Wharton's Marshall Meyer: China and the WTO

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Ten years after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), the country has become the world's largest exporter and accounts for some 10% of global trade. The International Monetary Fund predicts that by 2016, China will overtake the U.S. to become the world's largest economy. How did membership in the WTO help transform China? What will the next decade mean for China and its trading partners? To discuss these questions and others, Knowledge@Wharton spoke with Wharton management professor Marshall Meyer. 📂 Public Policy

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  1. [Music] [Music] Marshall, thank you so much for joining us today. My pleasure to be with you as
  2. always. Well, as you know, uh, November 2011 was the 10th anniversary of, uh, China joining the World Trade
  3. Organization or the WTO. So, why don't we start with a very simple question. What has joining the WTO meant for
  4. China? The short answer is everything. The changes in China have been quite dramatic. You can see the inflections in
  5. virtually every plot of the economy that you lay out. Um the obvious changes uh trade has gone up as a consequence of
  6. trade. GDP has gone up um as a consequence of uh the concentration of trade uh in the coastal cities of China,
  7. especially the special economic zones. The migration of uh peasant workers from countryside to city and back has
  8. increased enormously. Um one thing that uh another small inflection point interestingly is that
  9. the rural urban income gap um it didn't decrease but it stopped increasing rapidly about the time of WTO
  10. I assume as the result of wages remittances uh to the migrant workers. So overall this has had an enormous
  11. impact uh on China probably far greater than anybody anticipated. That that leads to the the next logical question
  12. is are there some sectors in China that benefited more uh than than others as a result of China joining the WTO? And
  13. were there actually other areas of the economy that may have suffered because of it? Yeah, there are actually some
  14. losers in this. There are some spectacular winners. The the big winner of course we know is manufacturing.
  15. Within manufacturing the big winner is electronics. China's biggest export is um electronic goods, computers and the
  16. like. Um uh not needle goods uh anymore. Uh these industries have burgeoned. Um much of the work of course is assembly
  17. work like Foxcon is doing for Apple and others. uh but uh but a lot of the work is uh manufacturer of of components and
  18. modules things like power transformers, electric cords, so on and so forth. So the manufacturing sector in general
  19. electronics in particular has benefited uh the next sector that's benefited actually is the automotive sector. Huge
  20. numbers of huge quantities of automotive components are coming out of China as a
  21. consequence of the development of this component infrastructure. Auto assembly has burgeoned in China. Some could argue
  22. that um the center of the auto industry has moved from Detroit to Shanghai. Um uh all of this I think is a
  23. consequence of uh WTO. Um, where have there been fewer benefits or even negative
  24. benefits? Uh, the answer quickly is the countryside of China. The migration has depleted the countryside um of many
  25. working age people. Uh, we talked a moment ago about the movie The Last Train Home. the couple the protagonists
  26. in the movie uh they leave their children with the grandparents behind in Sichuan province as they migrate uh to
  27. Shenzhen. I also think that Chinese agricultures in a bind as a consequence of WTO. Uh China's had a number of
  28. experiments with land reform. The first in 78 under Dang Xiaoping was pretty successful. Uh the household
  29. responsibility system they got productivity up. Uh, China's not had a great starvation since. They're very
  30. worried about that given the experience in the 60s. Today, however, they're still struggling with further land
  31. reform. uh there were some initiatives 2002 2008 to give the peasants control over their
  32. land but it's they've not really succeeded in assembling large enough pla plots of land to produce efficiently
  33. even given the low labor cost. So for example two crops in China are uh very much at risk. One of those crops I just
  34. read the article before I came down here is the cotton crop. They cannot find enough people to harvest the
  35. cotton. As a consequence, some of that cotton is going to stay unh harvested. They'll try mechanization, but
  36. mechanization doesn't work too well because the quality of the harvest is not nearly as good. Ultimately, they'll
  37. move to mechanization, but then who knows how price competitive uh the crop will be. Interestingly, the tomato crops
  38. in the same situation. This is a very delicate fruit. um and uh still uh grown on very small plots with hand harvesting
  39. and the the companies that are uh manufacturing the tomato paste which is the base ingredient in ketchup and other
  40. condiments uh aren't doing very well. In fact, they're losing money uh end of last year and this year again because of
  41. labor shortages and um raw material costs going on going up. And how how is China coping with these disruptions in
  42. the in the rural area? What solutions are they putting in place? It it's it's really interesting
  43. because um you have to go back and read uh what's called central document number
  44. one. The last four or five years until this year until 2011 central document number one focused on rural land reform
  45. and later rural subsidization market adjustment they call it. uh trying to take a lot of initiatives to subsidize
  46. agriculture with certain certain key crops and to incentivize people to stay on the land. Okay. Still however they've
  47. not gone quite as far as India as far as best I understand India where uh it's Indian government policy to keep the
  48. rural population which is the large majority of India it's only 50% in China now um to keep the rural population on
  49. the land by guaranteeing everybody for example what is it 100 hours of work a month and providing other subsidies to
  50. make rural life attractive. Uh China's not yet done that. Um the uh interestingly central document number
  51. one this year has a slightly different focus and it's a critical issue for China as well. It's called
  52. water. Uh they were very much worried about drought in Shandong province. The beginning of the year the rains finally
  53. came but it was it was pretty bad for a while. And you know, if you look at a map of China, it turns out the most
  54. agriculturally intensive areas are in that center area of China um uh above Jang Su province uh below Beijing, Hub
  55. so forth. Um and uh they they were going without water for a long long time. The
  56. Yellow River was running dry and water will be a perennial problem for China uh as well. And of course the water supply
  57. and the crops are closely related to each other. Now coming back to the earlier point about the the way the
  58. manufacturing uh sector especially electronic manufacturing is has been one of the winners. U how what has this
  59. meant membership in the WTO? What has it meant for the competitiveness of Chinese
  60. firms? How have they had to transform themselves into global producers? And what can other companies uh in other
  61. parts of the world learn from China's experience in this respect? Well, I I think we got to separate two parts of
  62. the Chinese uh economy. Um there's the foreigninvested assembly economy. Again, Foxcon, even think of
  63. Samsung has huge investment in China. By some measures, Samsung's the largest manufacturing firm in China.
  64. Um uh these firms have entered China um drawn on a lowcost uh labor labor supply
  65. uh and a labor supply that at least until recently has been uh very very reliable um and um uh you know pursued
  66. lowcost manufacturing for export. Um their competitive advantage again is cost. The margins are razor thin.
  67. and they're a bit at risk uh because the cost pressures are coming from two sides. We're still seeing some
  68. appreciation of the R&B, although if you read the recent columns in the in the business press, there's some questions
  69. as to whether the R&B will continue to appreciate near-term. Long-term, everyone's confident it will. So, they
  70. the pressure R&B appreciation plus wage increases. Okay, the wage increases are c are are are driven by
  71. supply and demand. So let's go back to the inflection point we talked about at the beginning. One of the interesting
  72. and I think very significant inflection points which we didn't understand until about a year ago was rural wages.
  73. Um this is called um u the uh the the Lewis turn the Lewis transition where um u uh where
  74. uh as a economy moves toward industrialization um uh wages labor supply shrinks first
  75. in the countryside then in the city and wages consequently increase. Well what did we see? We saw as early as 2003,
  76. this is only two years after WTO, wages in the deep interior provinces of China like Gansu begin to go up dramatically.
  77. uh agricultural wages uh on the rate of 10 15% a year sometimes more than that wages harvest season offseason the uh
  78. folks who acquired these data the at the Gansu Agricultural University looked at
  79. it every way came to the conclusion that this Lewis turn um occurred uh about in
  80. 2003 again only two years uh after WTO now the migrant laborers wages began in in the cities began and increasing
  81. dramatically 2005 2006 a couple of years later and so by 2007 wages were going up 20%.
  82. And in fact, the labor shortages provoked a a a new labor law in China. And the 2008 uh labor law, labor
  83. contract law, LCL, um gave workers on in principle, not in fact, but in principle, on paper, some
  84. of the same rights as tenure professors. Two, three-year contracts. After that, your employment was permanent, discharge
  85. only for cause, etc., etc. It's quite remarkable when you read this document. I'm not sure that it's honored more in
  86. fact in the breach, but uh it's a remarkable document to read. But that's a response to the labor shortages,
  87. right? So um 08 was an interruption in this a dramatic interruption because as you know WTO
  88. notwithstanding exports virtually stopped in some industries for lack of letters of
  89. credit. The government resuscitated the economy with a massive stimulus package.
  90. Don't need to go into details of it but it's again another turning point in China but some the the the man the
  91. assembly economy I talked about is being hit hard R&B appreciation their manufacturing for export and increases
  92. in labor costs and so parts of that economy are at risk. Yeah, I mean that that's actually a very good um segue to
  93. the the point I wanted to raise next which is uh clearly China has grown dramatically during the past decade
  94. during after its uh participation in the WTO. Yeah, it has uh it it its exports were you know 4% of the global economy
  95. or or so 10 years ago. Now China has become the world's biggest exporter. Uh how how sustainable do you think is this
  96. growth? Well, that that follows exactly. Um the export economy uh in my judgment
  97. um is unlikely to continue to grow at the same rate. And why is that? U again we talked about the cost squeeze on the
  98. exporters. Um uh and of course economic conditions in their principal markets whether it's the EU or the US are soft.
  99. That's a nice term. Uh so as a consequence um their ability to sell unlimited uh amounts of of relatively
  100. lowcost goods in these markets is going to be crimped somewhat. And there are lots of reports now of plants closing
  101. particularly in Guangong province and finally the numbers are beginning to show a slowing of exports.
  102. They didn't for a while leading to the inference that it was the Chinese domestic economy slowing
  103. down. I think it actually is a little bit or the rate of growth is slowing down. Um but um uh it's pretty clear now
  104. that this export model is not sustainable. Now that said um uh the Chinese economy has other places to grow
  105. and here's the irony. The place to grow is in the countryside of China. And so I think in fact I've
  106. observed firsthand and I'm writing about the development of rural distribution and the sudden profusion of rural
  107. markets in China. Finally at long last the traditional marketing system, the traditional distribution channels in
  108. rural China are giving way to much more modern systems. And as the large firms in China begin to
  109. penetrate the countryside, which for a long time they ignored, that'll give a little further headroom to China, but
  110. not nearly as much headroom as we've seen under in the last 10 years. So do you think that the growth of the
  111. domestic market will be uh fast enough and deep enough to offset the shrinking of the export demand as uh you know
  112. Europe and US uh you know slow down uh and and their consumption slows down? I don't know. And here's why. There's yet
  113. another competing force called population. Okay, China's aging. uh last year 2010 the dependency ratio non-working to
  114. working population reversed um it had been going down through 2010 and beginning last year it started going up
  115. um China has made some small modifications but hasn't fundamentally changed the one child policy even if
  116. they did it wouldn't make any difference for 15 20 years at least Um the best projections I see um suggest
  117. that China is going to have an upside down population pyramid very very quickly. And uh I sometimes describe it
  118. as as a pagota uh looking very much like like Japan today. uh uh the EU is not going to suffer this
  119. to the same extent the US provided we still have some immigration is not going to suffer it at all and what happens
  120. when the population ages there's a reluctance to spend money at least on consumer
  121. goods and uh we see this and actually in marketing surveys in China that uh many
  122. people though they have money are are reluctant to spend so the question is what steps can be taken to unleash the
  123. the buying power of of of domestic consumers. Now again, there's a group in the countryside, very large group, not
  124. the wealthiest in China, but not poor, um, who have untapped spending power and simply haven't had access to goods,
  125. which they'll now have. But how much more spending is going to take place in the urban populations uh, as they think
  126. about getting older, requiring social security, support if they can get it, medical services, etc. I don't know. I
  127. think that's the big question mark for China. So if you look to the next 10 years by
  128. uh 2021, what other inflection points do you see coming down the pike? That's an interesting question. Um
  129. uh the the there are a couple of inflection points. One's next year the government
  130. will change. We have no idea what the policies of Xiinping are going to be. We we simply
  131. don't know. He's been very careful. Will he be another who Hu Jun Tao? Will he be
  132. another Jew? Jurong J. Nobody knows. Um that's probably the most fundamental inflection point coming up
  133. soon. uh it will take a few years to know what direction China uh uh China takes. I think continuation of the
  134. present policies will alone or slow or cap economic growth a bit because um under Huenta
  135. um there's been a resurgence of the wealth and to some extent the power of the state enterprises uh in China um
  136. fewer are employed by the state the s so s so s so s so s so s so s so s so s so
  137. s so ses um uh are responsible for you know less and less of overall output in GDP but
  138. still their centrality in the economy uh has gone up and the question is whether
  139. there's going to be a second and vigorous wave of privatization in China turning toward a more capitalist system.
  140. We don't know the answer to this question and I think that's a very very fundamental question. Um a second
  141. inflection point will would will occur if under lower growth scenario different provinces go in
  142. different ways. Um you've maybe read about you've perhaps read about uh uh Bilai who is the party secretary of
  143. Chongqing. um uh he's advocating uh a very domestic centric uh set of policies. We should produce for the
  144. people's needs here in China. Okay. There's also a little bit of Mauism associated uh with Mr. Bo uh which
  145. people have seen in Time magazine and other places. Uh so his policies are very inward-looking. Take care of the
  146. people. If you go down to Guangdong um which has been the export engine of China um you'll see a different
  147. scenario. The government there I sat at an economic forum actually keynoted economic forum Guangdong uh in June the
  148. conversation was entirely about building and rebuilding our export industry. So the second turning point would be
  149. this kind of internal conversation if you will between uh a policy of focusing on the home market and f focusing on the
  150. needs of the people versus maintaining the export machine and um uh how that would play out politically I have no
  151. idea but clearly uh something like that uh is is coming along. Um third inflection point um
  152. innovation. China has a set of policies uh designed to promote innovation. Whether they'll have the effect, no one
  153. knows yet. Among other policies, um just like their targets for GDP growth, their
  154. targets for patents. The rate of patenting in China far exceeds patenting in the US. Um, and uh, although many
  155. many of the patents are so-called service patents of short duration, uh, many of them are not renewed because
  156. they're of no economic value. The number of patents of economic value is hard to
  157. determine, but in any case, there is a commitment to patenting and political advancement depends on GDP, but for some
  158. officials, it also depends on patenting and patenting. There's also a policy of indigenous
  159. innovation and it's been around for a while and the government asserts it and then you know last June or so said well
  160. we withdraw part of it but basically in government purchasing the policy is or was to favor locally developed products
  161. products developed not necessarily by Chinese-owned companies but by reg Chinese registered business entities
  162. they could be foreignowned And of course um many of the MNC's other western businesses have objected to this
  163. exactly where the policy stands a little unclear. Uh as always the rule in China
  164. is it's going to vary by province. So it it's hard to tell but that that that innovation inflection point if it works
  165. as anticipated could counteract some of the other forces I'm describing. Right. uh uh since we were talking a little
  166. earlier about uh you know the the export market and one there's also of course this financial aspect to it. Uh China
  167. has been trying so hard to globalize the R&B and I was wondering uh how you see that playing out over the next 10 years
  168. or so. The R&B that's an interesting question. Um uh f first I will confess even on camera
  169. that this is not my expertise. Uh having said that um I think they're in a bit of a bind and
  170. here's why. By globalizing the R&B you mean rendering the R&B convertible on the capital side, capital accounts and
  171. that would allow bond markets to open up so on and so forth. If you don't have convertability, it's very hard to get
  172. global investors in there to purchase bonds. Precisely. Okay, here's the rub. Look at M2 in China. The money supply,
  173. it's like a rocket. It's going up a lot faster than their GDP. You know, you're looking at numbers
  174. in the vicinity of 20% a year. And the question is, what's the source of it? And can
  175. they reverse this at the source? And um this and and the source ironically in my
  176. judgment lies um in their currency policy. Why is that? Uh when the Chinese government when I take to the Chinese
  177. government, the people's bank of China a dollar, I'm an investor. Okay, I need R&B. Okay, they give me the R&B,
  178. although in decreasing amounts. I think we're at about 6.4 right now, something like that. Um, they hold on to the
  179. dollar, they don't sell that dollar because they want to keep the country export
  180. competitive. So rather than selling the dollar, um, uh, they, uh, they they hold the
  181. dollar and the central bank reimbures the commercial bank where I exchange the money. um effectively not with fresh
  182. RMBB but rather with what are called sterilization bills long-term low interest notes.
  183. Okay? And the banks are required to hold them in their reserves. That's one of the reasons the reserves are so high.
  184. And um the consequence of this is that um uh on the one hand you've got all this currency around. On the other hand
  185. uh banks are finding it harder and harder to loan money because the reserve requirements go up. That's a that's a a
  186. check on inflation. If those bills do somehow circulate, I'm not confident that they don't circulate. That's a
  187. double negative. I really don't understand the intricacies of the system. I'm not sure anyone here does.
  188. Right. Uh but if they circulate, they create inflation because there's so much money around. Um if they don't
  189. circulate, they crimp they crimp loans, they crimp industry. And so China's in a
  190. bit of a bind because imagine imagine what would happen if suddenly the the R&B were fully
  191. convertible. Okay? What would happen is people are going to wake up and see what
  192. we've seen anyway but aren't fully taking into account and that is prices are very high in China. I have a slide
  193. I'm going to use tomorrow in class on food prices in China. Supermarket prices in China. Sure
  194. rice is cheap, cabbage is cheap compared to the US. Uh but if you look at the price of pork, not a lot different.
  195. actually milk not a lot different and Chinese incomes at least by the official statistics are a lot
  196. lower than ours. So there there are there there are a lot of um there'll be a lot of unanticipated consequences of
  197. freeing up the R&B and yet there's no alternative to it because basically the people of China are paying the price of
  198. uh an RMB that's uh uh pegged uh you know at a fairly low level uh at this point. So let let me ask with end with
  199. one final question. Hypothetically, let's assume that you were invited by the Chinese government to give them some
  200. advice on how they should navigate the next 10 years uh of uh participation in the WTO so as to maximize the benefit to
  201. the Chinese economy and the world economy. Uh what would you what advice could you give them? Oh, it would be
  202. unequivocal. I would they wouldn't listen to it, but it would be unequivocal. I mean that is like if if
  203. if you know the the people of China have as everyone has aspiration to become middle class right and um uh uh and yet
  204. some sense the uh the the the business model China's been using under WTO has run its course. Costs have gone up.
  205. Labor's labor is tight. Population's aging. Okay. What's the solution to the problem?
  206. Well, um, the solution doesn't lie in pouring more concrete, which is what they did in response to 2008. The fixed
  207. asset investment just blew through the ceiling. No, the solution lies in the quality of your people.
  208. And as a consequence to move up the value chain um you've got to upgrade the skills of your folks
  209. which means a huge investment in people. So I'd stimulate the demand side by trying to provide modest social
  210. safety nets where none now exist. It's very important so that the aging population, the aging consumer class
  211. willing to spend a little more, but at the same time, given that there's going to be a shortage of people, that you're
  212. going to be substituting sophisticated equipment for people. Um, you're going to have to upgrade the skills of people.
  213. Um, probably at all levels, including managerial. Um, so one recommendation is they send their most promising people
  214. here to Wharton. Okay. I know seriously so they learn the skills that are needed to run
  215. very complex very sophisticated enterprises u but more generally that they try to take some of the folks whose
  216. experience is in manual labor and train them to be sophisticated technicians so that China is able to continue to grow
  217. relying on higher value added industries and sheds the lower value added industries again like the needle trades
  218. clothing stuff like that. So that that that would be the recommendation. Marshall, thank you so much for joining
  219. us today. As always, it's a pleasure to be here. Thank you very much. [Music]

Brief Summary

China's WTO membership transformed its economy, boosting manufacturing but creating rural challenges and future uncertainties.

Key points

  • Impact of WTO on China. Marshall explains how joining the WTO transformed China's economy dramatically.
  • Winners and Losers in the Economy. Some sectors thrived post-WTO while others struggled, particularly in rural areas.
  • Challenges in Agriculture. Labor shortages are threatening key crops like cotton and tomatoes in China.
  • China's Export Growth. China has become the world's biggest exporter, but is this growth sustainable?
  • China's Aging Population. The aging population poses significant challenges for future economic growth.
  • Navigating China's Economic Future. Advice on how China can maximize benefits in the next decade of WTO participation.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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