Todd Sinai on Home Values

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Credit Crisis Interview: Todd Sinai on Home Values 📂 Finance & Accounting;Real Estate

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  1. this knowledge at wharton podcast and videocast is brought to you by wharton executive education for more information
  2. on wharton's executive programs such as the executive development program leading in managing people or the new
  3. high potential leaders course please visit executiveeducation.wharton.upenn.edu although the subprime crisis seems to be
  4. showing some signs of easing debate over what caused it whether it could have been prevented and how long it might
  5. last will continue for some time to come knowledge at wharton asked wharton real
  6. estate professor todd sinai for his perspective on the latest economic developments welcome professor sinai
  7. well thank you for having me homes have long been thought of as a rock solid investment the thing that
  8. always gained value and never let you down and uh now in the last decade or so a
  9. lot of people seem to have started to look at their homes as investments and not just speculators but ordinary people
  10. who thought there was a huge value that they could tap in their homes and we've seen that now they're behaving
  11. like investments like stocks which sometimes go down and don't always go up has the real estate market
  12. evolved or changed or is this just part of a regular cycle that we see from time
  13. to time well that wow let's start with the doozy of a question the uh there's a lot of answers to that so to
  14. take the last part first uh the real estate has changed but still a lot the same so let's start with the fact that
  15. you started with that that house values are behaving like stocks now and they didn't behave like stocks before this
  16. that they're exhibiting more volatility now than they used to i don't think that's really quite true
  17. right so what we're seeing now that we haven't seen in the past is actual declines in house prices
  18. nominal house prices at the national level we've seen actual declines in house prices at the local level before now if
  19. you owned a house in boston that you bought in 1988 by 1992 you were underwater on your mortgage even though
  20. you have put 20 down right so house prices have fallen before the thing that they've done at the
  21. national level is they've fallen in real terms and they've always gone up in nominal terms well back in the 70s and
  22. even the 80s when we had lots of inflation it was easy for house prices to go up a
  23. lot in nominal terms but uh still be losing real money in real terms in other words the price went up
  24. but when you factor in inflation is you're really losing value absolutely right so so comparing comparing
  25. your house price to nothing happening to keeping money under your mattress is probably the wrong
  26. thing to do comparing it to what you could have made some other investments probably the right thing to do and you
  27. know housing has dropped a lot in the past right so it's a volatile kind of asset now having said that uh to think
  28. of houses as an investment i think it's somewhat different and i think it's part because
  29. for people who are living in their house they're going to use as a primary residence there's not a lot of
  30. investment value to it okay and what i mean by that is that i bought a house say in mid condo in
  31. midtown manhattan let's say i paid 500 000 for it in the mid 1990s and it's worth a million five
  32. now um well if i sell that and i still want to live in midtown manhattan i'm still out
  33. a million five to buy another one right so my investment has gone up a lot but it just covers what i need to buy with
  34. it which is a place to live and the difference between housing and the stock market is that when you sell
  35. the share of stock and it's doubled in value or tripled in value you can buy more stuff
  36. right if your house doubles or triples in value you can buy the same amount of housing
  37. unless you're going to move somewhere else for housing prices didn't rise quite as much so it's a very different
  38. thing to think about in terms of investment and i think when people say that people are using it as an
  39. investment what they mean is they're using it as a line of credit right now we saw we saw prices just
  40. soaring in in the early and mid part of this decade what was behind that well there's a host of factors behind
  41. that so you have to keep in mind that 1995 was the absolute rock bottom in most cities for the housing market right
  42. so it wasn't until 2000 that we actually had house prices that reached the previous peak which is about 1988 1999.
  43. so for most people's memories uh half of the run-up that we've seen over the last 10 to 12 years was just
  44. catching up to where we had peaked at before the rest of it's due to a couple of
  45. factors about two-thirds of the run-up on average for the country appears to be due to
  46. essentially it's cheaper to to finance your house and the way to think of that is that if
  47. you were to invest in stocks by the time you went from 2000 to 2005 uh the kind of return that you or yield
  48. you would have gotten on the stocks would gone down a lot right same with bonds houses actually end up being
  49. priced a lot like bonds when bond yield required yields are lower bond prices go
  50. up with houses if the cost of your money in terms of where else you could have invested it or the cost of borrowing for
  51. housing goes way down then the prices go up to compensate now it's about two-thirds of it a third of it just
  52. seems to be what we call momentum looking backwards and saying hey prices have gone up it's going to go up uh uh
  53. in the future uh in that sort of a behavioral or psychological kind of bubble kind of story and part of it i
  54. take it is that when interest rates are low a person of a given income can qualify for a larger mortgage they have
  55. more money to spend they can bid up prices and it's hard to tell how much of it is that qualification mechanism that
  56. people spend to their their how much they're allowed to spend and how much of it is really people in effect behave
  57. like a really rational asset price or would in the bond market and i don't think you can distinguish between those
  58. but in essence your tuition is right which is if i'm thinking of buying a a hundred thousand dollar house uh and the
  59. interest rate is about ten percent uh it's going to take me to say finance the whole thing ten thousand dollars a year
  60. if the interest rate drops to five percent that's five thousand dollars a year and
  61. you know if i'm willing to spend ten thousand dollars a year then i can pay for two hundred thousand dollar house
  62. right well a large chunk of that increased willingness to pay leads to bid up house prices in markets
  63. where it's hard to build housing because people are competing with each other getting to those houses
  64. in markets where it's not hard to build housing that increased willingness to pay just means developers say wow profit
  65. and they come and build more houses because now the value of the house once they build it is greater than the cost
  66. of construction and that's what we saw in south florida that's what we saw in phoenix that's what we saw in las vegas
  67. that's what we saw in central california one of the things you notice if you drive around in in
  68. suburbs around major cities is you compare the newer neighborhoods the older neighborhoods the the proper
  69. the lots may be the same size but the houses get bigger and they're more elaborate and uh
  70. they have more stonework and and all of these sorts of things and i'm wondering to what extent is the housing market
  71. kind of a fashion industry that people just feel they need to have the house that has all these bells and whistles
  72. uh you know i think there's there are changes and tastes for what we call the structure part of housing
  73. uh if you were to look at what has really driven the the growth in the the prices house prices in these markets
  74. what we call house prices we mean the combination of the structure in the land that's built on
  75. uh most of it if you can decompose it can be decomposed down to growth in the cost
  76. of the underlying land so the rapid rise in house prices in la or san francisco and new york was not so much
  77. that people are buying these fancier condos in new york or fancier apartments in san francisco
  78. or fancier houses in la it's that the cost of just getting a place in that market has gone up a lot
  79. having said that the people who can afford to get a place in those markets are also the people who like granite
  80. countertops and massive home theaters and lots of square footage and all the other things that go along with being a
  81. high-income household they also have mercedes and bmws in the garages and all the other stuff
  82. so the kind of fancy housing goes along with the higher spending but it's not driving the higher spending
  83. and i think really what's driving the higher spending is that basically there's just a lot more rich
  84. people in the u.s than there ever used to be some of them were born here some came from other
  85. countries but they're just a lot more people willing to spend a lot more money on
  86. housing and there are only so many places that they want to live now it's long been government policy to
  87. encourage home ownership and we now have a rate that is somewhere in the high 60s
  88. i believe and i'm wondering whether this was something that helped feed this subprime mortgage problem
  89. i don't think government policy uh towards homeownership um explicitly fed the subprime problem
  90. and i have really no idea about what's implicit in your question which is uh did that lead to a degree of lack of
  91. regulation and oversight in in the housing finance industry that led to the subprime problem um
  92. i think in large part the subprime problem came from a a uh a lending sector banks uh uh in in
  93. finance companies uh that were in a hunt for yield right they had capital they needed to
  94. put to work and they needed to get yield and you could take an abnormally low yield in traditional
  95. bonds or you could put it into housing and you could uh do it knowing that you were taking on risk
  96. you might not have known exactly what the parameters of that risk was but you knew that you were taking on risk and it
  97. was still worth it because then you could actually make a bit more money or the same amount of money i
  98. i think whatever regulation the government had done wall street would have had if you have
  99. found a way to circumvent so it was really is really a search for high yield investments rather than the government
  100. saying you've got to go out and make sure you're doing loans in poor communities and all those sorts of
  101. rules that we've seen over the years ah you know i think that the run-up in house prices that we have
  102. seen uh if they were explicitly contained in poor communities then you'd have an argument for that
  103. policy um certainly uh we we think that the communities that have had more you know subprime lending uh have seen
  104. larger growth in in-house prices that has been a portion of the run-up has not been nearly all of the run-up uh uh in
  105. in house prices explain a little bit the differential i can't explain all the differential between those communities
  106. um so you i i i i think the the thing to keep in mind that they're traditionally poor communities
  107. are not the ones that have generated the bulk of the price growth right san francisco is no longer poor
  108. right it is the rare poor person who can live in the san francisco metropolitan area and they had 200 some odd percent
  109. house price increases over the last uh eight to nine years now the subprime uh mortgage is kind of a
  110. dirty word today but as recently as a year ago a lot of people were defending it and
  111. saying well look yes a larger portion of them go bad than other types of mortgages that's expected
  112. but but the whole impulse here is to make more mortgages available and home ownership available to people who
  113. couldn't get standard more mortgages as their credit is no good or their incomes
  114. are low or or some sort of problem like that so has this been a failed experiment to get money uh to those
  115. people uh or is it something that just shouldn't have taken place in the first place oh i hope it's not a failed
  116. experiment i mean i think this is the market that's terrific i think that the excesses and abuses
  117. the jury is still out about what has actually happened here and i think we need to wait a bit before the for the
  118. things that come in um the problems that are coming happening i think are not because subprime is subprime uh
  119. that is that subprime has you know negative amortization where you you you pay below market interest and
  120. your principal goes up i don't think that's inherently a problem uh i don't think adjustable rate mortgages that
  121. turn into fixed rate mortgages after a low teaser rate are inherently a problem those are all good things that lend
  122. borrowers should be able to have access to and i think we actually have real evidence that um
  123. credit markets get worse when you rule those things out when you have no documentation of income
  124. when you have people saying yes i'm living in the house they're not actually living in the
  125. house that's when the model breaks down because the investors need to be able to
  126. know that uh what the actual risk of default is from the borrower and they need to be able to
  127. know that the borrower is actually living in the house because historically if you're living in the house you have a
  128. much lower rate of default than if you're an investor who will default much more strategically that's if if the
  129. house value drops below the loan amount and so for an investor make a proper decision they need actual accurate
  130. information on that and they were taking risk that they may or may not have known
  131. about in that borrowers may not have been completely truthful with of course the complete
  132. consent of the mortgage originator to not actually check um that's a regulation problem right that
  133. is a borrowers need to be fully informed about the loans that they're taking and
  134. investors need to actually know exactly what uh the risk characteristics of the actual
  135. borrowers are and so we have full information there but the structure of adjustable rate mortgages or negative or
  136. amortization mortgages those are all fine structures for people to be able to borrow through
  137. and the truth is that for someone like me um i should have an adjustable rate mortgage right it is less expensive on
  138. average uh i take interest rate risk but i have enough liquidity in my life if interest
  139. rates go up i can still afford to pay it out of cash flow i don't become illiquid
  140. it's like going to las vegas can i gamble in las vegas well if i have the bankroll to back it
  141. it's okay it's my decision to take that gamble or not and adjustable rate mortgages are taking interest rate
  142. gamble it's probably a bad match for someone who doesn't have the resources to take that gamble but it
  143. doesn't mean that the product shouldn't exist now how should we ensure that the people
  144. who take on uh mortgages that have all sorts of features that are hard to understand
  145. are fully informed of what they're doing is there a do you need a license to get
  146. a mortgage or should should you have to go through a seminar or read a pamphlet uh who should be responsible for
  147. delivering that kind of information yeah that's an excellent question that i'll have a good answer to i think there are
  148. lots of possible answers to this i think it is relatively straightforward to improve disclosure on these products
  149. right so if you go and take out a mortgage you should get more information than just uh if the interest rate
  150. environment does not change this is what your payments will be which is about the
  151. information you get right now right you can disclose to investors how much in your cash flow
  152. payments could go up how much could they fall historically where the odds of those
  153. things happening right so better disclosure that's mandated uh is probably a good thing
  154. those are fairly basic things that that you don't have to be an economist or financially sophisticated person to
  155. understand that if if interest rates rise to normal levels from the subnormal levels of the
  156. mid part of the decade your monthly payment may double and then you can figure am i going to be able to
  157. pay that anyone can pretty much understand it if it's explained in a straightforward way is is that right oh
  158. i mean if the calculation is done for you you can do it uh a lot of these products you
  159. know i have smart students at warden and i would say any student i've had before
  160. taking a class would not be able to figure out what their payments would be if their
  161. interest rate changed right that is not easy calculation to do for a wharton student it's hard to be
  162. presented in a table or or a figure or something absolutely graphic way that you could really understand but that's
  163. only part of it right i mean there's there's a whole host of things that you know do you need a license well
  164. financial education clearly needs to be improved i mean there is a a large bundle of things that probably
  165. need to be done to help people be better consumers in this market that's the combination of consumer protection and
  166. consumer education but wiping out the whole bunch of financial products is probably not a good idea
  167. well in some to some extent the market seems to have handled that already i gather there aren't a lot of subprime
  168. loans being issued right now uh you know hopefully they will return i mean there aren't a lot of subprime
  169. loans being issued right now because the investors who bought the bonds in the end the the source of the capital uh
  170. aren't willing to invest until they understand what the risks are and one thing that uh subprime investors counted
  171. on when they invested in bundles of these underlying mortgages was that defaults
  172. would not be correlated among them all that much that is some might go bad because people lose their job and they
  173. default but the whole thing on mass is not going to to go into foreclosure um and they're discovering that they
  174. weren't quite right about that uh and i think they don't know quite how wrong they were and it's hard to figure
  175. out whether you should invest and feel comfortable investing until you have a sense of what that risk is and so
  176. they're waiting on the sidelines and i expect at some point they'll come back and this market will re-emerge in some
  177. form because it's a fairly efficient way of providing capital to the housing sector
  178. now there's been a lot of talk in uh washington and elsewhere of ways to help the homeowners who are in trouble
  179. over this and they run across the the board from things like buying the the mortgages from the
  180. investors who own them and writing them down and reissuing mortgages with fixed rates at lower
  181. rates others would postpone the resets that will raise payments to some future date
  182. a whole basket of things have been proposed but you've written that um there are dangers inherent in any kind
  183. of bailout uh and i take it that one of the problems is that inevitably you're going to favor one group over another is
  184. that right yeah yeah i think i mean absolutely i mean um i think the fundamental uh issue is the issue some
  185. people call it fairness or whatever um is that if you bail out people expose based off of the outcomes that
  186. they face then you were favoring a group who through often through choices that they
  187. made ended up in a financially bad situation and the question you have to decide as a
  188. society it's do you want to reward that group so for example if you look at the data
  189. there are lots of people who you can see who could have taken out what we would call a subprime mortgage say a low
  190. adjustable rate for two years and much higher fixed rate for the remaining 28 years
  191. many of those people chose not to some chose two and when they chose to do it they did it
  192. at a point where there's a good chance they could not afford the the payment when it jumped up
  193. um a bailout proposal if you're going to bail people who are in trouble bails out
  194. the people who made the the financially unwise choice and basically doesn't give
  195. anything to the people who made the financially sound choice because the financially sound people didn't get into
  196. trouble um as a society you might still want to do that right you might still want to
  197. say look for the greater good of not having neighborhoods empty out you know because all these people have to leave
  198. their houses because they've been foreclosed upon we're going to bail them out even though
  199. it's uh inequitable but it's inequitable and you need to weigh that in now i i gather also that
  200. the the use of the the the the people who are in trouble are not evenly distributed around the country and and
  201. in in different income groups that there's certain geographical pockets and certain
  202. income pockets can you explain that yeah i mean well i mean not surprisingly when
  203. you look at the proliferation of subprime mortgages uh most of the dollars of subprime mortgages are in the
  204. markets where there are lots of dollars of housing to be financed so if you look at california in new york
  205. uh california alone has about 26 of the outstanding subprime mortgage debt and you know in large part it's because
  206. there were two factors one is that housing was very expensive so when you borrowed money you borrowed
  207. a lot of it and another is that housing was expensive for the people who want to
  208. get in and so taking mortgages that had favorable initial terms allowed you to get into a
  209. house that you otherwise would not have been able to buy um and so even markets like texas which
  210. is very very large market ends up being something like fourth on the list in terms of dollars because the houses
  211. there were just not very expensive um i think there's a tendency among people to think of subprime as being an issue
  212. that you know faced by poor people right because they couldn't get credit before
  213. and they can get credit now that is not supported by the data i'll give example in the in the high house
  214. price growth markets so san francisco's et cetera um subprime usage goes all up and down the
  215. income distribution in fact it increases as you get higher up in the income distribution
  216. right and largely because the way that you got into you know the 1.2 million dollar house
  217. that you really couldn't afford rather than 900 000 house that you could with a 30-year fixed mortgage is that you took
  218. out a subprime mortgage and that enabled you to get to the house you wanted um in the markets where you don't see a lot
  219. of house price growth cleveland cincinnati detroit uh subprime usage there is skewed to the
  220. bottom end of the distribution people who would have been renters before get into the houses
  221. by taking out subprime mortgages and and i think we should explain that one of the appeals to the subprime loan
  222. was its very low teaser rate and you might start out at three percent or or some very low level and your
  223. ability to qualify for the loan was based on that rate and whether you could support the payment that that rate would
  224. require uh the the question was sort of left unanswered about whether you could afford a rate that would be higher
  225. sometime later absolutely and that's why you had both wealthy people who were trying to reach even further to get a
  226. bigger and bigger house uh taking out subprime loans as well as what we tend to think of as the typical
  227. consumer which was the poorer person absolutely and you can think of the following example which is that you can
  228. imagine a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage at whatever the the going rate was could have carried a thousand dollars a
  229. month payment on a two hundred thousand dollar house um if you took out a teaser rate
  230. on that same house you maybe would have had eight hundred dollars a month in terms of payment initially or even seven
  231. hundred dollars a month uh or if you could afford the thousand dollars a month then you could go and buy a two
  232. hundred seventy five thousand dollar house and say that two hundred thousand dollar house uh and your payment would
  233. remain the same at least initially but it would reset later now uh some people who are looking for
  234. remedies to this problem or ways to prevent a recurrence are talking about changing the
  235. underwriting standards so that people would not qualify for a loan based solely on whether they can afford the
  236. teaser rate but would qualify on some longer-term view of whether they could afford
  237. rates that might be higher in the payments that might be higher do you think that there's merit to this idea
  238. yes and no so for any mortgage that is implicitly guaranteed by the government so for example a
  239. mortgage that would get bought by fannie mae or freddie mac which are ostensibly independent but everyone
  240. believes the government would step into to bail them out if they get into trouble if they are mortgages that
  241. fannie or freddie can buy in the secondary market then i think the government needs to mandate underwriting
  242. standards that make sure the mortgage is appropriate for the expected income of the borrower um and yes that be the
  243. entire stream of payments on the mortgage for the entire stream of payments uh relative the entire stream of income
  244. over time of the borrower if it's not going to be bought by a government enterprise then as long as
  245. there's full disclosure and understanding by the borrower and the end investor i think the originator
  246. should just originate what they want we need to regulate and mandate complete disclosure and understanding
  247. but if you have a borrower who you would like a different set of mortgage terms in investors who are
  248. willing to take on that risk then there's no reason that we shouldn't allow that financial product to exist
  249. and probably lots of good reasons that we should because it's a way of a lot of families getting access to credit they
  250. otherwise would not have gotten access to so uh transparency and uh education are better
  251. solutions than heavy regulation uh again as long as the government is not backstopping it yeah all right well
  252. thank you very much oh sure it's a pleasure

Brief Summary

Todd Sinai discusses the subprime mortgage crisis and housing market volatility, emphasizing the need for better consumer education and transparency.

Key points

  • The Evolution of Real Estate Investment. Real estate has changed, with house values now exhibiting more volatility like stocks.
  • Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The subprime mortgage problem stemmed from a search for yield in the lending sector.
  • The Dangers of Bailouts. Bailouts may favor one group over another, raising fairness concerns.
  • Subprime Mortgages and Income Distribution. Subprime mortgage usage is not limited to low-income individuals; it spans all income levels.
  • Regulation vs. Transparency. The discussion emphasizes the importance of transparency over heavy regulation in lending.

Tension

50/ 100Some tension

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