Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis
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Episode Description
The global financial crisis and subsequent recession that began in 2008 and worsened in 2009 has raised many questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance systems. Swedish researcher Erik Berglof has been looking into this topic, with a special emphasis on Europe. He says scholars are only beginning to unravel the role that boards of directors and other governance components played in the meltdown. He sees two trends emerging, however: national governments are exerting much more control over financial institutions and regulators are moving to establish global harmonization of capital requirements. Mr. Berglof is chief economist and special adviser to the president at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses. Mr. Berglof was a speaker at a Wharton conference on "Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis" in late September. After making his presentation he visited the studios of Knowledge@Wharton for an interview.
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- Uh Erik Berglof, uh chief economist and special advisor to the president at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
- Development. Welcome to uh Knowledge at Wharton. Thank you for having me. Uh we have a lot of ground to cover
- um because the issue of corporate governance vis-a-vis the financial crisis and the recession is a is a large
- and important topic. But we do want to focus if we count on governance um exclusively and also to get your
- your views on the European aspects of um of this story. But first of all, can you talk a little
- bit about the the role of any that that governance played in either triggering or
- exacerbating the financial crisis that began in in 2008. Yeah, it's it's it's a bit of a paradox that on the one hand
- you have probably the the greatest governance failure that we can remember. And on the other hand, looking at the
- research that has been done now to try to to document you know, which aspect of governance was
- it that uh made the crisis happen or or contributed to the crisis, it the results from that type of research is is
- is not very clear. And it's it's not uh you you have work being done on showing that banks
- with concentrated ownership was not different from banks with widely uh uh held shares. And and you have a lot
- of work trying to compare banks that were state or owned banks and private banks. Not a lot
- of of difference. There are a few facts that stand out, but but on the whole I think we have just started to to un-
- unravel what happened in the crisis in terms of corporate governance. Are researchers looking at the role of uh
- not only issues of ownership, but uh the role that the boards of directors of these various institutions played? Yes,
- I I I certainly think that's part of it. And the problem with with that is that the role of a board is very different in
- a bank from in a company because the banks are much more regulated and and supervised.
- But the board is also very different if you have a controlling shareholder or if
- you have a a widely held structure, if you're a state-owned firm, so you're private. So it's also hard to to say
- even there that, you know, boards should be of particular structure, have a particular
- number of independent directors, should have operate according to specific rules
- and so on. So so it's it's it's hard certainly in this crisis to point to that a certain
- type of board made the crisis less likely. Is it um is it reasonable to think that
- researchers could determine whether boards in these various companies and banks acted
- irresponsibly or responsibly or just with no knowledge in terms of understanding and analyzing the events
- that led to the crisis and the actions that the executives in their own institutions performed? Uh I guess what
- I'm asking is often it's kind of a cliché, but you know, boards have been thought for many years
- by some critics to be more or less rubber stamps for whatever the chairman of the company and the CEO want to do.
- And and many people may have that feeling uh either either on an informed or uninformed basis about the financial
- crisis. Is that is that something that you you and other researchers are looking at as well? Yes, definitely. As
- I so as I said, you know, a board that has uh to overlook what a manager does uh and representing only minority
- shareholders has a very different role from a board that's trying to control what an
- owner-manager does. You know, it's an an owner that's very deeply in involved in
- in in management of of of a bank in particular. Uh I think also what one should remember is that the board
- you know, when you have a a bank that is regulated and supervised, maybe the board is not the structure that we
- should expect to to to uh to react. I mean, it it would be nice, but but what we see in
- this crisis is that there were sort of trends or or or sort of overwhelming patterns of behavior
- that were the boards more or less went along. As you said, they were sort of rubber stamp of of of of particular
- you know, management behavior. I I think one thing that is people are looking at, which I think is
- is a very very important aspect, is whether you want to have friendly boards or hostile boards. I'm probably someone
- who thinks that, you know, a board that has some degree of sort of co-optation, some some degree of of alignment with
- with management is is is something you want. But you of course have to also then have controls within the board to
- make sure that, you know, management does not get away with with anything. But again, you know, boards may not be
- the the function that that in the end will control or prevent a a financial crisis from happening. So so
- boards may not be enough. Boards may not be enough. And and you may we may not have boards may not be
- even uh helping very much unfortunately because banks also one problem with banks is that they may have become
- ungovernable. They have become so large that the only thing that really bites on
- these large institutions is is regulation and supervision. You know, intervention from the government. So
- again, I I'm not that's maybe a too too negative view of boards, but I'm just putting perspective a bit, you know,
- what we can expect from boards. Sure. So in terms of um learning lessons uh from the financial
- crisis and then implementing whatever changes um institutions and their boards feel
- are necessary. You're saying that some of these reforms, so to speak, would have to come
- from outside the institutions themselves and then probably from government. Yeah,
- some of these reforms will have to come from government, I think. One thing I should say to so that seemed to come out
- is is that attracting the right people to be on the board. So whether they are hostile or
- friendly is not maybe not the that's important that's important to find the right balance there, but also making
- sure that you find the right type of people. And one thing you you find, for example, in Europe you have looked at
- the the banks that have been to protected by government and and specially favored by government and they
- have done very poorly in the crisis. And when you look at what type of people were in governance positions in in on
- boards in these banks, it seems like they were much less capable competent and much less
- able to pursue or or full this fill this role of of governance. So I think one thing we
- should think more about what type of people, what type of backgrounds, you know, what level of competence should we
- have on board. Based on what you know now, are there certain reforms specifically that you think should be
- implemented uh on the part of financial institutions? Well, I think we see now a trend globally
- towards uh you know, two two important trends globally. One is that national governments are putting much more
- of control over financial institutions, particularly those countries that have don't have their own institutions, but
- have subsidiaries of large international banks. Those governments they felt that
- they were at the receiving end of the global crisis. They need to do things. They could not uh accept to be
- uh such victims. And and they they're putting in place regulation. That's going to make it very hard to have the
- same level of financial integration, same level of financial openness. That's one trend. The other trend is the the
- trend towards the global harmonization of of of uh capital requirements, liquidity requirements,
- uh you know, what to do with what large systemic organizations, what to do about
- levies on banking systems, and so on. That trend goes against, but I think that is now generating some results and
- and that's I think on the whole very positive, but it's it's too slow and probably
- well, I don't I wouldn't say too late because it's very hard to do things in the midst of the crisis,
- but also the political momentum on some of these reforms may not be there right now. Yeah, that that may be an
- understatement. Uh uh here here in the US, I think uh I I would think that some many people uh
- average people, even people who were like yourself, who were kind of immersed in this um all the time, may wonder
- whether there's a chance that some of this might be forgotten, you know, as another year
- goes by and another year year goes by and perhaps reforms are not as comprehensive as some would like to
- see. I mean, there may be a sense that um you know, why hasn't anyone been punished or
- or or put in jail or something for some of the activities by these institutions having caused such um
- terrible repercussions around the globe. Uh is that is that likely to happen? Are
- we likely to see the Basel Committee or the the government of the United States, whether
- it's the SEC or other institutions, actually coming down hard on some of the individuals or institutions that
- engaged in these activities? I I don't see that happening, I think. The the there is a very difficult trade-off here
- because in the middle of the crisis, you know, first of all, there are many things that you have to do just to try
- to keep things going. But one thing you don't want to do is to have harsher rules on on banks in the
- midst of the crisis because you know, you want banks to whatever to do whatever they can to lend to to the the
- real economy. So so that's why we have been waiting for these rules for so long. And and
- also now, if you look at these most recent international rules, the Basel three so-called rules on capital adequacy and
- liquid- liquidity and so on. They are going to be phased in until 2019. It's a very long period and it's exactly
- because you don't want to impose rules too early in the recovery. You don't want to threaten the recovery. So,
- that's one aspect of you know, why we have to wait so long. And then, I think on some of the issues of compensation,
- some of which I think one could have addressed earlier when there was a political momentum.
- I think there we lost the window. And uh I I you know, that whether that is because of the lobbying power of the
- financial industry because we didn't or because we didn't really have a good alternative. We didn't maybe have a good
- model for how to how to regulate the compensation. I think now we are slowly starting to
- realize and and maybe we knew all along, but we we have much stronger evidence that compensation was a very important
- aspect of the crisis. And then, so the way we reward managers is absolutely critical for their behavior. And and
- that I think is something we really need to sit down and and and and and work on.
- And and here whether this can be done globally, I'm not sure, but it's certainly or no rules
- coming into play that have been designed globally. And so, they will play some role. I'm not sure how
- powerful they will be in the United States. The the issue of compensation that you raised, of course, is the one
- that um touches, I think, the uh everyone who reads about this crisis because of the outsized compensation
- packages that many CEOs had. Do you really expect that um that those packages will be adjusted,
- that the incentives will be adjusted in such a way to to perhaps forestall the next I I I I
- can't speak so much about the United States, but I can say from the UK and the UK, you know, is is very closely
- related to to the US in this regard. So, you know, things that happen in compensation in the US affects what
- happen in the UK and and vice versa. And and in the UK, it's very clear that base
- salaries are coming up and bonuses are coming down. And and actually a lot of you know, employees often prefer this.
- The the the thing is that that it's often a more costly way sometimes of rewarding
- people because you have to give them, you know, very you know, raising the base salary turns out to be
- you know, quite expensive. So, so there are some I know in London, uh for example,
- you know, we are recruiting in the similar markets and and I think you know, some expect 80% increases in base
- salaries in London this year. Which is you know, quite dramatic and and that you know, whether that is you know,
- that that we're seeing happening, whether this will resolve some of the issues, I'm not sure. Uh just one or two
- other things uh before we close. The uh in your view, how have European institutions and their regulators
- approached or attacked the the financial crisis um compared to US companies and regulators? Have have they
- both been looking at similar reforms? Have they looked at this in much the same way or not? I think there is a
- there is a common pattern in it's one of a very reasonable response in the crisis. Maybe it's
- slightly late, but still when it finally came, it was a a very strong response and both at the national level, at the
- sort of regional level in the European Union, and at the international level, the the role of the international
- financial institution, particularly IMF. That was a very good response. I think if we look back at it without the
- response, the world would have been much worse off. I think when we look at dealing with the
- causes of the crisis and and all these things we discussed now in terms of of of compensation, regulation, provision,
- the response have been much have been much slower both in Europe and and in the United States.
- In in Europe, you had the additional problem of of the European Union had no mandate in this area really before the
- crisis. That is changing now quite dramatically. So, they're now creating new institutions at the European level
- to to deal with with both regulation and supervision with this future prudential
- regulation trying to to look into to the you know, the health of these institutions, the systemic
- importance and so on. We didn't have anything like that before the crisis. And the European Central
- Bank where it explicitly said that was not their role. And that was something that was very damaging in the beginning
- of the crisis. And and luckily, in the end, you know, politicians reacted and then we we got a
- good response, but it took a long time. And that's something we also need to think about, how do we put in place a
- good crisis management uh system because now these institutions are global and they probably will remain global in one
- form or another. We need to deal with that. And then, how do we deal with the all these links between countries? And
- if you want to be able to resolve institutions, how do we that? A lot of these issues are now on the table and
- and needs to be addressed. Some commentators have said that um uh that that not much is not enough has
- been done to prevent another crisis and that it's only a matter of time before banks and brokerage firms and uh uh and
- other financial institutions kind of repeat the same mistakes or or the same actions they had done
- previously and that there's just it's just a matter of time before we see the next crisis. Do you believe that or are
- you optimistic that that reforms will take place to forestall such a crisis again? I I I think we are
- making progress on on you know, some aspects of regulation, supervision. But the the deep structural
- issues are not being addressed. And and here I think there's only one country that I know of that is trying to tackle
- this. And this is the the UK, actually, because they have now put in place a commission.
- You know, of course, when you put a place in a commission, there's not a guarantee that something will happen. It
- could actually be a way of sort of postponing a discussion. But but actually, the way this commission is is
- constituted, the the the the people on on that commission, I think will bring about a discussion
- that is goes to the fundamental aspects. You know, what should we do about what should commercial banks be allowed to
- do? What what level of risk should I be allowed to be engaged in? You know, a lot of these deep structural issues that
- I think they are the one we need to address to be able to reduce the risk of a future crisis. And
- do you think the United States and other uh countries, European countries and others should look to the UK for any
- benchmarking or guidance along Well, I think it's too it's too early to say what will come out of this, but I I
- think all all the countries need to think about these structural issues. And I think
- particularly United States because the United States is the home of many very important global financial institutions.
- So, you know, the US probably doesn't want to be, you know, responding to what other countries are doing. They they
- should take the lead. Okay. Dr. Berglöf, thank you very much for joining us today.
- Thank you for having me.
Brief Summary
Erik Berglof discusses corporate governance's impact on the 2008 financial crisis and the need for reforms in banking oversight.
Key points
- The Role of Governance in the Financial Crisis. Exploring how corporate governance failures contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.
- Challenges in Board Effectiveness. Examining the complexities of board roles in banks versus companies.
- Global Trends in Financial Regulation. National governments are tightening control over financial institutions post-crisis.
Episode highlights
- The Role of Governance in the Financial CrisisExploring how corporate governance failures contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.“It's a bit of a paradox that on the one hand you have probably the greatest governance failure.”0:58Nov 5, 2010
- Challenges in Board EffectivenessExamining the complexities of board roles in banks versus companies.“The role of a board is very different in a bank from in a company.”2:05Nov 5, 2010
- Global Trends in Financial RegulationNational governments are tightening control over financial institutions post-crisis.“National governments are putting much more control over financial institutions.”7:01Nov 5, 2010





