Marshall Blume on the Evolving Marketplace
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Credit Crisis Interview: Marshall Blume on the Evolving Marketplace 📂 Finance & Accounting
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- Executive Education for more information on Wharton's executive programs such as
- the executive development program leading and managing people or the new high potential leaders course please
- visit executive education. won. up.edu [Music] although the subprime crisis seems to be
- showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long it might
- last will continue for some time to come knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton Finance Professor Marshall Bloom for his
- perspective on the latest economic developments welcome Professor Bloom thank you it seems odd I think to a lot
- of people that a problem that originated with a just a slice of the housing market uh has evolved this way to
- Encompass not only many any types of mortgages but other types of debt Securities that seems to be spilling
- over and affecting the the uh financial markets and and other countries as well uh how does this happen how does it
- evolve uh to be so big well you have to go back a little bit we actually had a liquidity bubble uh anybody could obtain
- uh funds at very cheap prices as a matter of fact it was a savings clut and in the it was going to be punctured the
- question is how it was going to be punctured and there were whole factors a perfect storm actually of factors that
- came together that created the problems in the subprime market and it was the most fragile um the uh there were a lot
- of government policies um Global events that uh created that uh situation uh you you
- used to have to borrow uh on a mortgage you had to pay uh something down now you
- don't have to do that as a matter of fact uh some of the mortgages were uh over were over the appraised value of
- the houses um this was actually a government policy both the house and the Senate
- Republicans and Democrats think homeownership in the United States is a good thing uh on top of that you had
- a a tax program for corporations which encourag them to issue debt they issued lots of debt some of that debt as as
- issued uh the debt it became lower and lower quality there are also some institutions that require high quality
- but for regulation or uh for U just that they always had it like insurance companies so what what did all this um
- amount to well brokerage firms figured out a way of taking this uh uh excess debt uh subprime mortgages and
- repackaging it making a lot of money in the process and selling it to to um insurance companies and the like um so
- that there was a a machine being uh developed which created just a fantastic amount of this uh really junk uh and it
- was being repackaged as high quality and at some point that had to explode now one of the things in the description of
- the perfect storm that I've heard fairly often is that people say well the problem is we had three events occur
- that don't usually occur together and that is that uh these Securities were predicated on the belief that uh
- interest rates would stay very low uh that housing prices would continue to rise and that people's incomes would
- rise enough so that they could cover the higher payments when these adjustable rate loans reset down the road but it
- doesn't seem all that unlikely for these events these conditions to change because interest rates were
- exceptionally low and they just went back to normal housing prices were clearly in a bubble and they just fell
- back to normal I mean was was this implosion something that the people who are involved in this market should have
- foreseen uh they might have foreseen I'm sure that some foresaw it but again if you can make money get rid of the risk
- yourself uh you make a lot of money in doing that I uh firms like Countrywide uh made money by uh selling
- uh mortgages and then they would get rid of them now you and the same thing would be
- true at the investment banking firms although they were stuck with little inventory at the end it's like a Ponzi
- scheme what one of the things that that seems curious to me about that is that if if many of the participants knew that
- these were risky things but but they saw a chance to make a great deal of money uh they must have anticipated that it
- would fall apart later and there there it seems to me that uh there had to have been a great financial incentive to make
- it quickly make the money quick quickly and the future would just take care of itself is is there something skewed in
- the compensation system in all of these lines of business that contributed to this well you always have to uh pay
- people to do things but you have to ultimately have a buyer of these tranches of these uh uh with
- alphabetical soup uh sivs Etc no SP special per SP special purpose entities uh you have to have uh somebody
- who wants to buy them well now the Credit Agencies come in and they say these are
- AAA well you know they're AAA that's good uh so people buy them and they could even get a higher yield than on
- other aaa's that should have told them something but they still bought them right if it's too good to to believe you
- shouldn't believe it right correct sounds too good to be true um you've done a lot of of work on on the
- evolution of of the financial markets the exchanges themselves uh and in recent years there's been dramatic
- change in uh both the lines of business that various exchanges are in which used
- to be separated either geographically or with the types of Securities they traded
- or in some other way now they're all sort of it seems to me blending into one another's business we have mergers that
- are even taking a place across oceans uh has this blending of these Mar markets contributed in any way to the kinds of
- uh aftershocks we're seeing and the the enlarged effects we're seeing from this subprime mess well I think there's
- um the what was happening is the regulatory uh framework has not caught up uh we in this country we regulate
- Futures differently from stocks but I can uh package as a financial engineer uh a derivative that looks just a
- derivative which behaves just like a stock a stock that behaves like a derivative uh so there's been a melding
- of these instruments um which has created a lot of liquidity uh in the uh economy but uh it's not being regulated
- as well as it should because the regulation hasn't caught up with the uh technology and and just to explore that
- a little further uh for example you have a stock that's going to behave in a certain way and historically that's
- that's predictable uh certain factors will affect it and then you have a derivative that will behave somewhat
- differently but is based on what the stock does and and they may be traded by entirely different groups of people or
- there may be overlapping groups of people but the point is that what happens to one of them will feed back
- into the other is that correct well certainly uh we used to think that there was a primary of security like a stock
- and all the derivatives but the derivatives actually are more liquid today so they may be driving the stock
- prices uh but I can also create a derivative whose returns are exactly the same as a stock and it's called a
- derivative mhm and what would be the purpose of that if you have the stock why bother it's cheaper to trade it's
- liquidity see I mean uh you don't we have very high volumes in all these markets uh the reason is it's cheap to
- trade and if you have a an inkling that something is mispriced by a mill of or Penny you go and you can trade it now
- and you can make a profit on the difference yeah you pick up the nickels and the dimes and the pennies and when
- you do it in hundreds of millions of dollars or billions So eventually it's real money yeah so you know you pick up
- a 20 up nickel you got a dollar and so on now you talked about uh and I think a lot of people have been looking at the
- question of whether the regulatory system which has roots going back 60 years and has been put together peace
- meal over time is really up to the task today and are there gaps in it and what do you think need to be uh done to fill
- them if there are we have uh first of all gaps in uh or differences in regulation in this country is between
- Futures and stocks and the the sec's uh uh dictate is to protect the small investor well the small investor isn't
- here anymore but they still try to protect them uh the uh future regulation is more designed for sophisticated
- invest ERS so you have a gap there people can take advantage of it and then you've got differences between Europe uh
- Asia and the United States regulation they don't always talk to each other so much they're a big gaps one of the
- arguments that comes up a lot when when you hear people talking about new regulation for the US markets is well
- they're not doing it overseas we'll lose all our business companies will list their stocks overseas instead of in New
- York and that sort of thing is that a legitimate worry or is that just an excuse to avoid regulation it's
- a one it's a worry it's a not a worry uh some people would argue that our better
- regulation in this country presumably better regulation encourages companies to list here because they have a cheaper
- cost of money than if they listed just in a foreign country now that is some what debatable but it might be the case
- so you can say good regulation is actually good for uh uh companies now it is true that we may be overregulation in
- Silly Ways in this country and what are those uh sarban Oxley uh requires a a lot of
- paperwork and some of that paperwork may not be valuable but uh corporations have to do
- it boards have to do it and that was a result of the Enron period that sarban oxid came yes that was passed quickly uh
- and it wasn't a well vetted Bill and there's some certain features of it are very good and some are not now one of
- the effects of this sort of globalization and mixing of all of these financial markets and institutions is
- that it's much easier for people around the world to trade Securities from places half a world away do do do
- International investors have a good enough idea of what it is they're buying and selling uh when they deal with some
- security that was created 6 or eight or 10,000 miles away well I think they have as good a
- knowledge as our people in this country which uh which the evidence shows uh some people have got hurt in both
- countries here and there so so a lot of people thought they were taking less risk than they were in well a lot of
- that had to do with the rating agencies I mean the that was a an example of systemic uh uh effects uh the mar the
- the rating agencies consistently underrated the risk of some of these derivatives and was this because they
- didn't understand them or their conflicts of interests in their relationship with the firms whose
- Securities they're rating or what oh I'm not sure they UND misund well certainly
- there wasn't I don't think fraud uh there was a uh this was an instrument that did not
- have a lot of history uh therefore they didn't really understand the risks so they made some
- assumptions and those assumptions turned out to be uh uh optimistic and do you think that this is something that they
- will remedy on their own they obviously got a black eye over this or does some agency need to step in and say you will
- do this from now on no I you know investors are very smart they only get burned once and uh they got burnt burned
- once in each way I take right other ways are always waiting around the corner oh
- no they'll be burned again but but I mean we you know we had the uh SNL uh disaster a long time ago um you don't
- have any problem there anymore now at at the other end of the spectrum we've talked about the the sort of the big
- companies the big players and and investors but at the other end there are homeowners and there are various
- proposals floating around in in Washington now for helping them in some way and they they range from things like
- uh uh helping them to refinance to fixed rate loans at lower rates to postponing
- the sets that will cause their monthly payments to rise to buying the Securities from their owners and
- rewriting them and all sorts of exotic things do you think that that that some sort of I hate to use the word bailout
- but bailout is necessary for homeowners um I do a bailout of homeowners is a bailout of the lenders whenever people
- say they're going to bail out the homeowners they're bailing out the lenders and that creates a horrible
- president now many of these uh homeowners uh didn't put much down so they're not going to be losing very much
- of the homes are in default of the lender's will and that's probably where where it should be now having said that
- there were certainly cases of fraud uh and uh there should be remedies for that type of U
- situation now finally what is your assessment of the federal reserve's response to all of
- this uh the Federal Reserve had has uh opened up new avenues uh which we're going to have to
- see how they work out I mean if I were now lending to a brokerage firm or an investment Bank in a subordinated debt I
- would say I don't really have to worry about doing too much research because if thing goes down they'll bail me out just
- like they do with beer Sterns and uh and you're including in this uh not just the baale stern
- situation but they they've been doing things like uh lending out treasury bonds and taking mortgage obligations as
- collateral and that sort of thing A lot of people are in favor of that they think this has restored liquidity and
- presented a do prevented a domino effect that would have been worse but I take it
- you don't agree with that no this is the problem uh in the short run is certainly
- uh helped um we don't know the counterfactual what would have happened had they not done it there was a lot of
- risk about what might happen if they had not done it by doing what they did they reduced that
- risk now whether they in the long run it will hurt the economy I'm not sure or hurt theii functioning of the financial
- markets I'm not sure so the real test will be in the future to see whether financial institutions sort of take
- advantage of this to do something excessive again uh I wouldn't say that all right well thank you very much
- profor very good
Brief Summary
Professor Bloom discusses the subprime crisis causes, regulatory failures, and the implications of Federal Reserve actions.
Key points
- Understanding the Subprime Crisis. Professor Bloom discusses the origins and evolution of the subprime crisis.
- The Role of Rating Agencies. Bloom examines the failures of rating agencies in assessing risk.
- Bailouts and Their Consequences. The discussion centers on the implications of bailing out homeowners versus lenders.
Episode highlights
- Understanding the Subprime CrisisProfessor Bloom discusses the origins and evolution of the subprime crisis.“A problem that originated with just a slice of the housing market.”0:47Jun 16, 2008
- The Role of Rating AgenciesBloom examines the failures of rating agencies in assessing risk.“The rating agencies consistently underrated the risk of some of these derivatives.”12:01Jun 16, 2008
- Bailouts and Their ConsequencesThe discussion centers on the implications of bailing out homeowners versus lenders.“A bailout of homeowners is a bailout of the lenders.”13:50Jun 16, 2008
Tension
45/ 100Some tension





