Deconstructing the Subprime Crisis
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Episode Description
In this Special Report, Knowledge@Wharton finds that the credit crisis was triggered when Wall Street alchemists, overeager borrowers and aggressive lenders let their eye for opportunity trump their nose for risk. New regulations might prevent a recurrence -- but so would diligent decision-making.
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- Welcome to Knowledge at Wharton's special report on the subprime crisis. In this report, we dissect the causes of
- the credit crisis that was triggered by the explosion of subprime lending and the repackaging of those loans into what
- appeared to be investment grade products and will offer scenarios for how the economy may emerge from the wreckage
- along with suggestions for how such a disaster can be avoided in the future. The subprime crisis had its roots in the
- US housing boom that began early in the decade. Low interest rates allowed home buyers to take out larger loans and bid
- up home prices. It wasn't until 2000 that we actually had house prices that reached the
- previous peak, which was about 1988, 1999. But many of those low interest rates were attached to subprime adjustable
- rate mortgages aimed at home buyers who might not qualify for a traditional loan.
- Well, there's not exactly a a standard definition of what a subprime mortgage is. The most common definition is to
- refer to a mortgage that has a low initial fixed interest rate, a teaser rate, and then it has a higher and
- frequently adjustable rate later. At the same time that these mortgages were proliferating, advances in loan
- securization and automated mortgage underwriting made it easy and profitable for Wall Street to convert newly issued
- mortgages into securities that could be sold to investors. Wall Street Alchemist
- found new ways to turn risky mortgages, subprime loans originally designed for borrowers with lowinccome or poor credit
- into securities that looked almost risk-free. Investors were eager to buy these securities which promised higher
- yields than US Treasury bonds and other safe holdings. Firms like Countrywide made money by
- selling uh mortgages and then they would get rid of them. It's like a Ponzi scheme.
- This is the first time in the US history since the Great Depression that we've had a national decline in home prices.
- So it is exceptional and part of the story is the 2006 explosion of credit. So that on the one hand we did have
- rates go up in 2006. On the other hand, standards eroded dramatically in 2006 and it's the 2006 book of business that
- is under most stress. That's where the foreclosures are coming from. As of now, most subprime loans carried adjustable
- interest rates and growing numbers of borrowers were falling behind after annual interest rate resets pushed up
- their monthly payments. By the summer of 2007, prices of securities based on subprime loans were in freefall as
- investors worried they would not get the interest in principal payments promised.
- So that there was a a machine being uh developed which created just a fantastic amount of this uh really junk uh and it
- was being repackaged as high quality and at some point that had to explode. Surprised about the depth of this
- problem, investors started to lose confidence in many other types of securities based on various forms of
- debt. Lenders became reluctant to lend and home values fell. People also lost faith in the underlying statistical
- models because the most sophisticated players in the business, the people who were really making markets in this, Bear
- Stern, City Bank, UBS, Meil Lynch, had major losses and indeed had trouble figuring out even what their exposures
- were. So, people completely lost faith in the valuation models. Once you see the the fire start, uh,
- everyone starts to realize it's going to spread. it's going to spread to other types of securities that have nothing to
- do with mortgages. And what we're learning is that this financial market of ours is very interconnected. And uh
- when you see a an reassessment of risk of one security, the market then very quickly reassesses risks on other
- securities. Worried that this credit crunch would stall the economy, the Federal Reserve began a series of
- interest rate cuts and initiated new lending programs to brokerage houses and commercial and investment banks,
- accepting risky mortgage back securities as collateral for the first time. The Fed even acted to save one investment
- bank, Bear Sterns, from collapse. The move stirred controversy, but Chairman Ben Bernani believed federal
- intervention was necessary. What the Fed could do, the Treasury could have done was to say, "Well, Bear Sterns, it's not
- the biggest investment bank in the world. Um, let's let the market work here." The great thing is that the head
- of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernani, has actually done a study of what happened the last time the Federal Government let
- the banking system go down in a domino effect. And his study of the of the depression was, of course, one of the
- major studies of that period. And I think that informed them a great deal about what to do in this crisis because
- the worry is that if you allow Bear Sterns to go under, you allow them to dump all their securities in the market.
- Remember this is a very highly levered firm. Uh what happens is an awful lot of other firms
- in the United States as well as in Europe and elsewhere in the world are at risk. Congress and President Bush
- approved an economic stimulus package early in 2008, and Washington was thrown into a debate over whether to help the
- estimated 2 million homeowners at risk of foreclosure. A bailout of homeowners is a bailout of
- the lenders. Whenever people say they're going to bail out the homeowners, they're bailing out the lenders. And
- that creates a horrible precedent. Now, many of these uh homeowners uh didn't put much down. So they're not going to
- be losing very much if the homes are in default. The lenders will and that's probably where where it should be.
- While the credit crunch is showing signs of easing, debate is likely to continue
- for some time. How can borrowers and lenders be helped without encouraging risky behavior in the future? Should the
- system for turning loans into securities be modified? Is the patchwork of regulatory agencies pieced together
- since the 1930s equipped to handle today's financial and economic issues? For example, if the Federal Reserve is
- going to take responsibility for rescuing errant investment banks, should it have more oversight over those banks?
- The Fed had to go in and provide funding to an investment bank. That's expanding
- the Fed Fed's role. And if you're going to expand their responsibility, I think you have to expand their ability
- to oversee these institutions. I think they're engaged in a very interesting experiment. I I I think
- we're in territory which we have very little idea of how things are going to play out going forward. So, they've cut
- rates to try and save the real economy and stop us going into recession and stopping what happened in Japan. That's
- often uh discussed as the rationale. No one's really tried this in this way and it may well be it works out in which
- case maybe a year two years from now things will be fine everything will be back to normal. These and other concerns
- are explored in this special knowledge at Wharton report. The full report includes articles deconstructing the
- Fed's reaction to the crisis and laying out frameworks for avoiding future similar crises. An interactive feature
- shows how the crisis unfolded like dominoes toward a recession. plus a glossery and timeline. And there are
- extended videos of the interviews with Wharton faculty who appear in this summary video. After you've digested it
- all, please share your thoughts and observations and come back from time to time. We'll continue to update this
- special report as developments dictate.
Brief Summary
The episode analyzes the subprime crisis, its causes, and the Federal Reserve's response to prevent economic collapse.
Key points
- The Subprime Crisis Explained. This report dissects the causes of the subprime crisis and its impact on the economy.
- The Role of the Federal Reserve. The Fed's intervention aimed to prevent a broader economic collapse during the crisis.
- Homeowners vs. Lenders Debate. A contentious debate arose over whether to bail out homeowners at risk of foreclosure.
Episode highlights
- The Role of the Federal ReserveThe Fed's intervention aimed to prevent a broader economic collapse during the crisis.“The Fed even acted to save one investment bank, Bear Sterns, from collapse.”4:09Jun 18, 2008
- Homeowners vs. Lenders DebateA contentious debate arose over whether to bail out homeowners at risk of foreclosure.“A bailout of homeowners is a bailout of the lenders.”5:17Jun 18, 2008
Tension
50/ 100Some tension





