Marshall Blume on the Evolving Marketplace

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Credit Crisis Interview: Marshall Blume on the Evolving Marketplace 📂 Finance & Accounting

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  1. [Music] this knowledge at Wharton podcast and video cast is brought to you by Wharton
  2. Executive Education for more information on Wharton's executive programs such as
  3. the executive development program leading and managing people or the new high potential leaders course please
  4. visit executive education. won. up.edu [Music] although the subprime crisis seems to be
  5. showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long it might
  6. last will continue for some time to come knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton Finance Professor Marshall Bloom for his
  7. perspective on the latest economic developments welcome Professor Bloom thank you it seems odd I think to a lot
  8. of people that a problem that originated with a just a slice of the housing market uh has evolved this way to
  9. Encompass not only many any types of mortgages but other types of debt Securities that seems to be spilling
  10. over and affecting the the uh financial markets and and other countries as well uh how does this happen how does it
  11. evolve uh to be so big well you have to go back a little bit we actually had a liquidity bubble uh anybody could obtain
  12. uh funds at very cheap prices as a matter of fact it was a savings clut and in the it was going to be punctured the
  13. question is how it was going to be punctured and there were whole factors a perfect storm actually of factors that
  14. came together that created the problems in the subprime market and it was the most fragile um the uh there were a lot
  15. of government policies um Global events that uh created that uh situation uh you you
  16. used to have to borrow uh on a mortgage you had to pay uh something down now you
  17. don't have to do that as a matter of fact uh some of the mortgages were uh over were over the appraised value of
  18. the houses um this was actually a government policy both the house and the Senate
  19. Republicans and Democrats think homeownership in the United States is a good thing uh on top of that you had
  20. a a tax program for corporations which encourag them to issue debt they issued lots of debt some of that debt as as
  21. issued uh the debt it became lower and lower quality there are also some institutions that require high quality
  22. but for regulation or uh for U just that they always had it like insurance companies so what what did all this um
  23. amount to well brokerage firms figured out a way of taking this uh uh excess debt uh subprime mortgages and
  24. repackaging it making a lot of money in the process and selling it to to um insurance companies and the like um so
  25. that there was a a machine being uh developed which created just a fantastic amount of this uh really junk uh and it
  26. was being repackaged as high quality and at some point that had to explode now one of the things in the description of
  27. the perfect storm that I've heard fairly often is that people say well the problem is we had three events occur
  28. that don't usually occur together and that is that uh these Securities were predicated on the belief that uh
  29. interest rates would stay very low uh that housing prices would continue to rise and that people's incomes would
  30. rise enough so that they could cover the higher payments when these adjustable rate loans reset down the road but it
  31. doesn't seem all that unlikely for these events these conditions to change because interest rates were
  32. exceptionally low and they just went back to normal housing prices were clearly in a bubble and they just fell
  33. back to normal I mean was was this implosion something that the people who are involved in this market should have
  34. foreseen uh they might have foreseen I'm sure that some foresaw it but again if you can make money get rid of the risk
  35. yourself uh you make a lot of money in doing that I uh firms like Countrywide uh made money by uh selling
  36. uh mortgages and then they would get rid of them now you and the same thing would be
  37. true at the investment banking firms although they were stuck with little inventory at the end it's like a Ponzi
  38. scheme what one of the things that that seems curious to me about that is that if if many of the participants knew that
  39. these were risky things but but they saw a chance to make a great deal of money uh they must have anticipated that it
  40. would fall apart later and there there it seems to me that uh there had to have been a great financial incentive to make
  41. it quickly make the money quick quickly and the future would just take care of itself is is there something skewed in
  42. the compensation system in all of these lines of business that contributed to this well you always have to uh pay
  43. people to do things but you have to ultimately have a buyer of these tranches of these uh uh with
  44. alphabetical soup uh sivs Etc no SP special per SP special purpose entities uh you have to have uh somebody
  45. who wants to buy them well now the Credit Agencies come in and they say these are
  46. AAA well you know they're AAA that's good uh so people buy them and they could even get a higher yield than on
  47. other aaa's that should have told them something but they still bought them right if it's too good to to believe you
  48. shouldn't believe it right correct sounds too good to be true um you've done a lot of of work on on the
  49. evolution of of the financial markets the exchanges themselves uh and in recent years there's been dramatic
  50. change in uh both the lines of business that various exchanges are in which used
  51. to be separated either geographically or with the types of Securities they traded
  52. or in some other way now they're all sort of it seems to me blending into one another's business we have mergers that
  53. are even taking a place across oceans uh has this blending of these Mar markets contributed in any way to the kinds of
  54. uh aftershocks we're seeing and the the enlarged effects we're seeing from this subprime mess well I think there's
  55. um the what was happening is the regulatory uh framework has not caught up uh we in this country we regulate
  56. Futures differently from stocks but I can uh package as a financial engineer uh a derivative that looks just a
  57. derivative which behaves just like a stock a stock that behaves like a derivative uh so there's been a melding
  58. of these instruments um which has created a lot of liquidity uh in the uh economy but uh it's not being regulated
  59. as well as it should because the regulation hasn't caught up with the uh technology and and just to explore that
  60. a little further uh for example you have a stock that's going to behave in a certain way and historically that's
  61. that's predictable uh certain factors will affect it and then you have a derivative that will behave somewhat
  62. differently but is based on what the stock does and and they may be traded by entirely different groups of people or
  63. there may be overlapping groups of people but the point is that what happens to one of them will feed back
  64. into the other is that correct well certainly uh we used to think that there was a primary of security like a stock
  65. and all the derivatives but the derivatives actually are more liquid today so they may be driving the stock
  66. prices uh but I can also create a derivative whose returns are exactly the same as a stock and it's called a
  67. derivative mhm and what would be the purpose of that if you have the stock why bother it's cheaper to trade it's
  68. liquidity see I mean uh you don't we have very high volumes in all these markets uh the reason is it's cheap to
  69. trade and if you have a an inkling that something is mispriced by a mill of or Penny you go and you can trade it now
  70. and you can make a profit on the difference yeah you pick up the nickels and the dimes and the pennies and when
  71. you do it in hundreds of millions of dollars or billions So eventually it's real money yeah so you know you pick up
  72. a 20 up nickel you got a dollar and so on now you talked about uh and I think a lot of people have been looking at the
  73. question of whether the regulatory system which has roots going back 60 years and has been put together peace
  74. meal over time is really up to the task today and are there gaps in it and what do you think need to be uh done to fill
  75. them if there are we have uh first of all gaps in uh or differences in regulation in this country is between
  76. Futures and stocks and the the sec's uh uh dictate is to protect the small investor well the small investor isn't
  77. here anymore but they still try to protect them uh the uh future regulation is more designed for sophisticated
  78. invest ERS so you have a gap there people can take advantage of it and then you've got differences between Europe uh
  79. Asia and the United States regulation they don't always talk to each other so much they're a big gaps one of the
  80. arguments that comes up a lot when when you hear people talking about new regulation for the US markets is well
  81. they're not doing it overseas we'll lose all our business companies will list their stocks overseas instead of in New
  82. York and that sort of thing is that a legitimate worry or is that just an excuse to avoid regulation it's
  83. a one it's a worry it's a not a worry uh some people would argue that our better
  84. regulation in this country presumably better regulation encourages companies to list here because they have a cheaper
  85. cost of money than if they listed just in a foreign country now that is some what debatable but it might be the case
  86. so you can say good regulation is actually good for uh uh companies now it is true that we may be overregulation in
  87. Silly Ways in this country and what are those uh sarban Oxley uh requires a a lot of
  88. paperwork and some of that paperwork may not be valuable but uh corporations have to do
  89. it boards have to do it and that was a result of the Enron period that sarban oxid came yes that was passed quickly uh
  90. and it wasn't a well vetted Bill and there's some certain features of it are very good and some are not now one of
  91. the effects of this sort of globalization and mixing of all of these financial markets and institutions is
  92. that it's much easier for people around the world to trade Securities from places half a world away do do do
  93. International investors have a good enough idea of what it is they're buying and selling uh when they deal with some
  94. security that was created 6 or eight or 10,000 miles away well I think they have as good a
  95. knowledge as our people in this country which uh which the evidence shows uh some people have got hurt in both
  96. countries here and there so so a lot of people thought they were taking less risk than they were in well a lot of
  97. that had to do with the rating agencies I mean the that was a an example of systemic uh uh effects uh the mar the
  98. the rating agencies consistently underrated the risk of some of these derivatives and was this because they
  99. didn't understand them or their conflicts of interests in their relationship with the firms whose
  100. Securities they're rating or what oh I'm not sure they UND misund well certainly
  101. there wasn't I don't think fraud uh there was a uh this was an instrument that did not
  102. have a lot of history uh therefore they didn't really understand the risks so they made some
  103. assumptions and those assumptions turned out to be uh uh optimistic and do you think that this is something that they
  104. will remedy on their own they obviously got a black eye over this or does some agency need to step in and say you will
  105. do this from now on no I you know investors are very smart they only get burned once and uh they got burnt burned
  106. once in each way I take right other ways are always waiting around the corner oh
  107. no they'll be burned again but but I mean we you know we had the uh SNL uh disaster a long time ago um you don't
  108. have any problem there anymore now at at the other end of the spectrum we've talked about the the sort of the big
  109. companies the big players and and investors but at the other end there are homeowners and there are various
  110. proposals floating around in in Washington now for helping them in some way and they they range from things like
  111. uh uh helping them to refinance to fixed rate loans at lower rates to postponing
  112. the sets that will cause their monthly payments to rise to buying the Securities from their owners and
  113. rewriting them and all sorts of exotic things do you think that that that some sort of I hate to use the word bailout
  114. but bailout is necessary for homeowners um I do a bailout of homeowners is a bailout of the lenders whenever people
  115. say they're going to bail out the homeowners they're bailing out the lenders and that creates a horrible
  116. president now many of these uh homeowners uh didn't put much down so they're not going to be losing very much
  117. of the homes are in default of the lender's will and that's probably where where it should be now having said that
  118. there were certainly cases of fraud uh and uh there should be remedies for that type of U
  119. situation now finally what is your assessment of the federal reserve's response to all of
  120. this uh the Federal Reserve had has uh opened up new avenues uh which we're going to have to
  121. see how they work out I mean if I were now lending to a brokerage firm or an investment Bank in a subordinated debt I
  122. would say I don't really have to worry about doing too much research because if thing goes down they'll bail me out just
  123. like they do with beer Sterns and uh and you're including in this uh not just the baale stern
  124. situation but they they've been doing things like uh lending out treasury bonds and taking mortgage obligations as
  125. collateral and that sort of thing A lot of people are in favor of that they think this has restored liquidity and
  126. presented a do prevented a domino effect that would have been worse but I take it
  127. you don't agree with that no this is the problem uh in the short run is certainly
  128. uh helped um we don't know the counterfactual what would have happened had they not done it there was a lot of
  129. risk about what might happen if they had not done it by doing what they did they reduced that
  130. risk now whether they in the long run it will hurt the economy I'm not sure or hurt theii functioning of the financial
  131. markets I'm not sure so the real test will be in the future to see whether financial institutions sort of take
  132. advantage of this to do something excessive again uh I wouldn't say that all right well thank you very much
  133. profor very good

Brief Summary

Professor Bloom discusses the subprime crisis causes, regulatory failures, and the implications of Federal Reserve actions.

Key points

  • Understanding the Subprime Crisis. Professor Bloom discusses the origins and evolution of the subprime crisis.
  • The Role of Rating Agencies. Bloom examines the failures of rating agencies in assessing risk.
  • Bailouts and Their Consequences. The discussion centers on the implications of bailing out homeowners versus lenders.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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