Management Behavior: Strategic Silence and Litigation
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Episode Description
Research by Wharton’s Matthew Cedergren finds that plaintiffs considering a lawsuit against a firm give serious weight to whether the manager went above and beyond normal reporting requirements. More: http://knlg.net/1NJEoCX 📂 Finance & Accounting 🏷️ Research
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- so my research focuses on the interaction among firm disclosure Behavior insider trading and litigation
- outcomes and I examine what are the kind of settings that lead managers to uh provide forecasts with their quarterly
- earnings release or whether they decide to withhold those forecasts and whether incentives play a role such as inator
- trading or whether the desire to uh reduce the likelihood of L ation uh plays a role on that so what are the
- determinants of whether uh management decides to go above and beyond providing the normal required accounting
- disclosures every quarter and in addition provide uh more qualitative or more uh uh subjective forecasts of the
- company's future prospects so in a recent study of mine my co-author and I examined a sample of
- firms which announced disappointing quarterly earnings and whether or not uh firm managers gave any warning about it
- prior to the announcement and we find that when company managers sell more of their own shares in The Firm after the
- prior quarters earnings announcement they're much less likely to warn about the current quarters uh earnings
- disappointment so as not to dampen the share price when they sell we call this Behavior strategic silence and what's
- more interesting is when we bring litigation into the story we find that the likelihood the firm will get sued
- after the earnings disappointment is related to both strategic silence and Insider selling and that there's an
- interactive effect between the two meaning that silence and selling enhance the effect of each other in predicting
- litigation so the main takeaway for managers who are aware of an upcoming earnings disappointment is that warning
- ahead of time can save a lot of headaches down the road in terms of litigation and especially so if they're
- planning to uh divest or sell off some of their own Holdings in The Firm after the earnings announcement uh because
- this is a key behavior that potential plaintiffs look for when deciding whether or not to initiate class action
- litigation against the firm so we're now looking at what happens to the firm's disclosure and
- trading Behavior after the firm gets sued we know from our prior study that silence and Insider selling both affect
- the like hood of the firm getting sued but what happens to that behavior after the lawsuit does the lawsuit uh
- instigate changes and whether or not managers are much more likely to warn of an earning short shortfall after they
- get sued and also are firms uh much more likely to have their managers engaging in selling uh prior to an earning
- shortfall does a lawsuit actually instigate changes and behavior in these dimensions
- [Music]
Brief Summary
Managers' disclosure behaviors affect litigation risks, with strategic silence linked to insider selling and earnings disappointments.
Key points
- Behavior Strategic Silence. Managers are less likely to warn about disappointing earnings if they sell shares first.


