Can Anyone Regulate a $400 Trillion Market?

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Outgoing U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission head Gary Gensler talks about how the agency has created a regulatory regime to rein in yesterday's excesses. 📂 Finance & Accounting;Public Policy

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  1. today at knowledge at wharton we're speaking with gary gensler and he's the chairman of the commodities futures
  2. trading commission thank you for joining us today gary no it's terrific to be back at my alma
  3. mater oh great um your career on wall street has not prevented you from being um
  4. a target of criticism by your former wall street colleagues and um most of that is happening because
  5. of the way you would like to interpret the dodd-frank and other financial reforms
  6. now your tenure comes to a close in just a couple months at the end of 2013 and a lot of people would be sort of
  7. buffing up their plaques on the wall and starting to pack their boxes but instead
  8. you're actually involved in one of the most intense debates of your entire career at the commission so um
  9. you're also overseeing a market of derivatives that's somewhere between 400 and 600 or 700
  10. trillion dollars you can you can fill us in on what the right number is um could you talk about what
  11. this latest intense debate is about i think it has to do with with overseeing overseas derivatives and
  12. getting them or not getting them on to an exchange well let me let me start by saying
  13. these financial contracts called derivatives or swaps were at the center of the 2008 crisis
  14. and 8 million people lost their jobs in that crisis and large businesses like the insurance company aig
  15. we americans as taxpayers bailed out because it was so interconnected with the rest of the economy through
  16. the unregulated swaps marketplace that's what this is about ensuring uh that there's transparency in
  17. the markets and ensuring that large financial firms have the freedom to fail rather than each of us americans putting
  18. our hard-earned dollars in to bail out those businesses well aig you might remember had
  19. a large swaps business which actually was run overseas there are four flung operations
  20. actually nearly brought down our u s economy so this most recent debate about the
  21. cross-border application was to ensure that our laws are not strictly territorial
  22. but they actually will cover the far-flung operations the branches and guaranteed affiliates
  23. of u.s financial institutions and we've been successful congress gives gave us those authorities
  24. and our commission voted out guidance in july to do that that is um it's a parallel situation to
  25. the banks and bank regulations correct where we're too big to fail is uh is it's it's
  26. a problem in preventing that partly because uh so many operations can be overseas so you
  27. you face that same problem you have as i understand it overseas regulators or certainly financial folks
  28. overseas that aren't very happy about this and are coming to a kicking and screaming and probably
  29. fighting it in many legal ways too so what what what's your defense when uh you know the uk or someone says wait a
  30. minute this this transaction originated here in london you can't impose your regulations washington on
  31. what we're doing over here actually we we've been on a journey together uh from 2009 when president obama got
  32. the leaders of 20 nations together in pittsburgh it was called the g20 summit in pittsburgh in 2009 and there was
  33. broad agreement on bringing new oversight to these once dark markets and europe canada japan the u.s
  34. we've been on this journey together they've had very strong laws in place in europe and in japan and the
  35. u.s we might be a little ahead on timing and that creates some challenges because of different timing
  36. uh but we really are on this journey together so the broad structure you're in agreement i
  37. know the devil's in the details and that's where yes this is those areas and but there's
  38. a lot of details um and a lot of dust devils so so uh a fair review is that on uh
  39. three or four areas just we're smack on about the same place and a couple of areas we're not so
  40. reporting to regulators meaning all of these transactions have to be reported to regulators that's been going
  41. on in the u.s since december of last year 400 trillion dollars of derivatives reported into the data repositories here
  42. in the u.s as we speak that there's something called central clearing that helps lower the
  43. risk of the marketplace it's it's been around for 120 years in other markets we've just brought this common sense
  44. reform to the swaps market in the u.s we have phased it from march until this october and it is now fully
  45. in place and the last data we had was nearly three quarters of the transactions in
  46. the middle of september were being cleared in the interest rate markets europe will
  47. put that in place uh sometime in the middle to second half of next year so there's some timing difference and then
  48. uh we have what's called the risk mitigation techniques that that the various dealers have to have
  49. clean up their back office the boring back office part of this but swaps have to be documented they have to
  50. be confirmed they have to be reconciled in all of those three areas we're really
  51. uh in sync i would say the one area that has has been um we americans have put in law and others
  52. have yet to join is that the public benefits from transparency and economists have shown whether
  53. they're at wharton or elsewhere economists have shown for decades that transparency price and volume of
  54. transactions helps the broader public it helps the 99 plus percent of the public that might use these
  55. contracts but it does shift some of the information advantage from wall street to main street we've put
  56. that in place we have post-trade reporting in the u.s that means every transaction is reported
  57. now publicly we're just initiating uh that trading platforms as well have to be registered
  58. um but as you might know europe is only now passing a law to do that as well and i think they will pass
  59. a strong law but there are some differences because we're about two years gap on the law when that gap's closed
  60. will there be um incentives for some organizations to try to let's say originate you know
  61. outside of these 20 countries and and you know so there's always the argument with some regulation that well if you
  62. if you regulate too much then things just go underground and they become less transparent but i mean
  63. you're in september you're saying you captured three quarters of the of the swamps in the u.s so can i go to
  64. the cayman islands well maybe that's a bad example because i know there are just some new rules passed there but can
  65. i go to some other you know outside of these 20 countries and initiate my my swap and avoid some of this paperwork
  66. well risk knows no geographic border or boundary so what we've done here in the u.s
  67. has said if you're a u.s person or if you're an overseas branch of that u.s person
  68. or you're an overseas affiliate that's guaranteed by the u.s person you're covered by
  69. these reforms that only makes sense because we have to remember and recall the lessons of the crisis
  70. that so many of the u.s banks came asunder because of their offshore uh enterprises in the cayman islands and
  71. elsewhere if you want to set up in the cayman islands and you have nothing to do with
  72. the u.s you're by all rights go ahead but if you're guaranteed back here by the mothership in the u.s you're a
  73. branch back here in the u.s then you need to be covered sounds pretty um a pretty advanced state of global
  74. regulation really how would you compare that to what's happened in banking are you are the two
  75. industries more or less i know they're interrelated but are they following parallel tracks or do you think that
  76. this swap business is maybe a little bit ahead now we've been very successful with the
  77. commodity futures trading commission we were given about 60 rules to write by congress
  78. that was three years ago and as we are here today we've completed 61 in fact rules
  79. guidances and orders and for the last year the markets have been coming into compliance
  80. i'm very proud of all of the people at the cftc we've largely completed the task the president and congress gave us
  81. that's partially true for bank regulation around the globe but it's not as far along in bank regulation
  82. you've been quoted as saying that the cftc is not going to allow the creation of another enron
  83. loophole could you tell us what you were referring to when you said that well there was there were various reforms
  84. that congress passed 13 years ago in a in a different era and as part of those reforms
  85. there was an allowance an exemption for trading platforms from registration i mean think about it as that you could
  86. operate a a restaurant or maybe if you wish a casino without having a proper license without having to
  87. allow inspectors to come into your restaurant or your casino and that was all right that's where congress
  88. was in 2000. that came to be known as the enron loophole a number of senators and congressmen and
  89. even senator obama in june of 2008 put out a release saying that he felt that we should close this enron loophole
  90. that we should no longer have unlicensed restaurants or casinos in the swaps trading
  91. area that's what congress did they repealed that exemption and with rules that we completed that
  92. went into effect on october 2nd of this year now if you want to trade on a trading
  93. platform it has to not only have a license but it has to have certain business conduct it
  94. has to be open to the whole broad public not just to a select view and these reforms will really help
  95. promote transparency in our economy you talked about a market of 400 trillion put that next to
  96. the entire u.s economy which is about 16 trillion so it's a big number um confront it with
  97. that and you one has to ask how can you possibly regulate something so big and sprawling what what are some
  98. of the fundamental principles that you start out with when you do that and how did you accomplish that
  99. so here's a market that actually is 25 times the size of our economy the notional
  100. amount the risk is is not quite that big so the fundamental principles going back
  101. to basics transparency matters you can shift information from the few dealers to the broad public and that makes an
  102. economy work better that's true whether it's in automobiles where we now can go on the internet we
  103. can see the price of automobiles before we go into the dealership and it's as true and important in these
  104. swaps so the market is your partner enforcer in a way well beyond that that we promote
  105. economic activity and efficiency in markets which is a fancy economic word saying that it cost you less
  106. if the market's transparent i have three daughters and uh they're young i wouldn't give
  107. them the keys to the car if i didn't think there were rules of the road that years ago the state legislature passed
  108. laws to have traffic lights and stop signs and cops on the beat to insure against drunk
  109. drivers i mean i just wouldn't give my daughters the keys to the car that's what we were
  110. doing in this swaps market it was unregulated and because of the crisis congress said
  111. no we have to have common sense rules of the road for the big highways of finance the same
  112. way we might have for the back roads for my daughters that's the basic principle after
  113. they ran the tractor trailer off the road well they did if i might just pause there
  114. so that's what we saw aig and others had fantastic accidents and they took out the the bystanders
  115. so so you could have been a pedestrian so to speak on the road and you could have been one of eight
  116. million that lost your job and having never heard of what a credit default swap my my mom she's 86 she still asked me
  117. gary what's a swap you know so so our job in washington and it's very different than
  118. when i once was fortunate enough to work on wall street for many years but our job is to look out for that
  119. broad public interest transparency and lowering risk and ensuring against manipulation and fraud for the
  120. general public you know it's interesting that uh with the uh aig bailout which i think was
  121. something like 180 billion that's right six hundred dollars for each and every american
  122. and i know that um i know that they've claimed not that long ago that they they paid it
  123. back with interest and i know there's a lot of folks who say but that you know that's miscounting or
  124. misaccounting there's a lot of other costs that that weren't added up in there and that there was probably actually a
  125. direct loss to the taxpayer but putting that controversy aside what you mentioned um is interesting
  126. that eight million jobs were lost they were a big contributor to that that's never
  127. on the ledgers that's never counted that's that's separate and apart from you know the you know the 180 billion
  128. and we and they paid that back um so just i mean it sounds like you're you're concerned about that and i find
  129. it interesting because you don't hear a lot of concern about that um it tends to be you know about the
  130. debits and credits and it turns into a technical discussion a lot of times and the human side is lost
  131. no no there's a very real human side i mean beyond the eight million people that
  132. lost their jobs i mean millions uh found themselves with homes that were valued less than
  133. their mortgages and and and millions found their pension and savings lower hundreds of thousands of
  134. businesses didn't make their budget in 2008 and 2009. there's real live consequences
  135. to the public from these what might be considered otherwise sort of narrow part of the economy do you know that
  136. non-finance in our economy the non-finance side employs 94 percent of private sector jobs and of
  137. the other six percent most of that is insurance or community banks only a very small slice
  138. is what we might call wall street but they produce more than 40 percent of the profits i think
  139. well but ultimately ultimately finance has got to serve the real economy finance is about what wharton it's
  140. studied it's about allocating the money in society to the best uses so that my family's savings or
  141. your family's savings is allocated to another family that wants to take out a mortgage
  142. or somebody that has a good idea and wants to innovate and start a business finance is about serving the rest of the
  143. economy and these complex market swaps uh if well regulated or a component of serving the rest of the economy but not
  144. taking down the rest of the economy right and i cite the 40 percent uh not so much to underline the
  145. importance of the industry of course it's very important but but to also note there's many economists
  146. uh and financial observers from across the spectrum who say that that's an imbalanced
  147. economy when you have that much of your economy based uh in finance well and and in fact economists will say
  148. if you bring efficiency to a market you usually narrow the profit spread and can produce the same product for
  149. less cost we all like it that our computers cost less today than they did three years ago or ten years ago
  150. transparency in the swaps market will provide the risk reduction of swaps for but for
  151. a lower cost one last question um i hope it's not a hard one i'm wondering you you're talking about
  152. regulating 400 trillion dollars worth of swaps i think you have about four employees
  153. working right now in your agency we're right now under the government shutdown still um
  154. you're the only financial regulator that's actually shut down except for a few key people um
  155. how does that work or not work well the staff of the cftc have proven themselves to be remarkably resilient
  156. the 650 that were furloughed and have not come in i thank them for their resilience of
  157. putting their uh professional lives on hold and living with this uncertainty for the 30
  158. who have come in each day and um each day we have an all hands meeting and we get together to say are
  159. you still here i fit them in one room one room one room and we go around everybody talks i thank them as well
  160. it we're not doing anything other than a cursory review of markets at this point
  161. in time this is not um adequately overseeing the markets and we're a gravely underfunded agency
  162. to start with we're only about five percent bigger than we were 20 years ago and that was before congress
  163. gave us this new responsibility to oversee a 400 trillion dollar market so i i wonder how many times bigger the
  164. market is can you do that math well we we had overseen a market called the futures
  165. market which historically was in corn and wheat and oil but it also was in financial
  166. products like the euro dollar contract and the s p 500. that total market was about 30 trillion
  167. dollars and congress asked us to take on this other market this 400 trillion dollar market so you
  168. can see and with that new responsibility we don't have more people there's one other odd thing about that i think
  169. that i've come across which is that i believe your agency was responsible for bringing in something like
  170. almost a billion dollars worth of fines is that correct over the last year or so well in the
  171. heart of the 2008 crisis what our agency the cftc found is that large financial institutions
  172. banks were readily and pervasively rigging the interest rate market there's something called the london
  173. interbank offer rate which is in many of your viewers mortgages and student loans and and
  174. business loans and that marketplace was being rigged by major banks we've brought four
  175. actions and you're right collectively those four actions against three big banks and one
  176. broker have brought in i think over two over two billion dollars to the u.s treasury somebody went back and they
  177. figured out that that added up to the last 17 years of our agency's funding well maybe in the future you'll be able
  178. to get a small cut of that no we don't i we're a good investment to the american public because you
  179. need cops on the road you need somebody looking we're also a good investment i would contend to wall street though
  180. they don't always agree with what we do their brand is wrapped up in the confidence in the markets could
  181. you imagine would anybody come to the football games on sundays if there were no referees i
  182. mean for a week or two it might be interesting but after that it would not we need referees to
  183. ensure that people have confidence in the markets thanks very much for joining us
  184. appreciate it thank you you

Brief Summary

Gary Gensler discusses financial regulations, derivatives, and the importance of market transparency in this episode.

Key points

  • The Role of Derivatives in the 2008 Crisis. Gary Gensler discusses how derivatives contributed to the financial crisis and the need for regulation.
  • The Enron Loophole. Gensler explains the reforms made to prevent another Enron-like situation in swaps trading.
  • The Size of the Swaps Market. Gensler reveals the staggering size of the swaps market compared to the U.S. economy.

Tension

50/ 100Some tension

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