Dual Directors and Corporate Spinoffs

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  1. so my research investigates uh what happens when companies appoint what I call dual directors following the
  2. completion of corporate spin-offs so let me take a step back and talk about what
  3. these deals actually are so a spin-off occurs when uh one company issues shares in an existing division to its
  4. shareholders uh and that results in the creation of a new company so you have the divesting firm which is the parent
  5. company and the deveste firm which is the spin-off company and so in Reading uh the legal regulations about these
  6. deals what I found is that companies are actually allowed parent companies are actually allowed to appoint their own
  7. directors to serve simultaneously on the boards of their spin-off firms uh so I call these directors that serve on both
  8. company boards at the same time dual directors and I look at their implications for the performance of each
  9. of the two companies and what I find is that these directors are positively associated with the average performance
  10. uh stock market returns of the two companies together uh in general but then in situations where the spin-off
  11. firm makes a large share of its sales to the parent company uh the Dual directors
  12. are negatively associated with spin-off firm performance but positively associated with parent firm performance
  13. so we have an average positive effect overall but a Divergent distributional effect when we look at spin-offs where
  14. there's a sales relationship between the spin-off firm and the parent firm so there are two key takeaways that
  15. I get out of the research uh both really interesting I think so one is about the
  16. prevalence of these directors so about 60% of the parent and spin-off from pairs so a pair again uh emerges from
  17. the fact that the parent company is divesting uh the spin-off company so these two companies were associated with
  18. one another prior to the spin-off and then they get separated by the deal so 60% of the parent spin-off firm pairs in
  19. my sample share one of these dual directors at least one of these dual directors in the effective year of the
  20. spin-off so that's a really high percentage uh 60% of these companies sharing the same director much higher
  21. than uh any other proportion of director interlock uh meaning an overlapping director between two companies that
  22. exists in regular American corporations we don't nearly see a proportion like that and what's interesting also is that
  23. even as you proceed a few years after the completion of the spin-off so let's take three years after the spin-off as
  24. the example uh 35% of the companies still share these dual directors uh which is still a really high number
  25. relative to what we see among other companies in terms of sharing common directors uh so I think that just the
  26. prevalence of this phenomenon and being able to identify this uh is a really unique contribution of of this study no
  27. one's done this before no one's looked at this phenomenon and that's that's something that I was able to contribute
  28. there the second key takeaway that I would raise is the idea of power right so I was talking before about this
  29. positive average effect versus this Divergent distributional implication by which I mean that the parent firm does
  30. well whereas the spin-off firm does poorly uh following the completion of these spin-offs um and so what this
  31. really boils down to is a question of power so if you think about a firm that undertakes a spin-off right the parent
  32. firm this company's been around for a number of years it's established it has its management team it has its
  33. reputation it has its position in the market uh it has existing business practices relationships with other
  34. companies and stakeholders so this company is pretty well situated the parent company not so for the spin-off
  35. firm these companies are created completely from scratch they have to start everything uh from the beginning
  36. they have to get their management team they have to build their reputation they have to build an analyst's following
  37. they have to establish their own business practices so on average in general the parent company is more
  38. powerful than the spin-off fir to begin with so when you have one of these dual directors in most cases they're not
  39. really going to have any motivation to take advantage of the spin-off firm or do things to benefit the parent firm at
  40. the spin-off firm's expense right so they have power the parent firm has power over the spin-off firm but that
  41. sort of mutes the uh effect that dual directors will have on the spin-off firm so that's why we see a positive average
  42. effect in some situations these dual directors might even help the spin-off firm in terms of establishing itself as
  43. a new company so that's the positive average effect however in situations where the parent firm is a big buyer of
  44. the spin-off firm's output in other words when the spin-off firm is selling a lot of its output to the parent firm
  45. that puts the parent company in a position of even greater power over the spin-off firm because not only is
  46. established uh an existing in the marketplace more so than the spin-off firm but on top of that uh the spin-off
  47. firm uh is basically dependent on the parent company as a buyer for its output so that puts the Dual directors in a
  48. position where they have both the ability and the motivation to take actions uh at the at the spin-off firm's
  49. expense to benefit the parent firm right so once the power Dynamic shifts to the
  50. point where it favors the parent firm even more significantly than it does the spin-off firm this is when we start to
  51. see the cost to the spin-off firm which benefits the parent company right so this Divergent distributional
  52. implication that I was talking about where the parent firm benefits at the spin-off firm's expense only happens
  53. when there's a situation where there's a sales relationship between the two companies so I would say that there is
  54. implications for the parent and spin-off firms that are involved in these deals and then there are also implications
  55. more from a regulatory and societal standpoint um so I'll take each of these in turn so starting with the companies
  56. that are involved in the spin-off um I think that the implication for uh parent companies is that dual directors can be
  57. a really useful tool with which to manage their relationships with the spin-off firm so the parent firm has the
  58. right to place these dual directors on the boards of their spin-off firm and that gives them the ability to somehow
  59. control or shape the relationship uh the spin-off Firs actions in a way that it wouldn't have the ability to do if it
  60. just did the spin-off and the that company was off on its own independent um so the implication there is that
  61. parent firms can proactively use these directors to manage their ongoing relationships uh with the spin-off firm
  62. however there's kind of a dark side to this story in the sense that the Dual directors create the potential for
  63. opportunism on the parent firm's part in situations where there there is this sales relationship so the dark side is
  64. that yes duol directors can be a useful tool but they can also be used for evil rather than for good um and allow the
  65. parent firm to take advantage of the relationship with the spin-off firm so I don't know that I would say that we want
  66. to advise parent companies to use dual directors to take advantage of their spin-off firms but it's certainly an
  67. implication that comes out of the research and continuing in this vein sort of the opposite implications are
  68. true for the spin-off firms that on the one hand uh these dual directors can be a really useful tool with which to kind
  69. of ease the separation process of uh sort of creating a new company starting from scratch building up these
  70. relationships that I was talking about earlier um however the spin-off firm needs to guard against this opportunism
  71. that I was mentioning in terms of the parent firm potentially taking advant Vantage of the spin-off firm especially
  72. in situations where there is sales dependence between the spin-off and the paing companies um so that's the first
  73. implication in terms of the companies that are involved in spin-offs the second implication has to do with more
  74. of a regulatory um or societal perspective and I think there are two points to bring up here the first one is
  75. that uh we need to think about uh how we classify independent directors right so
  76. the Dual directors that I'm talking about are independent in the governance sense of the term right so what that
  77. means is that they're uh independent of the management of the spin-off firms that are separated in these deals so
  78. that normally would be viewed by Regulators as a good thing right because they're they're they're free from any
  79. bias free from any uh sort of taint of being associated with uh the existing management of the spin-off firm however
  80. for dual directors even though they're classified as independent it's sort of a funny situation because they're not
  81. really independent in the sense that that first of all they originate from the parent company so obviously there's
  82. a relationship between the parent and the spin-off firm from before the deal um and so that's sort of a question mark
  83. in terms of the independence the second is that they may have a great deal of familiarity with the spin-off firm uh
  84. from its days as a as a subsidiary within the parent company right so the independence there gets called into
  85. question as well so we hear a lot in the press and popular media from Regulators
  86. about how we want independent directors as a marker of good Corp corporate governance and that's completely fine
  87. that's all well and good um but there's sort of gray areas let's say in terms of
  88. how we see this with dual directors so I think that that's a regulatory implication that's worth noting the
  89. second point the second regulatory implication that kind of goes hand inhand with this is the idea that uh
  90. when we think about this positive average effect of dual directors on the average performant of the parent
  91. spin-off firm average performance of the parent and spin-off firms together that's really masking this uh uh
  92. different effect that we see for the parent and spin-off firms right so yes we have a positive average effect
  93. meaning that the Dual directors are good on average but in one situation when we
  94. have this High sales dependence we actually have uh sort of a redistribution of value from the
  95. spin-off firm to the parent firm and that's not really getting picked up in the overall data because we're sort of
  96. seeing the positive average effect so from a regulatory standpoint you know yes maybe we do want dual directors as a
  97. tool to manage relationships between the parent and spin-off firms and sort of they're beneficial on average and that's
  98. fine but one has to be careful or mindful of the situation in which we see uh this High sales dependence because
  99. again that opens up the uh possibility of opportunism and that's sort of hidden by the average effect so Regulators need
  100. to be mindful of how directors dual directors might be misused in situations of high sales dependence between the
  101. spin-off firm and the parent firm so I'm actually really excited about this project there are three I think
  102. really useful and interesting avenues for for future research that I'd like to pursue in this so I'll tell you about
  103. them one by one um so the first uh area that I'd like to consider is what happens when dual directors leave the
  104. boards of the parent and spin-off firms so there's three ways that this could happen one is that the Dual directors
  105. remember that they're shared on both firms boards so the Dual directors could leave the boards break the Dual
  106. directorship by departing from the parent firm's board and just staying on the spin-off firm's board so that's one
  107. type of departure the second type of departure would be that the Dual director could leave the spin-off firm's
  108. board and stay on the parent firm's board breaking the connection between the two companies or third the Dual
  109. director could leave both both boards at the same time so my hunch is that there
  110. are very different reasons for each of these types of Departures and therefore there are going to be very different uh
  111. performance implications and management implications probably operational implications uh for the companies uh for
  112. example if you have the Dual director leaving the parent firm's board and staying on the spin-off firm's board
  113. that might mean that the spin-off firm has finally reached a state of maturity where it's able to function on its own
  114. and it doesn't need that connection anymore or if the Dual director leaves the spin-off firm's board but stays on
  115. the parent firm's board maybe the implication is something like the parent firm no longer needs the oversight or
  116. the management of the relationship with the spin-off firm so I'm really curious to dig more into these three types of
  117. Departures and think about uh what their potential implications might be for the
  118. two companies and then to test that empirically so that's the First Avenue that I'd like to pursue in this research
  119. the second is that I'm really interested in trying to understand more about the Dual director's personal characteristics
  120. so I was mentioning before that uh when we think about these dual directors especially in the context of
  121. Independence there are connections between uh the spin-off and the parent firm in terms of the fact that the Dual
  122. directors uh are serving on both companies board but really originated with the parent firm so I'm curious to
  123. dig deeper into that uh into that issue right so are these directors typically managers of the parent firm um what
  124. kinds of personal characteristics do they have what is their work experience what is their professional experience
  125. and why might the parent firm be wanting to apply that experience to the spin-off
  126. firm in terms of appointing those directors to the spin-off firm's board and even further what are the Dual
  127. director's Financial incentives uh they're obviously getting paid by both companies they're obviously owning uh
  128. shares of stock in both companies since they serve on both firms boards directors all uh get paid for their
  129. board service and and have ownership stakes in the companies that they serve on um so I'm curious to see a bit more
  130. about sort of where these directors incentives lie and this is really one of the novel things about this study in the
  131. sense that it's really the first to consider uh what's happening to the parent and spin-off firms together at
  132. the same time as opposed to treating the two companies completely independently once the spin-offs are complete so by
  133. looking more more at these Financial incentives by virtue of the fact that the directors are serving on both both
  134. firms boards I can actually pull apart uh some of these implications for uh understanding how these two companies
  135. the parent and the spin-off firms work together so that's the second Avenue that I'd like to pursue in my research
  136. and then the third is an even more general question or an even more General issue right so I've been talking about
  137. dual directors as managing ongoing relationships between the parent and the spin-off firms and that's a really
  138. interesting empirical context in which to do that this context of corporate spin-offs that's really what motivates
  139. most of my research uh this this context of corporate spin-offs but I would imagine that there are other uh
  140. empirical situations other professional situations where we do see or we might want to see uh overlapping directorships
  141. so one that immediately comes to mind is a buyer supplier relationship in general
  142. of two companies that are not necessarily linked by a spin-off but you could imagine a dual director being a
  143. really useful uh tool to manage that kind of relation ship another example might be a technological ecosystem where
  144. uh we see relationships between uh various companies that are participating in the same technological ecosystem so
  145. if you think about a smartphone uh the producer of the chip the producer of the glass that goes on the front these dual
  146. directors could be a really useful uh tool with which to manage uh the the overlapping relationships between
  147. companies that need to work together to put certain products or Services together uh for consumers to to use um
  148. and so so I'd like to uh try to broaden the lens a little bit of my research to look at other contexts in which these
  149. dual directorships are similar types of phenomena might be a useful uh useful mechanism to manage those types of
  150. relationships [Music]

Brief Summary

Dual directors in corporate spin-offs can boost parent firm performance but may harm spin-off firms, especially with sales dependencies.

Key points

  • The Role of Dual Directors. Research reveals dual directors positively impact stock market returns for parent and spin-off companies, but can also create conflicts of interest.
  • Implications for Corporate Governance. The study raises questions about the independence of dual directors and their impact on corporate governance.

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