How Big Data Ties Politically Connected Bankers to Pre-TARP Insider Trading
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Episode Description
Insider trading by politically connected bankers spiked just before the massive bailouts of October 2008, new research by Wharton accounting professor Daniel J. Taylor and colleagues shows. 📂 Public Policy 🏷️ Research
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- I'd like to welcome Daniel Taylor to knowledge at Wharton he's a professor of accounting here and he's written a very
- interesting paper on the connection between political connections and and insider trading during or just after the
- financial crisis and during the period where tarp was under consideration and tarp is the Troubled Asset Relief
- Program that's right and so I'm going to let you give us a short summary first and then we'll get into more specific
- questions about what your paper is about what it found okay so what we what we did in the paper is we look at the
- trading of corporate insiders so by corporate insiders we mean officers and directors of publicly traded
- corporations all of these individuals have to file what's known as form fours with the SEC in the public record that
- discloses their trades in their firms shares or their firm stock so there are allowed to trade in their firm shares
- they file that information with the SEC so what we did is we gathered all of the
- information that's out there on these on these form fours on their their trading
- and we looked at the trading before the financial crisis during the financial crisis and after the financial crisis so
- this is the trading of executives and directors in their own firm and we look specifically at financial institutions
- and so one of the big questions that comes out of the financial crisis that's interested you know and Wall Street and
- on Main Street is did anyone know you know did anyone see the crisis coming and so we initially started the project
- by looking at okay can we see whether insiders corporate insiders officers and directors traded in advance of the
- crisis so did banks that did poorly during the crisis to their executive sell shares before you know the crisis
- hit and then we looked at the trading during the crisis so around the bank bailouts the tarp monies that you
- alluded to and then sort of after the crisis what what what did it stabilized and we found that there was
- there didn't seem to really be any evidence of trading before the crisis there was no evidence that insiders
- traded in anticipation of the crisis but we did seem to find some evidence that insiders traded during the crisis in the
- period in which the tarp funds were dispersed and then we investigate that a little bit more and what we find is
- interestingly enough that it's only the insiders that had political connections and by political connections I mean
- connected to a bank regulatory agency or the current House or Senate at the time
- so we looked at bank boards who had a director or officer who had work experience current or past at a bank
- regulatory agency the senator the house and we found that the boards of those banks that had those political
- connections traded more heavily during the financial crisis their trades had higher predictive ability of outcomes
- during the financial crisis so they predict for example the market reaction and the amount of the bailout that the
- bank would receive so we basically find that during the crisis there is some trading and anticipation of a bank of
- bank bailouts and then after the crisis of course we sort of things go back to normal and we don't really find that the
- day that those trades or those individuals trades have any more information than otherwise so this would
- seem to be the definition of insider trading on the face of it so I wanted to just point out because I think it's very
- interesting that this study had a very large sample right looked at 7300 corporate officers is that right just
- fit across 497 publicly traded tarp eligible institution so this Greta says this was a very wide net work that you
- cast right I mean one way to think about this paper is to think about it as using
- big data and computer algorithms to sift through public information on the trades
- of officers and directors and to see which trades of the officers and directors are correlated with future
- outcomes and so we would say it trade is correlated with the future outcome if it has a high predictive
- ability it's more likely that that trade might have been based on on on information about that future outcome
- but I do want to i do want to clarify that you know in the popular press and legal scholars they use the term insider
- trading they're thinking of illegal insider trading when we use the term insider trading we're thinking of the
- trading by officers and directors so we say insider trading we mean trading by corporate insiders and there's two types
- the first type is the legal trading so this is they can you know the the board the CEO can trade in his shares you know
- just like anyone else can with proper disclosure with proper disclosure you know as long as they do not have any
- private information the illegal kind is when they have private information that they have not disclosed to shareholders
- so this would this sort of relates back to a set of rules called discloser abstain so if you're a CEO or a manager
- and you have private information it's your duty to either disclose to shareholders or abstain from trading and
- so in this setting it's a little bit more murky because when we're looking at political connections and connections to
- bank regulators you know it's not really clear how the manager would disclose any
- information that they would have gotten from their connections so for example because it's not definite information
- right so you know that's something looks someone is telling a bank insider it looks likely let this is going to happen
- so legally he can't he doesn't really have an obligation to disclose something that's not really certain is that right
- that's correct that's correct and so I think you know there's been a spate of recent insider trading cases that have
- gone on that the government is prosecuted and you know out of those insider trading cases the definition of
- illegal insider trading has become more murky slippery yes more slippery and so I you know I don't think it would be
- wrong to suggest that this paper has sort of a smoking gun okay what we're doing is we're reporting correlations
- when as you mentioned a large sample and casting sort of a suspicious I in the direction
- of insiders that have political connections I mean if you if you go back to all of the books and the popular
- press during the period you know the bailouts were effectively decided in you know backroom meetings with sort of
- insiders there's a great book you know too big to fail yes by Sorkin it's sort of details sort of all of these you know
- his interviews with people and so a natural question is is well you know if if the bailouts being decided in private
- and in consultation with you know bankers or you know Treasury officials or government officials how does that
- information sort of leak out so this I think that it's also interesting to note that this was not the result you were
- expecting when you started out on this path could you just talk about that briefly right this surprised you yes but
- is all surprised yes absolutely and frankly we're still kind of stunned at the at the results and so when we
- started the project several years ago you know as I mentioned it was sort of like a big data study you know we sat
- down the co-authors and I and you know talked about you know okay does this you know this would be interesting does it
- make sense because there's all of this concern about did they anticipate the crisis so we began the paper thinking
- okay we would shed some evidence on whether they anticipated the crisis or not and so five years ago that would
- have been sort of a very timely you know finding they did anticipate the crisis or they didn't anticipate the crisis but
- it took us a little longer than we expected to gather the data and to do the analysis but the analysis was you
- know a couple months of you know you know coding and get gathering data and and so when we started doing the
- analysis and we realized okay we're probably after the crisis let's add some more data let's add the post-crisis the
- bailout period data let's add you know the data from you know 2010-2011 into it and run the analysis we kind of we found
- somewhat surprisingly that there was this you know blip for lack of a better term in the correlation between insider
- trades and future performance during the what we call the bailout period and that's the
- from when tarp began dispersed in october through june and so when we saw the blip the next question is okay where
- is the blip coming from why is the blip there and so then we found that the blip
- only occurred in banks that actually received tarpon money okay so then we could you know think about like a you
- know an investigative journalist dig deeper okay so now the blip is only in those banks that receives tarp money ok
- so then dig deeper look at the connections of the individuals or of the bank okay well now the blip is not only
- and banks that receives tarp money it is also only within that set also those that received tarp money and had ties to
- former or current bank regulatory bank regulatory agencies like the Fed the Treasury the office of the comptroller
- of the currency the FDIC and so that's when we said you know like wait you'll wait a second you know is this actually
- you know what were is is this actually where the blip is and so you know we're my co-authors and I are actually pretty
- suspicious and skeptical people by nature so in terms of data analysis we threw everything we could add it to make
- it go away and so I I wouldn't be here if it went away and so this isn't a case where you know we're trying to you know
- can some suspicion on something that may or may not go away I mean this is a very
- very robust result i also want to mention that the data on political connections it was not like we collected
- this data or that we generated this data everything in the paper is generated from public available information so
- it's perfectly conceivable that somebody could go out there and you know investigate it themselves the data on
- political connections right where to get data on political connections well in the bios of directors and officers in
- the annual reports they list what their current and former work experience was so everything that's that's in the paper
- sort of out there in the public domain so you aren't using any insider information no we were not using it off
- what are some of the practical implications of these findings so I think I mean it's really interesting you
- pointed out that the alleged criminality of all this is is questionable because the information they had wasn't
- necessarily actionable in the way that they had to disclose it but if someone was whispering in their ear and it was
- good information you know it seems a little bit it seems sleazy right I have to put it mildly right so what what
- practical implications could come from this I mean for example I mean this speaks to the damage that can be done
- with the revolving door of government officials you know having come from industry and then going right back into
- industry perhaps without a you know a proper amount of gap in time but I'll leave it to you what what are some of
- the practical I mean I think that there are probably I would say two main practical practical implications the
- first is we need to give some more thought to what exactly constitutes illegal insider trading I think right
- now in light of recent court cases there's a big gray area out there and I think a lot of people would be surprised
- at how gray the area actually is so you need a smoking gun to be able to prove an insider trading case and it's very
- hard to get that smoking gun you have to get the tipster the tipster has to confess you know there has to be a
- series of dots that you can that you can collect a tipster who may have benefited
- some way from this to begin with it's it's it's difficult to do that using a large sample with correlations but this
- suggests areas where you know people may want to shine a light so think about is
- this this insider trading is a dark room we're shining a light you know it's not
- entirely illuminated but you know we've got a good area where you know people should look the second one is like you
- mentioned the revolving door there are a series of studies in the academic literature on political connections and
- specifically political connections of financials solutions so for example there's a
- recent study in the journal of financial economics and they found that this was before Tim Geithner was was made
- Treasury secretary that when he was announced to be the Treasury secretary the banks that had connections to him
- either on the board seats or what not experienced old massive increases in shareholder value so what this is saying
- is is that the market is aware that there is this connection between bank regulators and the banks at which they
- are regulating so for example many people are surprised when I when I say go to the go to the Federal Reserve's
- website you know you can even look during the crisis Lehman Brothers CEO was you know one of the board of
- directors of the Federal Reserve you know Jamie Dimon was on that was on that board at all first calls himself correct
- was heading that backroom deal right that you alluded to earlier so you've got this marriage is too strong of a
- word but you have these very strong connections between the regulators and the people that they are regulating now
- that's good and bad on the one hand you want somebody knowledgeable about the industry and how banks worked to
- regulate banks but where it you know where it becomes questionable is are their conflicts of interest and sort of
- our paper suggests that yes there are conflicts of interest and these conflicts of interest are potentially
- pervasive and I don't think that's really been given enough sort of you no consideration out there is that you know
- there's a good side to having a banker regulate the banks and there's also uh you know there's also a bad side did you
- attempt to quantify any of this like how much some folks may have benefited well
- so the benefits are tricky because what we're looking at is what we call opportunity profits so when an
- individual trades if their share price goes up let's say six percent over the next same month then that means that
- they've earned a six percent return on their on their money if they sell but we don't we can't match buys and sells so
- we can't actually compute a measure of realized profit all we can say is well you bought this month stock price went
- up six percent right that's six percent more than you would have made right if you had waited a month usually better
- when it goes up yes no that's right and so in this case we look at the trades in
- advance of the tarp infusion so we know the date of the tarp infusions we know the date of the trade and so we look at
- the trades and surprisingly we find a significant amount of trades both both in volume and dollars clustered 30 days
- before the bank actually receives a tarp infusion now I have done some some work
- on insider trading policies in my prior research what was surprising to us is that most companies have something known
- as trading blackout windows in a trading blackout window is imposed by the company in the code of ethics on the
- officers and directors and it says you shall not trade n days typically 20 30 40 days in advance of a material event
- so for example for an earnings announcement that firms make on a quarterly basis insiders are prevented
- from trading you know several days in advance of that earnings announcement in this case if there was a blackout window
- applied to the tarp infusion those trades should not have existed so what this suggests is is that either the
- event the tarp infusion was unanticipated so a blackout window could not apply or that they sort of skirted
- the their firms no blackout windows just one final thing I just wanted to focus on the no smoking gun comment that you
- made at the outset so this is seems like pretty clear evidence that there was insider trading to me as I create it
- very strong evidence and yet this isn't pointing to any individuals or necessarily I mean you were sort of
- doing this globally and the information that you have while interesting isn't the kind of information that someone
- takes the court it's the kind of information that together would use to say here are the
- most interesting places to look if I were going to try to find a wrongdoer right so I guess I would think about
- this as sort of as an academic paper on the costs and benefits to political connections so most of the academic
- literature has focused on the benefits that the shareholders in the firm receives from having political
- connections on the board right so it may very well be that you know you like as a
- shareholder in the firm you want your bank to be politically connected because you're more likely to get bailed out you
- know you're more likely to get special favors and so most of the academic literature suggests this is a good thing
- for shareholders you know not necessarily for the government for the public but for a narrow set of
- shareholders what we're coming along and saying in the you know sort of the a Couture the academic debate is there is
- also a cost what is the cost well the cost is if you have these political connections and during the crisis they
- may engage in some flack riveter term shady trading that shady trading comes at a cost to shareholders so who loses
- out from the you know the insider trading if the executives traded at with private information its other
- shareholders who potentially are on the other side of that trade and they lose out so this is really about sort of in
- if you think about academics is okay political connections have a have a benefit to the firm and we're
- documenting one cost which is sort of extracting rents will be say is rent extraction and also the potential cost
- or the risk of being exposed and what that could do right to the bank's stock right no so i don't i don't want there
- to be you know to one shouldn't ascribe any sort of policy agenda or anything like that to the paper or two to the
- findings we're just basically saying look there's this cost of of political connections and you know and by the way
- this is this is not a trivial cost this seems to be a big deal especially in light of all of the debate about tarp
- how the bailout monies were doled out the decisions about how of those things were
- were given out and so hopefully something like this doesn't you know doesn't happen again but it does suggest
- that you know these conflicts of interests do have real costs for for the bank shareholders even if the bank gets
- bailed out you know the the managers or the officers and directors may have traded you know in private information
- advance of that actual any idea of how many people were involved in that potential violation well its potential
- violation it's difficult because it's hard to say whether anything was actually sort of whether you know I
- can't go or it since everything's based on correlations I can't go around and say uuuuu this from that from this firm
- all I can say is the set of firms and the set of individuals where the correlation is particularly high now
- those trades may have been conducted entirely legally you know within sort of the per views of the existing and set of
- trading rules and by chance there was a very high correlation but the fact that we find that you know these correlation
- so pervasive as you mentioned and specifically focused within those that are politically connected suggest that
- there is you know it's not just one or two or three individuals they would not be able to drive a result on 73,000
- insiders or 7300 excuse me 7300 insiders but you know it's so it's sufficiently pervasive that you know it's able to
- generate a large sample result thanks for coming in today oh my did it my pleasure
- you
Brief Summary
Daniel Taylor discusses insider trading linked to political connections during the financial crisis and implications for regulations and conflicts of interest.
Key points
- Surprising Findings on Crisis Anticipation. The research found no evidence that insiders anticipated the financial crisis through trading.
- Political Connections and Insider Trading. The study reveals that insiders with political connections traded more during the financial crisis.
- Pervasive Correlations in Trading. The discussion reveals that correlations in trading are widespread, especially among politically connected individuals.
Episode highlights
- Surprising Findings on Crisis AnticipationThe research found no evidence that insiders anticipated the financial crisis through trading.“There was no evidence that insiders traded in anticipation of the crisis.”2:21Sep 26, 2016
- Political Connections and Insider TradingThe study reveals that insiders with political connections traded more during the financial crisis.“Insiders traded more heavily during the financial crisis.”3:10Sep 26, 2016
- Pervasive Correlations in TradingThe discussion reveals that correlations in trading are widespread, especially among politically connected individuals.“These correlations are so pervasive that they generate large sample results.”21:04Sep 26, 2016
Tension
55/ 100Some tension





