now has 27 members and so the uh
- decision process is in some ways much more reflective of a a broader range of interests. Well, the problem that they
- set out to fix, uh, one of the most obvious problems, and there were numerous ones, is that, um, they had
- made a really serious mistake in Basel 2 in ignoring the numerator in the minimum
- capital standard, the numerator and the middle and the the riskadjusted capital standard was supposed to um compare
- capital as the numerator to risk weighted assets. And the risk weights were supposed to
- indicate how risky the asset was. Well, there were huge problems in the risk weights. Uh we can get to that later.
- But the real problem with the capital definition is that they didn't even reconsider it. And the reason they
- didn't reconsider it is that when they originally negotiated Basel 1, about 85% of the time was taken up trying to agree
- on a definition of regulatory capital. Capital is one of those words that can have at least 10 or 12 different
- definitions. They started with capital to regulate banks because every single country had a capital ratio. But when
- you started looking at them in detail, they were all very different. In the United States, we had a huge proportion
- of loan loss reserves. Uh the Japanese counted unrealized gains on uh real estate and stock. Um the French that had
- just nationalized their whole banking system counted lots of preferred shares. And so that's why it took so long for
- them to come up with a right because and agreed. They were smart enough to know that if um you agree on a definition of
- capital that doesn't look like the capital we have, you're going to make it hard on our banks. Well, the Germans
- were sort of one end of the spectrum at that time, although they've now switched. And they thought that they we
- would ruin the rigor of the German regulation, in fact, banking regulation in general, if we went much beyond
- equity. and everybody else wanted something in addition to that. So they resolved it by having two kinds of
- regulatory capital. They ended up eventually with three kinds, but the third kind was never really used. Um but
- the first kind reflected the German view and it was originally shareholders equity um
- retained earnings and a very restricted kind of hybrid capital. It was a non-cumulative perpetual preferred
- security, which meant that if you missed a dividend, you didn't have to make it up. And perpetual meant that you never
- had to repay the principal. So like equity, it was with you to absorb loss without driving you out of business. The
- problem with debt contracts is that they can absorb loss, but only if you fail. And so all of this other stuff was
- really not very useful. Well, over time, banks, and this is a concern with the the uh very long leadin period to uh
- Basel 3, banks sort of whittleled away at that tier one definition because it was it was they considered the most
- burdensome kind of capital to have because issuing equity is is expensive. Um, and so what was originally a 4%
- requirement became generally sort of a 2% requirement with a lot of other stuff that was nothing like equity. Probably
- the most egregious example of that was that banks were able to count as cap as tier one capital deferred tax assets.
- Now, deferred tax assets are what you get when you make losses that you can't deduct because you don't have any
- income. Well, it's a kind of crazy thing to count as capital to protect you against going out of business because
- that's the time you're least likely to have the expectation of making income. So, that made no sense at all. The
- others were driven by trying to take advantage of tax laws because a lot of this is caused by um the asymmetry in
- the tax treatment of dividends and interest. Um, in general, governments will permit interest payments to be
- deducted for tax purposes, but dividends can't be. Uh, so there is an obvious incentive for people to try to finance
- themselves with debt instruments. and investment bankers spent a whole decade trying to invent instruments that were
- enough like equity that the regulators would accept them but enough uh like debt that the um tax authorities would
- permit them to be deducted. So you ended up with this very debased system. So they they whittleled that down to 2% and
- now uh bezel 3 is bringing it back up to 4%. Yeah, because one of the most embarrassing things that happened um
- during this crisis from a regulator's point of view is that in every case where a bank went under had to get a
- huge intervention. The regulators said well in the last reporting period they actually had way above the minimum
- required capital which simply means that our capital requirements were were kind
- of uh trivial and unimportant. Whittleled away too much. Yeah. Well, they were they were simply uh not uh sufficient.
- Uh and they were not what they were intended to be. Um as a result, the market paid no attention at all to
- regulatory capital. And that I guess is in the end the the thing that was uh most demeaning to the regulators because
- they could say all they wanted about regulatory capital and it made no difference in the market expectation.
- They were looking at tangible equity. Um so one of the first things to fix was the numerator and that meant more higher
- quality capital and in the eyes of regulators higher quality capital is equity because that's with you to absorb
- losses and let you continue doing businesses. And so they um not only uh have required more equity capital but
- they've tried to require three kinds of equity capital actually four. Um, the first one is pretty much like tier 1 was
- supposed to be, but rather than being 4%, it's now 4 1.5%. Um, there's kind of exaggerating by saying there's this huge
- increase in capital requirements from 2 to 4 and a half. Well, if you look at the original Basel agreement, they're
- really only going up half a percent for the minimum, which isn't very impressive. Um, then they're adding
- another 2.5% for what they call a buffer zone. And this is an attempt to um have the
- market accept the fact that capital can decline without making the bank more unsafe. Um what they may have done
- inadvertently however is create uh yet another problem because in principle when a bank starts eating into that
- buffer they're going to stop it from paying dividends and there may be sanctions on salaries and that sort of
- thing. Um and that could cause the market to lose a lot of confidence. I there should be some sanction, but
- ideally you'd like it to be graduated from something trivial to something more serious. Um, and it's not at all clear
- that that's the best way to handle the buffer. it may be a lot better to use something that is colloially called a
- Koka or a con mandatory convertible uh debt um which is a more complicated thing but it would allow tanks to get
- the tax benefit of having uh an interest thing but give you equity when you needed it. So, our banks, do you think
- going to voluntarily add yet another buffer on top of the buffer so that they don't Well, yeah, because um you know,
- living in the uncertain world, we do um nobody can be certain what you're going to earn in a year and you don't want to
- be in the position of having to not pay dividends. So, uh even as we saw with current capital requirements, banks
- voluntarily maintain a buffer above the minimum and so they'll probably maintain
- a buffer above that. But the third piece of it which is innovative and if it had
- been done well would have um been a real improvement is to deal with the fact that having risk adjusted capital
- requirements makes them much more proyclical than they otherwise would have been because it means that as the
- economy improves risk goes down. So the denominator goes down assuming you have the same capital. In fact, you'll be
- increasing it because retained earnings will increase. You have bigger lending capacity to sort of blow up the boom
- even larger. But on the way down, as risk increases, the denominator increases and as you get losses, capital
- declines. And so, you're going to contract lending even more. So, this is a you see this as a flaw in how they've
- designed this at this point? Yes, it's one of the the huge costs of having um riskadjusted capital requirements. Um,
- and they've tried to correct this in a very timid way. Um, and what they have done is to put it under pillar two,
- which means that nobody's going to know what they do because that's a secret agreement between the bank and and their
- supervisor, but they're going to add on a um an amount up to 2%. Could be anything from 0 to 2%. We won't know.
- when they think that demand is getting out of hand or the supply of credit is getting out of hand. So that will not be
- transparent. That will not be transparent. Um but it's intended to slow down the expansion so you won't
- have a pick a crash. The problem is that um inherently it's just very very difficult for a bank examiner making say
- 75 or $80,000 to go into a $10 million a year banker and say uh I know you're very profitable but I think that you're
- sitting on a lot of risk. Now, it's true they are because it's a standard saying
- that the worst loans are put on in the best of times. And we know that's true. But it's not very credible when uh the
- bank is in such good shape. Regulators have a lot more uh leverage when things get bad because they have uh some
- benefits to give out. So, um I think it's very unlikely that this is ever going to be imposed because it's always
- ambiguous about whether we are in a bubble or whether we're we have improving fundamentals because usually
- there's a little bit of each underneath. So, you've me you've mentioned a couple
- weaknesses here. Could you just kind of Well, then there's a fourth kind of capital before we get to the the rest of
- the weaknesses. Um and that is a leverage ratio. Um, and that's the one reason that that our banking system is
- actually in less trouble than Europe's because uh almost single-handedly Sheila Bear, the chairman of the FDIC, held on
- to the leverage ratio in the United States, which is um a a ratio of tier one capital to unweighted assets, but
- taking off balance sheet commitments on in their loan equivalent form. uh and so
- that put a limit on how much leverage you could have. Well, it turned out certain of the European banks, some
- leading banks like UBS and Deutsche Bank had leverage ratios as high as 50%. So assets to to tangible equity
- were so large that you had to be virtually perfect in risk management to be able to survive. Um it Switzerland
- became terrified when they figured it out and so they too have put in a leverage ratio because their banks are
- literally too big to save. They're both so large outside Switzerland that that it's large relative to their
- GDP. Um but the other European banks are not so sure they want to do it. So the compromise that was made is that they're
- going to aim for maybe a 3% leverage ratio, but it will be under tier 2. So, we're not going to really know. And they
- aim ultimately to make it tier one and an explicit requirement, but that may or may not happen because the Europeans are
- clearly dragging their feet. The Germans in particular, which is ironic given their earlier position, but they have a
- very weak stateowned sector and it's very hard for them to um raise equity. Uh moreover, the rule uh was made that you
- can't count loans from government as tier one and uh that that was a blow to Germany. And so I think the compromise
- was they got a pillar two leverage ratio. One of the other things about this that's uh striking is how long a
- delay there is before it's actually implemented. And of course the banks were afraid that this would um adversely
- affect them economically and so they they won at that buffer time. Um but um well they actually wanted lower
- standards. Uh but uh the compromise ended up being buffer time because uh most of the banking um so in fact you
- can read them on the BIS website in comments but uh all the the major bank lobbying groups and many of the major
- banks sent in arguments that look if you do this you're going to send the world economy into spiraling recession or
- depression because um if you raise required capital we're going to have to raise spreads on loans and um we're
- going to lend even less than we are now. And when you break down the argument into pieces, there's an element of truth
- to what banks are saying in the sense that um from the standard finance point of
- view, if they raise equity, they should be compensated in a lower cost of debt. But that's not going to happen for banks
- in general because we have guaranteed all of their debt. The one thing we did not do in the United States in any bank
- failure was let anybody who had a debt claim on a bank suffer except for layman brothers. And so they're not going to
- get the relief in a lower cost of debt that they could expect in a free capitalist system. So uh you know you
- can understand why they view that as a pure cost. But the reason that this long phase in period is thought to be helpful
- is that it's rather expensive to um do an IPO to raise debt. Um the big transactions costs and given the fact
- that banks are kind of in the doldrums at this point. Uh their PE ratios are not very attractive. So they'll have to
- pay a lot. Um so what they computed was how long it would take a bank to retain earnings to get to these ratios and you
- know you can make various assumptions about how that will happen but uh it it ends up to be something like 2018 or
- 2020. Um, and one of the subsidies we do not count, but we should in uh figuring out
- how much we're subsidizing the banking system is that we're really subsidizing those retained earnings by keeping
- interest rates so low that they have a natural build in spread that's just huge. And uh so there is some reason to
- believe they actually will retain the earnings to get there and you know once they're there I think most of the costs
- were really transitional costs. Um but there's a risk in that sort of policy. If we were to have a double dip
- recession, uh which I think is not impossible, uh we would be in even worse shape than
- uh we were before because uh banks would be um still unprepared to to deal with it.
- Um and uh the other problem is a political one. The longer you wait to phase in these things, the more
- effective bank lobbies are in weakening the fundamental regulations. So, what else is it important to know
- about Basil 3? Uh, well, that is it's a very complex package. Um, one thing they've already tried to do and it's
- clear they can't do it effectively is correct some of the risk weights. Um, one of the obvious mistakes they made
- was underestimating the riskiness of very lowrated debt like subprime u or uh CMOS or C collateralized mortgage back
- obligations. Um, and so they tried to fix that um I guess about a year and a half ago uh because it was such an
- obvious problem by doubling the risk weight on it. And it took about oh I don't know a month maybe five weeks for
- investment bankers to figure out a way around it. And because you can still tanch things, uh, all you have to do is
- create a new collateralized mortgage back security. And sometimes they would have it sort of guaranteed so that you
- would, uh, recolateralize it again and you could make enough of it AAA so that even with the greatly increased risk
- weights on the bottom piece, uh, you could actually lower your capital requirements. So, it's yet another
- indication of just how um I think misguided the whole notion is that they can estimate risk with enough precision
- to to have much of an impact. Um what what might have been a better approach? Uh I think in the end they're fooling
- themselves that they think they can do a lot better than a leverage ratio. uh you
- can do some simple things like uh taking government debt out or things that that
- are perfectly safe but uh in some ways I think Basel one had a closer it was it had distortions in it we all knew what
- they were uh but the distortions in Basel 2 are so subtle that I don't think that regulators will catch on to them
- and external analysts will have trouble tracking In in Europe, there are actually 168
- different implementation choices a bank can make. So, you'll have no idea how to compare them with another
- bank that may have made different choices. And with a lot of stuff coming under pillar 2 that we just don't know
- about, it's it's just very hard to know whether a bank that seems to have a lot of capital is very conservative or
- whether the regulators are scared to death and are causing them to hold more capital. But the other new thing about
- the Basel 3 requirements which isn't yet implemented has to do with um liquidity because one of the clear
- things uh actually it was uh overemphasized in my view was that liquidity was a major problem in the
- crisis. In fact, I think the regulators wasted a whole year treating it like a normal liquidity crisis when really as
- early as as August or September of of 2007, it was obvious that a number of banks were insolvent. But instead, the
- regulators chose to flood the market with liquidity. And um so they've decided that that banks need to be responsible
- for more of their own liquidity. And they're putting in two ratios for that. Um, one of them is pretty clear. The
- other one is sort of not ready for prime time, but they wanted to have a short-term ratio that would um enable a
- bank to survive a severe stress test for 30 days. Well, they did a trial run of it and um very few banks could survive
- it. So, they now have a less severe stress test. The banks are supposed to meet with 30 days on on their own
- liquidity. Um the other idea is to um limit the dependence of banks on wholesale funding. And so they have in
- mind a sort of long-term ratio that um they haven't really uh resolved yet. It's a hard thing to do. It may not be
- appropriate to do for every kind of financial institution. So it's not clear that's going to see the light of day.
- Well, thanks very much. We really appreciate you coming in today and uh look forward to following up if there's
- sounds like there may be a basil four in our future with all these things left undone. Well, it's not just that it's
- you have independent regulatory actions being undertaken by all the other major players, not least of which is the
- DoddFrank bill, which does not always correspond of what Basil is doing and um is turning out to be very very hard to
- implement.
Brief Summary
Wharton Professor Richard Harring discusses Basel 3 Accords and their impact on bank capital requirements and liquidity regulations.
Key points
- Basel 3 Accords Discussion. Professor Richard Harring discusses the implications of the Basel 3 Accords on banking regulations.
- Shift to G20 Governance. The shift from G10 to G20 reflects a new world governance system for finance.
- Flaws in Basel 2. Exploring the serious mistakes made in Basel 2 regarding capital definitions.
- Basel 3 Requirements. The Basel 3 requirements aim to hold banks accountable for their liquidity management.
- Challenges of Implementation. Implementing Basel regulations is complicated by independent regulatory actions like the Dodd-Frank bill.
Episode highlights
- Basel 3 Accords DiscussionProfessor Richard Harring discusses the implications of the Basel 3 Accords on banking regulations.βIt's a marked change, tidying up mistakes from Basel 2.β0:48Sep 29, 2010
- Shift to G20 GovernanceThe shift from G10 to G20 reflects a new world governance system for finance.βThe balance of economic power has shifted to Asia dramatically.β1:59Sep 29, 2010
- Flaws in Basel 2Exploring the serious mistakes made in Basel 2 regarding capital definitions.βThey ignored the numerator in the minimum capital standard.β4:05Sep 29, 2010
- Basel 3 RequirementsThe Basel 3 requirements aim to hold banks accountable for their liquidity management.βBanks need to be responsible for more of their own liquidity.β23:37Sep 29, 2010
- Challenges of ImplementationImplementing Basel regulations is complicated by independent regulatory actions like the Dodd-Frank bill.βIt's turning out to be very very hard to implement.β25:04Sep 29, 2010





