Richard Marston on Risk Credit Crisis

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Credit Crisis Interview: Richard Marston on Risk Credit Crisis πŸ“‚ Public Policy

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  1. [Music] This Knowledge at Wharton podcast and videocast is brought to you by Wharton
  2. Executive Education. For more information on Wharton's executive programs, such as the executive
  3. development program, leading and managing people or the new high potential leaders course, please visit
  4. executive education.warton.upen.edu. [Music] Although the subprime crisis seems to be
  5. showing some signs of easing, debate over what caused it, whether it could have been prevented, and how long it
  6. might last will continue for some time to come. Knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton finance professor Richard
  7. Marston for his perspective on the latest economic developments. Welcome, Professor Marston. Well, glad to be
  8. here. Looking back over the past few years, risk premiums have fluctuated dramatically and uh most people don't
  9. understand what this means. Can you explain it? Well, it's natural for over time for markets to uh change um in
  10. terms of interest rates, in terms of the spreads of riskier assets over uh US government bonds um to see the stock
  11. market fluctuate. Um, in the case of bonds though, it's um it's much easy to understand what's going on in terms of
  12. being able to measure what what is happening and in that we have the the spread of interest rates between uh
  13. riskier bonds and uh treasury bonds. And if you watch the spread over time, you can get a good indication of what the
  14. market is actually thinks is happening in terms of of of risk. And uh recently prior to the crisis uh the spreads on
  15. high yield bonds and emerging market bonds um came down to much lower levels than normal.
  16. So people thought the market is not that risky. That's right. If you look at the
  17. spreads uh winter uh a year ago what you find is that the spreads on high yield bonds had come all the way down to 2 and
  18. a.5%. Now the average spread in the long run is something like 5 to 6%. So the market was saying that uh high yield
  19. bonds, the bonds of corporations with lower credit standing were were simply looking much less risky than they
  20. normally are. Um the spreads on emerging market bonds had come down to 1.6%. And once again, what we're seeing
  21. is the market saying that emerging market bonds are just much less risky than they have been over the last 10 or
  22. 15 years. Now the market was saying that they were less risky. Were they really less risky or was this just uh looking
  23. at the market with rosecolored glasses? That's uh you know that's how judgments differ in the market. Um I felt a winter
  24. ago that uh the spreads looked uh very unattractive to me as an investor. Um in fact I was recommending to investors
  25. that they actually invest um 0% in emerging market bonds that the spreads have come down so far that there simply
  26. wasn't enough reward for the risk. On the other hand, if the market as a whole is pricing securities that way, that
  27. means there's an awful lot of the people in the market that disagree with me. That's what makes a market. And what
  28. were we shown when the subprime uh mark crisis began? Well, what we found is um is that uh it was like a um a fire. We
  29. need a spark to set the fire and uh the spark h happened to be in subprime loans. If it hadn't been there, it would
  30. have been some other security. But uh once the um once you see the the fire start uh everyone starts to realize it's
  31. going to spread. It's going to spread to other types of securities that have nothing to do with mortgages. And uh
  32. what happens is um risk is reassessed by the market and securities that would have had a spread of 4% just a few
  33. months ago suddenly have a spread of 7%. And uh this happens normally it it happened back in 1998 when there was a
  34. financial crisis that actually began in Russian government bonds of all things Russian government bonds. What the
  35. Russians decided to do is default on many of the government bonds. And as soon as that default occurred of course
  36. the Russian bonds were not worth very much but immediately the bonds of other emerging markets were suddenly
  37. reassessed and people wouldn't buy the bonds at the original prices. they insisted on much higher interest rates
  38. and then soon thereafter other securities were reassessed. High yield bonds in the United States um Danish
  39. mortgage back bonds of all things. Um and what we're learning is that this financial market of ours is very
  40. interconnected. And uh when you see a an reassessment of risk of one security, the market then very quickly reassesses
  41. risk on other securities. This time it was subprime loans. And what does that have to do with high yield bonds? And
  42. why why were high yield bonds then repriced? So there was just a general aversion to risk at the time that caused
  43. all of these bonds that were perceived as riskier to fall in price and make their interest rates. That's right. And
  44. what we had was a reassessment of risk and it affected a lot of securities that had nothing to do with mortgages. Now,
  45. one of the things we've seen uh in in the in the past few months or the past year is that the prices of of many uh
  46. debt securities have fallen tremendously even though there haven't been that many
  47. defaults in many of these categories. And and uh I if if the the issuers of the bonds are still making the payments
  48. they originally promised, it seems like uh these ought to be a good deal at these very low prices. And yet there
  49. seems to be this tremendous reluctance of investors to buy them even at these deep discounts. What has caused this
  50. when there haven't been so many defaults? What we worry about is um is the future. What we worry about is um
  51. how well the securities are going to do in the future and that's what the price is supposed to be indicating. That's
  52. what this the spread of the interest rate over treasuries supposed to be indicating. And if if we see the economy
  53. slowing down, and we're certainly seeing that at this point, um, and we see the risk of further turmoil in the financial
  54. markets, which we certainly were seeing in last fall, we were seeing in uh during the winter, we were seeing it
  55. into March. We were seeing the possibility that the that the deteriorating fixed income market could
  56. get even worse. And as a result, people were were not taking chances. They were bidding up the spreads of high yield
  57. bonds. Uh they were bidding up the spreads of of emerging market bonds. Um it wasn't just mortgage back securities
  58. and that's a natural development. Um and then of course there was the rescue of Bear Sterns and that turned the tables.
  59. Yes, the Federal Reserve has gotten involved and and the rescue of Beer Sterns was the most obvious example or
  60. the most prominent in the news. It's also done a lot of other things like uh lending to securities firms, US
  61. treasuries, and taking riskier mortgage back securities in trade as collateral, things it doesn't normally do. Uh are
  62. these a good idea, a bad idea? Are they working or not? Well, let's let's start off with what a bank normally does and
  63. has been doing for um in the case of the Bank of England for over 20 or 30 years.
  64. And that is to uh butress the banking system whenever there's a danger within the banking system. And what the bank of
  65. England learned they had to do in the 19th century and what the Fed has has been doing since it was founded is
  66. stepping in whenever there's a liquidity crisis, when banks are running short of
  67. of funding and they need some additional funding from the central bank. That's traditional banking function and you
  68. could see that very dramatically in August. This is before the Federal Reserve started lowering interest rates.
  69. The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank in concert uh moved into the market and started to
  70. flood the banks with sec with with liquidity and that's very important because what was happening at the time
  71. is the interbank rate in the Liebore market the London interbank market um those interest rates were going very
  72. high. Traditionally, liebore rates have an average uh spread over treasuries of about 50 basis points, half a percent.
  73. But in August of last year, the spread went up to 2 and a half%. And that that's basically sending off alarm bells
  74. saying that the banks are in distress. They don't trust each other. Um the the system needs more liquidity. So the Fed
  75. stepped in and provided liquidity. That was a very traditional banking function.
  76. Of course, that wasn't enough because later in the fall, what we found was um that um the banks and the investment
  77. banks were were having some difficulty with um funding their positions and the Fed expanded its role, not as
  78. dramatically as it did it this spring, but basically expanded its role to taking in securities that they normally
  79. wouldn't have taken in in trade. Uh once again, rather traditional banking function, uh trying to buttress the
  80. banking system. and um that kind of thing would have worked and solved the problem 20 years ago.
  81. What's changed? What's changed is that in the meantime we've uh we've um had a revolution in securization and what has
  82. happened is the uh banking institutions including investment banks have learned about ways to fund investments, fund uh
  83. securities uh ways that were really not tried in the in the early 1980s. And this has allowed the um for example in
  84. the mortgage market, it's allowed the mortgage market to expand much more dramatically than it could have
  85. otherwise. So what uh mortgage brokers do is they originate the securities, package them together, the banks package
  86. them together and then sell them to uh to pension plants and so on. Um this has opened up tremendous possibilities for
  87. the financial markets. Uh but it's also changed the role of the central bank in terms of what they have to do in a
  88. crisis. Now the first time we saw this was in uh 1998 again. In 1998 we had the Russians default on their government
  89. bonds and soon uh bond markets for a lot of securities having nothing to do with
  90. Russian government bonds froze up. Soon thereafter we saw that major hedge fund in New York um long-term capital
  91. management ran into trouble. So why would we care whether or not a hedge fund runs into trouble? Well, it turns
  92. out that the hedge fund highly leveraged positions has many of the same securities that the banks are holding
  93. and many of the same securities that the investment banks are holding. So, um, in
  94. some sense, securization has made the system much more interconnected than it was before. So, the Fed could have stuck
  95. to its normal role and said, "Oh, we're only responsible for commercial banks." And um, that would have been interesting
  96. to see what would have happened. It wouldn't have been pretty. But the Fed had an ingenious solution. Then what
  97. they did is they organized a meeting down at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York and lower Manhattan and invited the
  98. CEOs of virtually every major bank in the United States and many of the banks in Europe. Called them to meeting and
  99. said, uh, basically as as we understand it, um, wouldn't it be a good idea for all of us if you were to fund a rescue
  100. of this hedge fund that is about to go under? Wouldn't it be a great idea if you Maril Lynch and you City Bank and uh
  101. you Smith Barney would have put up $300 million each and of course everyone around the room with a few exceptions
  102. including the head of Bear Star said uh gee that would be a wonderful idea because this would be in our interest be
  103. in the interest of our shareholders. And so the Fed in a sense finessed the problem of um of a crisis being so large
  104. that it was no longer enough to be a traditional central bank. They finessed that problem by organizing a rescue
  105. which didn't involve any Federal Reserve money. One of the concerns back in the long-term capital management crisis was
  106. that uh the the hedge fund owned so many bonds of different types that if it went
  107. under and ended dumping them on the market at fire sale prices, it would cause prices of other banks holdings to
  108. collapse. and there would be kind of a domino effect. That's the concern. And that's the reason why the CEOs of these
  109. major firms, what they said to themselves is, is it in the interest of our shareholders and our management to
  110. provide $300 million each? And almost to the last person around the table, they came up with the money. And um in a
  111. sense, the Fed finessed the problem that time and very brilliantly. By the way, I
  112. was always a fan of that rescue. This time, it's different. Now this time as it it's uh it's sort of built on that it
  113. seems to me it's a little more extensive. How how so? Well um once again what we had was a institution
  114. getting into trouble much bigger institution. We're talking about Bear Sterns one of the major investment
  115. banks. Um but a lot of the um a lot of the situation was very similar in the in the sense that Bear Sterns was holding
  116. securities in a highly leveraged portfolio which were also being held by Croup, by Meil Lynch, by Goldman
  117. Sachs, by UBS, by many of banks of the world and investment banks. And so, uh, what the Fed could do, the Treasury
  118. could have done was to say, "Well, Bear Sterns, it's not the biggest investment bank in the world. Um, let's let the
  119. market work here." And, um, the great thing is that the head of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernani, has actually done
  120. a study of what happened the last time the federal government let the banking system go down in a domino effect. And
  121. his study of the of the depression was, of course, one of the major studies of that period. And um I think that
  122. informed him a great deal about what to do in this crisis because the worry is that if you allow Bear Sterns to go
  123. under, you allow them to dump all their securities in the market, remember this is a very highly levered firm, uh what
  124. happens is an awful lot of other firms in the United States as well as in Europe and elsewhere in the world are at
  125. risk. And subsequent to the Bear Stern's uh uh rescue, there have been other things that they've done and some of
  126. them preceded that which was making basically making money available to keep liquidity in the market. Uh are are
  127. these things that we're going to need on a continuing basis or do you see this crisis abating and going back to the
  128. sort of the practices that preceded it? Well, let me uh put my neck out on the line and say this episode we've probably
  129. seen the worst and we probably do not have I may regret these words, but we probably do not have another bear sterns
  130. lurking during this crisis. But that doesn't tell us that we don't have a problem in the future because when you
  131. think of it, um we're going to continue to have securization. In fact, we might have increased leverage in the future.
  132. And we haven't solved the problem of um how does a system that has been set up of system of regulation to to watch over
  133. commercial banks and leave hedge funds and leave investment banks relatively unregulated. How is that system going to
  134. withstand the next crisis? Now, the next crisis might be 10 years from now. It might be a totally different um
  135. administration. Of course, it will be a new administration. um it'll be a different set of actors. A lot of the
  136. regulators would have retired. We'll have a new new breed. Um but the same issues will occur again. And the
  137. question is in a um highly integrated financial sector with uh a tremendous amount of securization, high leverage,
  138. more leverage outside the commercial banking system than inside it. Um is it possible to have another bear sterns?
  139. And the obvious answer is of course. And the question is then how would we handle
  140. it the next time? Would it be a bigger problem next time? So we're faced with an issue of whether or not the old
  141. system of regulation is going to continue to work in the future and that's that's the number of the problem.
  142. Uh the the sort of extreme view on on one end of the scale is that well uh many of these big institutions suffered
  143. enormous losses and uh chief executives lost their jobs and there's there's been
  144. a lot of bloodletting and that alone should be less than enough to not not get out on this limb in the future. But
  145. you think that's probably not enough just leaving the market to sort it out. You have you have to remember that u the
  146. people who have learned this lesson will no longer be in leadership positions 5 10 years from now. We'll have a new uh a
  147. new group of people. There's a lot of turnover in the financial services industry. The careers are relatively
  148. short. And so what we'll have are are people who are traders today will be running the firms 10 years from now or
  149. so on. Uh the question is what what do we learn from history from the LTCM uh episode? Did did hedge funds learn that
  150. they had to be much more careful? Well, the next couple years, yes, they probably learned. But do current hedge
  151. funds uh behave um differently than they did in the late '9s because of LTCM? The
  152. answer is probably not. Probably not. There's um there's a short memory in the financial markets, particularly if the
  153. rewards are tremendously large, and they are for the individual players as well as for the shareholders, but
  154. particularly for the individual players. if you take some chances and let's we let's look at the uh previous five
  155. years. Suppose you were one of those people that were very riskaverse and you were in charge of fixed income at one of
  156. the major houses. You saw the spreads come down and down and down and you pulled back and you said well this
  157. institution I'd like to maintain a more conservative position. What would have happened to you within the industry? The
  158. answer is you probably would have had a fairly short career. And I could name some names of people who whose careers
  159. were shortened during this five-year period um because they were a little more conservative than than their peers.
  160. Whereas on the other hand, if you take your chances and if you make your money and over the 5-year period there's some
  161. very large bonuses to be had um and then the system blows up, you're still much better off, aren't
  162. you? Well, it certainly seems an individual actor. Certainly many of the CEOs who who left in shame left with a
  163. lot of money in shame and uh uh they're they're not out selling pencils. Um now as you mentioned the regulatory system
  164. is well it seems to be kind of a patchwork that's been built over the decades. parts of it originating back in
  165. the 1930s. And now we have with the repeal of GlassSteagall some years ago uh and
  166. and and other changes, we have different kinds of firms getting into lines of business that at other times they were
  167. barred from and uh the result is apparently a lack of regulation in some of these areas. Do you see that there
  168. needs to be some change in the regulatory structure? I think the answer um should be obvious to everyone, but
  169. I'm not sure that it will be obvious to Congress and the new administration is the following. That um in this episode,
  170. what we found was that the Fed had to stre to stretch its uh mandate in order to rescue the system. Um the Fed had to
  171. go in and provide funding to an investment bank which traditionally has been outside of the purview of the Fed.
  172. Um this is not like uh trying to rescue a commercial bank in 1980 because they're having funding problems. This is
  173. very different. It's going in because you know that the portfolio of securities of this investment bank uh is
  174. being held by commercial banks as well as by other investment banks and the financial sector as a whole is in
  175. danger. That's expanding the Fed Fed's role and if you're going to expand their responsibility, I think you have to
  176. expand their ability to oversee these institutions and I think it has to be done wisely and you have to think very
  177. carefully about what kind of regulation would be necessary and clearly um many of us believe that the less regulation
  178. the better. But once you have the Federal Reserve committing potentially committing taxpayers money, um you then
  179. have to say, well, does the Federal Reserve have to play more of a role in regulation? And this would mean reg
  180. regulation of investment banks. That's right. Regulation in terms of thinking through what kind of capital
  181. requirements are needed um if you're an investment bank as opposed to a commercial bank. I noticed uh uh one
  182. assessment said that Beer Sterns had a leverage of something like 33 to1. So for every $33 it had at risk, it really
  183. only had $1 uh uh in in real capital. Uh is that too much? Is that something needs to be overseen? That's something
  184. that um that's for the details of the regulation, but clearly commercial banks would not be able to get away with that
  185. kind of leverage. Commercial banks definitely have a lot of leverage but they wouldn't be able to get away with
  186. that much leverage without having I mean we have a whole set of rules international rules uh for banks on how
  187. much capital they have to hold behind each type of asset. We also have to reconsider the um oversight of
  188. offbalance sheet entities on the part of the commercial banks as well as the investment banks. Um, can we sit sit
  189. back and say, "Oh, it's all right for a commercial bank to set up an off uh balance sheet entity as long as they
  190. don't formally commit to rescuing those entities." Well, this episode's taught us some things. Uh, when push came to
  191. shove, the banks, many of them, stepped in and took over the entire book of these offbalance sheet entities, pulling
  192. them into their own balance sheets. That means that um in a sense they're now under the purview of the Federal Reserve
  193. and I think we have to rethink that. The the banks really had to do that or nobody would do business with them in
  194. the future. Yes, I'm certainly not criticizing the banks for trying to protect their their good reputation by
  195. using the offbalance sheet entities. They were carrying in fact liabilities that they didn't show. So people looking
  196. at the banks didn't really have a clear picture of the risk there. So transparency is always one of the early
  197. things you want to do in a crisis to make sure people understand risks even if you're going to let them take them.
  198. Is that right? That's exactly right. And that's what we want to uh guard against
  199. in the future. Making sure that there's much more transparency. You would have thought we would have learned from uh
  200. Enron that uh offbalance sheet entities can be dangerous particularly if we're talking about the major commercial banks
  201. of this country. And yet we don't seem to have learned enough lessons from from Enron. Now there's also been some talk
  202. about the way the mortgage business has evolved and uh we have companies that are uh initiating lo mortgages and
  203. others that are bundling them up into securities and uh mortgage brokers and many of these are are sort of
  204. unregulated or at least there's no central regulation at the federal level. Should there be? I think uh the mortgage
  205. industry has changed so much and we definitely used to have government federal government regulation of the
  206. provision of mortgages through the SNLs. Uh now we have mortgage brokers who are
  207. subject um as far as I can tell to uh a minimal amount of regulation um and oversight and uh we've heard about some
  208. pretty bad practices in the mortgage brokerage industry by a minority of of participants but nonetheless um
  209. upsetting to us because we know that ultimately the spark that set off this blaze was in the subprime mortgage
  210. market and the mortgage market in general. So clearly we're going to have to look at mortgage originations. Uh how
  211. much oversight there should be. Um we also have to worry about whether or not if a bank is going to package together a
  212. mortgage um would it be a good idea for the bank to be required to hold on to some of the mortgages in a sense to as
  213. we say um keep some skin in the game to make sure if they implode the bank will lose some money and it's not just passed
  214. on to somebody in Abu Dhabi or some place. That's right. That's exactly right. to try to get the banks to think
  215. of themselves. I mean, it's a wonderful thing that we've uh developed the financial market so we don't have an SNL
  216. um in uh Philadelphia that goes under because it's uh funding 30-year mortgages with uh short-term deposits. I
  217. mean, that was an absolute crazy system. Um now we have the ability to uh bundle
  218. together some mortgages um diversify them and then sell them to institutional investors. What a wonderful thing.
  219. Securization is such a sensible idea. But somehow we have to make sure that um that there's oversight first of all of
  220. the origination of the mortgages and then that the packages of the mortgages, whether they're commercial banks or
  221. investment banks, um somehow pay a little more attention to the quality of the securities that they're developing.
  222. Um, and one way to do that would be to require that they have some capital invested in those same securities so
  223. they'll share the losses. But these are the kinds of things that I think we have
  224. to think about. We have a change in in the administration coming up. We have an election, changes in Congress. Um, after
  225. the election, I think people are going to have to sit down in Washington and really think through what would be the
  226. minimum minimal amount of regulation which would make this system of ours safer. uh which would make the mortgage
  227. um system fairer to Americans and more sensible from the point of view of the stability of the financial system. But
  228. more generally, what what is the minimum amount of regulation which will make uh
  229. the financial sector as a whole safer? Well, this story is going to be running for quite some time we can tell. Uh
  230. thank you very much, Professor Marston. Thank you for inviting me. [Music] For more information, please visit
  231. knowledge.warton.upen.edu. [Music]

Brief Summary

Richard Marston discusses the subprime crisis, risk premiums, and the Federal Reserve's role in managing financial instability.

Key points

  • Understanding Risk Premiums. Professor Marston explains the fluctuations in risk premiums and their implications for investors.
  • The Spark of the Crisis. Marston likens the onset of the subprime crisis to a fire needing a spark.
  • Future Concerns. Marston discusses the uncertainty surrounding the future performance of securities amidst economic turmoil.
  • Lessons from Bear Stearns. Marston reflects on the lessons learned from the Bear Stearns crisis and its implications for future regulation.
  • The Role of the Federal Reserve. Discussing the expanded role of the Fed in regulating investment banks amidst financial danger.
  • Leverage Concerns. Highlighting the alarming leverage ratios of investment banks and the need for oversight.

Episode highlights

Tension

50/ 100Some tension

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