Mark Zandi on the Risky Loans Behind the Meltdown

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Days before the government stepped in to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Knowledge@Wharton chatted with Mark Zandi, the chief economist and cofounder of what is now Moody's Economy.com, about his new book, Financial Shock: A 360-Degree Look at the Subprime Mortgage Explosion, and How to Avoid the Next Financial Crisis. πŸ“‚ Finance & Accounting

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  1. [Music] this podcast is brought to you by knowledge at Warton please visit knowledge. won. up.edu for more
  2. information days before the government stepped in to rescue Fanny May and Freddy Mack knowledge at Wharton chatted
  3. with Mark xandy the chief Economist and co-founder of what is now Moody economy.com about his new book Financial
  4. shock a 360Β° look at the subprime mortgage explosion and how to avoid the next financial crisis Mark xandi Chief
  5. Economist and founder of Moody economy.com has a new book about the subprime mortgage crisis Financial shock
  6. knowledge at Wharton talked to zandi about his findings today's economic conditions and what should be done to
  7. get out of this crisis and avoid another welcome Mr xandy it's good to be here the uh subprime crisis is one of those
  8. things that has unfolded peace meal and has taken over a year and a half and some elements of it started much earlier
  9. and now we have have your book uh which puts it all into one place and describes
  10. it all and provides a lot of uh additional data and insight that we haven't had before and I'm curious that
  11. in in researching this book what you ran across that really surprised you beyond
  12. what you knew from having followed the whole story as it was unfolding right well uh many things surprised me but uh
  13. the most fundamental level was the just how egregious the The Lending had become
  14. at the peak of the housing boom it wasn't just simply uh making loans to people with low credit scores it was
  15. making loans to people with low credit scores with uh no down payment or down payment assistance with no proof of uh
  16. income uh and uh just enormous amount of risk layering that was going on you know
  17. I had a sense that obviously underwriting standards in the mortgage industry had fallen I had no concept to
  18. what degree they had declined and that that's a bit Sur Ur rising to me because many of my uh clients are in the
  19. industry uh they're mortgage companies uh mortgage insurance companies The Fanny May and Freddy Max of the world
  20. and I thought I had a pretty good understanding I thought it was bad but I I had no understanding of how bad it
  21. really was and this refers to things like the no do loans or liar loans as people came to call them and the 100%
  22. mortgages and know there sort of eroding of underwriting standards that were supposed to be the the safety net that
  23. kept these things from collapsing yeah exactly I mean if you go back early in the housing boom say 2004 um maybe early
  24. 05 uh the extent of the lending was uh aggressive lending was just giving loans to people who had problems making
  25. payments on other kinds of credit bad credit scores uh but the lenders would require a pretty sizable down payment
  26. and certainly proof of income uh and a stable job by the end of 2005 and into 2006 all of that had just evaporated and
  27. lenders weren't checking anything uh they weren't uh weren't even doing appraisals on the property so uh it was
  28. uh really the Wild Wild West uh to a degree I I did not know and could not have imagined just to go back a second
  29. one of the one of the things that happened in the in the buildup to all of this was that that you mention in the
  30. book in some detail that other people have talked about is this period when risk was seemed non-existent and and
  31. that risky Securities like uh junk bonds and Emerging Market debt and some of these mortgage back Securities we're
  32. we're trading at prices that offered yields that provided almost no risk premium at all and and apparently that
  33. was a mispricing that we now know that they were much riskier than people thought the two questions which is what
  34. caused people to be so sanguin about risk and where do we stand now are we are we overestimating risk have we
  35. gotten too nous Serv or uh is it just impossible to tell what risks are well in part uh there was a fundamental
  36. reason for this optimism and that it goes to the global economy itself uh the ups and downs in the economy seem to be
  37. moderating was called the Great moderation and there's some good reasons to believe that our economies are more
  38. stable than in the past and so if you have a more stable economy then uh it makes uh risk premiums for financial
  39. securities uh make there logical to expect that they would come in and wouldn't be quite as wide you're just
  40. not going to have big recessions and big bankruptcies and lots of credit problem
  41. so you don't need as much of a risk premum so there I think is a good sort of fundamental explanation for it but I
  42. think they got carried to an extreme uh and people started in a sense forecasting with a ruler and you know uh
  43. most forecasting is done that way if the price of something's going like this it'll keep going like that Prices rose
  44. last year by 10% and they Rose 10% the year before that what do you think the price increase is going to be next year
  45. 10% right and so you start building that into your forecasting and and uh you tend to take more risk uh in response
  46. the third thing is there was just a lot of of U of liquidity a lot of cash you can remember uh liquidity raining
  47. everywhere and there's a lot of discussion as to you know what drove that uh part of it was very aggressive
  48. monetary easing back earlier in the decade uh it was also related to the fact that we have this very large
  49. current account trade deficit so we're pumping out dollars buying goods produced overseas and that's putting
  50. dollars out there to be invested uh and that provided a lot of liquidity and so money managers investors uh had lots of
  51. cash lots of liquidity and they have to put that to work uh they just simply can't uh put it on the sidelines and
  52. wait for something bad to happen they could do that maybe for a year but if in that year Prices rose 10% they
  53. can't do that in year two because no one will invest with them they're saying what the heck are you doing I gave you
  54. my money to make to put it to invest it in whatever it is you do and now you're not doing that so inv the the
  55. professional money managers the the folks that were taking these these Global investor dollars and and
  56. funneling it through these these these these Investments really felt like they had no choice they actually felt
  57. uncomfortable have many money managers as client they they just knew that this wasn't right but it didn't feel right
  58. you know you go to conferences and everyone's hand ringing that this this doesn't make sense but that doesn't
  59. matter because I've got cash to invest and I'm going to I'm G to have to invest it and so they were they were they were
  60. willing to accept uh a a infinitesimal risk premium for buying Emerging Market one asset class to the next right I mean
  61. you you you look for first thing you got a ripple effect yeah because you know you buy one asset the risk premiums come
  62. in then you go okay well this asset has a higher risk premium so let me go invest in that that risk premium comes
  63. in and then you know at the peak you know going back to 2006 end of 2006 early 2007 right before the financial
  64. shock risk premiums on everything junk corporate bonds uh mortgage back Securities uh commercial mortgage back
  65. Securities uh uh uh investments in in direct investments in property everything all the wrist spreads were as
  66. narrow as they have ever been it seems to me that a lot of people in this circumstance would kind of you know draw
  67. the line at what went wrong here as the the the innocent bystanders who was hurt
  68. all of us who did not take out crazy mortgages and see our home prices fall or see our stocks fall that sort of
  69. thing so what you know where sort of along that Continuum you know would would the should the proper amount of
  70. Regulation be what should its goal be just to protect the innocent or to to guide the markets more in in a in a
  71. deliberate fashion in a certain direction well you know my view is that it's important to set down some basic
  72. rules that uh that uh you need certain levels of capital and these are the ways you measure capital and these Capital
  73. levels need to be uh uh equivalent across all financial institutions that the entire credit risk in the financial
  74. system is at least being monitored so that everyone can see it and we have something palpable that we can measure
  75. and have an understanding of well is the risk level of risk Rising is the level risk falling we need to have rules that
  76. increase transparency we talked about transparency in in the trading of Securities but also in terms of the
  77. balance sheets of the institutions that are in our financial system so you know I think it's it's it's not saying that
  78. this is a bad mortgage loan or this is a good credit card loan or there's some basic things we might want to lay out
  79. with regard to that like don't make a mortgage loan to someone you don't think who can repay you that makes sense sense
  80. to me but it's pretty basic but it's not it's not as much that as it is you know
  81. sort of the basic rules of the game and have a regulator that can sort of watch over the entire system as opposed to
  82. just a part of the system and a better sense of knowing what's going on and just having the information I mean I'll
  83. to end it this way we still don't know really don't know how many people are being forclosed on no one knows and
  84. that's not the fod of good policymaking well let's come back next here and talk about it again I would appreciate it
  85. thanks for the opportunity thank you very much and good luck with the book Thank
  86. you for more information please visit knowledge. won. up.edu [Music]

Brief Summary

Mark Zandi discusses the subprime mortgage crisis and regulatory solutions to prevent future financial disasters.

Key points

  • Financial Shock: Understanding the Crisis. Mark Zandi discusses his new book on the subprime mortgage explosion and its implications.
  • The Erosion of Underwriting Standards. Zandi reveals the shocking decline in mortgage lending standards leading to the crisis.
  • The Great Moderation and Risk Mispricing. Exploring how perceived economic stability led to risky financial behaviors.

Tension

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