The Math Behind Sports Rankings and Golf Analytics

Knowledge at Wharton

Ask about Knowledge at Wharton

Episode Description

ABOUT THE EPISODE What makes a sports ranking system fair? And can rankings ever truly reflect who the “best” team or player is? Mark Broadie, Carson Family Professor of Business at Columbia Business School and creator of the groundbreaking “strokes gained” metric, joins Wharton Moneyball to discuss golf analytics, college rankings, predictive models, and the impossible math behind sports rankings. The conversation explores NCAA golf rankings, World Golf Rankings, sports betting models, tournament design, and how analytics shape modern sports.

ABOUT THE PODCAST Sports is a game of numbers. Wharton experts Eric Bradlow, Shane Jensen, Cade Massey, and Adi Wyner team up to tackle the world of sports, from current events to longstanding issues such as: What sports streaks are the most impressive? How do you rank the best players? Can athletes be compared across sports? Moneyball Highlights explains how decision-makers in the game can avoid the common mistakes and embrace the data. Episodes are recorded at the Wharton School.

#sportsanalytics #golf #moneyball #datascience #sports ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.

Launched in 1999, Knowledge at Wharton offers free access to:

- Articles, podcasts, and videos highlighting Wharton faculty research and analysis of current business trends - Interviews with book authors from Wharton School Press - In-depth series of curated content like Wharton Executive Education’s Nano Tools for Leaders - A searchable database of more than 10,000 articles covering all aspects of business - A weekly newsletter that delivers Knowledge at Wharton insights directly to your inbox

Visit the Knowledge at Wharton homepage: https://whr.tn/3qUpSBE Subscribe to the Knowledge at Wharton YouTube channel: https://whr.tn/3DEAgAU

Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
  1. Welcome, welcome to Wharton Moneyball. Welcome to a full hour of sports analytics
  2. here on the Wharton Podcast Network. This is Cade Massey hosting this week at the moment with my longtime friend and collaborator,
  3. Eric Bradlow. Shane Jensen is out this week, sadly, tragically, but Audie Weiner will join us just a
  4. little bit late. Audie is in transit at the moment. Some combination, as you guys know, some combination
  5. of us are here almost every week of the year and have been for more than 12 years now talking sports analytics with you
  6. guys. We are going to run our usual format this week. We're gonna run a guest in the first
  7. half hour and then we'll do open lines. In the second half hour, me, Audie, and Eric will kick around a few things.
  8. I am piped in from Austin, Texas. Eric is from Huntsman Hall, West Philly, on campus.
  9. Mark, I'm assuming it's New York. I don't know that for a fact. Mark Brody is our guest in the first
  10. half of the show. He is a longtime friend of the show and we're always delighted to get time with
  11. you. Mark, thanks for making time for us. Thanks for having me. And yes, I'm in New York, New York,
  12. and looking out over the Hudson River, which you can't see in my background because it's
  13. the way I'm looking, not behind me. Right. Mark, as some of you guys know, is at Columbia, the Columbia Business School there in
  14. New York. He is the Carson Family Professor of Business there. He came out of the quant finance world,
  15. but he is best known in the sports analytics world for his contributions to golf.
  16. He flat out invented the concept of strokes gained, which is just kind of ridiculous.
  17. It's one of the great sports analytics stories of our lifetime and continues to be engaged
  18. in the sport at multiple levels. He has a great book, Every Shot Counts. We'd strongly recommend his book, Every Shot Counts.
  19. He consults to professional golfers and he has been involved with revising the ranking systems of
  20. various associations, including the World Golf Ranking System, which is like the biggie, but also NCAA
  21. ranking system. So something we wanna talk about at some point with Mark is that, that's a fun
  22. topic for us. But maybe we'll start, Mark, with just, this is kind of, in some ways, peak golf
  23. season. We're a few weeks post-masters, we're a week before the PGA, which is gonna be
  24. in the Philly area. The majors are all lined up now, one a month, which is fun these days.
  25. What is on your mind, what is on your docket right now in the world of golf? Well, I would say that I don't really
  26. follow golf as closely as some fans do, certainly not as closely as Rufus Peabody does.
  27. But I look at more kind of longer -term problems and actually my day-to-day stuff recently has been with college golf rankings
  28. and professional disc golf rankings. And this is the ranking season for college golf because, like the March Madness basketball tournament,
  29. the main use of college rankings, besides bragging rights throughout the year, is determining which teams
  30. go to regionals. And that's run by the NCAA. And then from regionals, you go to the
  31. nationals and then you crown the national champion. So it wasn't clear to me how this
  32. ecosystem worked until getting into the rankings, but the colleges, universities themselves choose their schedule and
  33. teams run their events. And it's kind of in coordination with the NCAA, but the NCAA isn't running all of
  34. these events. So we're keeping track of all that's going on and then ranking the teams throughout the
  35. year. And then at this point in the year, then the qualifiers for regionals are set.
  36. So there's some interesting problems there in the rankings. There's some interesting problems also, which is more
  37. operations research, I guess, than sports analytics, which is how do you assign the teams that
  38. you have selected into the six regions? Okay. So that comes up in many sports, but
  39. I was involved in it this year in golf. This sounds like a ball, frankly. Let me say, interesting that you mentioned Rufus
  40. at the top there. I happen to know that Rufus and Mark occasionally play golf in the New York area.
  41. So these guys are friends. But yeah, Rufus, not a trivial part of his living is made watching golf, paying attention
  42. to golf very closely. But one of the first things we ever did together when he was shortly after he
  43. was at Yale, the Yale women's golf coach at the time asked us if we could help develop a ranking system for women's golf,
  44. because they felt they were disadvantaged being in the Northeast, playing different tournaments, playing a different
  45. time of year. They thought whoever the cabal was in Oklahoma that ran the college golf rankings, maybe they're
  46. still the cabal. Maybe you're in with the cabal now, Mark. I don't know. But that coach was not happy with it.
  47. And we dabbled a little bit. It was good fun. But I could imagine that's great fun to
  48. get into. It is absolutely great fun. And I would argue that the previous rankings
  49. did appear to be biased in certain ways that if you played a stronger schedule, that
  50. you would be ranked higher for an equal level of performance. But that requires some analytics in order to
  51. prove that. Right. So I've heard a lot from coaches, but then when I develop this new ranking system,
  52. which has been in place for, this is the third year, I then hear questions from coaches.
  53. And I realized that just because people are criticizing the ranking system, doesn't mean they're right.
  54. You really need to go into the analysis to figure out back then, was Penn, was it biased against teams in the Northeast or
  55. not, just because... And that's another thing that's almost as important as the analytics is being able to convey
  56. the underlying rationale and to communicate why it's fair and to convince people that it is
  57. fair. Because I don't know how many times coaches have come up with the question to me,
  58. we have beaten this other team twice in the season. By that means they played in the same
  59. event and they finished higher in the final leaderboard. We've beaten them twice, therefore we should be
  60. ranked higher than them, but we're not. Your system is messed up. And so it's like, well, how do you
  61. answer that question? And the most direct way I could find to answer that question was to show cycles.
  62. So I found in the data, just looking at wins and losses, team A has beat team B two or three times.
  63. Team B has beat team C two or three times. And if you argue that A has to be ranked better than B and B should
  64. be ranked better than C, then A should be ranked better than C, but C beat A two or three times total.
  65. And then you realize you can't use that logic. It's completely impossible to have a ranking system
  66. that would satisfy that criterion. Right, so I think it's the NFL that by some point in the season every year,
  67. the circle's complete, that everybody has beat somebody and transitive property takes us all the way
  68. around. Eric has a question. So I just want to say real quickly, Eric, you don't know, like you probably don't
  69. quite understand that he's hinting at the greatest playoff tournament format in sports, you know, the
  70. one I get fired up about every May and June, the college golf tournament. Mark, I don't know if you've heard me
  71. rant, every year I make the guys pay attention because they play this, you know, three
  72. or four or five rounds of stroke play to identify the 16 or whatever it is, teams that play match.
  73. And it's just fricking brilliant in my opinion, but let's leave it there for now.
  74. Eric wants to jump in with a question. No, I just had a clarification question, Mark.
  75. Are the rankings, like literally it's a deterministic function on who qualifies based on the rankings
  76. or it's used like in college football, like it's an input to some subjective committee.
  77. It's a clarification question. I'm just asking which one is it? It's more the latter.
  78. It's an input, not a rule, but in practice, more of the divisions follow the ranking
  79. exactly than don't, but where it comes up is usually in borderline cases, when you draw
  80. the line and you take a look at the teams right around that line and somebody will make an argument.
  81. And I think it could be a valid argument that the rankings aren't perfect. And there might be some reason to take
  82. the team that's ranked one out rather than one in, you know, across the line. But also when you do that, then the
  83. committee that makes the ultimate decision needs to justify it because it's the team that got
  84. kicked out that was inside the bubble is like, oh, well, you better have a good reason for not letting us get in.
  85. But I assume Mark that the distribution of team, let's call them strengths or rankings is
  86. what we classically see that there's greater separation out in the right tail, but that right
  87. near the cut score, there tends to be bunching. And therefore there's a significant number of teams
  88. that could argue, I should be above the cut line or not. I assume that that follows for rankings as
  89. well. I think it happens in just about every stat that I've looked at, including rankings.
  90. So you're exactly right there. Mark, let's talk about, well, first one more thing on the college thing.
  91. You said it's interesting how they assign them to regions. Yes. And you said this is kind of an
  92. OR question, but what are the considerations? So you said there's six regions. What are the considerations?
  93. Yeah. So once you decide on the 72 teams and it's not in rank order because the conference champions get in.
  94. So Columbia women got in this year because they won the Ivy league championship.
  95. And so conference champions get a free pass into the regionals. And when they're not ranked in the top
  96. 72, that means there's teams that are ranked higher that get in place of other teams.
  97. But once you have the 72 teams, the six regional hosts, the six locations have been
  98. determined years in advance. So now the question is, how do you put those 72 teams and assign them to
  99. six regions? And the multiple- Why don't we listen to, we're all math people here.
  100. Is there an objective function, literally a mathematical objective function that's maximized by that assignment?
  101. Except it's an OR problem, there has to be an objective function, right? Well, the problem is there's three or four
  102. objectives. Good, good. And the question is, how do you weight them? But by far the number one objective is
  103. to make sure that the top six seeds, the top six ranked teams, which would be the number one seeds in each region have
  104. the easiest and an equal shot of getting through. In other words, you wanna make sure there's
  105. regional balance. You don't wanna put a bunch of strong teams in one region and a bunch of
  106. weak teams in another. So the number one criteria is so that the number one seeds have the best chance
  107. and a nearly equal chance of getting through and the same with the two seeds and
  108. three, four, five seeds. And even, so that's one objective, sort of this regional balance in terms of strength of
  109. each region. The other that I found out that they care about is they don't want one region
  110. to be overloaded with a bunch of teams from one conference. So it seems like it's a repeat of
  111. a conference championship and they have to duke it out somehow. Somebody is gonna get left out just because
  112. they happen to be in the same region as same conference. Well, Mark, let me ask you a question.
  113. If I gave you the 72 teams, suppose we all agree, I'm not saying we're agreeing on what those teams are, but I give
  114. you the list of 72 teams. Would you write down the criterion? Like you just mentioned, the top team should
  115. have the easiest path. We don't want too many teams in the same. Would some algorithm now just pump out those
  116. 72 broken into the six or would there still be subjectivity there? So yes, actually to both because the last
  117. one is travel. So I put that in as an objective, but it's less important than I had thought
  118. it would be. But I put it into an optimization problem and it will spit out an assignment.
  119. And then they will look at that assignment in more detail and find reasons for doing
  120. swaps. And because there are many, many assignments of these 72 to six regions that are nearly
  121. comparable, this to me is a way of choosing among many good alternatives, but the algorithmic
  122. viewpoint gets you to a really good starting place, which is very hard to do manually,
  123. which is what they were doing before. So what the standard practice is called the
  124. S-curve, which is teams one through six go into these regions and seven goes where
  125. the six and then you go around. Right, right, right. So we made the algorithm so that it
  126. starts with the S-curve and then when it does swaps, it preserves seeds so that only two seeds are swapped or three seeds
  127. are swapped or four seeds. So in some sense, the S-curve isn't completely blown apart, which again would be harder
  128. to justify or explain. This is a great example of man-machine collaboration and set the board with the algorithm
  129. and then tweak as you need to tweak, but you're going to do so much better as a baseline if it's set with, look,
  130. it's not Mark Brody deciding what the weights are. You had a long consultation about what those
  131. weights were before you ran the optimization. Adi Weiner has joined the show and he
  132. has a question from his office on a campus at University of Pennsylvania. Yeah, great to see you, Mark.
  133. I just want to, just only one question based on my partial understanding of the conversation.
  134. This seems like a job for AI, can it do it? At least get you at right towards a decent set of solutions pretty quickly?
  135. I think AI is good at some things, but not this. No. It's like saying, let's give a traveling salesman
  136. problem to AI and expect to get a better solution than our current algorithms? No.
  137. It isn't. I would expect you to use the current algorithm. That's basically what I would expect.
  138. Oh, sure, sure. Yeah, so yeah, if you think of it that way, but if you don't give AI
  139. enough guidance and it goes to try and figure this out on its own, it's not going to come up with a good solution.
  140. Right. And Mark, you just mentioned something that some of our audience will understand and some won't.
  141. And it's worth pausing and explaining what is the traveling salesman problem? Sure, so the traveling salesman problem is one
  142. of the most famous OR problems. And it says, if you have a list of cities, think of a bunch of cities
  143. in the United States and you want a salesman to go on a tour, visit each of those cities in some order, and you
  144. want to minimize the total travel that they take. And it turns out if you have 20
  145. cities, then there's 20 factorial, which is a large, large number, possible orderings of these traveling
  146. salesman tours. And it's very, very difficult to find the optimal solution. Well, 20 is pretty small now, so that
  147. can be done. But it's a problem that's in a class of very hard problems. It means as the number of cities increases,
  148. it becomes harder and harder to find the solution. But for any kind of reasonable set of
  149. cities that we have today, like the 72 college teams to assign them, that can be
  150. done relatively very fast on modern computers. And Mark's making a general point that I
  151. think Adi set up quite intentionally, which is whenever we have well-established models and algorithms
  152. for a solution, then they do most of the work. And unless they're fed it directly, AI wouldn't
  153. come up, because that's a well-honed, decades -long optimized model. Okay, let's jump to the pros, because you're
  154. also involved with the World Golf Rankings. And now we have a different set of problems, because this is, I was talking with
  155. Rufus about this just a few weeks ago, actually. World Golf Rankings versus like Data Golf Rankings.
  156. It's a little bit like the college football playoff debate that happens every season between best
  157. versus most deserving. And the best is the predictive model, that's kind of the Data Golf model.
  158. If you're gonna bet who's gonna win this weekend, you want a model like that. Versus most deserving, which is what I take
  159. to be the World Golf Rankings. So I'm sure there's best in there, but you're also trying to reward accomplishment.
  160. So it's more backward, it's at least some backward looking, whereas the best, quote best, is
  161. gonna be strictly forward looking. So that's the setup. And then can you talk to us about
  162. how y'all decide, talk about weights. I mean, you gotta decide what weight to put on different levels of accomplishment in order
  163. to fix these World Golf Rankings. And importantly, Mark, you weren't, you know, this
  164. thing existed many years before you got involved. So what are the changes since you've been
  165. involved? So Cade, you hit on the point that I think many people when they look at
  166. rankings don't realize that the objective could be predictive, forward looking, or it could be backward
  167. looking reward for performance. And it's easier to see the difference in the official World Golf Rankings if you just
  168. used a who's the best, what's the most predictive, then you wouldn't give any special treatment
  169. for majors beyond that they have a strong field. You wouldn't give any special reward for winning
  170. by- Winning, yeah. One shot for winning, period. Because it could be, you know, you won
  171. in a playoff and you didn't differentiate yourself from the other two or three players that
  172. were in the playoff, whereas a predictive system, one stroke matters, not very much, but in
  173. the official World Golf Rankings, winning means a lot. And winning majors means a lot more.
  174. So the board of the official World Golf Rankings and the way it has been set up for, you know, since the 1980s when
  175. it first started, is that wins are rewarded a lot, heavily, like the ratio is 100
  176. for first, 60 for second, 40 for third. And that decline, that exponential decline really says
  177. one stroke at the top matters a huge amount. Missing the cut, whether you miss the cut
  178. by one stroke or 20 strokes, you get zero points, which in a predictive sense clearly
  179. isn't gonna be good. So the official World Golf Rankings objective is clearly not to be predictive.
  180. It's a reward for performance, kind of backward looking, but it's of course related to skill
  181. because the better players win more often. But the biggest change was trying to make
  182. it unbiased within this reward for performance system. So you wanna make sure if you're giving
  183. points out this way, that a strong field gets the right total number of points compared
  184. to a weaker field. So you can still have the same exponential payoffs, but the main question then is, how
  185. many points do you give to a strong field versus a weak field event or between a PGA Tour event and the Hero World
  186. Challenge, which is 20 players or between that and some Asian Tour event? So that's- How do you do that?
  187. How do you do that? Let me clarify the question first. You're saying it's always gonna have this steep
  188. decay, say 160, 30. So 1.6.3, that ratio off the top three. But for a minor tour event, it might
  189. just be at a base of 10 points. Versus a PGA event might be, I don't know, 50, and then a major might be
  190. 100 or whatever. What's the ratio of those things? Yeah, we of course know, Mark, I don't
  191. know if your system relates this at all, but it's not principled really in any way.
  192. We know how they do it in tennis, for example, which is exactly that. It's 2,000 for the majors, 1,000
  193. for the Masters 1,000, which is why they call them that. You know, ATP 500, there's 500 points, 250.
  194. So how is it done in golf? And is it related at all to this kind of two for one system, two for
  195. one ratio system? Definitely not. And that was the problem that that's kind of arbitrary and that leads to biases.
  196. And there were biases that you could easily see in the old system. And so the question is, what's the principled
  197. way to do it? And the idea is you take an unbiased measure of skill, in this case, a strokes
  198. gained measure, and you actually have a curve which converts that into kind of points or
  199. endowments that the players bring to an event. And that endowment, you know, weaker players that
  200. have, you know, worse strokes gain bring fewer points to an event and stronger players bring
  201. more. And that total endowment of the players in the field is the number of points that
  202. are redistributed. And so then you get on average in any field, the players don't move up or
  203. down because their points that they bring to the event are just redistributed. So the players that do well are better
  204. than the points they brought, move up in the rankings, the players that do worse move
  205. down. And that's- It's a standard system. It's a standard of any ranking system ought
  206. to be that way that if your expected performance, if your performance matches your expected performance,
  207. you don't change the rankings, right? And if you outperform your expectation due to
  208. the rankings, then you should move up or move down. So it's a very- So Bradley Terry
  209. is optimized using the EM algorithm and you just, if you're at your expectation, you don't
  210. change. Well, so this is, it's lovely because you said principled and I was kind of like,
  211. well, I want to see this because it wasn't clear to me how you're going to come up with a principle for these ratios.
  212. How off was it before, Mark? Without throwing anybody under the bus or too much shade, like how big an adjustment was
  213. that? Not just that, good, Kate. How the hell did Mark get them to actually adopt that system?
  214. I want to hear that part of it too. Yeah, yeah, right. Well, there's two parts of that question.
  215. So one is, I mean, we kind of showed with Dick Rendleman, a colleague of mine, that there is great bias, but it's easier
  216. anecdotally to see that you could have a particular player, in this case, say from the
  217. Japanese tour, and they used to have these World Golf Champion events where they'd bring the
  218. top ranked players, top 72 or 75, and invariably, players from some of these lesser tours
  219. that happened to just make it into the top 75 would be destroyed in the tournament
  220. by many, many strokes. And you could see that they always, when you got them together in head-to-head
  221. competition with the other players, you could see that their ranks were misaligned, were out of
  222. whack. So to answer Eric's question, how did this happen? Well, Dick Rendleman and I wrote this paper,
  223. and like academics, we thought this would affect some change, but no, unlike, you know, we
  224. showed drive for show, putt for dough is not right. Here, when we showed the official World Golf
  225. rankings in the past iteration were biased, people said, yeah, we knew that. It was like, but then how do you
  226. get it to be fixed? And basically they got a, the official World Golf Rankings Board decided that they needed a
  227. mission statement, and the mission statement was to fairly rank golfers, not to just reward certain
  228. tours for one reason or the other. And they did an analysis, independent of what
  229. Dick Rendleman and I had done, five other groups did independent analyses that came to the
  230. same conclusion that the rankings as currently they stood at the time were biased.
  231. And so now they had a mission statement, they want unbiased rankings, and they have independent
  232. academic expertise saying they're biased, so what's the fix? And that's what led to the change.
  233. It's interesting, so then there's an, so let me just check. I just want to think about this.
  234. So if I'm a good player, I want Sheffler or potentially Sheffler or McElroy, well, when
  235. they're not in the field, there's less than total points brought to that event, which means
  236. there's less, I'll call it bonus for winning. So beating them, I mean, it's what you'd
  237. want. You'd want that to be true, but of course your probability of winning goes down.
  238. So have you ever thought of the problem of like, if I could, if I had, if I'm a, let's say I'm the number
  239. 10 player in the world, okay? I don't even know who that is, but let's, I could make up a name, but
  240. let's say, I don't know, whoever. Let's say I'm the number 10 player in the world.
  241. The number 10 player in the world golf rankings is Xander Shuffley. Okay, that's a great name.
  242. So I'm Xander Shuffley. Should I want McElroy and Sheffler not to show up? Now, the bad news is they're not, those
  243. points aren't coming their way, but of course my probability of being higher up the exponential
  244. curve goes up. So which, have you thought about the problem of optimal field depending on where I am
  245. in the rankings? Absolutely. So this was designed so that, that question that you just asked, you're indifferent between whether
  246. Scotty and Rory show up or not if you're Xander Shuffley. Right, right. Beautiful.
  247. Take it, but if you take it to an extreme and you say, we're going to give Eric Bradlow a sponsor's exemption into a
  248. no-cut signature event, okay? Yeah. You would be, you would not be in the top 10,000 of the official world
  249. golf ranking, yet because it's a no-cut event, you might get a few points and that would be unfair.
  250. So it works for almost all events, but not if you take a large, large range from, the Scotty Shufflers of the world to
  251. the 10,000th ranked player in the world. So your point is academically, it's perfectly correct.
  252. In practice, you don't have that large a dispersion in the quality of the field.
  253. I'm sorry, but just to be clarified, does that mean that an expected value, it's sort
  254. of balanced? It's indifferent? Yes. Okay, but not necessarily, but you could have
  255. other loss functions that could be optimized differently. On average, when you, when players, professionals play
  256. in events, they neither go up nor down in the rankings, unless like I said, you're
  257. Eric Bradlow on a sponsor's exemption, then on average, you're going to go up. All right, Mark, one, I'm curious, especially now
  258. that this has been jiggered a little bit, when it comes to like writer cup selection.
  259. Yep. How did the world golf rankings play into that versus predictive models like data golfs?
  260. And some of it, are the captains restricted or some guys automatically qualify, but that's a
  261. world golf rankings automatic qualification. And then, but they've scrunched that down a
  262. little bit to give the captains more discretion. Do you have any sense of whether captains
  263. just want the predictive or do they put a little value in the most deserving? Cause they might think that it captures an
  264. ability to win under pressure counting. So they've changed from like 10 out of 12 or automatic qualifiers now, like six out
  265. of 12. So the captains tend to have six discretionary picks. And I would say most of them are
  266. based on predictive and looking forward. And then the question is, well, something like
  267. strokes gained or the data golf rankings, whatever, don't take into account necessarily course fit, recent
  268. play. And the question is, how do you weight those factors? And so you're still trying to make it
  269. predictive, but you're including additional features that aren't necessarily in the raw numbers.
  270. Okay. Okay. Mark, we are coming up on the time we'll need to let you go, but I do want to ask one kind of general
  271. question about you and your experience with golf analytics. When you created this concept of strokes gained,
  272. you probably could have only fantasized that it would be as impactful as it has been.
  273. But I'm curious years on now, what is one place it's gone or something that's come
  274. from it that has surprised you or that you never would have anticipated? Because it strikes me that it's this tool,
  275. it's a method really, and any good method is going to find new and unexpected uses.
  276. So I'm just curious your experience with it. Where has it gone that you might not
  277. have anticipated? Well, I did not anticipate that most professional players and coaches and college coaches and college
  278. players would be looking at this, but for the most part they are. I didn't really anticipate that it would form
  279. the underpinnings of an official world golf ranking. And I didn't really anticipate that many betters
  280. like Rufus would also be using this as step one in their betting system. So it has had a lot more uses
  281. than I ever imagined. And also surprising when I started teaching the sports analytics course at the Columbia Business School
  282. is the strokes gain concept is now in most modern stats that are coming out. So rushing yards over expected and many other
  283. kind of new stats in football and many other sports have this idea of performance over
  284. expectation. And that's basically what strokes gained is for golf. Well, it's XG in golf and in soccer.
  285. Expected goals in soccer, expected goals in hockey. Guys, it's April or May, it's hockey.
  286. Come on now, Eric. I just have to ask Mark one question. When I think, and this is one academic
  287. to another. When I think of some of the things that I'm most quote unquote famous for in
  288. academia, it's none of the things that are particularly the most technical of my work.
  289. So can you just give us a sense briefly, like I assume strokes gained is not the most technical thing you've ever written.
  290. And so does it bother you? It doesn't bother me at all. I'll just tell you. But does it bother you at all that
  291. the thing you may become most famous, or you are most famous, I don't know, is or the most cited for is something that
  292. isn't as technical as like your training? No, it doesn't bother me because as academics,
  293. I think we try and come up with ideas that have an impact. And this is an idea that's had way
  294. wider an impact, but not on academics, but on the real world, at least as far as the golf world or the sports world
  295. is concerned. So I'm not embarrassed at all. And I, you know, in many of my talks, it said, you know, how, who would
  296. have guessed that you could get so much mileage out of a concept which is subtracting
  297. two numbers? Right. Well, there you go. That's a good counsel. That's good counsel to us and some of
  298. our listeners that it doesn't have to be the absolutely most technically proficient thing to make
  299. a contribution. Why don't we leave it there? Mark, greatly appreciate your being with us.
  300. Always enjoy the chance to visit with you. Thanks so much, Cade and Eric and Adi.
  301. It's always a pleasure. Thank you. Mark Brody, Carson Family Professor of Business at
  302. the Columbia Business School, the creator, literally the creator of Strokes Gained and a longtime friend
  303. of Wharton Moneyball. Come back and join us after the break. We have another half hour still ahead.
  304. Welcome back. Welcome back to Wharton Moneyball. Welcome to the second half of this week's
  305. show. Tuesday afternoon, as it usually is when we're recording, show will go up bright and early
  306. Wednesday. I think Dion gets this thing going early Wednesday. Eric Bradlow's in here with me.
  307. This is Cade. Adi Weiner's in here now, rolled in to his office about halfway through the first segment.
  308. Shane Jensen out and about doing Shane Jensen things. He'll be back. I think he's blood on a bloody committee
  309. right now, the poor guy. He'll be back just off the line with Mark Brody. He always enjoyed talking Mark.
  310. I didn't know he'd done all those golf rankings things. That was good fun. And that's a neat little extension of his
  311. Strokes Gained. And tournament design as a result of it. Yeah, it affects tournament design.
  312. That's great. We have a handful of topics to hit, some big, some small, but I'd mentioned last
  313. week on the show that he had done a little work on the ABS. Original primary research that Adi is prone to
  314. do on occasion just kind of spins it off. Some of us eat lunch kind of naturally,
  315. some of us drink coffee, some of us go for walks. And Adi just spins off original primary research
  316. on things like the challenges in baseball. So what do you got, Adi? Yeah, so it's really, it's all new.
  317. So we're really interested in trying to figure things out. And lots of analysis are being done.
  318. In fact, the MLB has its own website devoted to challenges created by, as usual, Tom
  319. Tango, who is not a real name. That's a real person, that's not a real name. And he's looking at essentially challenge rates and
  320. success rates, but he kind of creates his own denominator of challengeable pitches, and he's kind
  321. of have his own thing. So what I ask the question is, think about a universe where every wrong play was
  322. turned to the right one. Okay, good. And now accumulate all the, what I call run expectancy flip, caused by flipping the wrong
  323. play to the right play. We're just talking about called balls and strikes now. Exactly.
  324. And only when they're challenged. Well, no, no, no. No, no, no. All of them. All of them, right?
  325. And so every team will have a run, a defensive set of run expectancy they could reclaim by challenging, and offensive run expectancy that
  326. they can reclaim by challenging. So why I wanted to ask the question, how much of that pile, if you will,
  327. that's available to them, are they reclaiming? Okay, first, great, cool. But give us some context.
  328. How big is that pile? And how's it distributed? Well, it's actually pretty big. It balances out.
  329. So your opponent is missing or is being denied about the same amount that you are.
  330. So it's not like, it's a bias. But if you can recover more than your opponent, that's actually an advantage, substantial.
  331. Per game, it's getting close to about a quarter to a half a run. All right. So just remind me, per team?
  332. Yeah, per team. It balances out. So it's equal, so it's not like one side is advantage.
  333. That's like 5% of the number of runs that are scored. So that's a lot. It's a little less than that, but yes,
  334. it's a lot, yeah. Okay, and just correct me if I'm wrong. How many, before I answer your question on
  335. percent, can you just remind me of how many challenges I get and when, if I get it right?
  336. Because it matters. Because if I could infinitely challenge, and that's a different thing, but obviously I cannot.
  337. Obviously, you'll get all of it if you can infinitely challenge. Right. You just keep challenging until they make it
  338. right. And at that point, you give up the system and you just let the robots determine
  339. all the value. But that's not the system. The current system allows you two. And every time if you make a mistake,
  340. your amount is decremented. So you can do as many as you can until you hit two errors.
  341. So it's a classic. So that's a wonderful system. It is a good system. Because it actually is a lot of fun
  342. to sort of think about from a operational, strategic perspective, what should the teams do?
  343. And the players are kind of working them out. Now we've learned a few things. We've learned that catchers are much better than
  344. hitters and pitchers. Catchers are best at this. They're the best view. They also don't have the emotion.
  345. Jazz Chisholm is the worst. He has challenged pitches right down the middle. And he's already an internet meme for like
  346. looking at the camera going, oh, what am I doing? Most players- Catchers have caught a million
  347. pitches. And so they're calibrated for this. Exactly. But they make errors as well.
  348. The catcher error rate is around 60%. And the position player- Zero? No, no, sorry, getting backward.
  349. Success rate is around 60%. And the position players are in the mid 40s. Well, that already gives us some information.
  350. So because look, the two factors that help me determine reclaim percentage is the hit rate
  351. or how successful am I when I challenge, but also the distribution of when I ask
  352. for it, because I want to ask for it, for example, if it's bases loaded and it's three, two count and a marginal pitch
  353. comes in, I should challenge that pitch because that's potentially worth a lot in terms of
  354. expected number of runs. Absolutely. So people have recognized that your decision to
  355. challenge depends on two factors, your probability that you're right, which is how bad the call
  356. was. And of course, the run expectancy that would flip. Didn't I just say that? Exactly right.
  357. And people have recognized that, but people have not. There's no algorithm that anyone has made as
  358. yet. And I'm working, our team is working to create that. We don't know the algorithm right now because
  359. there's a problem. You only get a resource of two. So you have to husband that resource and
  360. think about it properly. So the question that I went out to answer and did answer is a very simple
  361. one, which is what percentage of the run expectancy that is out there for you to
  362. reclaim are you actually getting? And among the amount that you're missing, are you missing it because you're running out of
  363. challenges and therefore you can't challenge? That's really horrifying, by the way, if you're
  364. watching baseball and it's the eighth inning and there's a strikeout and it's a bad call
  365. and you're out of challenges that you're pulling your hair out. So how much of the missing challenge is
  366. cost is, missing RE is caused by lacking the ability to challenge because you're all out.
  367. And how much is it missed because you're just not challenging? Can I ask you a clarifying question?
  368. Sure. Why you decided to study runs as opposed to win probability? Eric Bradlow with the home run question.
  369. The answer is it's a lot more stable and it doesn't depend on context and it'll be the same no matter what inning you're
  370. in. And it is just, and there's a lot more data on it that's reliable. So win probabilities can barely move with a
  371. strike in the first inning, but a run expectancy is a measurable and determined quantity.
  372. So it really is a statistics argument. Yeah, the only reason I'm asking because I
  373. think it's a good question, I'm glad you thought of it, obviously, but also the reason
  374. why you might see a percentage lower than one might expect is because you've created a
  375. metric, but the team, I'm being generous, the team may be trying to reclaim win probability,
  376. not runs. And therefore that's why you see a lower percentage in your metric than you might expect.
  377. Actually, real quickly, you could imagine psychologically regret is more closely associated to win probability than
  378. runs. Even though I 100% agree with what Adi's saying and doing. And by the way, that's something Adi has
  379. said over the years about expected points versus win probability in different sports.
  380. So I kind of knew where he was coming from, but you could imagine regret, like even the hair pulling out in the eighth
  381. inning, that's a little bit closer. All right, do you want my answer, Adi, on the percent?
  382. Let me just before, just to respond on that as well, like in fourth down decision
  383. -making, the right thing to do is win probability. In decision-making in football, everything should be
  384. win probability, but a lot of decisions are made on expected points. And one of the reasons for that is
  385. there's just many more independent possessions. Possessions are valued on the point basis.
  386. Win probabilities are all related, right? So you have much more data to accurately
  387. estimate things when you're dealing with possessions and the points rather than win probability.
  388. And so we know much more about run expectancy than we know about win probability.
  389. And so we have to recognize the limits of our data. So also one of the things that I
  390. also tell my students, start with the easy thing, for God's sakes. No, I don't. All right, so you want to make some
  391. guesses? What percentage of the available RE is being reclaimed? I got it. I understand the question.
  392. And give me a defense and an offensive number. Well, clearly we know that defensive is going
  393. to get more because catchers are better. Yeah. I don't have a calculated answer, but my
  394. intuition is like just a very small fraction. I don't know, 10%, 15%. Eric? I was going to guess a third.
  395. Okay, so you're both in the ballpark. It is small. And no one is at a third, but
  396. defense is around 27% and offense is just around 19. And that's only through April 29th when I
  397. ran the data. Eric, we should have asked if we could pool our guesses and we would have hit
  398. it. You would have nailed it. Yeah, exactly. Model average. That would have been the right thing to
  399. do as you guys all know. Ensemble, we just have to demonstrate it. Now the real question is, the second question,
  400. which I know the answer to, is how much of the missed challenge, which is roughly
  401. between 75% to 80%, how much of that missed challenges are caused by not having challenges?
  402. Small number. Quarter to a third. I'm going to guess more than that. I'm not going to, I was going to
  403. say half. Now we're going to average. Which side? That doesn't matter. Eric's half is this.
  404. So how much is lost of the remaining chunk that we're missing? X, take out the ones you're getting.
  405. Yeah, if I had more challenges, I could regain half of that. That's my thought. Okay, so I'm not asking the question, that's
  406. a different, that's a totally different question. If I had three challenges, how much can
  407. I regain? I'm asking you just an observational question of the challenge run expectancy that you have not
  408. reclaimed, how much of it is missed during the periods of time where you have no
  409. challenges? Yeah, yeah. Then it's small. Then I'm going to go back to what Kate's saying.
  410. I'm going to go with a quarter. It's actually much smaller than that. Much smaller.
  411. They are barely missing any challenge because they don't have it. It's about 5%.
  412. So they happen to pick the right number of attempts too? No, I just think they're underusing their challenges.
  413. That's my guess. They're underusing their challenges. That's another explanation.
  414. I got plenty of challenges because I'm not using them. They're just not using them.
  415. And when they use them, but they don't use them enough. I think the teams, once they blow one,
  416. are just under, I just think they underuse them. And particularly later in the game, I think
  417. they're underusing them. Seventh innings, eighth inning, and the ninth. I mean, come on.
  418. Just use the goddamn challenge. Is this the same as like sitting your guy with two fouls in the first half?
  419. Yes. You're trying to preserve something and you're being too conservative about the preservation.
  420. Yep. Or it's like, you're starting actually to see Adi's point actually in the NBA now.
  421. Like you're starting to see at the end of games, like you know it was a foul, but what the hell?
  422. Let's challenge this thing and see what happens. There's 15 seconds on the clock.
  423. And you know what? We're going to lose the game if this thing isn't overturned. There's no cost for me to see.
  424. You know, maybe some gets in the ref's eye and he says, no, that's not a foul. You know, who knows?
  425. Actually, I'm starting to see it in the playoffs. I've seen ridiculously bad challenges in high leverage
  426. situations. Are there no penalties for over? You get a certain number. But it's just the end of the game.
  427. You're going to lose the game if this isn't reversed. Give it a shot. So that's the real question.
  428. So the answer, the unknown now is what's the right policy. Right. Yeah, right. Don't know it.
  429. Are you observing different teams following different policies? Is there much heterogeneity?
  430. Is there already learning? Oh, Adi could have been talking about two different things, Adi.
  431. Do you mean MLB's policy? Or do you mean what Cade was talking about, which is the team policy?
  432. I'm not changing MLB. Oh, okay. By the way, so I'm able to rank teams by their ability to recover challenges.
  433. And actually Philadelphia is very good on the offensive side. They've been recovering a lot of challenge.
  434. They may be doing that because they're actually challenging a lot. And in fact, a lot of, I mean,
  435. this gets to the psychology. When you challenge and are wrong, they often feel the heat for that.
  436. And I think in a way that's probably not deserved. A good challenging team should be not ending
  437. the game with challenges. That's, you screwed up if you did that. Which means that you have to bear the
  438. brunt of what might be considered silly challenge. Can you tell us the probability?
  439. If I have on the Y-axis, the probability of successful challenge, and on the X -axis, the distance from the strike zone, what
  440. does that curve look like? I actually have, so I don't have that number because it's very correlated with that.
  441. But I'll start with the first number, which is, I can tell you the probability of
  442. an umpire error as a function of the distance from the strike zone. Okay. I fit that curve.
  443. And by the time you get to three inches, the probability is nearly zero. Yeah. And it interpolates fairly linearly.
  444. What is the diameter of a baseball? Just under three inches. All right, so it's basically, once it gets
  445. to more than a baseball outside of the zone. They tend to be very, very good. That's good.
  446. I'm glad, thank you. The umpires, by the way, the umpires are awesome. Yeah. I mean, we laugh at them and think,
  447. oh, 92.5 is their success rate. Do you have any idea how many pitchers are right on the border?
  448. These are professional pitchers we're talking about. They throw it on the corners and on
  449. the edges. And when you're on the edges, their probabilities are roughly 50%. I mean, it's very hard to get right.
  450. The trouble is, and this is one of the reasons the challenge system is so great,
  451. is that there are outliers. I mean, there are human beings. And the outlier, if you can zap those,
  452. then you've made a lot of progress. Why don't we let that sit there for now? This sounds like an ongoing project.
  453. I'll be able to come back to us on some things. I have some other, I'll do some other
  454. baseball trivia for y'all. Trivia is the wrong word. I'll put you through your paces a little
  455. bit. Did y'all happen to see this Wall Street Journal article about the Brewers the other
  456. day? They looked at how over-performing they are over the years. So, FanGraph's preseason predictions for number of wins
  457. over an 11-year period of time, 2015 through 2025. So 11 seasons. The Brewers have been the most outperforming of
  458. the FanGraph's expectations. And you can go to like Pakoda, you can go to somebody else's system.
  459. They're also the top there. What do you think the average number of wins above expectation the Brewers have achieved over
  460. the last 11 years? Five. So what is the, in wins? How far in wins above expectation?
  461. Observe your wins minus FanGraph's expected wins. Sum it over 11 years and divide by
  462. 11. Yeah, and I've guessed five. I would guess three. Seven and a half. What? Right?
  463. And that's 11 years set. Dodgers are five, 5.1. Astros are 4 .8. You're Yankees, who seem like underachievers to
  464. me, are actually four. But the Brewers are 7.6. And- Does that say more about their model than
  465. anything else? Well, the key, I think the article, is it Jared Diamond? He's always doing these kinds of articles.
  466. I'm not sure if it's him. Let me look real quick. Yeah, Jared Diamond, as a matter of fact.
  467. This is May 4, so yesterday. They say it's development. You know, this is a small market team,
  468. small budget team. And they say they are turning, making players better more than they're expected to and more
  469. than other teams are. And if that's true, I just- They're also relying heavily on youngsters because if they're
  470. not youngsters, they would be priced into the preseason expectation. So if I'm getting this right- Unless
  471. they're just turning them into, they take a veteran and they make them better than they
  472. were before in some way. I mean, this was the story for the Astros all those years.
  473. Like Astros were first into development. Now we talk about baseball being this way.
  474. But apparently, seemingly, at least by this article, they're ahead of the league on that.
  475. But Adi's got a good point in that, like when residuals like this tend to be persistent, any good statistician would go back to
  476. the model and say, I'm missing something here, you know? But what if it's a team effect?
  477. And then you're just going to put your thumb on the scale and have a real Brewer's Fixed Effect?
  478. That's not the way you want to go. That's a big number. That's seven and a half.
  479. That's a big number. Right? Yeah, no, because listen, they don't tell us what their forecasting system is.
  480. Yeah. I don't know what that is. That is a very big number. And it is time for us to just
  481. shout out a former student of ours, Eric Babitz, who is the Director of Player Acquisition
  482. for the Brewers and has been there since he graduated five, six years ago. At the Brewers?
  483. At the Brewers. Oh, how about that? Well, heck, let's get him on the show and find out whether Jared Diamond's article is
  484. actually capturing what's going on. I mean, he's right in the middle of that stuff.
  485. Because he's charged with finding people that aren't going to break the bank because they're a
  486. small budget team, and yet they believe they can make better. That's his charge.
  487. That's his charge. That's interesting. Okay, let me give you one other baseball question.
  488. I don't know how I wasn't calibrated for this, but top, so the women's softball season
  489. is winding down. Their postseason is great fun. Top shortstop in the country, Issa Torres, Florida
  490. State. She's got a big bat, she makes offensive contributions, but she's also great defensively.
  491. What do you think, just let's say, I don't know if this is true, but let's say she has the top fielding percentage in
  492. the country. What do you think her field, a shortstop, women's college softball shortstop, what do you think
  493. the top fielding percentage would be? And I'll give you the number of, well, you might even guess, what's the number of
  494. chances? There's a simple thing to guess. How many games are there in a season? 30 or so?
  495. About 30, yeah. And I would guess chances are probably in the, there's so many strikeouts, probably between six
  496. or seven chances a game. So I'd go for about 150, so. You're dead on, 142. I thought it'd be higher, 142.
  497. So Issa Torres, 142 chances this season, led the country in fielding percentage.
  498. What do you think it was? So I bet she got about 138 of those 143, would be my guess.
  499. So that's 97, 98%. That's what I was, I was gonna guess somewhere between 95 to 98%.
  500. What's your upper limit? Well. 100. Well, I know that's your true max, but we do agree.
  501. She's 100%, she had no errors this year. She had no errors, that's amazing. Playing shortstop.
  502. Now, let me ask you a question about that. So let's suppose you have a known statistic.
  503. So let's imagine there's a play that happens now or whatever during the season. And the scoring person says, you know what,
  504. let's tilt this to the no side. First baseman should have scooped that ball. Yeah, exactly.
  505. That was not a bad throw. Okay, that is wonderfully cynical, Eric. Well done. Okay.
  506. Let's do one last one. And this is more involved. And this is the paper, y'all saw
  507. that Dylan Weawad. Dylan Weawad is with Slack. He's a quantitative researcher with Slack.
  508. He is a social psychologist out of Simon Fraser, making him Canadian. And he did, Northwestern has had, Northwestern, Kellogg's
  509. Graduate School of Business at Northwestern, as Eric knows anyway, has had postdocs for years.
  510. Great postdoc program. He did that. And then he's moved on to Slack. But he's rediscovering his love of hockey and
  511. is running some quantitative analysis. And so I wanna ask y'all. So he sent us this paper and he's
  512. a published academic. And so when he writes a paper, he's gonna write it soundly like an academic.
  513. So it's this impressive, only 15 pages, but very strong methodologically. I wanna ask y'all, because he takes
  514. on an interesting challenge. He goes to measure depth in hockey. And one of the reasons he sent it
  515. to us was that we talked to Eric Tolsky a few weeks ago, the general manager of the Carolina Hurricanes.
  516. And Tolsky's whole thing is basically depth. They've built their whole roster to be deep,
  517. like less top-heavy and just deep. All four front lines, all three back lines, whatever.
  518. They're gonna have guys that can play all the way. Is there an agreed upon measure?
  519. Like you can imagine like entropy of skillset. You can imagine max minus min. You can imagine taking lines and looking at
  520. the summation of some metric and looking at lowering the variance. Is there a well, I'm saying, is there
  521. a, no, okay. But you mean something like this. But no, but you mean something like this
  522. when you say depth. If we take Dylan to have done a thorough lit review, and I don't know that
  523. that was his objective, so we don't know, but he's acting as if he's creating this.
  524. I suspect teams, some teams have this. Some teams, certainly Tolsky has done this.
  525. But as far as we know, there's no accepted measure. So I'm asking y'all how you go
  526. about doing it. Just a neat little paper about Dylan. I just came up with three measures right
  527. there. I just, so you have some strength parameter for a player. And so depth would be, well, I mean,
  528. it depends on meaning across the whole team, or you could mean across lines. You could, matter of fact, around the team.
  529. Well, you know, there's classic measures of, you know, variance is one. You could have some sort of- Just
  530. look at the difference. How much, what's the rate of scoring per minute among each line and look at the,
  531. how that erodes from, look for big drop in three and four in some way. So you want to use scoring, Adi, as
  532. opposed to like some sort of strength measure. Well, you can make a composite measure because
  533. there's obviously offense and defense. But I think the lines are different. I mean, they're misaligned, right?
  534. You're out of my pen here, folks. No, no, no, but let's- No, no, let's- But isn't there offensive players and
  535. defensive players- No, no, but this- But no, you're asking a good question. Suppose- Let's say, let's, straight offense.
  536. We're going to play- Yeah, so I want to look at your rate of scoring and then compare that across the lines, either
  537. per possession per minute, probably per minute. Okay. And then there's also a power play issue
  538. because I think you bring in your top line. You could do that, yes. You could do power plays, sure.
  539. Okay, so let me just walk you through a few of the steps that he does because I think it's thoughtful and interesting.
  540. Let me say it's relevant also because he ran the numbers on this year's NHL and Carolina is like a standard deviation beyond everybody
  541. else in this measure. And in his analysis, it shows that it's predictive. It makes contribution above baselines on the likelihood
  542. of a team winning. Okay, so that's how you're controlling for a bunch of other things that you'd expect.
  543. It's there's incremental contribution. That's right. Can I just shout out to, yeah, go
  544. ahead, finish. Well, I'm going to give you a little bit of a, I'm going to give you
  545. a couple of steps on methodology because I thought they were nice. First, it's at the player level as opposed
  546. to the line level. So he'll take a stat like ice time or closer to what you might care about,
  547. like XG, expected goals. He looked at also things like assist and shots on goal, but it ends up with
  548. a suite of these statistics. And in each case, he asked, he asked what's the compliment of the Gini coefficient.
  549. So y'all know the Gini coefficient is this IO kind of, it's a concentration measure.
  550. And so he's asking how concentrated is the ice time or shots on goal or expected
  551. goals among the players or the offensive player or the skaters. It's all obviously defensive players can have XG
  552. as well. And so that's one, that's the basic measure, but then he models the whole thing as
  553. a latent variable. And so I think this is something that we ought to listen to. I think there's a nice contribution because he's
  554. saying, look, it's not one thing. XG, like the compliment of the Gini coefficient
  555. of XG for a team is an imperfect measure of depth. But if we get three or four of
  556. these things and ask, is there a latent variable? I'd say this is basic measurement science.
  557. You don't measure a construct with one thing. You use a bunch of manifest variables that
  558. represent some underlying basic concept, which is why I was thinking of some sort of strength
  559. model. You could call that latent thing a strength thing, which is manifested itself in different observables.
  560. I'm excited to look at his paper, Cade. Thanks for bringing it to our attention.
  561. I will just point out that that was the qualitative or quantitative or qualitative question that
  562. we asked our high school students in our competition. Is that right? They were asked to essentially evaluate whether depth,
  563. we didn't call it that, we call it line variance, how that affected winning. And that was the final question for their
  564. high school students. And we didn't- Maybe I should just say a few words, what you're talking, I
  565. mean, I obviously know what you're talking about. You should just say a few words.
  566. What is the Wharton High School Data Science Competition? So Wharton Analytics and AI at Wharton, we
  567. sponsored a major competition for high school students and we created a fake hockey league.
  568. They played each other all season. And then we asked the students to forecast the outcomes of the playoffs.
  569. And that was all very forecasty and very rigorous and qualitative. But then we had them ask an open
  570. -ended question, like a hockey question, which is, what is the relationship between having a depth,
  571. which is the right word for it, and winning? And we asked them to study that. And it was actually very hard because there
  572. was a very strong confounder, which is the top lines also play against the top defenses.
  573. And so you have to control for the quality of the defense that they play against
  574. to measure the quality of your top line. And if you didn't do that, you thought that your underlying, your lower lines were better
  575. than they were because they were playing against weaker defenses. And I will tell you that one team
  576. managed to do that out of the 700 submissions. Well, I know who it was because they
  577. presented actually at the Wharton AI and Analytics Board Meeting. I assume you mean the Pingree team.
  578. Is that the team that won? They were the team that won. I'm not sure they're the team that figured
  579. that out because it was so esoteric that there were so many components to the program.
  580. All right, guys. So we'll let that one go. If anyone's interested in chasing it down, Dylan's
  581. website is hockeydecoded.com, hockeydecoded.com. Thanks, Dylan, for sending that to us.
  582. And listen, guys, we're always interested in the work. And to be fair, the more put together
  583. the work is when you send it to us, the better, but we'll take work in progress.
  584. We'll take data. We'll take websites. And Dylan, maybe he got lucky. He got me in a moment where I
  585. could pause and read the paper, but we love that you guys send us stuff on occasion and we learn from it.
  586. So please keep it up. Fellas, what else around the world of sports right now before we have to run?
  587. Well, just one thing for me. I always love talking about tennis, but Yannick Sinner has done something no one's ever done.
  588. He's won five straight Masters 1000 titles. And no, not Federer, not Djokovic, not Nadal
  589. has ever done that. And my prediction is, I don't think, unless he gets injured, I don't think he's going
  590. to lose unless, until Alcaraz comes back. I mean, the gap between him and everybody
  591. else, look, he just played Zverev, who's number three in the world. He beat him 6-1, 6-2.
  592. It's the fourth straight match. He hasn't given up more than six games to Zverev.
  593. And that's the number three player in the world, okay? And Djokovic is injured right now.
  594. Maybe Djokovic beats him on a bad day for Sinner, but the gap is so large that he may win every tournament he competes
  595. in, assuming he stays healthy right now. I don't see any reason why he wouldn't be.
  596. I have to start looking at the betting odds, but you have to put him at minus 400 minimum, minimum for any tournament he
  597. plays right now. That takes the fun out of it, doesn't it? That's a little too heavy.
  598. It does. How long is Alcaraz out, you said? It's hard to know. I mean, he's not playing the French, which
  599. is upcoming. They're not at the French yet. They still have, I forget which one's next,
  600. the Italian Masters or whatever. But there's one more tournament and then the French, and Alcaraz is already saying, because of
  601. his wrist, he's not playing the French. So, yeah. So that's what caught my eye. All right.
  602. We should note that two Philadelphia franchises are in the second round of the playoffs.
  603. That's not nothing. How long has it been? How long has it been since that happened?
  604. Both Flyers and the Sixers are into the second round? That's pretty good. They're both getting whipped right now in that
  605. second round, but presumably the Sixers will bounce back. I assume that that Knicks first game was
  606. just because of how rough that Sixers- Well, the Knicks, by the way, have set up, I mean, whatever this is worth, it's
  607. a small sample. The Knicks have now set a playoff record. They've won four, three straight, but they've won
  608. four straight, I think, playoff games now by 25 points or more, which has never been
  609. done before. So the Knicks are on a heater. They were down 2-1, just remember, mind
  610. everyone, they were down 2-1 to the Hawks. They beat them three straight by plus 25.
  611. They beat the Sixers by 39 last night. So whatever heater they're on, they're on a
  612. wrecking crew mission right now. And you're right, the Sixers may bounce back and lose by 15.
  613. Now, one trick, concern potentially, is that they were winning, and then the team starts to
  614. try to get desperate, and then it ends up creating a gigantic margin if it doesn't
  615. work out. They were beat pretty early on this game. Yeah, I have to tell you, I was
  616. in- It cuts out pretty quick. I was in Penn Station when the Knicks were playing their last game of their first
  617. series, and at the bar in Penn Station, they had the game going on, and I turned over and looked, and I saw the
  618. score, and I'm like, that can't be real. Right, it was like 90 to 30 or something.
  619. No, it was an unbelievably unreal score. But there's this thing in tennis that I
  620. think is known, that tennis players, if they get behind in a set, sometimes just say,
  621. I'm gonna lose this set, I'm gonna conserve energy. And I think this happens in basketball series
  622. as well, that sometimes a team will get sufficiently behind, they're like, we're gonna conserve energy
  623. this time, we're gonna come back- Well, Cade, I mean, let's remember, the Sixers played
  624. seven games. They ended on Saturday. So they had to fly down from Boston. By the time they was blown out, I
  625. know for a fact, Embiid, Paul George, Tyrese Maxey, they were all pulled in the early
  626. to mid part of the third quarter, the third quarter, because they're playing again tomorrow.
  627. There's no, I mean, I'm saying there's no rest. There's one day rest. You obviously, the game's over.
  628. Tank this game and go for the next one. I'm worried about that in the Eastern NHL
  629. playoffs, the Canes are up on the Flyers 2-0. They're big favorites anyway, they might sweep them.
  630. The team I'm pulling for, the Sabres, haven't yet started their series against the Habs.
  631. And so it could be that the Canes get out and have like a 10-day break before- Get rusty.
  632. Then you hope for us, that's exactly right. All right. Let me give you one other thing, guys,
  633. before we go. The NHL lottery, draft lottery is today. So there's a few wrinkles here that are
  634. just a little bit interesting. But by the way, the presumed number one pick, it's not 100% sure, but the
  635. presumed number one pick is that kid that's at Penn State. He kind of unexpectedly went to Penn State
  636. when Penn State was practically just an intramural team still, Gavin McKenna. And by the way, he's like six foot
  637. 170. It's just amazing to me that a guy on the hockey ice, six foot 170, which is a very average size guy, could be
  638. that good. But setting that aside, the odds, the top odds for the worst performing team last year,
  639. the Vancouver Canucks, it's 25 and a half percent, 25% chance. It's pretty, pretty good.
  640. And then it drops to Blackhawks are 13, Rangers are 11. And here's something for us to pull for
  641. tonight. In absentia, Shane Jensen's Calgary Flames are the fourth highest probability of getting the number one
  642. pick, nine and a half percent. So we should all be pulling for the Flames. They haven't done quite as much flattening as
  643. like the NBA has done with the draft lottery, et cetera. Or where they haven't even, there's tiers.
  644. Like bottom four in the NBA are all at the same percentage now, so in other words, you can tank, but there's no reason
  645. to tank from third to second. They haven't, I don't think they've done that yet, but they're talking about making that last
  646. change she just said. But there's another wrinkle in here that I've never seen before.
  647. We talk about tournament design, but here's lottery design. Of course, we're hearing a lot about it
  648. from the NBA, but I think this is just gonna exacerbate what you just said. They have separate draws for the number one
  649. and the number two pick. I think that means in the NBA, they'll count down like 10, nine, eight, seven to
  650. one. And so it's one draw all the way through. I think that means they're gonna choose a
  651. ball for number one, and they're not just gonna do a full, well, would it make any difference?
  652. And they're gonna, that team will obviously be removed for the next draw. Why would it be any different?
  653. That team's probability should be, that probability, let's say it's 25.5%, that probability should be
  654. distributed equally. In other words, it doesn't violate what we call the IIA property, meaning the remaining 74
  655. .5% probability still has the same ratio amongst all the other teams. So there should be no impact.
  656. Yeah, so why would it matter? Maybe I have it, maybe I get, so I don't know. I don't know what they're doing and what
  657. they're doing wrong. That must not be what they're doing. Anyway, I would just wanna, something for a
  658. future show, but I have a group of students from my Moneyball Academy over the summer.
  659. They studied the rate at which value is lost as you go down the draft curve for all sports.
  660. And hockey surprisingly gets the incredible amount of value from the top of the draft, and
  661. it drops quickly, but way more than other sports. I was surprised. I didn't realize how predictable a top-ranked
  662. hockey player is in terms of value. That's a lot. The difference in predictability is what you're talking
  663. about, though, the drop. Yeah, but even, it starts high, and then it stays high and it goes down, but
  664. it's amazing. So the metric they used was all-star appearances, and they are a lot at the
  665. top of the draft. Interesting, and did you have any sense of where the other sports come in?
  666. Yes, we have that. We'll have to talk about that at a later date, because it's a great little study.
  667. Well, it's surprising given the long development time on most hockey players. It's much more like, it's in the direction
  668. of baseball as opposed to like a football or basketball. Okay, guys, that's a pretty solid show.
  669. Well, well over an hour here. It feels like we haven't talked in a while, and we did some today.
  670. We'll let it go there. For the whole team here, Eric Bradlow and Adi Weiner joining me, Shane Jensen in absentia,
  671. Dion Simpkins, the big boss behind the scenes making this thing happen for more than 12
  672. years now, Marissa Reyna, our producer, and Deep Patel, boss lady, keeping us all in line.
  673. Thanks to that whole team. Thank you guys for listening. Come back and join us next time.
  674. Between now and then, enjoy your sports.

Brief Summary

Mark Brody discusses golf rankings, strokes gained, and sports analytics in this episode of Wharton Moneyball.

Key points

  • Welcome to Wharton Moneyball. Join Cade Massey and Eric Bradlow as they dive into sports analytics.
  • Mark Brody Joins the Show. Mark Brody, a pioneer in sports analytics, discusses his work in golf rankings.
  • The Concept of Strokes Gained. Mark Brody invented the concept of strokes gained, revolutionizing golf analytics.
  • College Golf Rankings Discussion. Mark shares insights on the complexities of college golf rankings and their implications.
  • World Golf Rankings Explained. Mark discusses the differences between predictive and performance-based rankings in golf.
  • The Principle of Ranking. A principled way to rank golfers involves unbiased measures of skill, redistributing points based on performance.

Episode highlights

Tension

40/ 100Low tension

Related episodes