Richard Herring on Mortgage-backed Securities
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Credit Crisis Interview: Richard Herring on Mortgage-backed Securities 📂 Finance & Accounting
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- this knowledge at wharton podcast and videocast is brought to you by wharton executive education for more information
- on Wharton's executive programs such as the executive development program leading and managing people or the new
- high potential leaders course please visit executive education wharton upenn dot edu although the subprime crisis
- seems to be showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long
- it might last will continue for some time to come knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton finance professor Richard
- Herring for his perspective on the latest economic developments welcome professor herring glad to be here the
- subprime crisis seems to have aggravate been aggravated by the use of mortgage-backed securities that many
- people didn't understand and now are hard to value what was different about these securities from The Plain Jane
- mortgage-backed securities that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been writing for years you're absolutely right Jeff
- the origination of the securitization market which is probably one of the most important financial innovations in
- post-world War two ERA was based on securities that were guaranteed by fannie and freddie which had the
- implicit guarantee of the US government so the private sector didn't have to worry about the creditworthiness of
- these instead of these instruments although they did have other tricky bits such as pre payment options and so forth
- private securitization evolved as people found ways to substitute for the credit
- guarantees from Freddie and Fannie and there were essentially three ways that people did this one was reliance on
- credit rating agencies which would examine each of these securities and issue them a letter grade with several
- notches around it indicating how safe they felt that would be the second approach was to my
- them very carefully using statistical models based on past repayment history to try to indicate that the amount that
- you would need to set aside to make securities perfectly safe and the third technique was credit risk crashing um
- you designated certain claims on a pool of securities as bearing the brunt of the risk and if you had a sufficient
- amount of those securities then you could make most of the rest of the Securities very very safe this was an
- extremely popular innovation it led to a profusion of perhaps six trillion or more in securitizations many of these
- mortgage-backed and it began to become more and more complex the residential mortgage-backed securities are fairly
- straightforward it's relatively easy to see what the underlyings are there is some pretty close relationship between
- your claim on the pool and the pool itself but there was a much bigger demand for investment grade securities
- then there are investment grade issuers in the world so the financial engineers began to to innovate to find ways to
- synthesize investment grade securities by making combinations of these underlying mortgage pools and other
- sorts of of securities one famous innovation were called collateralized debt obligations and collateralized debt
- obligations would take pieces of the securitized pools often times lower pieces but sometimes upper pieces they
- would add to them pieces from other pools and they would also tranche the CDL so that they designated with the
- assistance and it's a little bit ambiguous to say the role of the ratings agencies it was something less than
- being consultants and how you do it but it had the same effect because a potential issuer would
- essentially show a securitization to an issue to a ratings agency asked what kind of reading do I get with this if
- they didn't like the answer they would go back and try another set so you were able to get pieces that would bear the
- first trash and these would be below investment grade but that mean meant that the rest of the pool had a very
- very high quality and boring cressman investment-grade ratings this could be complicated still more by doing cdo's of
- CDOs or CBS Squared's or cubes in principle and sometimes they were fed into structured investment vehicles or
- sometimes an asset-backed commercial paper conduits and all three of these and indeed the whole CDO market has
- completely collapsed and essentially the reason is that the three props that made
- people feel confident in making investments in these things have turned out to be not very reliable the ratings
- have shown themselves to be completely unreliable for this whole category of structured finance we've seen multi
- notch downgrades of many of these securities that are huge multiples of what one would expect even in the worst
- times for corporate debt so the implicit assumption and I would stress it it as an assumption because there were lots of
- reasons that people should have believed otherwise but the implicit assumption that a double a corporate bond was the
- same as a double a trash of a securitization was simply false people also lost faith in the underlying
- statistical models because the most sophisticated players in the business the people who are really making markets
- in this bear stearns city bank ubs had major losses Merrill Lynch had major losses and indeed had trouble figuring
- out even what their exposures were so people completely lost faith in the valuation models
- and then finally monoline insurance that that last safe guide became unreliable as people started to worry about the
- mounting losses relative that they had guaranteed relative to their equity base and their ratings came under pressure
- once they've lost the ratings they're of no value and that actually led to contagion to other kinds of products
- that are guaranteed by monoline ensures such as muni bonds one of the problems I
- gather is that if you you go back to the kinds of securities that Fannie and Freddie been issuing for a long time
- they have track records they know how many homeowners default or fall behind on their payments or and so they can
- they can project pretty accurately based on history how new batch of these securities will behave but some of these
- newer securities had no such track records and some of the models that were used to guess what the track records
- were or just faulty is that right that's one of the problems behind the statistical models there simply wasn't
- enough data over enough cycles to be able to predict another problem was that underwriting standards had deteriorated
- in an amazing way which undermined the assumptions about diversification because one of the ways you can perform
- the financial al coming of turning less than investment grade securities into investment grade securities is by
- diversifying out all of the idiosyncratic risk well it turned out that underwriting standards had had
- deteriorated across the board almost all over the United States now just to focus
- on these the alchemy that you talked about and to try to put it into layman's terms as much as possible as I
- understand it you you you have say a large pool of mortgages and all together it has a certain level level of risk a
- kind of average risk for the whole thing but then you could slice it up and say well we're going to give certain
- investors first dibs on the payments made by homeowners and they will be very low risk and they'll get relatively low
- interest rates and then other investors will have sort of last dips they'll be the first ones to suffer if people fall
- behind it but in return they'll be rewarded with higher interest rates assuming they get
- what they're expecting is in layman's terms is that roughly it that's pretty much it but there was some other bells
- and whistles attached to make it safer still if you were not utterly persuaded that simply having a buffer of creditors
- who would suffer loss before you were you might insist that you have a trigger clause in your contract such that if
- there were cash flow problems you could demand that the entire pool be liquidated and you be paid off or if you
- were very very very conservative you might say well gee this is all good but I'd feel even better if I had monoline
- insurance guaranteeing my part of it and most of the monoline insurance went to the the Triple A which we came in a
- super triple-a tranches now some people have described the collapse of all this and the subprime mortgage market as a
- kind of perfect storm because a lot of these securities were predicated on the assumption that home prices would
- continue rising and that interest rates would stay low and that people's incomes
- would rise enough to cover future resets as their as their mortgage payments went
- up and on the other hand it looks like those three things although they don't always happen at the same time a
- reversal in those three things is not all that unpredictable if you say well interest rates were to extraordinarily
- low levels assume well they've got to go up and the same with home prices that were extraordinarily high was this an
- unpredictable perfect storm or were people just ignoring the risks that were apparent there it's the sort of thing
- that happens time and again bubble after bubble there was in no sense a perfect storm in this case it was simply a
- return to no more normal sorts of economic relationships if you look at the growth and house prices in the
- United States it's been relatively modest until about nineteen ninety-eight you were making about as much on your
- house as on your treasury belt it's as if you'd invested in Treasury bills the appreciation started just about as
- interest rates went down they were very which was very fortuitous because it helped soften the collapse of aggregate
- spending in the recession but it led to a circumstance where most of the people doing the business had not in their
- lifetime experienced a downturn in house prices and there are a number of psychological mechanisms that suggest
- that when people don't actually know the probabilities of things they will tend to extrapolate recent experience they'll
- use something called the availability doctrine to see how easy it is to imagine something happening well even if
- you do start with the notion that these could decline if over time you've had more and more favorable experience that
- tends to fall to a very very low number and if you believe that house prices are
- going to continue to go up then you don't care so much about the ability of the borrower to repay because you figure
- you can always get the value out of the house now obviously these are all especially in from the perspective of
- hindsight utterly foolish assumptions yet they are characteristic of virtually all the bubbles that we've experienced
- and there seemed to be bubbles at least once every 10 years or so well in this bubble as in the.com bubble before and
- in others that many of the participants have been punished pretty badly shareholders have lost a lot of money
- top executives that Wall Street firms have lost their jobs although they don't seem to wandered away impoverished is
- the marketplace punishing people enough to deter this kind of behavior in the future or do you think something needs
- to be done on the regulatory area well there are thats a very complicated question the market is to a very large
- extent self-regulating the ratings agencies are already all three of them very busy trying to figure out ways to
- improve their methodology and to make it more transparent as you mentioned several executives have
- lost their jobs but not necessarily their bonuses and there are some real questions about compensation question
- compensation structures that I think probably will need to be reviewed I think more fundamentally we need to
- rethink the way in which we have redesigned bank regulation bank regulation under Basel to the new view
- that's been worked on for over a decade relies very heavily on credit ratings in
- the one hand or for the more advanced banks the internal models and both of them have turned out to be not very
- reliable beyond that liquidity issues have turned out to be enormously difficult those are to be handled under
- pillar 2 but in a as yet to be determined why we're promised that the Basel Committee is going to tell us
- something about that later on another issue that is surfaced that we thought we'd put to bed with Enron is the use of
- special purpose vehicles or off-balance-sheet entities these special purpose vehicles did in fact comply with
- the post Enron rules they just became more complicated off-balance-sheet vehicles but at the end of the day a
- reputation risk caused most of the sponsors particularly the large bank sponsors to bail them out yet neither
- the regulators nor the shareholders in general even knew they existed so we've in fact created an off-balance banking
- system that is huge very nearly as large as the on balance sheet banking system one of the proposals for dealing with
- that is still forming I think but the general idea is to require that the people who create the institutions that
- create the off-balance sheet entities keep some skin in the game as people have said that they continue to own the
- kinds of securities that they're trying to sell to other people and so that they
- share some of the risk do you think that's a good idea I think that it would improve the incentive structure for
- sure although we have to remember that a number of the institutions that have suffered the biggest losses maybe
- unknowingly had a lot of skin in the game as well Merrill Lynch Citibank and UBS we're all big producers and Bear
- Stearns were all big producers of these securities yet themselves got caught up in it what is your general assessment of
- the way the Federal Reserve has responded to this they've been very innovative they have taken the view that
- the first thing to do is ensure that that there's sufficient liquidity to enable markets to function well they've
- been real problems in doing that because it is more than a liquidity problem it is potentially a very serious capital
- problem and there's a capital problem not only because of the losses the key institutions have suffered because of
- the new business they will not do but have an inventory all of the loans they claimed it and securitize but also
- because of the potential that they may have to bring a lot of this off balance sheet business back onto their balance
- sheets and to do that will require raising enormous new amounts of capital so they've been very reluctant I think
- to lend to each other a long term because they think they may well have very much better uses for that capital
- in their own book of business one thing relative to earlier crisis that I applaud and think has worked very well
- is the prompt corrective action solutions that we've put in place in the United States have encouraged banks to
- recapitalize very very quickly the sovereign wealth funds to some extent private equity to some extent
- shareholders have been recapitalizing these banks and massive amounts which will enable them to continue and to give
- them some time to restructure and and find new and more profitable business models but contrast that with what
- happened in the 1980s when basically the hypothesis the Fed was using is that the
- best way to recapitalize the system is to ignore the losses and let banks aren't enough on other lines of business
- so that they can retain earnings to I replace the capital that it that we all know is already lost that gets this is
- the final question which is do you think the recovery will be faster than it was
- in the 80s and are we closer to the end now than the beginning I think that it much depends what's different about this
- of course is that it is in the housing sector and much depends on how long it takes to work down the huge inventory of
- houses that is is really very substantial and there isn't a lot that the Fed can do about that there is a
- genuine excess supply of houses out there that will have to somehow be work through now this is an entirely bad news
- if you're a young household tried to find a home there may well be good bargains ahead and buy lots of measures
- the house prices we were seeing generally over the last three or four years were simply unaffordable to Middle
- American so there is there's a sense in which this is a transfer costs problem but there will be winners as well as the
- losers we all read about in the newspaper I'm sure we'll be unfolding for quite some time thank you very much
- my pleasure
Brief Summary
Richard Herring discusses the causes and implications of the subprime mortgage crisis and the failures of mortgage-backed securities.
Key points
- Understanding the Subprime Crisis. The discussion delves into the complexities of the subprime mortgage crisis and its causes.
- The Rise of Securitization. A look at how securitization became a massive financial innovation, leading to trillions in investments.
- Assumptions in Financial Securities. A critical examination of the flawed assumptions surrounding corporate bonds and securitizations.
- Cyclical Nature of Financial Bubbles. An insight into the recurring theme of financial bubbles throughout history.
- Winners and Losers in the Housing Market. The aftermath of the housing crisis will see both winners and losers in the market.
Episode highlights
- Understanding the Subprime CrisisThe discussion delves into the complexities of the subprime mortgage crisis and its causes.“The subprime crisis seems to have aggravated by the use of mortgage-backed securities.”0:48Jun 16, 2008
- The Rise of SecuritizationA look at how securitization became a massive financial innovation, leading to trillions in investments.“This was an extremely popular innovation; it led to a profusion of perhaps six trillion or more in securitizations.”2:50Jun 16, 2008
- Assumptions in Financial SecuritiesA critical examination of the flawed assumptions surrounding corporate bonds and securitizations.“The implicit assumption that a double A corporate bond was the same as a double A trash of a securitization was simply false.”6:04Jun 16, 2008
- Cyclical Nature of Financial BubblesAn insight into the recurring theme of financial bubbles throughout history.“There seemed to be bubbles at least once every 10 years or so.”12:17Jun 16, 2008
Tension
50/ 100Some tension





