Mark Zandi on the Risky Loans Behind the Meltdown
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Episode Description
Days before the government stepped in to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Knowledge@Wharton chatted with Mark Zandi, the chief economist and cofounder of what is now Moody's Economy.com, about his new book, Financial Shock: A 360-Degree Look at the Subprime Mortgage Explosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis. π Finance & Accounting
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- [Music] this podcast is brought to you by knowledge at Warton please visit knowledge. won. up.edu for more
- information days before the government stepped in to rescue Fanny May and Freddy Mack knowledge at Wharton chatted
- with Mark xandy the chief Economist and co-founder of what is now Moody economy.com about his new book Financial
- shock a 360Β° look at the subprime mortgage explosion and how to avoid the next financial crisis Mark xandi Chief
- Economist and founder of Moody economy.com has a new book about the subprime mortgage crisis Financial shock
- knowledge at Wharton talked to zandi about his findings today's economic conditions and what should be done to
- get out of this crisis and avoid another welcome Mr xandy it's good to be here the uh subprime crisis is one of those
- things that has unfolded peace meal and has taken over a year and a half and some elements of it started much earlier
- and now we have have your book uh which puts it all into one place and describes
- it all and provides a lot of uh additional data and insight that we haven't had before and I'm curious that
- in in researching this book what you ran across that really surprised you beyond
- what you knew from having followed the whole story as it was unfolding right well uh many things surprised me but uh
- the most fundamental level was the just how egregious the The Lending had become
- at the peak of the housing boom it wasn't just simply uh making loans to people with low credit scores it was
- making loans to people with low credit scores with uh no down payment or down payment assistance with no proof of uh
- income uh and uh just enormous amount of risk layering that was going on you know
- I had a sense that obviously underwriting standards in the mortgage industry had fallen I had no concept to
- what degree they had declined and that that's a bit Sur Ur rising to me because many of my uh clients are in the
- industry uh they're mortgage companies uh mortgage insurance companies The Fanny May and Freddy Max of the world
- and I thought I had a pretty good understanding I thought it was bad but I I had no understanding of how bad it
- really was and this refers to things like the no do loans or liar loans as people came to call them and the 100%
- mortgages and know there sort of eroding of underwriting standards that were supposed to be the the safety net that
- kept these things from collapsing yeah exactly I mean if you go back early in the housing boom say 2004 um maybe early
- 05 uh the extent of the lending was uh aggressive lending was just giving loans to people who had problems making
- payments on other kinds of credit bad credit scores uh but the lenders would require a pretty sizable down payment
- and certainly proof of income uh and a stable job by the end of 2005 and into 2006 all of that had just evaporated and
- lenders weren't checking anything uh they weren't uh weren't even doing appraisals on the property so uh it was
- uh really the Wild Wild West uh to a degree I I did not know and could not have imagined just to go back a second
- one of the one of the things that happened in the in the buildup to all of this was that that you mention in the
- book in some detail that other people have talked about is this period when risk was seemed non-existent and and
- that risky Securities like uh junk bonds and Emerging Market debt and some of these mortgage back Securities we're
- we're trading at prices that offered yields that provided almost no risk premium at all and and apparently that
- was a mispricing that we now know that they were much riskier than people thought the two questions which is what
- caused people to be so sanguin about risk and where do we stand now are we are we overestimating risk have we
- gotten too nous Serv or uh is it just impossible to tell what risks are well in part uh there was a fundamental
- reason for this optimism and that it goes to the global economy itself uh the ups and downs in the economy seem to be
- moderating was called the Great moderation and there's some good reasons to believe that our economies are more
- stable than in the past and so if you have a more stable economy then uh it makes uh risk premiums for financial
- securities uh make there logical to expect that they would come in and wouldn't be quite as wide you're just
- not going to have big recessions and big bankruptcies and lots of credit problem
- so you don't need as much of a risk premum so there I think is a good sort of fundamental explanation for it but I
- think they got carried to an extreme uh and people started in a sense forecasting with a ruler and you know uh
- most forecasting is done that way if the price of something's going like this it'll keep going like that Prices rose
- last year by 10% and they Rose 10% the year before that what do you think the price increase is going to be next year
- 10% right and so you start building that into your forecasting and and uh you tend to take more risk uh in response
- the third thing is there was just a lot of of U of liquidity a lot of cash you can remember uh liquidity raining
- everywhere and there's a lot of discussion as to you know what drove that uh part of it was very aggressive
- monetary easing back earlier in the decade uh it was also related to the fact that we have this very large
- current account trade deficit so we're pumping out dollars buying goods produced overseas and that's putting
- dollars out there to be invested uh and that provided a lot of liquidity and so money managers investors uh had lots of
- cash lots of liquidity and they have to put that to work uh they just simply can't uh put it on the sidelines and
- wait for something bad to happen they could do that maybe for a year but if in that year Prices rose 10% they
- can't do that in year two because no one will invest with them they're saying what the heck are you doing I gave you
- my money to make to put it to invest it in whatever it is you do and now you're not doing that so inv the the
- professional money managers the the folks that were taking these these Global investor dollars and and
- funneling it through these these these these Investments really felt like they had no choice they actually felt
- uncomfortable have many money managers as client they they just knew that this wasn't right but it didn't feel right
- you know you go to conferences and everyone's hand ringing that this this doesn't make sense but that doesn't
- matter because I've got cash to invest and I'm going to I'm G to have to invest it and so they were they were they were
- willing to accept uh a a infinitesimal risk premium for buying Emerging Market one asset class to the next right I mean
- you you you look for first thing you got a ripple effect yeah because you know you buy one asset the risk premiums come
- in then you go okay well this asset has a higher risk premium so let me go invest in that that risk premium comes
- in and then you know at the peak you know going back to 2006 end of 2006 early 2007 right before the financial
- shock risk premiums on everything junk corporate bonds uh mortgage back Securities uh commercial mortgage back
- Securities uh uh uh investments in in direct investments in property everything all the wrist spreads were as
- narrow as they have ever been it seems to me that a lot of people in this circumstance would kind of you know draw
- the line at what went wrong here as the the the innocent bystanders who was hurt
- all of us who did not take out crazy mortgages and see our home prices fall or see our stocks fall that sort of
- thing so what you know where sort of along that Continuum you know would would the should the proper amount of
- Regulation be what should its goal be just to protect the innocent or to to guide the markets more in in a in a
- deliberate fashion in a certain direction well you know my view is that it's important to set down some basic
- rules that uh that uh you need certain levels of capital and these are the ways you measure capital and these Capital
- levels need to be uh uh equivalent across all financial institutions that the entire credit risk in the financial
- system is at least being monitored so that everyone can see it and we have something palpable that we can measure
- and have an understanding of well is the risk level of risk Rising is the level risk falling we need to have rules that
- increase transparency we talked about transparency in in the trading of Securities but also in terms of the
- balance sheets of the institutions that are in our financial system so you know I think it's it's it's not saying that
- this is a bad mortgage loan or this is a good credit card loan or there's some basic things we might want to lay out
- with regard to that like don't make a mortgage loan to someone you don't think who can repay you that makes sense sense
- to me but it's pretty basic but it's not it's not as much that as it is you know
- sort of the basic rules of the game and have a regulator that can sort of watch over the entire system as opposed to
- just a part of the system and a better sense of knowing what's going on and just having the information I mean I'll
- to end it this way we still don't know really don't know how many people are being forclosed on no one knows and
- that's not the fod of good policymaking well let's come back next here and talk about it again I would appreciate it
- thanks for the opportunity thank you very much and good luck with the book Thank
- you for more information please visit knowledge. won. up.edu [Music]
Brief Summary
Mark Zandi discusses the subprime mortgage crisis and regulatory solutions to prevent future financial disasters.
Key points
- Financial Shock: Understanding the Crisis. Mark Zandi discusses his new book on the subprime mortgage explosion and its implications.
- The Erosion of Underwriting Standards. Zandi reveals the shocking decline in mortgage lending standards leading to the crisis.
- The Great Moderation and Risk Mispricing. Exploring how perceived economic stability led to risky financial behaviors.
Episode highlights
- Financial Shock: Understanding the CrisisMark Zandi discusses his new book on the subprime mortgage explosion and its implications.βThe most fundamental level was how egregious the lending had become.β1:27Oct 14, 2008
- The Erosion of Underwriting StandardsZandi reveals the shocking decline in mortgage lending standards leading to the crisis.βI had no concept to what degree they had declined.β1:57Oct 14, 2008
- The Great Moderation and Risk MispricingExploring how perceived economic stability led to risky financial behaviors.βThere was a fundamental reason for this optimism.β4:05Oct 14, 2008
Tension
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