Trade War with China

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  1. hi I'm Jacques de Lille I'm professor of law and political science and deputy director of the Center for the Study of
  2. contemporary China here at Penn and I'm delighted to have with us today Charlene
  3. Bartowski ambassador of our chefs key has worn many hats including the one probably most familiar to those who
  4. watch the China issues was her role as the US Trade Representative during the Clinton administration when China
  5. entered the WTO so we're gonna be talking about some of that history and where we are now and how we get out of
  6. it perhaps in a bit of time we have today so we're 40 years past the opening to China really the normalization of
  7. relations which brought conditional most-favored nation or normal trade relations status between China and the
  8. US the u.s. granting that to China and of course in 2000 you finished a very long and painful negotiation that led to
  9. Congress passing permanent normal trade in relations which was a condition for China getting into the u.s. you didn't
  10. to the WTO or perhaps more precisely for the u.s. meeting the obligations it would then have to China and that was a
  11. very successful story right China becomes an even more major trading partner great opportunities for US
  12. exports lots of US firms getting in on the ground services sectors starting to open up all this sort of stuff and now
  13. here we are 2019 and suddenly the worm seems to have turned a bit we're on the brink of or some would say deeply into a
  14. trade war where we've got 250 billion with perhaps another amount of that 250 260 billion more Chinese goods possibly
  15. subject to tariffs from the US China's retaliated with 110 billion u.s. goods being subject to tariffs we've had these
  16. trade negotiations which keep not quite reaching a result a lot going on so what
  17. happened how did we get from the rosy days of 2002 the current really much much less happy a state of us-china
  18. trade relations well I mean first of all the days weren't necessarily rosy in 2000 and I'll come to that in a minute
  19. but of course China's reform and opening started with dumb chopping so really started in 1978 as you say it's been 40
  20. years and starting with dong chopping with sort of tentative steps toward reform continuing on through the 1990s
  21. and into the first half of the tooth thousands you saw China not only affecting internal economic reform on
  22. its own but also through WTO accession expanding and deepening that reform very significantly let's keep in mind that
  23. china is the world's second largest importer second largest importer and that would not have happened without a
  24. WTO entry but what happened is while China had been on a convergent course or near a more convergent course with
  25. Western market economics and therefore the WTO what we saw around 2005-2006 was that China's internal reform and opening
  26. began to sputter and then it stopped and rather than continuing on a converging course China began to diverge course an
  27. undersea Jinping that divergent course a statist approach has accelerated significantly so that China's internal
  28. economy while robust and so on and it's external trade relationships are really no longer in sync with where its largest
  29. trading partners tend to be why did this happen it's hard to know what fully the
  30. motives were except that China turned from more market oriented systems toward a resurgence of state-led enterprises
  31. toward the creation of champion companies Huawei being one but not the only one toward heavy subsidization of
  32. favored sectors in the mid 2000s those were called strategic emerging industries now they're all routinely
  33. referred to as made in China 2025 and for China in China's view this seemed to be a better course in that the state
  34. became the dominant after an undersea Jinping of course the party is even more dominant still
  35. so now we see the US and China in conflict China is also in conflict with its other major trading partners with
  36. Europe Australia and others because of its economic practices principally on the technology side but not exclusively
  37. on the technology side and so that's one threat second threat and the current tensions is the u.s. financial meltdown
  38. in 2008-2009 which continues to reverberate today but China saw an opening to make its own path the u.s.
  39. did relatively little to stop it at that point third strand in this story is I think a failure on the part of the u.s.
  40. to adequately enforce the commitments China made there were many specific commitments made that applied only to
  41. China including for example a prohibition on forced technology transfer remarkably the US has never
  42. sued China on that basis so a somewhat lacks enforcement regime I think also contributed and finally I think a to
  43. slow realization of China's u-turn and so letting it get ahead of where policymakers then later discovered it
  44. was and I think all of these strands have come together to create a very difficult situation between the US and
  45. China not to mention job loss in the US on the manufacturing side that some economists
  46. have attributed to China so you've stressed the change in China in the u.s. reaction to it let me throw out a couple
  47. of other factors that are sometimes in the discussion and see if you think they mattered once one argument was that
  48. there was going to be a honeymoon period that when China first entered in 2000 had been such a long tough slog to get
  49. the deal done and China really made some pretty big concessions it didn't try to
  50. take advantage of developing country exceptions to the rules under the WTO it didn't try to take the socialist
  51. transitional economy thing that had agreed to things like a very short trigger for essentially surges of
  52. exports so it took a pretty tough deal and although many reforms had been as you've pointed out and although the
  53. story that's often told that would she would know better than just about anybody is that then Chinese premier
  54. Jerome G saw the WTO commitment as a way of forcing through reform at home so how
  55. much foot was okay we're gonna give you some amount of time we're gonna give me some number of years and by the middle
  56. 2000s and a bit later that starts to wear out and it's worn out even more now do you buy that part of the story
  57. another one is that as China's moved up the value chain they're starting to compete in industries that really matter
  58. to the US we've lost textiles we've lost a lot of low end electronics already but
  59. when we're getting into the IP intensive industries it's now kind of hitting us where we live do you think that's part
  60. of the story absolutely so the composition of China's trade with the US has changed as you said in the earlier
  61. years they were exporting low value goods we were exporting high-value goods now we're competing increasingly on sort
  62. of mid-level technologies and technological goods but we are becoming fast competitors on higher-end
  63. technology in part a function of theft by China and forced technology transfer requirements in China and in part a
  64. function of China being an extremely inventive and innovative society quite on its own so there's no question that
  65. has led to the tension and indeed when people talk about the trade war I think of it as a technology war rather more
  66. than a trade war and with respect to the honeymoon period I think that in the beginning China implemented its WTO
  67. commitments actually rather well and that implementation period went better than many thought it would go I think it
  68. was by that time of course the Clinton ministration was long since over but I think that George W Bush administration
  69. watched that pretty carefully but then I think as things began to lapse as promises were made and not kept by China
  70. with respect to further reform and opening then I think you saw a rather a bit of a lackadaisical view part of that
  71. was the US financial crisis in inward turning by the us the importance of stabilizing the US economy and
  72. China's importance at that time as being one of the few sources of demand for a world in which there was a dearth too
  73. little demand able to pull countries back out of what was becoming a very steep recessionary spiral so part of it
  74. was that part of it was u.s. involvement Middle East Wars further diverting its attention from China and part of it as I
  75. say may have been that some of China's actions which were clearer which were clear to people on the ground were less
  76. clear to policymakers and there was simply a sort of a failure of a meeting of the minds sufficiently early in this
  77. process of divergence to bring total right the ship one of the other developments in that period you're
  78. talking about of course was complaints about China being slow to open service sectors financial services insurance
  79. areas where they're heavily regulated so it's maybe a little harder to pick up exactly where we're crossing the line
  80. from legitimate regulation into protectionism so you've mentioned that the u.s. being a little slow to push
  81. back now the u.s. did use WTO mechanisms the US and China have been since China's
  82. entry about the most frequent WTO litigants out there and many of them involve complaints about Chinese
  83. practices so it's either a US complaint about a Chinese practice or a Chinese complaint about the u.s. imposing an
  84. anti dumping duties or a countervailing duty which ultimately is about a Chinese
  85. practice but you think we didn't do that all that much I'm gathering and and so what could we have done more either
  86. under the WTO general rules or under the specific provisions that China committed
  87. to in its protocol of accession some of which of course are now lapsed right so I think on the issue of specific WTO
  88. cases the US was certainly right to pursue the cases that have pursued no quarrel with that
  89. win-loss record is very good in favor of the United States and all of that is positive I think that the protocol of
  90. accession which prohibited forced transfer should have been the subject of the case it wasn't I suspect
  91. because of some difficulty in gathering evidence companies are reluctant to come
  92. forward they also don't want to admit technology was stolen which is the same actually in the United States as well
  93. second of all the disciplines imposed on state enterprise and state enterprise activities could have been the basis for
  94. an additional suit and last of course and most important the agreement as you noted prohibited surges of imports of
  95. Chinese goods into the United States if they cost market disruption in the US market disruption is a very low legal
  96. standard and if China were found to be creating market disruption in any sector the president United States would have
  97. been authorized to undertake any action he or she deemed warranted quotas tariffs prohibitions bans so on and so
  98. forth that should have been done and should have been utilized it was a provision
  99. that was utilized only once in 12 years that was by Barack Obama but in addition
  100. under the general WTO agreement there is something called nullification and impairment it's sort of the nuclear
  101. option but I think quite justified in this case and that is it's a provision that allows a party let's say the United
  102. States to essentially sue another party let's say China on the basis that the benefits the United States thought it
  103. would get from China's WTO accession have not fully occurred and that China and that's because China has reverted to
  104. a kind of state-led approach to its economy heavy discrimination against foreign companies heavy subsidization of
  105. homegrown companies that these practices and many others have nullified or impaired the benefits we the United
  106. States thought we would get other countries clearly would have joined that suit because many have exactly the same
  107. complaints and what is the remedy if you were to win which is not easy to do but
  108. what's the remedy if you were to win you could forego MFN which is very nuclear the point of the
  109. case would have been to bring China to the table in a serious way that would have been the point of the case and as
  110. you point out MFN has been there it wasn't obligatory until the legislation in 2000 but even in the wake of
  111. Tiananmen which is the closest we came to yanking MFN ultimately we did and ultimately we didn't exactly so what do
  112. you think of the critique that says although many of the points you make that is Chinese behavior that is not
  113. consistent with WTO commitments or obligations we could have done more with that but there's a critique that says
  114. some of the things that are problematic in China's economic behavior are hard to
  115. police with WTO rules nobody police's intellectual-property perfectly how much is enough maybe you can police flat-out
  116. state subsidization but what do you do about companies that maybe get the nudge-nudge wink-wink that they don't
  117. have to worry about the bottom line fully or they pursue a more politicized strategies where's the line between that
  118. and legitimate industrial policy there's a bunch of gray there is this a systemic
  119. problem where the WTO does a good job of catching trade law violations by countries that operate the way the u.s.
  120. does but a less good job at allowing us to police that kind of behavior I think it's very difficult to police the kind
  121. of behavior you've said even in the context of countries that abide by WTO rules so there are many intellectual
  122. property cases the US has brought against Canada against Europe clearly these are market economies rule of law
  123. countries similar to the United States and yet you'll see cases on that European state-owned enterprises were a
  124. big issue for the United States during the 1970s 1980s very difficult to police there's no question China system is
  125. difficult to police in what we would call these gray areas as they are for other countries that also operate in
  126. these kinds of gray areas to me the best use of US time would have been to begin
  127. to remake the WTO and thereby push China in the action of either reform sustainably
  128. durably or be completely disadvantaged commercially and the way the US should have done that is to stay in TPP the
  129. trans-pacific partnership which created a very high standard agreement covering many of these areas that are in this
  130. gray zone it should then have taken that agreement to Europe then you have 60% of
  131. global GDP on a system different from the WTO system by different I mean much more rigorous much tougher on countries
  132. much better dispute settlement system then China can choose does it wanna have the economic opportunity of 260 percent
  133. of the global economy or does it want to be disadvantaged and at a minimum it would have strengths in the United
  134. States and the u.s. Alliance structure quite apart from whatever trying to decided to do and it would have in
  135. effect rewritten the rules of the WTO because it's hard to ignore 60% of global GDP so to my mind this would have
  136. been a more constructive way of proceeding a more durable way of proceeding one that didn't hurt the US
  137. economy as tariffs do since tariffs or taxes on consumers and one that reinforced the United States Alliance
  138. structure with its closest partners and I think that is an aspect that is not often discussed but is one of the most
  139. critical features of what TPP would have done it would have cemented the u.s. position in Asia which China does not
  140. want to see would have strengthened our allies in Asia which China would rather not see and would have led to better
  141. balance in Asia no one picking sides but a balance of power in Asia which will slowly erode over time without
  142. agreements of this sort for the United States so you're telling a compelling story about some constant themes that
  143. run through the nearly 20 years and really before that when we first started talking really at the dawn of the WTO
  144. about China's possible accession but the sort of political atmospherics of this have been a little more ragged in a
  145. sense we started with what were perhaps inflated expectations and there were reasons to do this in domestic politics
  146. but to say that engaging China and the WTO would lead to all sorts of great changes in China and those haven't fully
  147. panned out for reasons you've talked about and maybe they were a little exaggerated because of the need to sell
  148. Congress or a little optimistic perhaps then we went through the phase with the TPP when Obama said again perhaps not
  149. the best external politics but understandable internal politics that the TPP was part of a contest between
  150. the US and China about who would write the rules of the international economy for the 21st century and now we're in a
  151. rather different moment and some of the things you have said are China I was China's problems problems with China in
  152. the relationship with the US and the broader engagement with the international order some of your list is
  153. a bit like the list one would hear from the Trump administration coerced intellectual property transfer outright
  154. intellectual property theft problems with market access problems with selective application be it
  155. anti-monopoly law or regulation these are things you've spoken about in our conversation and in other contexts
  156. that's a pretty familiar list but I'm guessing that somehow if I were to have Robert light hyzer rather than Sharlene
  157. our chefs key of that chair we might get a slightly different discussion about how one should pursue dealing with those
  158. problems so what's the Trump administration doing wrong and what are they doing right in your opinion well
  159. the list of problems with China has been well known and they were the subject of
  160. much of the engagement and WTO enforcement actions taken during the eight years of the Obama administration
  161. there's nothing new in the list a little more evidence here a little less evidence there so on and so forth but
  162. the list has been well known the process of engagement that had been undertaken I
  163. think by Obama which combined negotiation with China with TPP that is to say negotiation with China's
  164. other trading partners for a different arrangement coupled with WTO enforcement actions I always thought was basically
  165. about right in terms of position but not right in terms of Moxie and in terms of real push against China
  166. and these dialogues that were held during the Obama years became more way for China to manage the United States
  167. than the u.s. managing China so this I think helps spawn the kind of Trump administration approach which is take a
  168. two-by-four whack the head with a two-by-four and if the patient hasn't died see what you can extract and the
  169. real question there is how durable is that whatever will be announced we already know will be the best the
  170. biggest president has used the word himself the most epic trade agreement ever done here it's been 20 years post
  171. WTO and we've come to this point where will we be in 20 years following the two-by-four approach the internal
  172. reforms that are asked of China our reforms long known to China and the international community if it wants to
  173. propel itself forward so these are reforms outlined in many reports including in the China 2030 strategy
  174. done by the World Bank many years ago those reforms if they had been installed over these many years would have made
  175. China stronger would have made its economy rather more stable than it is today and would have ameliorated some of
  176. the problems we see in China's financial sector in particular and therefore would
  177. have put China on a firmer footing than it is now so these reforms have to be undertaken by China if it's going to
  178. propel itself forward on the basis of real data not made-up numbers and if it wants to escape the middle income trap
  179. so on and so forth and so we'll have to see I did whatever comes out of the administration we already know how it
  180. will be announced and it will take a number of years before we see the outcome will be in the interim to my
  181. mind the single most important thing the u.s. can do is get its own house in order it doesn't matter
  182. what China does how fast or how slow it goes if our infrastructure is crumbling if we don't provide R&D funding to our
  183. major research institutions if we don't have budgetary capacity to do the things
  184. in the United States we need to be doing analyst is well known on education and other fronts it is a strengthening of
  185. the United States that is a single most important thing we can do if we're on an
  186. economically stronger footing if we're better educated if we're funding are indeed the way we used to fund R&D we're
  187. still riding on the coattails of R&D funding from the 1950s if we funded it the way we did then if we strengthened
  188. our alliance structure as we did then which is the way the u.s. projects power it we would be in a far better position
  189. to address China in other words we can't control what China does at the end of the day it's one it's a it's a fifth of
  190. the world's population the world's second biggest economy and soon the world's biggest oil the world's biggest
  191. economy on a purchase power parity basis just about coming very close to the US now on that basis but we can completely
  192. control what we do within the United States and that has to be a principal part of any program with respect to
  193. China and there of course China is throwing immense resources that some of these undertakings R&D of its own
  194. requiring R&D shops to be open to by foreign investors and all that there's some question about how efficient it is
  195. but it's certainly a large number so I certainly take the point that on both sides strength begins at home with the
  196. domestic economy and all that that makes possible militarily and otherwise but we
  197. still do have a bilateral relationship which I think most people accurately describe as the world's most important
  198. bilateral relationship and the broader atmospherics beyond the trade and investment disputes you've been talking
  199. about or not so good right now it wasn't too long ago that there seemed to be a pro and
  200. agent consensus in the US and now it has turned almost 180 degrees at least in policy-relevant
  201. circles and I'm wondering what you see as the things that have contributed to that and whether we can manage our way
  202. out of it I mean some things have changed since the negotiations you were doing back in the run-up to 2000 the
  203. business community in the US was then very supportive of China getting in the WTO now it's a much less happy group
  204. with his experiences on the ground in China and the Republican Party which has often been relatively free trade at
  205. least part of the time is now very much in line with taking a tougher line toward China and we have a national
  206. security set of issues in the mix this has come up with Huawei has come up with ZTE so that's a pretty long list of
  207. things that make the relationship a lot tougher do you think those were intractable can they be managed how
  208. should they weigh in to our considerations because as you know one of the big critiques of the Trump
  209. administration has been a tendency to mix national security concerns with trade concerns so that's a big a big
  210. question we're almost out of time so I throw it all idealize right exactly but I would say this there has to be a way
  211. to manage the relationship or it's war which is unthinkable on almost every basis one could consider so we have to
  212. say well first of all let's set aside ideology they have a particular political system we won't change that we
  213. have a particular political system they won't change that and put that aside a moment we have some common concerns
  214. whether it is or was climate change or whether it is global pandemics whatever it might be global terrorism there are
  215. some common concerns China contributes less than as advertised and that has s has been advertised by
  216. the United States but even with that you obviously want to cooperate if it's in your interest to cooperate it won't
  217. always be in your interest to cooperate that's for sure but where it is you can't put yourself in an adversarial
  218. position such that you can never cooperate because again then the only thing you have left is something that is
  219. potentially exceedingly dangerous with no stop to it then with respect to those issues that are the difficult
  220. issues I think the United States has to continue to not only work toward moving China in the right direction working
  221. with its allies working through other agreements that leave China out putting greater economic pressure on China and
  222. taking counter measures if we need to in other words if China persists in the direction it's going in I think the
  223. United States will simply have to take its own measures as Trump has done but Trump has done it without having tested
  224. the proposition whether he had to do it this way and my own view is he never had
  225. to do it this way and it will affect the durability of whatever is agreed to but
  226. last I would say the engagement strategy never died what are negotiations if not
  227. engagement during the Obama years these meetings were negotiations they weren't pointed enough they weren't narrow
  228. enough they weren't focused enough there were too many things on the table that got lost but engagement is negotiation
  229. that's what's happening now engagement with the calls between bush and cg and pea between Trump and si Jinping these
  230. used to be conversations between si Jinping and Obama and before si Jinping between who Jintao and Obama so these
  231. elements of engagement persist and will have to persist because we have to manage this relationship in such a way
  232. that the pieces can fit okay together not great but okay but in the meantime the United States has to strengthen
  233. itself I can't emphasize enough the importance it is so fundamental it's fundamental to our future and the way in
  234. which we can continue to play the leadership role we've played which is very important because it does
  235. matter who writes the rules and it does matter who's in the position to enforce the rules the US by dint of its economic
  236. size and the attractiveness of our market was almost always in a position to enforce the rules through formal and
  237. informal means we have to remain in a position to do that we won't be the only country who can do it any longer
  238. but we have to remain in a position where we can still do that well thank you very much for sharing your expertise
  239. your long experience in this field I think it's an extremely useful reminder of all the subtle work that's done
  240. through policymakers and through diplomats that all too often gets drowned out by the rhetoric and the
  241. swings over broad policies whether they be decoupling or or as you say taking the two-by-four and I just hope that
  242. message gets through to to everyone out there who's listening to this and hopefully have some role in getting us
  243. through the current difficult period thank you so much ambassador of our chefs q my pleasure thank you for more
  244. insight from knowledge at Wharton please visit knowledge Wharton UPenn edu [Music]

Brief Summary

Jacques de Lille and Charlene Bartowski discuss the evolution of US-China trade relations and the challenges faced since China's WTO entry.

Key points

  • The Trade War Looms. The US and China are on the brink of a trade war, with tariffs looming large.
  • China's Economic Divergence. China's internal reforms have stalled, leading to a divergence from Western market practices.
  • US Enforcement Failures. The US has struggled to enforce trade commitments made by China, leading to ongoing tensions.
  • Remaking the WTO. A call for the US to remake the WTO to better address China's economic practices.
  • The Importance of Domestic Strength. Strengthening the U.S. economy is crucial for addressing challenges posed by China.
  • Managing U.S.-China Relations. The relationship with China requires careful management to avoid conflict.

Tension

55/ 100Some tension

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