The Fight Over Fed Independence and Presidential Power

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ABOUT THE EPISODE David Zaring, Elizabeth F. Putzel Professor and Professor of legal studies and business ethics at The Wharton School explores the legal dimensions of the Federal Reserve’s independence, its connection to monetary policy, and how this relationship has evolved historically.

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  1. The recent activity between the Federal Reserve and the White House has the question of Fed independence being
  2. brought up yet again. And now the questions revolve around that what that relationship should look like. Is it
  3. good as it is right now or are there tweaks to be needed? Pleasure to be joined to speak about this with David
  4. Zaring who is a professor of legal studies and business ethics here at the Wharton School. Hi David, great to talk
  5. again. How are you? >> Good. Good. Uh great to be here again. It has been certainly an interesting
  6. last few months to see this play out as this has all kind of developed. What have been your thoughts on where the Fed
  7. stands and obviously the concern about maybe not having the independence that it it has historically had.
  8. >> That's right. The Fed's independence isn't on the legally strongest footing you could possibly imagine. Um and
  9. certainly um recently there's been an effort to give the president a lot more control over sort of oversight remote
  10. areas of the administrative state and and the question has always been is that going to uh include the Fed which um uh
  11. people often talk about how important it is to maintain its independence and uh in the you know last few decades it's
  12. being able to set monetary policy really without much regard to political oversight.
  13. And that's led to low inflation um uh for most of this period since the 1980s with the very notable exception of what
  14. happened after the coronairus crisis. Uh but with that blip um the Fed is being pretty good about keeping um
  15. unemployment low and inflation low and and that's what it is being charged to do and and one of the reasons it's being
  16. able to do that is because it hasn't had to worry about you know what's going to
  17. happen in the next election and how should we think about that? Um, and that is the kind of thing that happens if
  18. you're going to talk about uh political oversight of the Fed and its monetary policy decision-m
  19. >> and historically the Federal Reserve has done a very good job. It seems like as
  20. an independent body, correct? >> It does have a pretty good track record. Like I said, the period between 2020 and
  21. 1980 was really low inflation and pretty high growth. And that's um that's an admirable record. Uh the Fed has always
  22. had to deal with presidents who would like it to pursue a different monetary policy. And there were years um the
  23. years before the Great Depression and between the founding of the Fed in 1913 and the Great Depression where the
  24. Treasury Secretary was on the board of governors of the Federal Reserve and and that obviously added a political
  25. dimension to the way the Fed did monetary policy before then. and Congress amended the statute to move the
  26. Treasury Secretary off the board of governors and and try to make it a sort of more independent bipartisan
  27. institution. And and of course a lot of the discussion right now is uh whether or not the president of the United
  28. States, not necessarily this president but a president would have the ability to make changes in terms of the
  29. leadership uh of the Federal Reserve without having cause I guess you know just on basically the whim of what he
  30. would like to see from a policy perspective. >> That's right. The Fed um like a lot of
  31. independent government agencies has for cause removal protections written into the statute. Um unlike a number of other
  32. agencies, the statute doesn't define what cause is. Um other agencies it's it's uh malfeasants, neglect of office,
  33. um that kind of thing. And we don't know what the feds for cause protections exactly protect. Um but we do know that
  34. um with the possible exception of a case in uh 1951 where the President Truman told the chair of the Federal Reserve
  35. he'd lost confidence in him. The Federal Reserve chair at the time then shortly after hearing this from the president
  36. did resign. So was that a four cause removal? I'm not sure. Um but he resigned after he told that the he he
  37. was told that the president didn't have confidence in him. And that's the only time where um a federal um member of the
  38. board of governors has gone in the past and um it's never really been tested as to whether they can be removed for any
  39. reason that the president wants um including the desire to have lower interest rates. When you talk about
  40. independence and the Fed, obviously we're talking about in this discussion, but central banks in general,
  41. put in perspective the importance of having that independence when you think about monetary policy and trying to make
  42. sure that an economy runs as smoothly as it potentially could. >> Yes. Now, here's where I should say that
  43. I'm I'm just a country lawyer from Iowa, um not an economist. Um uh and um I think economists are a little more
  44. measured than they used to be about central bank independence which they overwhelmingly think is important in
  45. general. It hasn't been established very clearly that if you get yourself an independent central bank and independent
  46. monetary policy that makes everyone richer. It is however the case that people think that if there's an
  47. independent central bank that sets monetary policy, you know, outside of political oversight, you get lower
  48. inflation. Um, and uh, people really hate inflation. So if if inflation is what you're worried about, then what you
  49. want is an independent central bank um that isn't um overseen by politicians who may be worried about the next
  50. election. and so want low interest rates with the idea that that'll juice growth
  51. and the inflation that follows from juiced growth is something they won't have to worry about um because um they
  52. won't be around when the you know sort of bill comes due for low interest rates juicing economic growth
  53. >> but from a legal perspective if a president were to make such moves then I guess the expectation is there would be
  54. legal challenges that would follow probably from those individuals who are being removed uh maybe potentially all
  55. the way up to the Supreme Court. I would I would assume >> I think that's right. Um it's uh really
  56. high profile these uh um efforts to either get the Fed to change its monetary policy or to change the
  57. personnel who are making those monetary policy decisions. the uh Fed has indicated that it uh believes that
  58. legally the president can't remove uh the chair or members of the board of governors. Um and so I expect that um if
  59. that kind of thing happens that you're going to see litigation and in fact I think we are seeing litigation. Um and
  60. it's likely that the courts will have to weigh in on this. The Supreme Court itself will probably have to weigh in on
  61. it if it gets to that level. And by the way, it's already said something about this issue. It it said in another order
  62. that while it's comfortable with the removal of other uh members of federal agencies for any reason uh even with
  63. their four cause protections they think the need to have presidential political supervision over those agencies is more
  64. important than their need to be insulated from politics. Um but it said it said the Fed is different. Um, and so
  65. the Supreme Court's already a little bit on record as to saying we think Fed independence is more important than, you
  66. know, the independence of something like the National Labor Relations Board. >> And I'll finish up on this then. If
  67. there if the four cause provision is somewhat cloudy at times, does that need to be cleared up a little bit further as
  68. we move forward here because of seemingly what appears to be challenges being brought forward? But
  69. what we could see is challenges coming down the road. >> I think that's right. Um and I think
  70. that if Congress really wanted to preserve Fed independence, they ought to pass a statute that explicitly makes
  71. clear what's going on right now. We're relying on something from 1913 that really isn't very clear as to what's
  72. covered and what isn't. Um now, you never want to bet on Congress taking up legislation that would be a great idea.
  73. Um but um you know that's the kind of thing that would clarify what exactly Fed independence is and then you know it
  74. could be that there's a political desire for more oversight of the Fed then that
  75. might lead to inflation but if that's what Congress and the president want to do then they could write that into the
  76. law and that might be a good idea. >> David great to talk to you as always. Thanks very much. All the best.
  77. >> I appreciate it. >> Thank you. David Zaring who's a professor of legal studies and business
  78. ethics here at the Wharton School.

Brief Summary

David Zaring discusses Federal Reserve independence and the implications of political oversight on monetary policy.

Key points

  • The Fed's Independence at Risk. The discussion highlights concerns about the Federal Reserve's independence and potential political influence.
  • Inflation and Central Bank Independence. The importance of having an independent central bank to control inflation is emphasized.
  • Supreme Court's View on Fed Independence. The Supreme Court has indicated that the independence of the Fed is crucial compared to other agencies.

Tension

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