Risk and the Single CEO

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πŸ“‚ Leadership 🏷️ Research

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  1. in finance we're very interested in understanding the role that risk and attitudes to risk
  2. play in determining investment investment behavior which is obviously very important for
  3. long-run economic growth my co-author pavel savor and i were particularly interested in understanding the role
  4. that marital status and changes to marital status over an individual's life can affect
  5. important risk-taking decisions generally marital status is not something that is
  6. thought of as an important determinant of economic decisions and risk-taking decisions in particular however there
  7. are reasons shaped by both economic and psychological forces to think that it may indeed be important what we
  8. wanted to know is is it important for decisions that are really large stakes uh outcomes that uh that are tied to them
  9. so what we look at is the risk taking decisions of ceos of public companies in the u.s so we'd
  10. collected data of a marital status of ceos of 1500 largest public companies and looked at
  11. the differences in behavior of these firms of the firms that were led by ceos who were single
  12. and those who were married what we found was that firms led by single ceos engaged in much more
  13. aggressive investment behavior along the lines of capital expenditure as well as
  14. innovation activity research and development acquisitions to some extent than companies led by ceos who were
  15. married and these differences translated also in greater riskiness of the firms led by single ceos as measured by the
  16. stock return volatility what was surprising to us was how large the magnitudes of these differences were
  17. what we found was that not accounting for various differences between the two types of firms
  18. you could see that firms led by single ceos invest almost 75 percent more as a kind of
  19. share of their current assets in the various uh of firm building activities such as
  20. again capital expenditures or research and development now part of that difference is
  21. attributable to the fact that the firms that single ceos run tend to be smaller younger firms these tend to
  22. grow faster and therefore invest more however even after accounting for the variety of
  23. differences in these two types of firms that we can observe we find that there is a still
  24. sizable difference about 10 percent greater investment by firms led by single ceos
  25. compared to firms run by ceos who are married and differences in stock return volatility are also quite substantial
  26. well the key practical implication is that the person's individual characteristics
  27. and person's individual kind of life cycle matter for the decisions that they make
  28. on behalf not just of their their families themselves but also on behalf of the firms that
  29. that they lead and therefore one may need to be aware of the personal situation that
  30. a leader of a company or a manager has because that is going to shape the risk-taking decisions
  31. and investment decisions that they're going to be facing one reason to believe that marital
  32. status shapes risk-taking decisions has to do with kind of the economics of marriage
  33. and what this means is that single individuals they're clearly competing for potential
  34. mates with other single individuals and one of the important factors and that competition is kind of
  35. socio-economic status and even at the kind of the high end of the wealth distribution
  36. where most of the ceos are how much wealth you have how successful you are matters potentially for your prospects
  37. and that potentially could be one of the drivers another potential driver is of course that
  38. people who are married have a family uh they're more risk-averse simply because they have a
  39. family to provide for and they're just more cautious and more careful we're not sure if that is kind
  40. of a as important enough of a concern for the wealthy individuals that ceos tend to be
  41. but it's a it's a potential concern something that is kind of in between is kind of
  42. psychological almost evolutionary biology uh shaped uh driver there's evidence in
  43. fact in evolutionary biology that suggests that single men in particular uh are kind of more aggressive and are willing
  44. to take more risk and that may be related to some extent to our kind of status story but it could be a kind of a purely
  45. biological driver that we're we're not able of course to to to identify it's an interesting question how much uh
  46. boards can actually take into account uh the manager's kind of personal life circumstances
  47. and hiring or or firing them into some extent that that is not entirely legal to do so
  48. however in determining the compensation package that the ceo will receive in particular
  49. how much incentive compensation to award the ceo for example in the form of options clearly
  50. it matters how risk tolerant or risk-averse the ceo is and therefore knowing their personal
  51. situation knowing something about their marital status whether they are indeed in the search for a spouse or not may
  52. impact how sensitive that compensation package that ceo will receive is to the performance of the firm and therefore
  53. how much the firm wants to encourage the ceo to take more or less risk because a married ceo who is leading a
  54. fast-growing firm may be potentially overly cautious and they may need to incentivize them with
  55. particular options to take more risk on the other hand you could have a a young single ceo of a firm whose
  56. investment opportunities are not that great and the firm that needs to grow in a more conservative fashion
  57. there you may want to scale down the kind of the risk appetites of the ceo by appropriately shaping their pay package
  58. i think these results have potentially very wide applicability throughout the business world we focused on the ceos
  59. because this is one of the settings where the stakes are potentially as large as they can get
  60. and finding an effect there in some sense is the most surprising however we can think of managers of course
  61. at lower levels who still make risk-taking decisions we can think of of course the money management industry
  62. where risk is everything and risk-taking decisions are very central in the money management
  63. industry that the trade-off between risk and return is the key determinant of success and therefore we
  64. should expect the same type of forces acting there as well i think there is potentially
  65. misconception that actually economists help perpetuate that managers are kind of like autonomous
  66. automatons and machines that do the right thing they're rational maximizers of something the question is what that
  67. something is of course and what we're adding to this picture is that managerial decisions are affected by
  68. what is happening in those individuals personal lives in ways that most of our views of kind of business
  69. decision making does not account for well nobody of course has looked at the effect of marital status on the
  70. decisions of ceos but there's a large field of study that tries to understand the role of ceo characteristics in
  71. driving firm outcomes what i think is particularly important about our approach is that we're looking at a
  72. characteristic that is not an inherent personal trait of an individual like some life experience then they
  73. obtain early in their life or some particular kind of immutable uh thing like race or gender uh what
  74. we are interested in how a in a characteristic that is inherently changing over time is affecting
  75. individuals behavior now one could say that what we observe in the data is that there's some
  76. individuals who are inherently more risk tolerant that they also tend to be more likely to stay single and then
  77. there are others who are somehow more conservative and they're also more likely to be married
  78. we would like to rule out that simple explanation for our story in order to do so
  79. we look at predictors of marital status that allow us to identify the effect of the changing marital status rather than
  80. a personal kind of inherent trait uh what we what we look at is the variation and the laws governing divorce across
  81. the states in the u.s and the idea is um divorce laws shape the incentives to get
  82. married especially for wealthy individuals in particular in community property states it is much
  83. costlier for a wealthy individual to be divorced therefore it is potentially costlier for
  84. them to get married in the first place and all else equal that will shape the decision
  85. whether to get married or not for a particular person what we find is that in community
  86. property states where indeed the ceos are more likely to be single as this logic predicts uh ceos are also
  87. more risk-taking and more willing to to invest in the firm and and take greater risks suggesting
  88. that the evidence that we find is not about kind of the two different types of people but more about how these
  89. marital incentives are driving individual risk-taking decisions well one interesting direction that i
  90. sort of alluded to earlier is to to see how does marital status affect risk-taking decisions of money managers
  91. hedge fund managers mutual fund managers individuals who make risk taking decisions again on a daily basis
  92. for potentially even more responsive to kind of risk and risk and return trade-off and that's something that is
  93. definitely on our agenda going forward you

Brief Summary

Marital status significantly influences CEOs' investment risk-taking behaviors, with single CEOs showing more aggressive strategies than married counterparts.

Key points

  • Impact of Marital Status on CEOs. Research shows single CEOs take more risks and invest aggressively compared to married CEOs.
  • Surprising Findings on Investment Behavior. Single CEOs invest significantly more than their married counterparts, even after accounting for firm differences.

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