Doha Debacle: What's Next for Global Commerce

Knowledge at Wharton

Ask about Knowledge at Wharton

Episode Description

Progress toward unfettered international commerce stumbled last week with the collapse of the World Trade Organization's Doha talks, a seven-year effort to establish new global trade rules. The lengthy talks were complicated by the rapid emergence of China and India as major economic powers -- powers with commercial and strategic interests to protect, and the clout to do so. Many observers say the talks' collapse is a setback for poorer nations, which need access to larger markets in order for their economies to grow. Wharton professors Stephen Kobrin, whose research interests include globalization, and Marshall Meyer, an authority on China's economy, recently spoke to Knowledge@Wharton about the talks' collapse, global commerce and China's interest in the rules governing trade. 📂 Public Policy

Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
  1. [Music] This podcast is brought to you by Knowledge at Wharton. Please visit knowledge.warton.upen.edu
  2. for more information. Progress toward unfettered international commerce stumbled last week with the
  3. collapse of the World Trade Organization's Doha Talks, a seven-year effort to establish new global trade
  4. rules. The lengthy talks which commenced in Doha, Qar and ended in Geneva were complicated by the rapid emergence of
  5. China and India as major economic powers. Powers with commercial and strategic interests to protect and the
  6. clout to do so. It was far from clear in the aftermath of the collapse that the talks would resume in the foreseeable
  7. future. Some negotiators wondered if an agreement among so many nations was even
  8. possible. The fundamental reality is that it has become too complex. WTO general director Pascal Lami told the
  9. Financial Times. Wharton professors Steven Cobrin, whose research interests include globalization and Marshall
  10. Meyer, an authority on China's economy, recently spoke to knowledge at Wharton about the collapse of the talks, global
  11. commerce, and China's interests in the rules governing trade. Welcome, Professor Cobin. The World Trade
  12. Organization's talks set the rules for governing international trade among more than 150 member nations. Now that the
  13. current round of talks, the Doha talks have broken down. What's the practical effect, trade is going to continue? No,
  14. I think in the short run, the threat isn't going to be dramatic. There'll be some minor impact on world GDP. I think
  15. the more serious threat in the longer run is the multilateral trading system as a whole in terms of how seriously
  16. countries take the World Trade Organization, how willing they are to abide by its principles and especially
  17. how willing they are to abide by a negative decision in one of their tribunals. If that's the case, then what
  18. does trade look like in the absence of a global agreement of some sort? Well, the
  19. the absence of a quote global agreement is the absence of a fairly major but still marginal
  20. uh extension of the rules. Mhm. So, we still have a rule-based international trading system. We've had a series of
  21. negotiations since the period immediately after World War II. The GAT the GAT through the current DA round.
  22. Okay. They've been incremental. they've built on one another culminating with the emergence of the World Trade
  23. Organization in 1994. Right? So we have a fairly broad-based system of rules to govern the international trading system.
  24. Okay. Uh the question is extending those rules uh further into agriculture services and other issues which this
  25. round was going to do and perhaps as you mentioned enforcing the rules if this harms the WTO's authority in some way.
  26. Well, one of the major uh advances with the creation of the WTO in 1994 was a serious tribunal. The big change with
  27. the WTO viz the GAT is it was much more difficult for a country to ignore a finding that wasn't in its favor. I see.
  28. And to to date, none of the major countries has. Okay. But there's still no way to compel a country to go along
  29. with a WTO finding. Mhm. It's based on a belief in mutual self-interest and a belief in the benefits of a multilateral
  30. system. And the danger is that without the talks proceeding that that could erode. There was a uh Wall Street
  31. Journal article immediately after the talks collapsed that said the they could uh signal an end to some 60 years of uh
  32. continuous expansion of global free trade deals. That does sound pretty dramatic, but it sounds similar to what
  33. you've just described. I think it is overly dramatic. I think it may signal an end to the incremental progress again
  34. since the f first gat talks in the late 40s. And what's happened since then is first the lowhanging fruit was grabbed
  35. off the tree earliest and second the world economy has become much more inclusive. And if you think about the
  36. 60s, the Kennedy round, which was one of the major post-war rounds, you probably
  37. had eight or nine countries that needed to uh come to agreement to reach a deal,
  38. right? Even in the Uruguay round, most of the developing countries were sidelined. All of a sudden, I think
  39. rightfully so, in the Doha round, you have 163 countries which in of which probably 60 or 70 have a major voice in
  40. the negotiations. I see. And so I think what's changed is the ease and that's too strong a word but the process of
  41. multilateral negotiations with the WTO meeting as a whole. Mhm. And able to hammer out an agreement among all the
  42. members. Exactly. So I think any further progress may require somewhat of a different process. Okay. There were a
  43. lot of uh reasons that the bro talks broke down. But in addition to having uh more inclusiveness and many more
  44. countries participating, the the role in which they participated was different. I mean with China in
  45. India, Brazil emerging as major economic powers, they had a lot more perhaps they
  46. had more clout than they did before. Um certainly they had interests that had to
  47. be contended with. Yeah. And and that's what I was talking about just previously. I I think that's true in the
  48. sense that uh a lot of the developing countries have become serious players in the world economy and have a serious
  49. voice in the negotiations. Okay. And that means that as diverse as the 30 or 31 OECD members are, that pales when you
  50. start to consider China and India and Uruguay uh whose levels of economic development, whose objectives, whose
  51. political systems, whose economic beliefs differ vastly among themselves and visav the traditional members of the
  52. OECD? I see. Do you think that it's possible for the traditional economic powers in North America and Europe and
  53. Asia uh and these emerging economic powers to ever reach an agreement on trade given their divergent interests
  54. and and especially under the rules of these talks in which I believe any one member can veto uh a particular um um
  55. portion of the agreement uh and make the whole agreement come to a crashing halt.
  56. I think in effect one member can veto it. I don't think that's what happened this time around. No. Okay. Uh I think
  57. it may represent as I said before a change in the nature of process. The the our ability to reach a multilateral
  58. agreement on a wide uh reaching set of issues among60 different countries may be beyond our
  59. reach at this point. Uh may not be possible. uh we may have to e a e either a negotiate on smaller pieces uh among
  60. all of the countries or b even break down into regional negotiations which then tend to come together in a
  61. community in a committee of a whole. Oh I see. So that you achieve free trade on
  62. a regional level and then move to a global level. Uh as I said before we may have to break the negotiations down into
  63. smaller pieces. I think the to use the standard analogy the bicycle will keep moving ahead but I think it's going to
  64. have to do it at a different pace and in a very different way given the change in
  65. the dynamic of the number of countries participating in the divergent interests. Is there any reason to think
  66. that these talks would resume anytime soon in their in their current form or do you think that some of the if they do
  67. resume they'll resume in one form or another of some of the different um uh uh scenarios that you've described
  68. regional or or one one measure at a time. Uh they could resume. I think it would
  69. be very difficult to reach a broad-based agreement without some sort of major shock that got everyone's attention. uh
  70. and and and force people to make compromises and agree. I think what's much more likely is they again we take
  71. smaller pieces of the puzzle, solve those and then stitch them together. Uh do you think it's possible that the
  72. collapse of the talks um in this particular round will energize free trade critics in the United States? It's
  73. always been everybody's favorite uh whipping boy. Uh I'm not sure that they need energizing. I think a lot of
  74. concerns about trade uh revolve around the business cycle. Uh and as times get more difficult,
  75. I think more and more people will start to question the benefits of free trade, the value of outsourcing, the value of
  76. inward flows of investment. Uh so the collapse of the talks certainly isn't going to help, but I suspect it's not
  77. going to be a major factor in energizing opposition to globalization or free trade. Trade's always been a tough
  78. issues for US voters to resolve. Uh and it's likely that it's going to be an important issue in this fall's
  79. presidential election. On one hand, people generally understand that free trade in the long term is necessary to
  80. spread economic opportunity globally, but on the other hand, it can the the long term can mean a very long time
  81. between paychecks. So, it's tempting for politicians to latch on to free trade as an issue to
  82. beat each other over the head with. Do you think that um uh well, if you were a voter or if you were giving advice to
  83. voters, um how would you say they should approach this issue? I mean, how do you
  84. try to get a a handle on the importance of free trade? I believe in an open economy. That doesn't mean a lack of all
  85. regulation or restriction. Okay? In any open system, any country that's open to the world economy, they're going to be
  86. winners and losers. And that's clear. People are more concerned about the losers as they feel more threaten
  87. themselves economically. Uh I think one of the things we need to do, which has been talked about for 50
  88. years, is building more of a secure safety net for people who fall through the cracks of free trade. Mhm. I think
  89. it may be beneficial to the economy as a whole and it isn't clear in every instance but I think generally it is
  90. true. Uh it free trade doesn't represent a gain for any individual or every industry. I think there have to be has
  91. to be more attention paid to providing some form of support for those who lose jobs uh need retraining, need temporary
  92. employment, uh unemployment payments and the like. Thanks for joining us, Professor. Uh when we first asked you
  93. about your reaction to the collapse of the trade talks, you said that China wants to protect its inefficient
  94. farmers. What about their agricultural system is inefficient? Well, you know, China
  95. still has more farmers, uh, more rural population than urban population. Last numbers I
  96. saw, 42% urban, 58% rural. Uh, rural population is shrinking maybe 1% a year, which is a very very dramatic rate of
  97. urbanization given the size of the country, but still huge rural population. Now, let's look at Chinese
  98. geography. Um, you got 1.3 roughly billion people. 58% are rural. That translates into roughly
  99. 770 million quote rural residents. They live at very high density. Almost all of
  100. them in an area that's like the equivalent to the US east of the Mississippi River.
  101. So you've got a lot of rural pop, you got lot large rural population concentrated in a very small area. Some
  102. say that 40% of the world's farmers live in China. Maybe it's 38% today. Mhm. Working 10%
  103. of the world's arable land. Now this tells you that farm plots or rice patties in China are very very small.
  104. and they're not really conducive to consolidation largescale farming because in the south of China at least
  105. inner Mongolia would be a little different where they have grasslands but um uh but the south of China much of
  106. this is terrorist this is historical this has been going on for years and it's very hard to convert terrorist rice
  107. patties into large efficient farms um so conse consequence is smallcale at least for grains smallcale production
  108. okay which by global standards is going to be inefficient absolutely yeah so are
  109. there other geographic areas in China where agriculture could occur but does not or
  110. is that just or are the areas that are farmable being farmed um we most people in the US don't realize that China's
  111. land mass is about the same as the US but two3 third of its desert or you know mountain that you really can't do
  112. anything about. So the answer is yeah if they had a lot more water and water is becoming a huge crisis in the north of
  113. China. They're planning to divert water like the old Grand Canal you know from uh from three gorges up north in China
  114. to relieve the pressures on the Beijing and Tanzhin water supplies. No, no, no. They're losing through urbanization and
  115. desertification a lot of farmland. The obvious place would first be again try to get the
  116. grasslands of Inner Mongolia more productive, keep the sandstorms down and then if they could find any water
  117. anywhere, begin to irrigate say Chingghai province um and uh get some intensive agriculture as Israel has
  118. done. They have Israel as a model um but so far their attempt to emulate that model has not been terribly successful.
  119. Okay. Is there a problem with the access to technology that um that American farmers have or would the technology not
  120. make a big difference given the the nature of the farming there? Well, it does make a difference but in an area
  121. not critical to China. Mhm. Okay. Small plot intensive agriculture is great for produce
  122. and there's a very active very profitable produce market in China. So um uh and some of the produce is high
  123. value is exported brings money into China. Mhm. So you you go to this town called Shoguang which is in the middle
  124. of Shandong province between Ginan the capital and Ching Dao where large companies like Higher and High sense are
  125. located and you will see trucks from all over this all over China coming together
  126. and just just you've never seen so much produce in your life and they have to move it very quickly because obviously
  127. it deteriorates. Mhm. And uh this is a city of about a town of about a million, you know, one traffic light, one movie
  128. theater. Uh but um you you can see how active this this this kind of highv value produce industry is in China. But
  129. that's not going to feed the masses of China. Right? No, what China needs is is rice for the south, wheat, and also
  130. soybeans. And presently they're huge they are importing huge quantities of these. But because of the price gap,
  131. um, even with elevated world prices, they've got to do something to protect their farmers. They've formerly used
  132. direct subsidies. Mhm. But I think they want the right to impose tariffs if they
  133. think their domestic producers are going to be overwhelmed. And this is a matter
  134. of national self-sufficiency. As mentioned to you earlier, uh, China sees what's happening with petroleum in the
  135. United States. They don't want to be dependent on foreign sources um for um fundamental
  136. food stuffs again wheat, rice to some extent soybeans and their dependence is much greater than already much greater
  137. than you think it is because let's say they're importing 12% of their food supply which I I think is approx is
  138. probably a good number to use as a rough number. Could be 10, could be 15. I'm going to say 12. um doesn't sound like
  139. too much, but if you got 58% of your population, 60% of your population sort of growing food for themselves,
  140. okay, that means it's you're really not looking at at 12 over 100. You're looking at say 12 over 42.
  141. In other words, food that's in the market. And 12 over 42 is is roughly 30% of the of the food that's in the market,
  142. right, is imported. And that means that they're just terribly vulnerable to global price fluctuations at least in
  143. the urban areas of China. Which is why you would said it's really a strategic it's very much a strategic issue for
  144. them not entirely. And there's something else going on um aside from the the uh global fluctuations in price of grain uh
  145. for many many reasons including some say ethanol. China's had a particular problem this year not with grain but
  146. with meat. They've had something called blue ear disease which has destroyed a lot of of of of their pigs. Okay. And as
  147. a consequence, the price of meat in China has shot up uh between 40 and 50% in the last 12 months. Mhm. It means the
  148. overall food prices have shot up about 25%. And in a country where say 354% of the
  149. household budgets food, um uh this has had very very dramatic impact on people. And uh the the the
  150. Chinese need to do what they can to kind of keep these prices in check on the one
  151. hand, but also to protect their domestic producers and their incomes, right? And
  152. for China, it well in many nations uh the the government will try to protect its its uh its farmers for um domestic
  153. political reasons. Sure. And one might think that that's less important in China. They don't vote. Ah, but they do
  154. other things. They vote with their feet. Yes. And by meeting voting with their feet is they riot.
  155. And and through 2005, the Chinese government actually published statistics on what they call mass disturbances. No
  156. one knew quite what that meant. Was it two or more people or 12 or more people? But whatever it was, it was. And you
  157. could see the graph going up exponentially. And they stopped releasing these numbers. But your
  158. anecdotal accounts tell you that discontent in rural communities has shot up in China. Uh some people tell me that
  159. premier wjao first thing he looks at in the morning are these reports of discontent particularly in rural areas.
  160. We've read in the newspaper various accounts of riots and uh the government is very very sensitive to this. This is
  161. a historical thing in China. It's not just under communism that they've had spontaneous riots. It was part of the
  162. political process in China. instead of going to the ballots box, people would just get out there and riot for and
  163. sometimes for five years in a row. But the Chinese government really wants to minimize this for all kinds of reasons
  164. as you can imagine. Of course. Um so then is it in China's interest to uh I mean to return to the talks or see the
  165. talks revived? I mean a lot of people are saying that they they threw in this last minute demand on the uh on on some
  166. of the tariff uh negotiations to derail the talks. it would seem that it's in their best
  167. interest to have some sort of a trade agreement. Uh I would think so. Again, I'm not an expert on trade, but I I I I
  168. would think that um um from the point of view of the export economy in which they've so heavily depended, yeah, it is
  169. in their interest to have a trade agreement. Um but I think right now um the the the priority for the Chinese
  170. the the current Chinese government um is national self-sufficiency. uh in food and again protecting the farmers among
  171. whom discontent where where discontent is is is I think very high right now. Okay. For all kinds of reasons given the
  172. the um uh geographical situation there. Is it a reasonable expectation for them to be
  173. self-sufficient uh agriculturally? That's a very interesting question because just as
  174. think of this geopolitically um just as the world depends heavily on the Middle East for oil,
  175. the world unfettered would depend heavily on the English-speaking countries, US, Canada, Australia particularly for
  176. the global supply of grain. There are many reasons for this and the question that's being raised is can the world
  177. afford to be that dependent on one block of countries. Mhm. And uh the answer I think remains unknown. Okay. But that's
  178. I think there there lies the issue. US, Canada and Australia particularly US and
  179. Canada are uniquely positioned to supply the world with grain and that has the n
  180. to do with the nature of weather patterns. Um I don't know if you recall but the
  181. Soviet Union used to go through periodic I won't say starvations. China did have
  182. a great starvation and great great leap forward but Soviet Union used to have periodic food shortages and it wasn't
  183. just due to socialism. See, if you look if you look at the crop bands in the Soviet Union, you know, the wheat's
  184. grown in the south, say in in Georgia and Ukraine, so on and so forth, the crop bands run east to west. In the US
  185. and Canada, they run north to south. And that means look, you know, where's our wheat belt? Where's our corn belt? You
  186. can just see these vertical stripes across the map. US and Canada. So weather patterns shift, but you still
  187. get production, right? You got somewhere somewhere on the somewhere you're getting production. Exactly. Okay. That
  188. doesn't happen in Eurasia much more vulner vulnerable to climate changes and China in particular as well
  189. as India by the way have another huge problem called water. The north of China the wheat area is
  190. arid. Desertification is happening. If you've ever been in Beijing in a sand in a sandstorm, you'll know what the word
  191. desertification means. You know, you know, when they tell you that, you know, over a good weekend, 318,000 tons of
  192. sand were deposited in Beijing. Um, and it's not the kind of sand, you know, it's in your kid's sandbox. I
  193. mean, this is the kind of stuff that when it gets into jet engines, makes the engine manufacturers very happy. It's
  194. like throwing an abrasive into your vehicle's engine, right? Or in the aircraft engine. Um when you see this
  195. happening, you know that their capacity to grow food is going to be constrained going forward
  196. unless either climate change reverses or they find some way to engineer water supplies in the north of China. I don't
  197. know the topography of India all that well, but I understand that there are similar problems in India. Certainly.
  198. Yes. Okay. Well, this has been fascinating. Thank you so much for for joining. More than welcome. It was fun.
  199. For more information, please visit knowledge.warton.upen.edu. [Music]

Brief Summary

The episode analyzes the collapse of the Doha Talks and China's agricultural inefficiencies in global trade.

Key points

  • Collapse of Doha Talks. The Doha Talks, aimed at establishing global trade rules, have collapsed after seven years.
  • Impact of Trade Talks Collapse. The breakdown of trade talks may energize critics of free trade in the U.S.
  • China's Agricultural Inefficiency. China's agricultural system is inefficient due to small farm plots and a shrinking rural population.
  • The Global Food Supply Question. Can the world rely on a few countries for grain? The answer remains unknown.
  • China's Water Crisis. Desertification in northern China threatens food production and water supplies.

Tension

40/ 100Low tension

Related episodes