Trade War with China
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- hi I'm Jacques de Lille I'm professor of law and political science and deputy director of the Center for the Study of
- contemporary China here at Penn and I'm delighted to have with us today Charlene
- Bartowski ambassador of our chefs key has worn many hats including the one probably most familiar to those who
- watch the China issues was her role as the US Trade Representative during the Clinton administration when China
- entered the WTO so we're gonna be talking about some of that history and where we are now and how we get out of
- it perhaps in a bit of time we have today so we're 40 years past the opening to China really the normalization of
- relations which brought conditional most-favored nation or normal trade relations status between China and the
- US the u.s. granting that to China and of course in 2000 you finished a very long and painful negotiation that led to
- Congress passing permanent normal trade in relations which was a condition for China getting into the u.s. you didn't
- to the WTO or perhaps more precisely for the u.s. meeting the obligations it would then have to China and that was a
- very successful story right China becomes an even more major trading partner great opportunities for US
- exports lots of US firms getting in on the ground services sectors starting to open up all this sort of stuff and now
- here we are 2019 and suddenly the worm seems to have turned a bit we're on the brink of or some would say deeply into a
- trade war where we've got 250 billion with perhaps another amount of that 250 260 billion more Chinese goods possibly
- subject to tariffs from the US China's retaliated with 110 billion u.s. goods being subject to tariffs we've had these
- trade negotiations which keep not quite reaching a result a lot going on so what
- happened how did we get from the rosy days of 2002 the current really much much less happy a state of us-china
- trade relations well I mean first of all the days weren't necessarily rosy in 2000 and I'll come to that in a minute
- but of course China's reform and opening started with dumb chopping so really started in 1978 as you say it's been 40
- years and starting with dong chopping with sort of tentative steps toward reform continuing on through the 1990s
- and into the first half of the tooth thousands you saw China not only affecting internal economic reform on
- its own but also through WTO accession expanding and deepening that reform very significantly let's keep in mind that
- china is the world's second largest importer second largest importer and that would not have happened without a
- WTO entry but what happened is while China had been on a convergent course or near a more convergent course with
- Western market economics and therefore the WTO what we saw around 2005-2006 was that China's internal reform and opening
- began to sputter and then it stopped and rather than continuing on a converging course China began to diverge course an
- undersea Jinping that divergent course a statist approach has accelerated significantly so that China's internal
- economy while robust and so on and it's external trade relationships are really no longer in sync with where its largest
- trading partners tend to be why did this happen it's hard to know what fully the
- motives were except that China turned from more market oriented systems toward a resurgence of state-led enterprises
- toward the creation of champion companies Huawei being one but not the only one toward heavy subsidization of
- favored sectors in the mid 2000s those were called strategic emerging industries now they're all routinely
- referred to as made in China 2025 and for China in China's view this seemed to be a better course in that the state
- became the dominant after an undersea Jinping of course the party is even more dominant still
- so now we see the US and China in conflict China is also in conflict with its other major trading partners with
- Europe Australia and others because of its economic practices principally on the technology side but not exclusively
- on the technology side and so that's one threat second threat and the current tensions is the u.s. financial meltdown
- in 2008-2009 which continues to reverberate today but China saw an opening to make its own path the u.s.
- did relatively little to stop it at that point third strand in this story is I think a failure on the part of the u.s.
- to adequately enforce the commitments China made there were many specific commitments made that applied only to
- China including for example a prohibition on forced technology transfer remarkably the US has never
- sued China on that basis so a somewhat lacks enforcement regime I think also contributed and finally I think a to
- slow realization of China's u-turn and so letting it get ahead of where policymakers then later discovered it
- was and I think all of these strands have come together to create a very difficult situation between the US and
- China not to mention job loss in the US on the manufacturing side that some economists
- have attributed to China so you've stressed the change in China in the u.s. reaction to it let me throw out a couple
- of other factors that are sometimes in the discussion and see if you think they mattered once one argument was that
- there was going to be a honeymoon period that when China first entered in 2000 had been such a long tough slog to get
- the deal done and China really made some pretty big concessions it didn't try to
- take advantage of developing country exceptions to the rules under the WTO it didn't try to take the socialist
- transitional economy thing that had agreed to things like a very short trigger for essentially surges of
- exports so it took a pretty tough deal and although many reforms had been as you've pointed out and although the
- story that's often told that would she would know better than just about anybody is that then Chinese premier
- Jerome G saw the WTO commitment as a way of forcing through reform at home so how
- much foot was okay we're gonna give you some amount of time we're gonna give me some number of years and by the middle
- 2000s and a bit later that starts to wear out and it's worn out even more now do you buy that part of the story
- another one is that as China's moved up the value chain they're starting to compete in industries that really matter
- to the US we've lost textiles we've lost a lot of low end electronics already but
- when we're getting into the IP intensive industries it's now kind of hitting us where we live do you think that's part
- of the story absolutely so the composition of China's trade with the US has changed as you said in the earlier
- years they were exporting low value goods we were exporting high-value goods now we're competing increasingly on sort
- of mid-level technologies and technological goods but we are becoming fast competitors on higher-end
- technology in part a function of theft by China and forced technology transfer requirements in China and in part a
- function of China being an extremely inventive and innovative society quite on its own so there's no question that
- has led to the tension and indeed when people talk about the trade war I think of it as a technology war rather more
- than a trade war and with respect to the honeymoon period I think that in the beginning China implemented its WTO
- commitments actually rather well and that implementation period went better than many thought it would go I think it
- was by that time of course the Clinton ministration was long since over but I think that George W Bush administration
- watched that pretty carefully but then I think as things began to lapse as promises were made and not kept by China
- with respect to further reform and opening then I think you saw a rather a bit of a lackadaisical view part of that
- was the US financial crisis in inward turning by the us the importance of stabilizing the US economy and
- China's importance at that time as being one of the few sources of demand for a world in which there was a dearth too
- little demand able to pull countries back out of what was becoming a very steep recessionary spiral so part of it
- was that part of it was u.s. involvement Middle East Wars further diverting its attention from China and part of it as I
- say may have been that some of China's actions which were clearer which were clear to people on the ground were less
- clear to policymakers and there was simply a sort of a failure of a meeting of the minds sufficiently early in this
- process of divergence to bring total right the ship one of the other developments in that period you're
- talking about of course was complaints about China being slow to open service sectors financial services insurance
- areas where they're heavily regulated so it's maybe a little harder to pick up exactly where we're crossing the line
- from legitimate regulation into protectionism so you've mentioned that the u.s. being a little slow to push
- back now the u.s. did use WTO mechanisms the US and China have been since China's
- entry about the most frequent WTO litigants out there and many of them involve complaints about Chinese
- practices so it's either a US complaint about a Chinese practice or a Chinese complaint about the u.s. imposing an
- anti dumping duties or a countervailing duty which ultimately is about a Chinese
- practice but you think we didn't do that all that much I'm gathering and and so what could we have done more either
- under the WTO general rules or under the specific provisions that China committed
- to in its protocol of accession some of which of course are now lapsed right so I think on the issue of specific WTO
- cases the US was certainly right to pursue the cases that have pursued no quarrel with that
- win-loss record is very good in favor of the United States and all of that is positive I think that the protocol of
- accession which prohibited forced transfer should have been the subject of the case it wasn't I suspect
- because of some difficulty in gathering evidence companies are reluctant to come
- forward they also don't want to admit technology was stolen which is the same actually in the United States as well
- second of all the disciplines imposed on state enterprise and state enterprise activities could have been the basis for
- an additional suit and last of course and most important the agreement as you noted prohibited surges of imports of
- Chinese goods into the United States if they cost market disruption in the US market disruption is a very low legal
- standard and if China were found to be creating market disruption in any sector the president United States would have
- been authorized to undertake any action he or she deemed warranted quotas tariffs prohibitions bans so on and so
- forth that should have been done and should have been utilized it was a provision
- that was utilized only once in 12 years that was by Barack Obama but in addition
- under the general WTO agreement there is something called nullification and impairment it's sort of the nuclear
- option but I think quite justified in this case and that is it's a provision that allows a party let's say the United
- States to essentially sue another party let's say China on the basis that the benefits the United States thought it
- would get from China's WTO accession have not fully occurred and that China and that's because China has reverted to
- a kind of state-led approach to its economy heavy discrimination against foreign companies heavy subsidization of
- homegrown companies that these practices and many others have nullified or impaired the benefits we the United
- States thought we would get other countries clearly would have joined that suit because many have exactly the same
- complaints and what is the remedy if you were to win which is not easy to do but
- what's the remedy if you were to win you could forego MFN which is very nuclear the point of the
- case would have been to bring China to the table in a serious way that would have been the point of the case and as
- you point out MFN has been there it wasn't obligatory until the legislation in 2000 but even in the wake of
- Tiananmen which is the closest we came to yanking MFN ultimately we did and ultimately we didn't exactly so what do
- you think of the critique that says although many of the points you make that is Chinese behavior that is not
- consistent with WTO commitments or obligations we could have done more with that but there's a critique that says
- some of the things that are problematic in China's economic behavior are hard to
- police with WTO rules nobody police's intellectual-property perfectly how much is enough maybe you can police flat-out
- state subsidization but what do you do about companies that maybe get the nudge-nudge wink-wink that they don't
- have to worry about the bottom line fully or they pursue a more politicized strategies where's the line between that
- and legitimate industrial policy there's a bunch of gray there is this a systemic
- problem where the WTO does a good job of catching trade law violations by countries that operate the way the u.s.
- does but a less good job at allowing us to police that kind of behavior I think it's very difficult to police the kind
- of behavior you've said even in the context of countries that abide by WTO rules so there are many intellectual
- property cases the US has brought against Canada against Europe clearly these are market economies rule of law
- countries similar to the United States and yet you'll see cases on that European state-owned enterprises were a
- big issue for the United States during the 1970s 1980s very difficult to police there's no question China system is
- difficult to police in what we would call these gray areas as they are for other countries that also operate in
- these kinds of gray areas to me the best use of US time would have been to begin
- to remake the WTO and thereby push China in the action of either reform sustainably
- durably or be completely disadvantaged commercially and the way the US should have done that is to stay in TPP the
- trans-pacific partnership which created a very high standard agreement covering many of these areas that are in this
- gray zone it should then have taken that agreement to Europe then you have 60% of
- global GDP on a system different from the WTO system by different I mean much more rigorous much tougher on countries
- much better dispute settlement system then China can choose does it wanna have the economic opportunity of 260 percent
- of the global economy or does it want to be disadvantaged and at a minimum it would have strengths in the United
- States and the u.s. Alliance structure quite apart from whatever trying to decided to do and it would have in
- effect rewritten the rules of the WTO because it's hard to ignore 60% of global GDP so to my mind this would have
- been a more constructive way of proceeding a more durable way of proceeding one that didn't hurt the US
- economy as tariffs do since tariffs or taxes on consumers and one that reinforced the United States Alliance
- structure with its closest partners and I think that is an aspect that is not often discussed but is one of the most
- critical features of what TPP would have done it would have cemented the u.s. position in Asia which China does not
- want to see would have strengthened our allies in Asia which China would rather not see and would have led to better
- balance in Asia no one picking sides but a balance of power in Asia which will slowly erode over time without
- agreements of this sort for the United States so you're telling a compelling story about some constant themes that
- run through the nearly 20 years and really before that when we first started talking really at the dawn of the WTO
- about China's possible accession but the sort of political atmospherics of this have been a little more ragged in a
- sense we started with what were perhaps inflated expectations and there were reasons to do this in domestic politics
- but to say that engaging China and the WTO would lead to all sorts of great changes in China and those haven't fully
- panned out for reasons you've talked about and maybe they were a little exaggerated because of the need to sell
- Congress or a little optimistic perhaps then we went through the phase with the TPP when Obama said again perhaps not
- the best external politics but understandable internal politics that the TPP was part of a contest between
- the US and China about who would write the rules of the international economy for the 21st century and now we're in a
- rather different moment and some of the things you have said are China I was China's problems problems with China in
- the relationship with the US and the broader engagement with the international order some of your list is
- a bit like the list one would hear from the Trump administration coerced intellectual property transfer outright
- intellectual property theft problems with market access problems with selective application be it
- anti-monopoly law or regulation these are things you've spoken about in our conversation and in other contexts
- that's a pretty familiar list but I'm guessing that somehow if I were to have Robert light hyzer rather than Sharlene
- our chefs key of that chair we might get a slightly different discussion about how one should pursue dealing with those
- problems so what's the Trump administration doing wrong and what are they doing right in your opinion well
- the list of problems with China has been well known and they were the subject of
- much of the engagement and WTO enforcement actions taken during the eight years of the Obama administration
- there's nothing new in the list a little more evidence here a little less evidence there so on and so forth but
- the list has been well known the process of engagement that had been undertaken I
- think by Obama which combined negotiation with China with TPP that is to say negotiation with China's
- other trading partners for a different arrangement coupled with WTO enforcement actions I always thought was basically
- about right in terms of position but not right in terms of Moxie and in terms of real push against China
- and these dialogues that were held during the Obama years became more way for China to manage the United States
- than the u.s. managing China so this I think helps spawn the kind of Trump administration approach which is take a
- two-by-four whack the head with a two-by-four and if the patient hasn't died see what you can extract and the
- real question there is how durable is that whatever will be announced we already know will be the best the
- biggest president has used the word himself the most epic trade agreement ever done here it's been 20 years post
- WTO and we've come to this point where will we be in 20 years following the two-by-four approach the internal
- reforms that are asked of China our reforms long known to China and the international community if it wants to
- propel itself forward so these are reforms outlined in many reports including in the China 2030 strategy
- done by the World Bank many years ago those reforms if they had been installed over these many years would have made
- China stronger would have made its economy rather more stable than it is today and would have ameliorated some of
- the problems we see in China's financial sector in particular and therefore would
- have put China on a firmer footing than it is now so these reforms have to be undertaken by China if it's going to
- propel itself forward on the basis of real data not made-up numbers and if it wants to escape the middle income trap
- so on and so forth and so we'll have to see I did whatever comes out of the administration we already know how it
- will be announced and it will take a number of years before we see the outcome will be in the interim to my
- mind the single most important thing the u.s. can do is get its own house in order it doesn't matter
- what China does how fast or how slow it goes if our infrastructure is crumbling if we don't provide R&D funding to our
- major research institutions if we don't have budgetary capacity to do the things
- in the United States we need to be doing analyst is well known on education and other fronts it is a strengthening of
- the United States that is a single most important thing we can do if we're on an
- economically stronger footing if we're better educated if we're funding are indeed the way we used to fund R&D we're
- still riding on the coattails of R&D funding from the 1950s if we funded it the way we did then if we strengthened
- our alliance structure as we did then which is the way the u.s. projects power it we would be in a far better position
- to address China in other words we can't control what China does at the end of the day it's one it's a it's a fifth of
- the world's population the world's second biggest economy and soon the world's biggest oil the world's biggest
- economy on a purchase power parity basis just about coming very close to the US now on that basis but we can completely
- control what we do within the United States and that has to be a principal part of any program with respect to
- China and there of course China is throwing immense resources that some of these undertakings R&D of its own
- requiring R&D shops to be open to by foreign investors and all that there's some question about how efficient it is
- but it's certainly a large number so I certainly take the point that on both sides strength begins at home with the
- domestic economy and all that that makes possible militarily and otherwise but we
- still do have a bilateral relationship which I think most people accurately describe as the world's most important
- bilateral relationship and the broader atmospherics beyond the trade and investment disputes you've been talking
- about or not so good right now it wasn't too long ago that there seemed to be a pro and
- agent consensus in the US and now it has turned almost 180 degrees at least in policy-relevant
- circles and I'm wondering what you see as the things that have contributed to that and whether we can manage our way
- out of it I mean some things have changed since the negotiations you were doing back in the run-up to 2000 the
- business community in the US was then very supportive of China getting in the WTO now it's a much less happy group
- with his experiences on the ground in China and the Republican Party which has often been relatively free trade at
- least part of the time is now very much in line with taking a tougher line toward China and we have a national
- security set of issues in the mix this has come up with Huawei has come up with ZTE so that's a pretty long list of
- things that make the relationship a lot tougher do you think those were intractable can they be managed how
- should they weigh in to our considerations because as you know one of the big critiques of the Trump
- administration has been a tendency to mix national security concerns with trade concerns so that's a big a big
- question we're almost out of time so I throw it all idealize right exactly but I would say this there has to be a way
- to manage the relationship or it's war which is unthinkable on almost every basis one could consider so we have to
- say well first of all let's set aside ideology they have a particular political system we won't change that we
- have a particular political system they won't change that and put that aside a moment we have some common concerns
- whether it is or was climate change or whether it is global pandemics whatever it might be global terrorism there are
- some common concerns China contributes less than as advertised and that has s has been advertised by
- the United States but even with that you obviously want to cooperate if it's in your interest to cooperate it won't
- always be in your interest to cooperate that's for sure but where it is you can't put yourself in an adversarial
- position such that you can never cooperate because again then the only thing you have left is something that is
- potentially exceedingly dangerous with no stop to it then with respect to those issues that are the difficult
- issues I think the United States has to continue to not only work toward moving China in the right direction working
- with its allies working through other agreements that leave China out putting greater economic pressure on China and
- taking counter measures if we need to in other words if China persists in the direction it's going in I think the
- United States will simply have to take its own measures as Trump has done but Trump has done it without having tested
- the proposition whether he had to do it this way and my own view is he never had
- to do it this way and it will affect the durability of whatever is agreed to but
- last I would say the engagement strategy never died what are negotiations if not
- engagement during the Obama years these meetings were negotiations they weren't pointed enough they weren't narrow
- enough they weren't focused enough there were too many things on the table that got lost but engagement is negotiation
- that's what's happening now engagement with the calls between bush and cg and pea between Trump and si Jinping these
- used to be conversations between si Jinping and Obama and before si Jinping between who Jintao and Obama so these
- elements of engagement persist and will have to persist because we have to manage this relationship in such a way
- that the pieces can fit okay together not great but okay but in the meantime the United States has to strengthen
- itself I can't emphasize enough the importance it is so fundamental it's fundamental to our future and the way in
- which we can continue to play the leadership role we've played which is very important because it does
- matter who writes the rules and it does matter who's in the position to enforce the rules the US by dint of its economic
- size and the attractiveness of our market was almost always in a position to enforce the rules through formal and
- informal means we have to remain in a position to do that we won't be the only country who can do it any longer
- but we have to remain in a position where we can still do that well thank you very much for sharing your expertise
- your long experience in this field I think it's an extremely useful reminder of all the subtle work that's done
- through policymakers and through diplomats that all too often gets drowned out by the rhetoric and the
- swings over broad policies whether they be decoupling or or as you say taking the two-by-four and I just hope that
- message gets through to to everyone out there who's listening to this and hopefully have some role in getting us
- through the current difficult period thank you so much ambassador of our chefs q my pleasure thank you for more
- insight from knowledge at Wharton please visit knowledge Wharton UPenn edu [Music]
Brief Summary
Jacques de Lille and Charlene Bartowski discuss the evolution of US-China trade relations and the challenges faced since China's WTO entry.
Key points
- The Trade War Looms. The US and China are on the brink of a trade war, with tariffs looming large.
- China's Economic Divergence. China's internal reforms have stalled, leading to a divergence from Western market practices.
- US Enforcement Failures. The US has struggled to enforce trade commitments made by China, leading to ongoing tensions.
- Remaking the WTO. A call for the US to remake the WTO to better address China's economic practices.
- The Importance of Domestic Strength. Strengthening the U.S. economy is crucial for addressing challenges posed by China.
- Managing U.S.-China Relations. The relationship with China requires careful management to avoid conflict.
Episode highlights
- The Trade War LoomsThe US and China are on the brink of a trade war, with tariffs looming large.“We're on the brink of a trade war.”1:14May 2, 2019
- China's Economic DivergenceChina's internal reforms have stalled, leading to a divergence from Western market practices.“China's internal reform began to sputter and then it stopped.”2:56May 2, 2019
- US Enforcement FailuresThe US has struggled to enforce trade commitments made by China, leading to ongoing tensions.“The US has never sued China on forced technology transfer.”5:24May 2, 2019
- Remaking the WTOA call for the US to remake the WTO to better address China's economic practices.“The best use of US time would have been to remake the WTO.”15:28May 2, 2019
- The Importance of Domestic StrengthStrengthening the U.S. economy is crucial for addressing challenges posed by China.“Strength begins at home with the domestic economy.”24:10May 2, 2019
- Managing U.S.-China RelationsThe relationship with China requires careful management to avoid conflict.“We have to manage this relationship in such a way that the pieces can fit.”28:28May 2, 2019
Tension
55/ 100Some tension





