How Big Data Ties Politically Connected Bankers to Pre-TARP Insider Trading

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Insider trading by politically connected bankers spiked just before the massive bailouts of October 2008, new research by Wharton accounting professor Daniel J. Taylor and colleagues shows. 📂 Public Policy 🏷️ Research

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  1. I'd like to welcome Daniel Taylor to knowledge at Wharton he's a professor of accounting here and he's written a very
  2. interesting paper on the connection between political connections and and insider trading during or just after the
  3. financial crisis and during the period where tarp was under consideration and tarp is the Troubled Asset Relief
  4. Program that's right and so I'm going to let you give us a short summary first and then we'll get into more specific
  5. questions about what your paper is about what it found okay so what we what we did in the paper is we look at the
  6. trading of corporate insiders so by corporate insiders we mean officers and directors of publicly traded
  7. corporations all of these individuals have to file what's known as form fours with the SEC in the public record that
  8. discloses their trades in their firms shares or their firm stock so there are allowed to trade in their firm shares
  9. they file that information with the SEC so what we did is we gathered all of the
  10. information that's out there on these on these form fours on their their trading
  11. and we looked at the trading before the financial crisis during the financial crisis and after the financial crisis so
  12. this is the trading of executives and directors in their own firm and we look specifically at financial institutions
  13. and so one of the big questions that comes out of the financial crisis that's interested you know and Wall Street and
  14. on Main Street is did anyone know you know did anyone see the crisis coming and so we initially started the project
  15. by looking at okay can we see whether insiders corporate insiders officers and directors traded in advance of the
  16. crisis so did banks that did poorly during the crisis to their executive sell shares before you know the crisis
  17. hit and then we looked at the trading during the crisis so around the bank bailouts the tarp monies that you
  18. alluded to and then sort of after the crisis what what what did it stabilized and we found that there was
  19. there didn't seem to really be any evidence of trading before the crisis there was no evidence that insiders
  20. traded in anticipation of the crisis but we did seem to find some evidence that insiders traded during the crisis in the
  21. period in which the tarp funds were dispersed and then we investigate that a little bit more and what we find is
  22. interestingly enough that it's only the insiders that had political connections and by political connections I mean
  23. connected to a bank regulatory agency or the current House or Senate at the time
  24. so we looked at bank boards who had a director or officer who had work experience current or past at a bank
  25. regulatory agency the senator the house and we found that the boards of those banks that had those political
  26. connections traded more heavily during the financial crisis their trades had higher predictive ability of outcomes
  27. during the financial crisis so they predict for example the market reaction and the amount of the bailout that the
  28. bank would receive so we basically find that during the crisis there is some trading and anticipation of a bank of
  29. bank bailouts and then after the crisis of course we sort of things go back to normal and we don't really find that the
  30. day that those trades or those individuals trades have any more information than otherwise so this would
  31. seem to be the definition of insider trading on the face of it so I wanted to just point out because I think it's very
  32. interesting that this study had a very large sample right looked at 7300 corporate officers is that right just
  33. fit across 497 publicly traded tarp eligible institution so this Greta says this was a very wide net work that you
  34. cast right I mean one way to think about this paper is to think about it as using
  35. big data and computer algorithms to sift through public information on the trades
  36. of officers and directors and to see which trades of the officers and directors are correlated with future
  37. outcomes and so we would say it trade is correlated with the future outcome if it has a high predictive
  38. ability it's more likely that that trade might have been based on on on information about that future outcome
  39. but I do want to i do want to clarify that you know in the popular press and legal scholars they use the term insider
  40. trading they're thinking of illegal insider trading when we use the term insider trading we're thinking of the
  41. trading by officers and directors so we say insider trading we mean trading by corporate insiders and there's two types
  42. the first type is the legal trading so this is they can you know the the board the CEO can trade in his shares you know
  43. just like anyone else can with proper disclosure with proper disclosure you know as long as they do not have any
  44. private information the illegal kind is when they have private information that they have not disclosed to shareholders
  45. so this would this sort of relates back to a set of rules called discloser abstain so if you're a CEO or a manager
  46. and you have private information it's your duty to either disclose to shareholders or abstain from trading and
  47. so in this setting it's a little bit more murky because when we're looking at political connections and connections to
  48. bank regulators you know it's not really clear how the manager would disclose any
  49. information that they would have gotten from their connections so for example because it's not definite information
  50. right so you know that's something looks someone is telling a bank insider it looks likely let this is going to happen
  51. so legally he can't he doesn't really have an obligation to disclose something that's not really certain is that right
  52. that's correct that's correct and so I think you know there's been a spate of recent insider trading cases that have
  53. gone on that the government is prosecuted and you know out of those insider trading cases the definition of
  54. illegal insider trading has become more murky slippery yes more slippery and so I you know I don't think it would be
  55. wrong to suggest that this paper has sort of a smoking gun okay what we're doing is we're reporting correlations
  56. when as you mentioned a large sample and casting sort of a suspicious I in the direction
  57. of insiders that have political connections I mean if you if you go back to all of the books and the popular
  58. press during the period you know the bailouts were effectively decided in you know backroom meetings with sort of
  59. insiders there's a great book you know too big to fail yes by Sorkin it's sort of details sort of all of these you know
  60. his interviews with people and so a natural question is is well you know if if the bailouts being decided in private
  61. and in consultation with you know bankers or you know Treasury officials or government officials how does that
  62. information sort of leak out so this I think that it's also interesting to note that this was not the result you were
  63. expecting when you started out on this path could you just talk about that briefly right this surprised you yes but
  64. is all surprised yes absolutely and frankly we're still kind of stunned at the at the results and so when we
  65. started the project several years ago you know as I mentioned it was sort of like a big data study you know we sat
  66. down the co-authors and I and you know talked about you know okay does this you know this would be interesting does it
  67. make sense because there's all of this concern about did they anticipate the crisis so we began the paper thinking
  68. okay we would shed some evidence on whether they anticipated the crisis or not and so five years ago that would
  69. have been sort of a very timely you know finding they did anticipate the crisis or they didn't anticipate the crisis but
  70. it took us a little longer than we expected to gather the data and to do the analysis but the analysis was you
  71. know a couple months of you know you know coding and get gathering data and and so when we started doing the
  72. analysis and we realized okay we're probably after the crisis let's add some more data let's add the post-crisis the
  73. bailout period data let's add you know the data from you know 2010-2011 into it and run the analysis we kind of we found
  74. somewhat surprisingly that there was this you know blip for lack of a better term in the correlation between insider
  75. trades and future performance during the what we call the bailout period and that's the
  76. from when tarp began dispersed in october through june and so when we saw the blip the next question is okay where
  77. is the blip coming from why is the blip there and so then we found that the blip
  78. only occurred in banks that actually received tarpon money okay so then we could you know think about like a you
  79. know an investigative journalist dig deeper okay so now the blip is only in those banks that receives tarp money ok
  80. so then dig deeper look at the connections of the individuals or of the bank okay well now the blip is not only
  81. and banks that receives tarp money it is also only within that set also those that received tarp money and had ties to
  82. former or current bank regulatory bank regulatory agencies like the Fed the Treasury the office of the comptroller
  83. of the currency the FDIC and so that's when we said you know like wait you'll wait a second you know is this actually
  84. you know what were is is this actually where the blip is and so you know we're my co-authors and I are actually pretty
  85. suspicious and skeptical people by nature so in terms of data analysis we threw everything we could add it to make
  86. it go away and so I I wouldn't be here if it went away and so this isn't a case where you know we're trying to you know
  87. can some suspicion on something that may or may not go away I mean this is a very
  88. very robust result i also want to mention that the data on political connections it was not like we collected
  89. this data or that we generated this data everything in the paper is generated from public available information so
  90. it's perfectly conceivable that somebody could go out there and you know investigate it themselves the data on
  91. political connections right where to get data on political connections well in the bios of directors and officers in
  92. the annual reports they list what their current and former work experience was so everything that's that's in the paper
  93. sort of out there in the public domain so you aren't using any insider information no we were not using it off
  94. what are some of the practical implications of these findings so I think I mean it's really interesting you
  95. pointed out that the alleged criminality of all this is is questionable because the information they had wasn't
  96. necessarily actionable in the way that they had to disclose it but if someone was whispering in their ear and it was
  97. good information you know it seems a little bit it seems sleazy right I have to put it mildly right so what what
  98. practical implications could come from this I mean for example I mean this speaks to the damage that can be done
  99. with the revolving door of government officials you know having come from industry and then going right back into
  100. industry perhaps without a you know a proper amount of gap in time but I'll leave it to you what what are some of
  101. the practical I mean I think that there are probably I would say two main practical practical implications the
  102. first is we need to give some more thought to what exactly constitutes illegal insider trading I think right
  103. now in light of recent court cases there's a big gray area out there and I think a lot of people would be surprised
  104. at how gray the area actually is so you need a smoking gun to be able to prove an insider trading case and it's very
  105. hard to get that smoking gun you have to get the tipster the tipster has to confess you know there has to be a
  106. series of dots that you can that you can collect a tipster who may have benefited
  107. some way from this to begin with it's it's it's difficult to do that using a large sample with correlations but this
  108. suggests areas where you know people may want to shine a light so think about is
  109. this this insider trading is a dark room we're shining a light you know it's not
  110. entirely illuminated but you know we've got a good area where you know people should look the second one is like you
  111. mentioned the revolving door there are a series of studies in the academic literature on political connections and
  112. specifically political connections of financials solutions so for example there's a
  113. recent study in the journal of financial economics and they found that this was before Tim Geithner was was made
  114. Treasury secretary that when he was announced to be the Treasury secretary the banks that had connections to him
  115. either on the board seats or what not experienced old massive increases in shareholder value so what this is saying
  116. is is that the market is aware that there is this connection between bank regulators and the banks at which they
  117. are regulating so for example many people are surprised when I when I say go to the go to the Federal Reserve's
  118. website you know you can even look during the crisis Lehman Brothers CEO was you know one of the board of
  119. directors of the Federal Reserve you know Jamie Dimon was on that was on that board at all first calls himself correct
  120. was heading that backroom deal right that you alluded to earlier so you've got this marriage is too strong of a
  121. word but you have these very strong connections between the regulators and the people that they are regulating now
  122. that's good and bad on the one hand you want somebody knowledgeable about the industry and how banks worked to
  123. regulate banks but where it you know where it becomes questionable is are their conflicts of interest and sort of
  124. our paper suggests that yes there are conflicts of interest and these conflicts of interest are potentially
  125. pervasive and I don't think that's really been given enough sort of you no consideration out there is that you know
  126. there's a good side to having a banker regulate the banks and there's also uh you know there's also a bad side did you
  127. attempt to quantify any of this like how much some folks may have benefited well
  128. so the benefits are tricky because what we're looking at is what we call opportunity profits so when an
  129. individual trades if their share price goes up let's say six percent over the next same month then that means that
  130. they've earned a six percent return on their on their money if they sell but we don't we can't match buys and sells so
  131. we can't actually compute a measure of realized profit all we can say is well you bought this month stock price went
  132. up six percent right that's six percent more than you would have made right if you had waited a month usually better
  133. when it goes up yes no that's right and so in this case we look at the trades in
  134. advance of the tarp infusion so we know the date of the tarp infusions we know the date of the trade and so we look at
  135. the trades and surprisingly we find a significant amount of trades both both in volume and dollars clustered 30 days
  136. before the bank actually receives a tarp infusion now I have done some some work
  137. on insider trading policies in my prior research what was surprising to us is that most companies have something known
  138. as trading blackout windows in a trading blackout window is imposed by the company in the code of ethics on the
  139. officers and directors and it says you shall not trade n days typically 20 30 40 days in advance of a material event
  140. so for example for an earnings announcement that firms make on a quarterly basis insiders are prevented
  141. from trading you know several days in advance of that earnings announcement in this case if there was a blackout window
  142. applied to the tarp infusion those trades should not have existed so what this suggests is is that either the
  143. event the tarp infusion was unanticipated so a blackout window could not apply or that they sort of skirted
  144. the their firms no blackout windows just one final thing I just wanted to focus on the no smoking gun comment that you
  145. made at the outset so this is seems like pretty clear evidence that there was insider trading to me as I create it
  146. very strong evidence and yet this isn't pointing to any individuals or necessarily I mean you were sort of
  147. doing this globally and the information that you have while interesting isn't the kind of information that someone
  148. takes the court it's the kind of information that together would use to say here are the
  149. most interesting places to look if I were going to try to find a wrongdoer right so I guess I would think about
  150. this as sort of as an academic paper on the costs and benefits to political connections so most of the academic
  151. literature has focused on the benefits that the shareholders in the firm receives from having political
  152. connections on the board right so it may very well be that you know you like as a
  153. shareholder in the firm you want your bank to be politically connected because you're more likely to get bailed out you
  154. know you're more likely to get special favors and so most of the academic literature suggests this is a good thing
  155. for shareholders you know not necessarily for the government for the public but for a narrow set of
  156. shareholders what we're coming along and saying in the you know sort of the a Couture the academic debate is there is
  157. also a cost what is the cost well the cost is if you have these political connections and during the crisis they
  158. may engage in some flack riveter term shady trading that shady trading comes at a cost to shareholders so who loses
  159. out from the you know the insider trading if the executives traded at with private information its other
  160. shareholders who potentially are on the other side of that trade and they lose out so this is really about sort of in
  161. if you think about academics is okay political connections have a have a benefit to the firm and we're
  162. documenting one cost which is sort of extracting rents will be say is rent extraction and also the potential cost
  163. or the risk of being exposed and what that could do right to the bank's stock right no so i don't i don't want there
  164. to be you know to one shouldn't ascribe any sort of policy agenda or anything like that to the paper or two to the
  165. findings we're just basically saying look there's this cost of of political connections and you know and by the way
  166. this is this is not a trivial cost this seems to be a big deal especially in light of all of the debate about tarp
  167. how the bailout monies were doled out the decisions about how of those things were
  168. were given out and so hopefully something like this doesn't you know doesn't happen again but it does suggest
  169. that you know these conflicts of interests do have real costs for for the bank shareholders even if the bank gets
  170. bailed out you know the the managers or the officers and directors may have traded you know in private information
  171. advance of that actual any idea of how many people were involved in that potential violation well its potential
  172. violation it's difficult because it's hard to say whether anything was actually sort of whether you know I
  173. can't go or it since everything's based on correlations I can't go around and say uuuuu this from that from this firm
  174. all I can say is the set of firms and the set of individuals where the correlation is particularly high now
  175. those trades may have been conducted entirely legally you know within sort of the per views of the existing and set of
  176. trading rules and by chance there was a very high correlation but the fact that we find that you know these correlation
  177. so pervasive as you mentioned and specifically focused within those that are politically connected suggest that
  178. there is you know it's not just one or two or three individuals they would not be able to drive a result on 73,000
  179. insiders or 7300 excuse me 7300 insiders but you know it's so it's sufficiently pervasive that you know it's able to
  180. generate a large sample result thanks for coming in today oh my did it my pleasure
  181. you

Brief Summary

Daniel Taylor discusses insider trading linked to political connections during the financial crisis and implications for regulations and conflicts of interest.

Key points

  • Surprising Findings on Crisis Anticipation. The research found no evidence that insiders anticipated the financial crisis through trading.
  • Political Connections and Insider Trading. The study reveals that insiders with political connections traded more during the financial crisis.
  • Pervasive Correlations in Trading. The discussion reveals that correlations in trading are widespread, especially among politically connected individuals.

Tension

55/ 100Some tension

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