Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis

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The global financial crisis and subsequent recession that began in 2008 and worsened in 2009 has raised many questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance systems. Swedish researcher Erik Berglof has been looking into this topic, with a special emphasis on Europe. He says scholars are only beginning to unravel the role that boards of directors and other governance components played in the meltdown. He sees two trends emerging, however: national governments are exerting much more control over financial institutions and regulators are moving to establish global harmonization of capital requirements. Mr. Berglof is chief economist and special adviser to the president at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses. Mr. Berglof was a speaker at a Wharton conference on "Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis" in late September. After making his presentation he visited the studios of Knowledge@Wharton for an interview.

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  1. Uh Erik Berglof, uh chief economist and special advisor to the president at the European Bank for Reconstruction and
  2. Development. Welcome to uh Knowledge at Wharton. Thank you for having me. Uh we have a lot of ground to cover
  3. um because the issue of corporate governance vis-a-vis the financial crisis and the recession is a is a large
  4. and important topic. But we do want to focus if we count on governance um exclusively and also to get your
  5. your views on the European aspects of um of this story. But first of all, can you talk a little
  6. bit about the the role of any that that governance played in either triggering or
  7. exacerbating the financial crisis that began in in 2008. Yeah, it's it's it's a bit of a paradox that on the one hand
  8. you have probably the the greatest governance failure that we can remember. And on the other hand, looking at the
  9. research that has been done now to try to to document you know, which aspect of governance was
  10. it that uh made the crisis happen or or contributed to the crisis, it the results from that type of research is is
  11. is not very clear. And it's it's not uh you you have work being done on showing that banks
  12. with concentrated ownership was not different from banks with widely uh uh held shares. And and you have a lot
  13. of work trying to compare banks that were state or owned banks and private banks. Not a lot
  14. of of difference. There are a few facts that stand out, but but on the whole I think we have just started to to un-
  15. unravel what happened in the crisis in terms of corporate governance. Are researchers looking at the role of uh
  16. not only issues of ownership, but uh the role that the boards of directors of these various institutions played? Yes,
  17. I I I certainly think that's part of it. And the problem with with that is that the role of a board is very different in
  18. a bank from in a company because the banks are much more regulated and and supervised.
  19. But the board is also very different if you have a controlling shareholder or if
  20. you have a a widely held structure, if you're a state-owned firm, so you're private. So it's also hard to to say
  21. even there that, you know, boards should be of particular structure, have a particular
  22. number of independent directors, should have operate according to specific rules
  23. and so on. So so it's it's it's hard certainly in this crisis to point to that a certain
  24. type of board made the crisis less likely. Is it um is it reasonable to think that
  25. researchers could determine whether boards in these various companies and banks acted
  26. irresponsibly or responsibly or just with no knowledge in terms of understanding and analyzing the events
  27. that led to the crisis and the actions that the executives in their own institutions performed? Uh I guess what
  28. I'm asking is often it's kind of a cliché, but you know, boards have been thought for many years
  29. by some critics to be more or less rubber stamps for whatever the chairman of the company and the CEO want to do.
  30. And and many people may have that feeling uh either either on an informed or uninformed basis about the financial
  31. crisis. Is that is that something that you you and other researchers are looking at as well? Yes, definitely. As
  32. I so as I said, you know, a board that has uh to overlook what a manager does uh and representing only minority
  33. shareholders has a very different role from a board that's trying to control what an
  34. owner-manager does. You know, it's an an owner that's very deeply in involved in
  35. in in management of of of a bank in particular. Uh I think also what one should remember is that the board
  36. you know, when you have a a bank that is regulated and supervised, maybe the board is not the structure that we
  37. should expect to to to uh to react. I mean, it it would be nice, but but what we see in
  38. this crisis is that there were sort of trends or or or sort of overwhelming patterns of behavior
  39. that were the boards more or less went along. As you said, they were sort of rubber stamp of of of of particular
  40. you know, management behavior. I I think one thing that is people are looking at, which I think is
  41. is a very very important aspect, is whether you want to have friendly boards or hostile boards. I'm probably someone
  42. who thinks that, you know, a board that has some degree of sort of co-optation, some some degree of of alignment with
  43. with management is is is something you want. But you of course have to also then have controls within the board to
  44. make sure that, you know, management does not get away with with anything. But again, you know, boards may not be
  45. the the function that that in the end will control or prevent a a financial crisis from happening. So so
  46. boards may not be enough. Boards may not be enough. And and you may we may not have boards may not be
  47. even uh helping very much unfortunately because banks also one problem with banks is that they may have become
  48. ungovernable. They have become so large that the only thing that really bites on
  49. these large institutions is is regulation and supervision. You know, intervention from the government. So
  50. again, I I'm not that's maybe a too too negative view of boards, but I'm just putting perspective a bit, you know,
  51. what we can expect from boards. Sure. So in terms of um learning lessons uh from the financial
  52. crisis and then implementing whatever changes um institutions and their boards feel
  53. are necessary. You're saying that some of these reforms, so to speak, would have to come
  54. from outside the institutions themselves and then probably from government. Yeah,
  55. some of these reforms will have to come from government, I think. One thing I should say to so that seemed to come out
  56. is is that attracting the right people to be on the board. So whether they are hostile or
  57. friendly is not maybe not the that's important that's important to find the right balance there, but also making
  58. sure that you find the right type of people. And one thing you you find, for example, in Europe you have looked at
  59. the the banks that have been to protected by government and and specially favored by government and they
  60. have done very poorly in the crisis. And when you look at what type of people were in governance positions in in on
  61. boards in these banks, it seems like they were much less capable competent and much less
  62. able to pursue or or full this fill this role of of governance. So I think one thing we
  63. should think more about what type of people, what type of backgrounds, you know, what level of competence should we
  64. have on board. Based on what you know now, are there certain reforms specifically that you think should be
  65. implemented uh on the part of financial institutions? Well, I think we see now a trend globally
  66. towards uh you know, two two important trends globally. One is that national governments are putting much more
  67. of control over financial institutions, particularly those countries that have don't have their own institutions, but
  68. have subsidiaries of large international banks. Those governments they felt that
  69. they were at the receiving end of the global crisis. They need to do things. They could not uh accept to be
  70. uh such victims. And and they they're putting in place regulation. That's going to make it very hard to have the
  71. same level of financial integration, same level of financial openness. That's one trend. The other trend is the the
  72. trend towards the global harmonization of of of uh capital requirements, liquidity requirements,
  73. uh you know, what to do with what large systemic organizations, what to do about
  74. levies on banking systems, and so on. That trend goes against, but I think that is now generating some results and
  75. and that's I think on the whole very positive, but it's it's too slow and probably
  76. well, I don't I wouldn't say too late because it's very hard to do things in the midst of the crisis,
  77. but also the political momentum on some of these reforms may not be there right now. Yeah, that that may be an
  78. understatement. Uh uh here here in the US, I think uh I I would think that some many people uh
  79. average people, even people who were like yourself, who were kind of immersed in this um all the time, may wonder
  80. whether there's a chance that some of this might be forgotten, you know, as another year
  81. goes by and another year year goes by and perhaps reforms are not as comprehensive as some would like to
  82. see. I mean, there may be a sense that um you know, why hasn't anyone been punished or
  83. or or put in jail or something for some of the activities by these institutions having caused such um
  84. terrible repercussions around the globe. Uh is that is that likely to happen? Are
  85. we likely to see the Basel Committee or the the government of the United States, whether
  86. it's the SEC or other institutions, actually coming down hard on some of the individuals or institutions that
  87. engaged in these activities? I I don't see that happening, I think. The the there is a very difficult trade-off here
  88. because in the middle of the crisis, you know, first of all, there are many things that you have to do just to try
  89. to keep things going. But one thing you don't want to do is to have harsher rules on on banks in the
  90. midst of the crisis because you know, you want banks to whatever to do whatever they can to lend to to the the
  91. real economy. So so that's why we have been waiting for these rules for so long. And and
  92. also now, if you look at these most recent international rules, the Basel three so-called rules on capital adequacy and
  93. liquid- liquidity and so on. They are going to be phased in until 2019. It's a very long period and it's exactly
  94. because you don't want to impose rules too early in the recovery. You don't want to threaten the recovery. So,
  95. that's one aspect of you know, why we have to wait so long. And then, I think on some of the issues of compensation,
  96. some of which I think one could have addressed earlier when there was a political momentum.
  97. I think there we lost the window. And uh I I you know, that whether that is because of the lobbying power of the
  98. financial industry because we didn't or because we didn't really have a good alternative. We didn't maybe have a good
  99. model for how to how to regulate the compensation. I think now we are slowly starting to
  100. realize and and maybe we knew all along, but we we have much stronger evidence that compensation was a very important
  101. aspect of the crisis. And then, so the way we reward managers is absolutely critical for their behavior. And and
  102. that I think is something we really need to sit down and and and and and work on.
  103. And and here whether this can be done globally, I'm not sure, but it's certainly or no rules
  104. coming into play that have been designed globally. And so, they will play some role. I'm not sure how
  105. powerful they will be in the United States. The the issue of compensation that you raised, of course, is the one
  106. that um touches, I think, the uh everyone who reads about this crisis because of the outsized compensation
  107. packages that many CEOs had. Do you really expect that um that those packages will be adjusted,
  108. that the incentives will be adjusted in such a way to to perhaps forestall the next I I I I
  109. can't speak so much about the United States, but I can say from the UK and the UK, you know, is is very closely
  110. related to to the US in this regard. So, you know, things that happen in compensation in the US affects what
  111. happen in the UK and and vice versa. And and in the UK, it's very clear that base
  112. salaries are coming up and bonuses are coming down. And and actually a lot of you know, employees often prefer this.
  113. The the the thing is that that it's often a more costly way sometimes of rewarding
  114. people because you have to give them, you know, very you know, raising the base salary turns out to be
  115. you know, quite expensive. So, so there are some I know in London, uh for example,
  116. you know, we are recruiting in the similar markets and and I think you know, some expect 80% increases in base
  117. salaries in London this year. Which is you know, quite dramatic and and that you know, whether that is you know,
  118. that that we're seeing happening, whether this will resolve some of the issues, I'm not sure. Uh just one or two
  119. other things uh before we close. The uh in your view, how have European institutions and their regulators
  120. approached or attacked the the financial crisis um compared to US companies and regulators? Have have they
  121. both been looking at similar reforms? Have they looked at this in much the same way or not? I think there is a
  122. there is a common pattern in it's one of a very reasonable response in the crisis. Maybe it's
  123. slightly late, but still when it finally came, it was a a very strong response and both at the national level, at the
  124. sort of regional level in the European Union, and at the international level, the the role of the international
  125. financial institution, particularly IMF. That was a very good response. I think if we look back at it without the
  126. response, the world would have been much worse off. I think when we look at dealing with the
  127. causes of the crisis and and all these things we discussed now in terms of of of compensation, regulation, provision,
  128. the response have been much have been much slower both in Europe and and in the United States.
  129. In in Europe, you had the additional problem of of the European Union had no mandate in this area really before the
  130. crisis. That is changing now quite dramatically. So, they're now creating new institutions at the European level
  131. to to deal with with both regulation and supervision with this future prudential
  132. regulation trying to to look into to the you know, the health of these institutions, the systemic
  133. importance and so on. We didn't have anything like that before the crisis. And the European Central
  134. Bank where it explicitly said that was not their role. And that was something that was very damaging in the beginning
  135. of the crisis. And and luckily, in the end, you know, politicians reacted and then we we got a
  136. good response, but it took a long time. And that's something we also need to think about, how do we put in place a
  137. good crisis management uh system because now these institutions are global and they probably will remain global in one
  138. form or another. We need to deal with that. And then, how do we deal with the all these links between countries? And
  139. if you want to be able to resolve institutions, how do we that? A lot of these issues are now on the table and
  140. and needs to be addressed. Some commentators have said that um uh that that not much is not enough has
  141. been done to prevent another crisis and that it's only a matter of time before banks and brokerage firms and uh uh and
  142. other financial institutions kind of repeat the same mistakes or or the same actions they had done
  143. previously and that there's just it's just a matter of time before we see the next crisis. Do you believe that or are
  144. you optimistic that that reforms will take place to forestall such a crisis again? I I I think we are
  145. making progress on on you know, some aspects of regulation, supervision. But the the deep structural
  146. issues are not being addressed. And and here I think there's only one country that I know of that is trying to tackle
  147. this. And this is the the UK, actually, because they have now put in place a commission.
  148. You know, of course, when you put a place in a commission, there's not a guarantee that something will happen. It
  149. could actually be a way of sort of postponing a discussion. But but actually, the way this commission is is
  150. constituted, the the the the people on on that commission, I think will bring about a discussion
  151. that is goes to the fundamental aspects. You know, what should we do about what should commercial banks be allowed to
  152. do? What what level of risk should I be allowed to be engaged in? You know, a lot of these deep structural issues that
  153. I think they are the one we need to address to be able to reduce the risk of a future crisis. And
  154. do you think the United States and other uh countries, European countries and others should look to the UK for any
  155. benchmarking or guidance along Well, I think it's too it's too early to say what will come out of this, but I I
  156. think all all the countries need to think about these structural issues. And I think
  157. particularly United States because the United States is the home of many very important global financial institutions.
  158. So, you know, the US probably doesn't want to be, you know, responding to what other countries are doing. They they
  159. should take the lead. Okay. Dr. Berglöf, thank you very much for joining us today.
  160. Thank you for having me.

Brief Summary

Erik Berglof discusses corporate governance's impact on the 2008 financial crisis and the need for reforms in banking oversight.

Key points

  • The Role of Governance in the Financial Crisis. Exploring how corporate governance failures contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.
  • Challenges in Board Effectiveness. Examining the complexities of board roles in banks versus companies.
  • Global Trends in Financial Regulation. National governments are tightening control over financial institutions post-crisis.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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