Susan Wachter on Securitizations and Deregulation

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Credit Crisis Interview: Susan Wachter on Securitizations and Deregulation 📂 Finance & Accounting;Real Estate 🏷️ Great Recession

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  1. [Music] this knowledge at Wharton podcast and video cast is brought to you by Wharton
  2. Executive Education for more information on Wharton's executive programs such as
  3. the executive development program leading and managing people or the new high potential leaders course please
  4. visit executive education. won. up.edu [Music] although the subprime crisis seems to be
  5. showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long it might
  6. last will continue for some time to come knowledge at Wharton asked Wharton real
  7. estate Professor Susan Walter for her perspective on the latest economic developments welcome Professor wer
  8. pleasure to be here blame for the subprime crisis has been attributed to all sorts of things uh the uh rise of
  9. securitization in recent years the use of adjustable rate loans uh low interest rate policy by the federal Federal
  10. Reserve and greed of homeowners uh greed on Wall Street uh with an aim to short-term profits or Regulators of
  11. their heads in the sand which of these factors have been most important in your view well guilty as charged all of the
  12. above were part they all contributed it would not have happened but for securitization it would not have
  13. happened but for deregulation and deregulation securitization came together uh don't know um about the
  14. greed there certainly are investors out there who respect calculating but a large part of it is the prices rising
  15. affordability crisis and pushing on the part of both borrowers and lenders for more affordable products which were also
  16. over time standards eroded let more people into Home Ownership let more people refinance but the standards
  17. eroded over time now why was that that the this is what we call partly it's the underwriting question that the lenders
  18. were simply willing to lend to people uh that they had less likelihood of getting
  19. paid from than they were before what led them to do that well I want to be clear
  20. too there are two ways that Sanders wrote over time one the underwriting standards literally uh stated income
  21. came into play in 2006 where people could basically say what their income was on many of these loans and that's
  22. underwriting eroding over time but also the standards itself the ltvs loan to values consolidated loan to values went
  23. up with piggyback loans so the lending standards that existed became more liberally offered so in econom call The
  24. Supply function shifted there was more Supply now you ask me why yes why well it's a it's an interesting question
  25. that's going to be a question for economic historians to ask and answer but in models that my colleague Andre
  26. POF and I work it's a natural competitive moving for market share you compete not just on price but you
  27. compete on uh on Market you compete for market share by competing with your fellow lenders by undercutting them and
  28. you can undercut them on rate you can undercut them on standards to increase market share especially so if the ones
  29. who originate in making the loans don't have any exposure to the risk on the other side now there also is a change in
  30. the the kinds of companies institutions that were making uh mortgage loans and back in the days when we think of it all
  31. as being Freddy Mack and Fanny May uh there there were certain standards that some of these newer firms didn't have to
  32. abide by is that correct absolutely correct and the firms whose gaining in market share were not as exposed to risk
  33. so that's part of the uh story of how this happened uh Fanny and Freddy's market share fha's market share
  34. particularly Federal housing Administration government insured dramatically declined as subprime
  35. increased and we saw that starting in 2002 through uh the end of 2006 so Fanny and Freddy were simply not able to make
  36. the kinds of loans that some of these other firms started to make Fanny and Freddy and I want to also include FHA
  37. because there was really a one for one uh Fanny and Freddy and FHA were not able to make these loans because they by
  38. law needed to invest in quot unquote investment grade which excluded subprime now why were these other types of firms
  39. able to get into the market at this point rather than 15 years ago or 30 years ago or some other time this is uh
  40. private label securitization which did not exist 15 or 20 years ago uh what exists did was securitization which was
  41. Fanny Freddy and jumbo securitization jumbo securitization are loans that are investment grade Prime but over the
  42. conforming loan limit 417,000 until recently so those were the markets that was it uh and that's all that there
  43. could be because there was really no way of evaluating risk charging borrowers for different risk so with risk-based
  44. pricing came the incentive to lend to riskier borrowers and to charge them perhaps more for the loan and was this
  45. technical advances or research on this is risk are and that sort of thing what were the elements that went into that uh
  46. automated underwriting was first de developed by Freddy Mac in the mid1 1990s and that means computerized
  47. basically right correct for the risk of the borrower using credit card FICO score type of information that used to
  48. be used in consumer credit that Mig ated over to mortgage market and the purpose
  49. of the automated underwriting is to give the lender an idea of the the the prospects that a particular borrow is
  50. likely to default on the loan based on past history patterns of other other people in that cat their characteristics
  51. and I take it that one of the problems with the uh in the subprime situation is that now you're dealing with a group of
  52. borrowers for and a group of products for which the track record is not as extensive is that is that right that's a
  53. it's a it's a too simplified that's really too simplified well let's hear the complicated first okay the um uh
  54. automated underwriting is quite successful at uh predicting based on the risk of the borrower there's another
  55. component which is the value of the home so in any more any incentive to default
  56. on a mortgage or eventually foreclosing bare losses uh th that series of events happens because of the borrower risk
  57. their willingness to pay Etc which is uh predicted by credit score but in addition very key the most key factor
  58. for foreclosure prediction is loan to value so if values deteriorate and if loans exceed values then it's very
  59. difficult to sell the home therefore foreclosure is almost inevitable that's where we are today and the models the
  60. automated underwriting were really not developed to predict what values would be under extreme circumstances yeah
  61. let's look at that how extreme they really were when when you look back at the period that many of these loans were
  62. being written earlier mid part of this decade interest rates were extraordinarily low unusually low at
  63. that time and and what happened afterward that seemed to have been the trigger event uh for many of these
  64. defaults and then foreclosures appears to be that interest rates simply Rose to normal levels uh
  65. the FED funds rate went went from one to I think five and a quarter uh something
  66. like that was that really so unpredictable that rates would go back to the normal range uh from an
  67. abnormally low range yes it's it it first of all you can't predict rates but certainly the rates as they were in 2006
  68. were not historically high in fact they're historically in a moderate range so it's not as simple again to say it
  69. was the rate rise that occurred in 2006 nor is it simple to say that it was the rate decline in 2001 2 and three which
  70. set us up those I think contributed they were contributory factors but they weren't sufficient to explain the sharp
  71. debacle that we're in now because rates certainly haven't gone back to levels we
  72. saw you know 20 years ago or 30 years ago when there were double digit rates for many many mortgages correct and at
  73. that point obviously we didn't have anything like we have today we did not have this kind of Crisis now the second
  74. element of this was the uh the falling of home prices which as you said left lots of people underwater they can't
  75. sell or they may feel inclined not to not to just to walk away as people say now the the falling of home prices again
  76. uh many people tend to think of their homes as as as the perfect investment that always rises in value but there
  77. have been periods when they have uh retrenched and it doesn't seem again from the professionals point of view all
  78. that surprising that home prices would uh level off and perhaps drop after the extraordinary gains uh from the '90s
  79. into the early part of this decade this is the first time in US history since the Great Depression that we've had a
  80. national decline in home prices so it is exceptional and part of the story of the
  81. extraordinary collapse of 2007 and current 2008 continuing is the 2006 explosion of credit so that on one hand
  82. we did have rates go up in 2006 on the other hand standards eroded dramatically in 2006 and it's the 2006 book of
  83. business that is under most stress that's where the foreclosures are coming from as of now so why are we seeing this
  84. this sort of unprecedented Nationwide decline in housing prices so it's not local markets it's not unemployment it's
  85. not simply expectations reversing it's not the local Factory shutting down or something that indeed has been what
  86. previous housing price recessions have been attributed to there there is a um for there is a factor there's a critical
  87. factor that all of this misses and it's not interest rates either what it is is that the standards the roading
  88. especially in 2006 when there was a dramatic decline in standards was unsustainable and that retrenched we had
  89. a sharp reversal starting in 2006 of these unsustainable standards which were artificially inflating housing prices so
  90. over this period standards eroded artificially inflating housing prices housing prices increases and even levels
  91. could only be sustained with this unsustainable overly liberalized credit being manufactured which directly caused
  92. the price rise of 2006 and basically that boils down to you you make money so easily available that people have more
  93. to spend and they bid up prices is that absolutely it's a credit induced bubble people are able and willing to pay more
  94. when you have zero Z down payment negatively advertised they can get into the home and the bet is not on them the
  95. bet is on someone else what's going to happen in the future so it's an affordability and it also is uh simply
  96. these are loans without money going into in some cases that's the investor side of the story now uh there's also been
  97. there was during this period an increase in the use of adjustable rate mortgages
  98. and this has been one of the problems for borrowers who now are facing re sets the interest rates have gone up and
  99. that's causing their monthly payments to rise to points where they can't pay it or don't want to pay it uh what caused
  100. or first is it correct that the use of adjustable rate mortgages increased uh and what caused that not just adjustable
  101. rate mortgages more to the point teaser rate adjustable rate mortgages in option
  102. arms all of these latter are negatively advertising instruments that is you get into the loan and then you borrow more
  103. money over time so that drives loan to Value ratio up which again is going to be the key to the next part of the story
  104. which is now what do we do our loan is worth more than the home maybe we walk and there's lots of research that
  105. says that people who don't have skin in the game as they say that is equity in the house are more likely to walk away
  106. from it than people who do absolutely that is a key constent in all of our research foreclosure loan is driven by
  107. high loan to value upside down LTV is greater than one and one of the factors uh here is that uh lenders stopped
  108. requiring the this the kind of down payments that many people were accustomed to years ago 10% or 20% of
  109. the sales price why did they stop demanding those well in part it was ability to expand the market this
  110. natural competition if one guy is doing it the other guy is doing it that's how you get market share and it's not simply
  111. the LTV of one lender these are consolidated loan to value ratios so they were allowing piggybacks to come on
  112. uh which were very popular to allow people to afford their home and good business good
  113. fees now there's lots of debate about what to do now uh now that this has happened and it seems to me there are
  114. two broad areas which are what to do about the people uh the borrowers and the lenders who are in trouble right now
  115. and then what to do to prevent a recurrence of this kind of thing in the future so let's break it down what what
  116. do you think should be done uh for the borrowers who are finding themselves underwater today this is this has been a
  117. big issue in Washington recently yeah on the one hand there's moral hazard involved there's the story of rescuing
  118. people who make bad decisions only supports bad decisions going forward and there are bad decisions not only but
  119. borrowers but by the underwriting agencies Etc and by investors so let's let everyone take their medicine and
  120. educate and go forward learn by doing and there is an argument for that unless it actually leads to a serious recession
  121. which is a Desta one where in fact we have a free fall in prices which feeds back to the overall economy we don't
  122. know that that's going to happen but we don't know that it's not going to happen
  123. so there there it's one thing to say uh this is a homeowner who took a chance and it didn't work out and that's their
  124. tough luck it's another thing to say to that person's Nextdoor neighbors uh it's
  125. too bad that your home prices are falling because there's a glut of houses on the market uh in your neighborhood
  126. due to this that's it's really what we're concerned about is the collateral damage the rest of us uh uh suffering in
  127. some ways that is economy and what's the medicine what's the response to that uh
  128. the FED is out of quivers at that point so preventing that kind of free fall on housing prices has to be out there we
  129. have to have some tool to do that even if we don't implement it immediately because in fact the need for it depends
  130. on the severity of the slow down or recession that we may be in and what do you think is the tool for for dealing
  131. with that well uh the concept has been supported by the fetch chair banki uh it's there's a bipartisan leg
  132. legislation on the hill uh that has the FHA coming in putting a floor on the market uh there's something to be said
  133. for that kind of response where the lenders take a haircut the investors take a haircut but they do it and then
  134. in return for uh the federal government then taking the risk of further price declines which hopefully then will be
  135. slowed down so you'd make both parties suffer enough that they wouldn't want to do it again and at the same time limit
  136. their losses to the point where their their their disaster doesn't spill over and affect everyone else floor to for
  137. security for all of us now how do we distinguish between the borrower who is uh just an ordinary homeowner with a
  138. primary residence who either made a mistake or was duped into a mortgage that wasn't a good idea and somebody who
  139. is a Speculator or somebody who was buying more house than they really could afford well that's a simple one I there
  140. are uh owner occupants versus investors and have to go down that line and again uh talking about the institutions the
  141. the the ones that lent money um how big a haircut do they need to take to discourage this kind of thing in
  142. the future well that of course is going to be question but there are already uh firms out there that are pricing there
  143. is some sign it looks like right now there's some trades at about a 20 30% haircut now this is dealing with the
  144. current crisis but but looking down the road I think most people would uh would like to not see this kind of volatility
  145. in these markets in the future are there things that can be done to tweak the way
  146. the mortgage markets work and the Securities markets work to prevent the the the kind of excesses that led to
  147. this tweaks is a small word there are going to have to be major changes to the way securitization works this exposes
  148. the kiles heill of securitization which it which is that leads to a pro- cyclical impact of housing on the
  149. overall economy housing brings down the overall econ economy and then the overall economy interfaces with housing
  150. and then we're in a free fall we need to have a response I think it's early in the game certainly early in the game to
  151. put on major changes in in in uh regulatory responses because right now we have to be very concerned about
  152. liquidity that's the number one issue in the subprime market we have to be very concerned about liquidity in the overall
  153. mortgage Market major looking down the line we are going to have to question the underlying basis for where we are
  154. here today which is risk-based price securitization that's what's new this time and can you explain that what's new
  155. this time is unlike the securitization of the past the securitization is tranching of risk in very complicated
  156. cdos Clos SS instruments which do not trade so we have neither Market discipline because we don't although the
  157. the price of the loan may be vary by risk may as I say the price of the mortgage instrument did not in the
  158. securitization uh of the mortgage instrument these Securities did not trade therefore there wasn't a market
  159. discipline to price the risk and give the signal of these were extraordinarily risky instruments they were marked to
  160. model not to Market lots of fees UPF front across the board but the ultimate risk was known because in fact they
  161. weren't priced to the risk uh in some sense you know it's a it's a disaster when we have potentially uh the
  162. Foreclosure rate that we have of 2 3% could bring down the economy with if there's a recession that's serious um
  163. but on the other hand uh if this is priced if the rate of return on the instruments that Wall Street pays is
  164. high at least we're sending the right signal that did not happen in our research what we've seen is the
  165. standards eroded but the rate did not go up so this is a failure of pricing not surprising because these instruments did
  166. not trade well if they don't trade and you don't have examples of recent sales to look at to set values how will you
  167. set values I mean they tried to use models and that clearly doesn't work these are theoretical basis clearly for
  168. for setting value what's the alternative well uh if we are going to have securitization there's going to have to
  169. be securitization with trading or with some indicator that these are extraordinarily risky Securities because
  170. they don't trade some kind of red flag and there's discussion SEC is moving along these lines that's one answer the
  171. other answer is and these are not either or the other answer is we've been in a extreme deregulated environment where
  172. basically anything goes and in that environment even the competitors can race to the bottom so they may be some
  173. need for the return of credential regulation especially if it's the banks themselves who are engaging in this race
  174. to the bottom competition because then all of us are exposed to demand deposit insurance now in order to encourage uh
  175. trading would you have to have some form of standardization so that uh people would have a fairly good understanding
  176. of what this instrument is I gather that in this recent event many were sort of custom made and each one in some
  177. respects unique to all the others which of course music can't trade liquidity ET
  178. so how would you standard standardization there's no trading so that's an open question there are ways
  179. and um we're just beginning to think about how that would actually come about it could be totally Market based
  180. incentives for standardization SEC might have to have a role but as you say without standardization there is no
  181. liquidity there is no trading and another proposal that's been floating around is to make sure that the
  182. participants in these markets all keep skin in the game as they say that is that instead of packaging up bundling up
  183. one of these Securities then sending it on its way into the market and forgetting about it uh the creators uh
  184. would would have to maintain some sort of position or some sort of guarantee so that if things went wrong uh they would
  185. pay a price uh and that would give them an incentive to produce things of a higher quality does something along
  186. those lines make sense it does uh the basic um research that my colleague Andre pavlof and I have done which in
  187. fact helped explain the Asian banking crisis uh points to the incentive to produce fees short-run produce fees and
  188. if there's nothing on the other side about what the consequences these fee driven returns then you are going to
  189. have a race to the bottom it is under certain circumstances inevitable so this is not the first time that we've had a
  190. real State and Bank crisis that occurs together in fact throughout history we just look at Asia look at Japan over the
  191. last 20 years so yes skin in the game so that its decisions are not just short-term fee driven is absolutely
  192. critical uh in every step of the way uh looking at the the other uh part of the equation which is the the home
  193. buyer who people will continue to want to get mortgages and uh you get the impression that many people are still
  194. going to want to use adjustable rate mortgages uh for some types of borrowers they may be a better choice than the
  195. classic 30-year fixed rate mortgage do you agree with that they should still be part of the market there nothing wrong
  196. with adjustable rate mortgages we've had adjustable rate mortgages for tens of years and in the rest of the world they
  197. are the most common they are the standard mortgage it's not just where mortgages that a problem the problem are
  198. negatively advertising teaser rate option arms which are predictably subjecting borrowers to payment shock at
  199. the same time that they're predictably artificially uh boosting the market so that the other side market prices will
  200. fall recipe for exactly where we are now uh when people take out adjustable rate
  201. mortgages uh one of the appeals is that with the teaser rate uh you qualify for the loan uh based on the low rate that
  202. with a with a smaller payment that will fit a more modest income um but there's been some talk of uh having to look more
  203. deeply into the borrower future or estimate what it's going to be and see what will be the borrower's ability to
  204. pay a higher payment if interest rates cause a reset that's much higher is there some way to do that well it's
  205. certainly very reasonable it's in the FED proposed rules that indeed you underwrite to the rate that the teaser
  206. rate adjusts to which of course it would have avoided a lot of the damage that we
  207. have the other issue of adjustable rate mortgage is no you can't have an adjustable rate mortgage which under
  208. writes to any interest rate but adjusted rate mortgages as I said before are not
  209. the cause of the problem that we're currently in they're well vetted instrument we can have them we can have
  210. adjustable rate mortgages we can have fix rate mortgages what we can't have is an explosion of credit that induces
  211. price Rises artificially and then induces the pullback um two things which you didn't ask me about what I want to
  212. quickly address is one um early on you said well what caused this one of the causes was default rates did not rise
  213. immediately and of course they don't rise as long as values are driven up but as long as credit standards erode as
  214. long as more credits pushed out there that's unsustainable prices will increase so the signal to pull back is
  215. not in the default so if you're looking for it there you're not going to find it
  216. so you need to have Market discipline which is lo looking to the long term and car and able to identify this artificial
  217. credit induced bubble and price it that's one way out the other way out is a credential way out which is if the
  218. banking sector is part of this boom artificial boom and by the way it was tangential this time around in the US
  219. but it isn't in the rest of the world we've seen these kinds of booms and bust brought down Japan for 20 years which
  220. came from the banking sector so in this case there has to be Prudential supervision of the banks themselves
  221. because Banks them too can engage in feed driven race to the bottom even if they have skin in the game it happens
  222. and there's no reason why it wouldn't happen I want to make sure we understand what credential means in this context
  223. you mean can you explain that a little further thinking further down further down long and that of course is what The
  224. Regulators must do if on the one hand they're also giving out demand deposit insurance which basically takes out a
  225. big part of the providers of the fund to the banks from making these decisions someone has to have the long run
  226. concerns demand depositors are neither in place nor do they have the incentive with insurance to do so uh finally uh
  227. what is your general assessment of the way the Federal Reserve has handled this so far uh banki is really pulled this
  228. off he's it's really incredible nonetheless even he is quite concerned with going forward there may need to be
  229. more that happens and it's out of his hands at this point and looking at the things they've done it's a whole range
  230. of things from opening the discount window to to uh uh lending out treasuries and taking mortgage
  231. Securities in in as collateral uh to helping out with the bar Stern situation which of these do you think have been
  232. the most useful well we've been so exposed uh not just us but worldwide to potentially
  233. worldwide crash that there are two of these that are absolutely critical one was when is
  234. the decline in short-term rates The increased liquidity which is not just the FED but worldwide which keeps arms
  235. low lowered short-term rates which allow these teaser rates to adjust to a lower
  236. rate than they otherwise would adjust to secondly equally important is the historic Bear Sterns Intervention which
  237. is going to be very controversial historically and brings on its own questions going forward of now we have a
  238. whole other part of the financial system that is going to be rescued to some degree and therefore there's a more
  239. obviously increased moral hazard there as well a very controversial decision and and and have you got a conclusion of
  240. your own about that well my at the at the time and I think without that we would have had a bank run in the
  241. non-financial sector no doubt about it and it does seem that uh although people have called it a bailout or a rescue
  242. there certainly was a lot of suffering on the part of baris's employees and Sheriff shareholders and Executives the
  243. shareholders the shareholders were indeed disciplined and I'm sure that was part of the planning of the event let me
  244. just finish by asking uh do you think we're closer to the end of this whole uh process or still still in the
  245. beginning we're not in the beginning uh we're not at the end what really there's
  246. really this critical middle piece of how does the overall economy perform and how
  247. does that subvert the potential recovery in the housing market or in fact uh cause the housing
  248. market to further unravel and that's really we need that there's no answer we don't know that's uncertainty what
  249. simply going to play out in the next three to six months so this really is very much uh not just a routine crisis
  250. or cycle but a kind of Uncharted Territory for the next six months we are in Uncharted Territory we simply don't
  251. know how far the econom is going to fall if it's going to fall and how that's going to interact interact with falling
  252. home prices well we'll be watching thank you very much pleasure

Brief Summary

Professor Susan Wachter discusses the causes and effects of the subprime mortgage crisis, emphasizing regulatory failures and the role of adjustable rate mortgages.

Key points

  • The Subprime Crisis Explained. Professor Susan Walter discusses the factors leading to the subprime crisis, including deregulation and securitization.
  • Unprecedented Housing Price Decline. The conversation reveals that the current decline in housing prices is unprecedented since the Great Depression.
  • The Erosion of Lending Standards. The discussion highlights how lending standards eroded over time, leading to a housing crisis.
  • The Role of Adjustable Rate Mortgages. The increase in adjustable rate mortgages is identified as a significant issue for borrowers facing resets.
  • Future of Mortgage Markets. Discussion on potential major changes needed in the mortgage market to prevent future crises.
  • Uncharted Territory Ahead. The economy faces uncertainty in the coming months, with potential impacts on the housing market.

Episode highlights

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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