Richard Herring on Mortgage-backed Securities

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Credit Crisis Interview: Richard Herring on Mortgage-backed Securities 📂 Finance & Accounting

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  1. this knowledge at wharton podcast and videocast is brought to you by wharton executive education for more information
  2. on Wharton's executive programs such as the executive development program leading and managing people or the new
  3. high potential leaders course please visit executive education wharton upenn dot edu although the subprime crisis
  4. seems to be showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long
  5. it might last will continue for some time to come knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton finance professor Richard
  6. Herring for his perspective on the latest economic developments welcome professor herring glad to be here the
  7. subprime crisis seems to have aggravate been aggravated by the use of mortgage-backed securities that many
  8. people didn't understand and now are hard to value what was different about these securities from The Plain Jane
  9. mortgage-backed securities that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been writing for years you're absolutely right Jeff
  10. the origination of the securitization market which is probably one of the most important financial innovations in
  11. post-world War two ERA was based on securities that were guaranteed by fannie and freddie which had the
  12. implicit guarantee of the US government so the private sector didn't have to worry about the creditworthiness of
  13. these instead of these instruments although they did have other tricky bits such as pre payment options and so forth
  14. private securitization evolved as people found ways to substitute for the credit
  15. guarantees from Freddie and Fannie and there were essentially three ways that people did this one was reliance on
  16. credit rating agencies which would examine each of these securities and issue them a letter grade with several
  17. notches around it indicating how safe they felt that would be the second approach was to my
  18. them very carefully using statistical models based on past repayment history to try to indicate that the amount that
  19. you would need to set aside to make securities perfectly safe and the third technique was credit risk crashing um
  20. you designated certain claims on a pool of securities as bearing the brunt of the risk and if you had a sufficient
  21. amount of those securities then you could make most of the rest of the Securities very very safe this was an
  22. extremely popular innovation it led to a profusion of perhaps six trillion or more in securitizations many of these
  23. mortgage-backed and it began to become more and more complex the residential mortgage-backed securities are fairly
  24. straightforward it's relatively easy to see what the underlyings are there is some pretty close relationship between
  25. your claim on the pool and the pool itself but there was a much bigger demand for investment grade securities
  26. then there are investment grade issuers in the world so the financial engineers began to to innovate to find ways to
  27. synthesize investment grade securities by making combinations of these underlying mortgage pools and other
  28. sorts of of securities one famous innovation were called collateralized debt obligations and collateralized debt
  29. obligations would take pieces of the securitized pools often times lower pieces but sometimes upper pieces they
  30. would add to them pieces from other pools and they would also tranche the CDL so that they designated with the
  31. assistance and it's a little bit ambiguous to say the role of the ratings agencies it was something less than
  32. being consultants and how you do it but it had the same effect because a potential issuer would
  33. essentially show a securitization to an issue to a ratings agency asked what kind of reading do I get with this if
  34. they didn't like the answer they would go back and try another set so you were able to get pieces that would bear the
  35. first trash and these would be below investment grade but that mean meant that the rest of the pool had a very
  36. very high quality and boring cressman investment-grade ratings this could be complicated still more by doing cdo's of
  37. CDOs or CBS Squared's or cubes in principle and sometimes they were fed into structured investment vehicles or
  38. sometimes an asset-backed commercial paper conduits and all three of these and indeed the whole CDO market has
  39. completely collapsed and essentially the reason is that the three props that made
  40. people feel confident in making investments in these things have turned out to be not very reliable the ratings
  41. have shown themselves to be completely unreliable for this whole category of structured finance we've seen multi
  42. notch downgrades of many of these securities that are huge multiples of what one would expect even in the worst
  43. times for corporate debt so the implicit assumption and I would stress it it as an assumption because there were lots of
  44. reasons that people should have believed otherwise but the implicit assumption that a double a corporate bond was the
  45. same as a double a trash of a securitization was simply false people also lost faith in the underlying
  46. statistical models because the most sophisticated players in the business the people who are really making markets
  47. in this bear stearns city bank ubs had major losses Merrill Lynch had major losses and indeed had trouble figuring
  48. out even what their exposures were so people completely lost faith in the valuation models
  49. and then finally monoline insurance that that last safe guide became unreliable as people started to worry about the
  50. mounting losses relative that they had guaranteed relative to their equity base and their ratings came under pressure
  51. once they've lost the ratings they're of no value and that actually led to contagion to other kinds of products
  52. that are guaranteed by monoline ensures such as muni bonds one of the problems I
  53. gather is that if you you go back to the kinds of securities that Fannie and Freddie been issuing for a long time
  54. they have track records they know how many homeowners default or fall behind on their payments or and so they can
  55. they can project pretty accurately based on history how new batch of these securities will behave but some of these
  56. newer securities had no such track records and some of the models that were used to guess what the track records
  57. were or just faulty is that right that's one of the problems behind the statistical models there simply wasn't
  58. enough data over enough cycles to be able to predict another problem was that underwriting standards had deteriorated
  59. in an amazing way which undermined the assumptions about diversification because one of the ways you can perform
  60. the financial al coming of turning less than investment grade securities into investment grade securities is by
  61. diversifying out all of the idiosyncratic risk well it turned out that underwriting standards had had
  62. deteriorated across the board almost all over the United States now just to focus
  63. on these the alchemy that you talked about and to try to put it into layman's terms as much as possible as I
  64. understand it you you you have say a large pool of mortgages and all together it has a certain level level of risk a
  65. kind of average risk for the whole thing but then you could slice it up and say well we're going to give certain
  66. investors first dibs on the payments made by homeowners and they will be very low risk and they'll get relatively low
  67. interest rates and then other investors will have sort of last dips they'll be the first ones to suffer if people fall
  68. behind it but in return they'll be rewarded with higher interest rates assuming they get
  69. what they're expecting is in layman's terms is that roughly it that's pretty much it but there was some other bells
  70. and whistles attached to make it safer still if you were not utterly persuaded that simply having a buffer of creditors
  71. who would suffer loss before you were you might insist that you have a trigger clause in your contract such that if
  72. there were cash flow problems you could demand that the entire pool be liquidated and you be paid off or if you
  73. were very very very conservative you might say well gee this is all good but I'd feel even better if I had monoline
  74. insurance guaranteeing my part of it and most of the monoline insurance went to the the Triple A which we came in a
  75. super triple-a tranches now some people have described the collapse of all this and the subprime mortgage market as a
  76. kind of perfect storm because a lot of these securities were predicated on the assumption that home prices would
  77. continue rising and that interest rates would stay low and that people's incomes
  78. would rise enough to cover future resets as their as their mortgage payments went
  79. up and on the other hand it looks like those three things although they don't always happen at the same time a
  80. reversal in those three things is not all that unpredictable if you say well interest rates were to extraordinarily
  81. low levels assume well they've got to go up and the same with home prices that were extraordinarily high was this an
  82. unpredictable perfect storm or were people just ignoring the risks that were apparent there it's the sort of thing
  83. that happens time and again bubble after bubble there was in no sense a perfect storm in this case it was simply a
  84. return to no more normal sorts of economic relationships if you look at the growth and house prices in the
  85. United States it's been relatively modest until about nineteen ninety-eight you were making about as much on your
  86. house as on your treasury belt it's as if you'd invested in Treasury bills the appreciation started just about as
  87. interest rates went down they were very which was very fortuitous because it helped soften the collapse of aggregate
  88. spending in the recession but it led to a circumstance where most of the people doing the business had not in their
  89. lifetime experienced a downturn in house prices and there are a number of psychological mechanisms that suggest
  90. that when people don't actually know the probabilities of things they will tend to extrapolate recent experience they'll
  91. use something called the availability doctrine to see how easy it is to imagine something happening well even if
  92. you do start with the notion that these could decline if over time you've had more and more favorable experience that
  93. tends to fall to a very very low number and if you believe that house prices are
  94. going to continue to go up then you don't care so much about the ability of the borrower to repay because you figure
  95. you can always get the value out of the house now obviously these are all especially in from the perspective of
  96. hindsight utterly foolish assumptions yet they are characteristic of virtually all the bubbles that we've experienced
  97. and there seemed to be bubbles at least once every 10 years or so well in this bubble as in the.com bubble before and
  98. in others that many of the participants have been punished pretty badly shareholders have lost a lot of money
  99. top executives that Wall Street firms have lost their jobs although they don't seem to wandered away impoverished is
  100. the marketplace punishing people enough to deter this kind of behavior in the future or do you think something needs
  101. to be done on the regulatory area well there are thats a very complicated question the market is to a very large
  102. extent self-regulating the ratings agencies are already all three of them very busy trying to figure out ways to
  103. improve their methodology and to make it more transparent as you mentioned several executives have
  104. lost their jobs but not necessarily their bonuses and there are some real questions about compensation question
  105. compensation structures that I think probably will need to be reviewed I think more fundamentally we need to
  106. rethink the way in which we have redesigned bank regulation bank regulation under Basel to the new view
  107. that's been worked on for over a decade relies very heavily on credit ratings in
  108. the one hand or for the more advanced banks the internal models and both of them have turned out to be not very
  109. reliable beyond that liquidity issues have turned out to be enormously difficult those are to be handled under
  110. pillar 2 but in a as yet to be determined why we're promised that the Basel Committee is going to tell us
  111. something about that later on another issue that is surfaced that we thought we'd put to bed with Enron is the use of
  112. special purpose vehicles or off-balance-sheet entities these special purpose vehicles did in fact comply with
  113. the post Enron rules they just became more complicated off-balance-sheet vehicles but at the end of the day a
  114. reputation risk caused most of the sponsors particularly the large bank sponsors to bail them out yet neither
  115. the regulators nor the shareholders in general even knew they existed so we've in fact created an off-balance banking
  116. system that is huge very nearly as large as the on balance sheet banking system one of the proposals for dealing with
  117. that is still forming I think but the general idea is to require that the people who create the institutions that
  118. create the off-balance sheet entities keep some skin in the game as people have said that they continue to own the
  119. kinds of securities that they're trying to sell to other people and so that they
  120. share some of the risk do you think that's a good idea I think that it would improve the incentive structure for
  121. sure although we have to remember that a number of the institutions that have suffered the biggest losses maybe
  122. unknowingly had a lot of skin in the game as well Merrill Lynch Citibank and UBS we're all big producers and Bear
  123. Stearns were all big producers of these securities yet themselves got caught up in it what is your general assessment of
  124. the way the Federal Reserve has responded to this they've been very innovative they have taken the view that
  125. the first thing to do is ensure that that there's sufficient liquidity to enable markets to function well they've
  126. been real problems in doing that because it is more than a liquidity problem it is potentially a very serious capital
  127. problem and there's a capital problem not only because of the losses the key institutions have suffered because of
  128. the new business they will not do but have an inventory all of the loans they claimed it and securitize but also
  129. because of the potential that they may have to bring a lot of this off balance sheet business back onto their balance
  130. sheets and to do that will require raising enormous new amounts of capital so they've been very reluctant I think
  131. to lend to each other a long term because they think they may well have very much better uses for that capital
  132. in their own book of business one thing relative to earlier crisis that I applaud and think has worked very well
  133. is the prompt corrective action solutions that we've put in place in the United States have encouraged banks to
  134. recapitalize very very quickly the sovereign wealth funds to some extent private equity to some extent
  135. shareholders have been recapitalizing these banks and massive amounts which will enable them to continue and to give
  136. them some time to restructure and and find new and more profitable business models but contrast that with what
  137. happened in the 1980s when basically the hypothesis the Fed was using is that the
  138. best way to recapitalize the system is to ignore the losses and let banks aren't enough on other lines of business
  139. so that they can retain earnings to I replace the capital that it that we all know is already lost that gets this is
  140. the final question which is do you think the recovery will be faster than it was
  141. in the 80s and are we closer to the end now than the beginning I think that it much depends what's different about this
  142. of course is that it is in the housing sector and much depends on how long it takes to work down the huge inventory of
  143. houses that is is really very substantial and there isn't a lot that the Fed can do about that there is a
  144. genuine excess supply of houses out there that will have to somehow be work through now this is an entirely bad news
  145. if you're a young household tried to find a home there may well be good bargains ahead and buy lots of measures
  146. the house prices we were seeing generally over the last three or four years were simply unaffordable to Middle
  147. American so there is there's a sense in which this is a transfer costs problem but there will be winners as well as the
  148. losers we all read about in the newspaper I'm sure we'll be unfolding for quite some time thank you very much
  149. my pleasure

Brief Summary

Richard Herring discusses the causes and implications of the subprime mortgage crisis and the failures of mortgage-backed securities.

Key points

  • Understanding the Subprime Crisis. The discussion delves into the complexities of the subprime mortgage crisis and its causes.
  • The Rise of Securitization. A look at how securitization became a massive financial innovation, leading to trillions in investments.
  • Assumptions in Financial Securities. A critical examination of the flawed assumptions surrounding corporate bonds and securitizations.
  • Cyclical Nature of Financial Bubbles. An insight into the recurring theme of financial bubbles throughout history.
  • Winners and Losers in the Housing Market. The aftermath of the housing crisis will see both winners and losers in the market.

Tension

50/ 100Some tension

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