Dual Directors and Corporate Spinoffs
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📂 Management 🏷️ Research
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- so my research investigates uh what happens when companies appoint what I call dual directors following the
- completion of corporate spin-offs so let me take a step back and talk about what
- these deals actually are so a spin-off occurs when uh one company issues shares in an existing division to its
- shareholders uh and that results in the creation of a new company so you have the divesting firm which is the parent
- company and the deveste firm which is the spin-off company and so in Reading uh the legal regulations about these
- deals what I found is that companies are actually allowed parent companies are actually allowed to appoint their own
- directors to serve simultaneously on the boards of their spin-off firms uh so I call these directors that serve on both
- company boards at the same time dual directors and I look at their implications for the performance of each
- of the two companies and what I find is that these directors are positively associated with the average performance
- uh stock market returns of the two companies together uh in general but then in situations where the spin-off
- firm makes a large share of its sales to the parent company uh the Dual directors
- are negatively associated with spin-off firm performance but positively associated with parent firm performance
- so we have an average positive effect overall but a Divergent distributional effect when we look at spin-offs where
- there's a sales relationship between the spin-off firm and the parent firm so there are two key takeaways that
- I get out of the research uh both really interesting I think so one is about the
- prevalence of these directors so about 60% of the parent and spin-off from pairs so a pair again uh emerges from
- the fact that the parent company is divesting uh the spin-off company so these two companies were associated with
- one another prior to the spin-off and then they get separated by the deal so 60% of the parent spin-off firm pairs in
- my sample share one of these dual directors at least one of these dual directors in the effective year of the
- spin-off so that's a really high percentage uh 60% of these companies sharing the same director much higher
- than uh any other proportion of director interlock uh meaning an overlapping director between two companies that
- exists in regular American corporations we don't nearly see a proportion like that and what's interesting also is that
- even as you proceed a few years after the completion of the spin-off so let's take three years after the spin-off as
- the example uh 35% of the companies still share these dual directors uh which is still a really high number
- relative to what we see among other companies in terms of sharing common directors uh so I think that just the
- prevalence of this phenomenon and being able to identify this uh is a really unique contribution of of this study no
- one's done this before no one's looked at this phenomenon and that's that's something that I was able to contribute
- there the second key takeaway that I would raise is the idea of power right so I was talking before about this
- positive average effect versus this Divergent distributional implication by which I mean that the parent firm does
- well whereas the spin-off firm does poorly uh following the completion of these spin-offs um and so what this
- really boils down to is a question of power so if you think about a firm that undertakes a spin-off right the parent
- firm this company's been around for a number of years it's established it has its management team it has its
- reputation it has its position in the market uh it has existing business practices relationships with other
- companies and stakeholders so this company is pretty well situated the parent company not so for the spin-off
- firm these companies are created completely from scratch they have to start everything uh from the beginning
- they have to get their management team they have to build their reputation they have to build an analyst's following
- they have to establish their own business practices so on average in general the parent company is more
- powerful than the spin-off fir to begin with so when you have one of these dual directors in most cases they're not
- really going to have any motivation to take advantage of the spin-off firm or do things to benefit the parent firm at
- the spin-off firm's expense right so they have power the parent firm has power over the spin-off firm but that
- sort of mutes the uh effect that dual directors will have on the spin-off firm so that's why we see a positive average
- effect in some situations these dual directors might even help the spin-off firm in terms of establishing itself as
- a new company so that's the positive average effect however in situations where the parent firm is a big buyer of
- the spin-off firm's output in other words when the spin-off firm is selling a lot of its output to the parent firm
- that puts the parent company in a position of even greater power over the spin-off firm because not only is
- established uh an existing in the marketplace more so than the spin-off firm but on top of that uh the spin-off
- firm uh is basically dependent on the parent company as a buyer for its output so that puts the Dual directors in a
- position where they have both the ability and the motivation to take actions uh at the at the spin-off firm's
- expense to benefit the parent firm right so once the power Dynamic shifts to the
- point where it favors the parent firm even more significantly than it does the spin-off firm this is when we start to
- see the cost to the spin-off firm which benefits the parent company right so this Divergent distributional
- implication that I was talking about where the parent firm benefits at the spin-off firm's expense only happens
- when there's a situation where there's a sales relationship between the two companies so I would say that there is
- implications for the parent and spin-off firms that are involved in these deals and then there are also implications
- more from a regulatory and societal standpoint um so I'll take each of these in turn so starting with the companies
- that are involved in the spin-off um I think that the implication for uh parent companies is that dual directors can be
- a really useful tool with which to manage their relationships with the spin-off firm so the parent firm has the
- right to place these dual directors on the boards of their spin-off firm and that gives them the ability to somehow
- control or shape the relationship uh the spin-off Firs actions in a way that it wouldn't have the ability to do if it
- just did the spin-off and the that company was off on its own independent um so the implication there is that
- parent firms can proactively use these directors to manage their ongoing relationships uh with the spin-off firm
- however there's kind of a dark side to this story in the sense that the Dual directors create the potential for
- opportunism on the parent firm's part in situations where there there is this sales relationship so the dark side is
- that yes duol directors can be a useful tool but they can also be used for evil rather than for good um and allow the
- parent firm to take advantage of the relationship with the spin-off firm so I don't know that I would say that we want
- to advise parent companies to use dual directors to take advantage of their spin-off firms but it's certainly an
- implication that comes out of the research and continuing in this vein sort of the opposite implications are
- true for the spin-off firms that on the one hand uh these dual directors can be a really useful tool with which to kind
- of ease the separation process of uh sort of creating a new company starting from scratch building up these
- relationships that I was talking about earlier um however the spin-off firm needs to guard against this opportunism
- that I was mentioning in terms of the parent firm potentially taking advant Vantage of the spin-off firm especially
- in situations where there is sales dependence between the spin-off and the paing companies um so that's the first
- implication in terms of the companies that are involved in spin-offs the second implication has to do with more
- of a regulatory um or societal perspective and I think there are two points to bring up here the first one is
- that uh we need to think about uh how we classify independent directors right so
- the Dual directors that I'm talking about are independent in the governance sense of the term right so what that
- means is that they're uh independent of the management of the spin-off firms that are separated in these deals so
- that normally would be viewed by Regulators as a good thing right because they're they're they're free from any
- bias free from any uh sort of taint of being associated with uh the existing management of the spin-off firm however
- for dual directors even though they're classified as independent it's sort of a funny situation because they're not
- really independent in the sense that that first of all they originate from the parent company so obviously there's
- a relationship between the parent and the spin-off firm from before the deal um and so that's sort of a question mark
- in terms of the independence the second is that they may have a great deal of familiarity with the spin-off firm uh
- from its days as a as a subsidiary within the parent company right so the independence there gets called into
- question as well so we hear a lot in the press and popular media from Regulators
- about how we want independent directors as a marker of good Corp corporate governance and that's completely fine
- that's all well and good um but there's sort of gray areas let's say in terms of
- how we see this with dual directors so I think that that's a regulatory implication that's worth noting the
- second point the second regulatory implication that kind of goes hand inhand with this is the idea that uh
- when we think about this positive average effect of dual directors on the average performant of the parent
- spin-off firm average performance of the parent and spin-off firms together that's really masking this uh uh
- different effect that we see for the parent and spin-off firms right so yes we have a positive average effect
- meaning that the Dual directors are good on average but in one situation when we
- have this High sales dependence we actually have uh sort of a redistribution of value from the
- spin-off firm to the parent firm and that's not really getting picked up in the overall data because we're sort of
- seeing the positive average effect so from a regulatory standpoint you know yes maybe we do want dual directors as a
- tool to manage relationships between the parent and spin-off firms and sort of they're beneficial on average and that's
- fine but one has to be careful or mindful of the situation in which we see uh this High sales dependence because
- again that opens up the uh possibility of opportunism and that's sort of hidden by the average effect so Regulators need
- to be mindful of how directors dual directors might be misused in situations of high sales dependence between the
- spin-off firm and the parent firm so I'm actually really excited about this project there are three I think
- really useful and interesting avenues for for future research that I'd like to pursue in this so I'll tell you about
- them one by one um so the first uh area that I'd like to consider is what happens when dual directors leave the
- boards of the parent and spin-off firms so there's three ways that this could happen one is that the Dual directors
- remember that they're shared on both firms boards so the Dual directors could leave the boards break the Dual
- directorship by departing from the parent firm's board and just staying on the spin-off firm's board so that's one
- type of departure the second type of departure would be that the Dual director could leave the spin-off firm's
- board and stay on the parent firm's board breaking the connection between the two companies or third the Dual
- director could leave both both boards at the same time so my hunch is that there
- are very different reasons for each of these types of Departures and therefore there are going to be very different uh
- performance implications and management implications probably operational implications uh for the companies uh for
- example if you have the Dual director leaving the parent firm's board and staying on the spin-off firm's board
- that might mean that the spin-off firm has finally reached a state of maturity where it's able to function on its own
- and it doesn't need that connection anymore or if the Dual director leaves the spin-off firm's board but stays on
- the parent firm's board maybe the implication is something like the parent firm no longer needs the oversight or
- the management of the relationship with the spin-off firm so I'm really curious to dig more into these three types of
- Departures and think about uh what their potential implications might be for the
- two companies and then to test that empirically so that's the First Avenue that I'd like to pursue in this research
- the second is that I'm really interested in trying to understand more about the Dual director's personal characteristics
- so I was mentioning before that uh when we think about these dual directors especially in the context of
- Independence there are connections between uh the spin-off and the parent firm in terms of the fact that the Dual
- directors uh are serving on both companies board but really originated with the parent firm so I'm curious to
- dig deeper into that uh into that issue right so are these directors typically managers of the parent firm um what
- kinds of personal characteristics do they have what is their work experience what is their professional experience
- and why might the parent firm be wanting to apply that experience to the spin-off
- firm in terms of appointing those directors to the spin-off firm's board and even further what are the Dual
- director's Financial incentives uh they're obviously getting paid by both companies they're obviously owning uh
- shares of stock in both companies since they serve on both firms boards directors all uh get paid for their
- board service and and have ownership stakes in the companies that they serve on um so I'm curious to see a bit more
- about sort of where these directors incentives lie and this is really one of the novel things about this study in the
- sense that it's really the first to consider uh what's happening to the parent and spin-off firms together at
- the same time as opposed to treating the two companies completely independently once the spin-offs are complete so by
- looking more more at these Financial incentives by virtue of the fact that the directors are serving on both both
- firms boards I can actually pull apart uh some of these implications for uh understanding how these two companies
- the parent and the spin-off firms work together so that's the second Avenue that I'd like to pursue in my research
- and then the third is an even more general question or an even more General issue right so I've been talking about
- dual directors as managing ongoing relationships between the parent and the spin-off firms and that's a really
- interesting empirical context in which to do that this context of corporate spin-offs that's really what motivates
- most of my research uh this this context of corporate spin-offs but I would imagine that there are other uh
- empirical situations other professional situations where we do see or we might want to see uh overlapping directorships
- so one that immediately comes to mind is a buyer supplier relationship in general
- of two companies that are not necessarily linked by a spin-off but you could imagine a dual director being a
- really useful uh tool to manage that kind of relation ship another example might be a technological ecosystem where
- uh we see relationships between uh various companies that are participating in the same technological ecosystem so
- if you think about a smartphone uh the producer of the chip the producer of the glass that goes on the front these dual
- directors could be a really useful uh tool with which to manage uh the the overlapping relationships between
- companies that need to work together to put certain products or Services together uh for consumers to to use um
- and so so I'd like to uh try to broaden the lens a little bit of my research to look at other contexts in which these
- dual directorships are similar types of phenomena might be a useful uh useful mechanism to manage those types of
- relationships [Music]
Brief Summary
Dual directors in corporate spin-offs can boost parent firm performance but may harm spin-off firms, especially with sales dependencies.
Key points
- The Role of Dual Directors. Research reveals dual directors positively impact stock market returns for parent and spin-off companies, but can also create conflicts of interest.
- Implications for Corporate Governance. The study raises questions about the independence of dual directors and their impact on corporate governance.
Episode highlights
- The Role of Dual DirectorsResearch reveals dual directors positively impact stock market returns for parent and spin-off companies, but can also create conflicts of interest.“These directors are positively associated with average performance.”0:59Jun 30, 2015
- Implications for Corporate GovernanceThe study raises questions about the independence of dual directors and their impact on corporate governance.“Dual directors are independent in governance, but not truly independent.”7:59Jun 30, 2015





