Deconstructing the Subprime Crisis

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Episode Description

In this Special Report, Knowledge@Wharton finds that the credit crisis was triggered when Wall Street alchemists, overeager borrowers and aggressive lenders let their eye for opportunity trump their nose for risk. New regulations might prevent a recurrence -- but so would diligent decision-making.

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  1. Welcome to Knowledge at Wharton's special report on the subprime crisis. In this report, we dissect the causes of
  2. the credit crisis that was triggered by the explosion of subprime lending and the repackaging of those loans into what
  3. appeared to be investment grade products and will offer scenarios for how the economy may emerge from the wreckage
  4. along with suggestions for how such a disaster can be avoided in the future. The subprime crisis had its roots in the
  5. US housing boom that began early in the decade. Low interest rates allowed home buyers to take out larger loans and bid
  6. up home prices. It wasn't until 2000 that we actually had house prices that reached the
  7. previous peak, which was about 1988, 1999. But many of those low interest rates were attached to subprime adjustable
  8. rate mortgages aimed at home buyers who might not qualify for a traditional loan.
  9. Well, there's not exactly a a standard definition of what a subprime mortgage is. The most common definition is to
  10. refer to a mortgage that has a low initial fixed interest rate, a teaser rate, and then it has a higher and
  11. frequently adjustable rate later. At the same time that these mortgages were proliferating, advances in loan
  12. securization and automated mortgage underwriting made it easy and profitable for Wall Street to convert newly issued
  13. mortgages into securities that could be sold to investors. Wall Street Alchemist
  14. found new ways to turn risky mortgages, subprime loans originally designed for borrowers with lowinccome or poor credit
  15. into securities that looked almost risk-free. Investors were eager to buy these securities which promised higher
  16. yields than US Treasury bonds and other safe holdings. Firms like Countrywide made money by
  17. selling uh mortgages and then they would get rid of them. It's like a Ponzi scheme.
  18. This is the first time in the US history since the Great Depression that we've had a national decline in home prices.
  19. So it is exceptional and part of the story is the 2006 explosion of credit. So that on the one hand we did have
  20. rates go up in 2006. On the other hand, standards eroded dramatically in 2006 and it's the 2006 book of business that
  21. is under most stress. That's where the foreclosures are coming from. As of now, most subprime loans carried adjustable
  22. interest rates and growing numbers of borrowers were falling behind after annual interest rate resets pushed up
  23. their monthly payments. By the summer of 2007, prices of securities based on subprime loans were in freefall as
  24. investors worried they would not get the interest in principal payments promised.
  25. So that there was a a machine being uh developed which created just a fantastic amount of this uh really junk uh and it
  26. was being repackaged as high quality and at some point that had to explode. Surprised about the depth of this
  27. problem, investors started to lose confidence in many other types of securities based on various forms of
  28. debt. Lenders became reluctant to lend and home values fell. People also lost faith in the underlying statistical
  29. models because the most sophisticated players in the business, the people who were really making markets in this, Bear
  30. Stern, City Bank, UBS, Meil Lynch, had major losses and indeed had trouble figuring out even what their exposures
  31. were. So, people completely lost faith in the valuation models. Once you see the the fire start, uh,
  32. everyone starts to realize it's going to spread. it's going to spread to other types of securities that have nothing to
  33. do with mortgages. And what we're learning is that this financial market of ours is very interconnected. And uh
  34. when you see a an reassessment of risk of one security, the market then very quickly reassesses risks on other
  35. securities. Worried that this credit crunch would stall the economy, the Federal Reserve began a series of
  36. interest rate cuts and initiated new lending programs to brokerage houses and commercial and investment banks,
  37. accepting risky mortgage back securities as collateral for the first time. The Fed even acted to save one investment
  38. bank, Bear Sterns, from collapse. The move stirred controversy, but Chairman Ben Bernani believed federal
  39. intervention was necessary. What the Fed could do, the Treasury could have done was to say, "Well, Bear Sterns, it's not
  40. the biggest investment bank in the world. Um, let's let the market work here." The great thing is that the head
  41. of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernani, has actually done a study of what happened the last time the Federal Government let
  42. the banking system go down in a domino effect. And his study of the of the depression was, of course, one of the
  43. major studies of that period. And I think that informed them a great deal about what to do in this crisis because
  44. the worry is that if you allow Bear Sterns to go under, you allow them to dump all their securities in the market.
  45. Remember this is a very highly levered firm. Uh what happens is an awful lot of other firms
  46. in the United States as well as in Europe and elsewhere in the world are at risk. Congress and President Bush
  47. approved an economic stimulus package early in 2008, and Washington was thrown into a debate over whether to help the
  48. estimated 2 million homeowners at risk of foreclosure. A bailout of homeowners is a bailout of
  49. the lenders. Whenever people say they're going to bail out the homeowners, they're bailing out the lenders. And
  50. that creates a horrible precedent. Now, many of these uh homeowners uh didn't put much down. So they're not going to
  51. be losing very much if the homes are in default. The lenders will and that's probably where where it should be.
  52. While the credit crunch is showing signs of easing, debate is likely to continue
  53. for some time. How can borrowers and lenders be helped without encouraging risky behavior in the future? Should the
  54. system for turning loans into securities be modified? Is the patchwork of regulatory agencies pieced together
  55. since the 1930s equipped to handle today's financial and economic issues? For example, if the Federal Reserve is
  56. going to take responsibility for rescuing errant investment banks, should it have more oversight over those banks?
  57. The Fed had to go in and provide funding to an investment bank. That's expanding
  58. the Fed Fed's role. And if you're going to expand their responsibility, I think you have to expand their ability
  59. to oversee these institutions. I think they're engaged in a very interesting experiment. I I I think
  60. we're in territory which we have very little idea of how things are going to play out going forward. So, they've cut
  61. rates to try and save the real economy and stop us going into recession and stopping what happened in Japan. That's
  62. often uh discussed as the rationale. No one's really tried this in this way and it may well be it works out in which
  63. case maybe a year two years from now things will be fine everything will be back to normal. These and other concerns
  64. are explored in this special knowledge at Wharton report. The full report includes articles deconstructing the
  65. Fed's reaction to the crisis and laying out frameworks for avoiding future similar crises. An interactive feature
  66. shows how the crisis unfolded like dominoes toward a recession. plus a glossery and timeline. And there are
  67. extended videos of the interviews with Wharton faculty who appear in this summary video. After you've digested it
  68. all, please share your thoughts and observations and come back from time to time. We'll continue to update this
  69. special report as developments dictate.

Brief Summary

The episode analyzes the subprime crisis, its causes, and the Federal Reserve's response to prevent economic collapse.

Key points

  • The Subprime Crisis Explained. This report dissects the causes of the subprime crisis and its impact on the economy.
  • The Role of the Federal Reserve. The Fed's intervention aimed to prevent a broader economic collapse during the crisis.
  • Homeowners vs. Lenders Debate. A contentious debate arose over whether to bail out homeowners at risk of foreclosure.

Tension

50/ 100Some tension

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