The Fight Over Fed Independence and Presidential Power
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ABOUT THE EPISODE David Zaring, Elizabeth F. Putzel Professor and Professor of legal studies and business ethics at The Wharton School explores the legal dimensions of the Federal Reserve’s independence, its connection to monetary policy, and how this relationship has evolved historically.
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- The recent activity between the Federal Reserve and the White House has the question of Fed independence being
- brought up yet again. And now the questions revolve around that what that relationship should look like. Is it
- good as it is right now or are there tweaks to be needed? Pleasure to be joined to speak about this with David
- Zaring who is a professor of legal studies and business ethics here at the Wharton School. Hi David, great to talk
- again. How are you? >> Good. Good. Uh great to be here again. It has been certainly an interesting
- last few months to see this play out as this has all kind of developed. What have been your thoughts on where the Fed
- stands and obviously the concern about maybe not having the independence that it it has historically had.
- >> That's right. The Fed's independence isn't on the legally strongest footing you could possibly imagine. Um and
- certainly um recently there's been an effort to give the president a lot more control over sort of oversight remote
- areas of the administrative state and and the question has always been is that going to uh include the Fed which um uh
- people often talk about how important it is to maintain its independence and uh in the you know last few decades it's
- being able to set monetary policy really without much regard to political oversight.
- And that's led to low inflation um uh for most of this period since the 1980s with the very notable exception of what
- happened after the coronairus crisis. Uh but with that blip um the Fed is being pretty good about keeping um
- unemployment low and inflation low and and that's what it is being charged to do and and one of the reasons it's being
- able to do that is because it hasn't had to worry about you know what's going to
- happen in the next election and how should we think about that? Um, and that is the kind of thing that happens if
- you're going to talk about uh political oversight of the Fed and its monetary policy decision-m
- >> and historically the Federal Reserve has done a very good job. It seems like as
- an independent body, correct? >> It does have a pretty good track record. Like I said, the period between 2020 and
- 1980 was really low inflation and pretty high growth. And that's um that's an admirable record. Uh the Fed has always
- had to deal with presidents who would like it to pursue a different monetary policy. And there were years um the
- years before the Great Depression and between the founding of the Fed in 1913 and the Great Depression where the
- Treasury Secretary was on the board of governors of the Federal Reserve and and that obviously added a political
- dimension to the way the Fed did monetary policy before then. and Congress amended the statute to move the
- Treasury Secretary off the board of governors and and try to make it a sort of more independent bipartisan
- institution. And and of course a lot of the discussion right now is uh whether or not the president of the United
- States, not necessarily this president but a president would have the ability to make changes in terms of the
- leadership uh of the Federal Reserve without having cause I guess you know just on basically the whim of what he
- would like to see from a policy perspective. >> That's right. The Fed um like a lot of
- independent government agencies has for cause removal protections written into the statute. Um unlike a number of other
- agencies, the statute doesn't define what cause is. Um other agencies it's it's uh malfeasants, neglect of office,
- um that kind of thing. And we don't know what the feds for cause protections exactly protect. Um but we do know that
- um with the possible exception of a case in uh 1951 where the President Truman told the chair of the Federal Reserve
- he'd lost confidence in him. The Federal Reserve chair at the time then shortly after hearing this from the president
- did resign. So was that a four cause removal? I'm not sure. Um but he resigned after he told that the he he
- was told that the president didn't have confidence in him. And that's the only time where um a federal um member of the
- board of governors has gone in the past and um it's never really been tested as to whether they can be removed for any
- reason that the president wants um including the desire to have lower interest rates. When you talk about
- independence and the Fed, obviously we're talking about in this discussion, but central banks in general,
- put in perspective the importance of having that independence when you think about monetary policy and trying to make
- sure that an economy runs as smoothly as it potentially could. >> Yes. Now, here's where I should say that
- I'm I'm just a country lawyer from Iowa, um not an economist. Um uh and um I think economists are a little more
- measured than they used to be about central bank independence which they overwhelmingly think is important in
- general. It hasn't been established very clearly that if you get yourself an independent central bank and independent
- monetary policy that makes everyone richer. It is however the case that people think that if there's an
- independent central bank that sets monetary policy, you know, outside of political oversight, you get lower
- inflation. Um, and uh, people really hate inflation. So if if inflation is what you're worried about, then what you
- want is an independent central bank um that isn't um overseen by politicians who may be worried about the next
- election. and so want low interest rates with the idea that that'll juice growth
- and the inflation that follows from juiced growth is something they won't have to worry about um because um they
- won't be around when the you know sort of bill comes due for low interest rates juicing economic growth
- >> but from a legal perspective if a president were to make such moves then I guess the expectation is there would be
- legal challenges that would follow probably from those individuals who are being removed uh maybe potentially all
- the way up to the Supreme Court. I would I would assume >> I think that's right. Um it's uh really
- high profile these uh um efforts to either get the Fed to change its monetary policy or to change the
- personnel who are making those monetary policy decisions. the uh Fed has indicated that it uh believes that
- legally the president can't remove uh the chair or members of the board of governors. Um and so I expect that um if
- that kind of thing happens that you're going to see litigation and in fact I think we are seeing litigation. Um and
- it's likely that the courts will have to weigh in on this. The Supreme Court itself will probably have to weigh in on
- it if it gets to that level. And by the way, it's already said something about this issue. It it said in another order
- that while it's comfortable with the removal of other uh members of federal agencies for any reason uh even with
- their four cause protections they think the need to have presidential political supervision over those agencies is more
- important than their need to be insulated from politics. Um but it said it said the Fed is different. Um, and so
- the Supreme Court's already a little bit on record as to saying we think Fed independence is more important than, you
- know, the independence of something like the National Labor Relations Board. >> And I'll finish up on this then. If
- there if the four cause provision is somewhat cloudy at times, does that need to be cleared up a little bit further as
- we move forward here because of seemingly what appears to be challenges being brought forward? But
- what we could see is challenges coming down the road. >> I think that's right. Um and I think
- that if Congress really wanted to preserve Fed independence, they ought to pass a statute that explicitly makes
- clear what's going on right now. We're relying on something from 1913 that really isn't very clear as to what's
- covered and what isn't. Um now, you never want to bet on Congress taking up legislation that would be a great idea.
- Um but um you know that's the kind of thing that would clarify what exactly Fed independence is and then you know it
- could be that there's a political desire for more oversight of the Fed then that
- might lead to inflation but if that's what Congress and the president want to do then they could write that into the
- law and that might be a good idea. >> David great to talk to you as always. Thanks very much. All the best.
- >> I appreciate it. >> Thank you. David Zaring who's a professor of legal studies and business
- ethics here at the Wharton School.
Brief Summary
David Zaring discusses Federal Reserve independence and the implications of political oversight on monetary policy.
Key points
- The Fed's Independence at Risk. The discussion highlights concerns about the Federal Reserve's independence and potential political influence.
- Inflation and Central Bank Independence. The importance of having an independent central bank to control inflation is emphasized.
- Supreme Court's View on Fed Independence. The Supreme Court has indicated that the independence of the Fed is crucial compared to other agencies.
Episode highlights
- The Fed's Independence at RiskThe discussion highlights concerns about the Federal Reserve's independence and potential political influence.“The Fed's independence isn't on the legally strongest footing you could possibly imagine.”0:47Oct 1, 2025
- Inflation and Central Bank IndependenceThe importance of having an independent central bank to control inflation is emphasized.“If inflation is what you're worried about, then you want an independent central bank.”5:30Oct 1, 2025
- Supreme Court's View on Fed IndependenceThe Supreme Court has indicated that the independence of the Fed is crucial compared to other agencies.“The Supreme Court thinks Fed independence is more important than other agencies.”7:27Oct 1, 2025





