Why Pitchers Are Dominating Baseball

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ABOUT THE EPISODE Why has pitching gained such a powerful edge in Major League Baseball?

Adam Ottavino, former 15-year MLB reliever and current ESPN analyst, explains how pitch design, bat-tracking data, and high-speed video changed the way pitchers develop their arsenals and attack hitters. He discusses in-game adjustments, dugout pitch calling, the importance of command alongside velocity, automated ball-strike challenges, and the evolving balance between offense and pitching.

ABOUT THE PODCAST Sports is a game of numbers. Wharton experts Eric Bradlow, Shane Jensen, Cade Massey, and Adi Wyner team up to tackle the world of sports, from current events to longstanding issues such as: What sports streaks are the most impressive? How do you rank the best players? Can athletes be compared across sports? Moneyball Highlights explains how decision-makers in the game can avoid the common mistakes and embrace the data. Episodes are recorded at the Wharton School.

#MLBAnalytics #PitchDesign #BatTracking #BaseballData #PaulSkenes #AdamOttavino ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.

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Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
  1. Welcome. Welcome to Wharton Moneyball. Welcome to a full hour of sports analytics
  2. here on the Wharton Podcast Network. This is Cade Massey hosting with two of my long-time three collaborators.
  3. The third will slide in here eventually. Eric Bradlow is here from his office on
  4. the University of Pennsylvania campus. Adi from his home office on the main line.
  5. I am ringing in from Austin, Texas as I usually am these days. Shane will be in here eventually.
  6. Some combination of us are here almost every week of the year, have been for more
  7. than 12 years now, about 12 and a half. We are recording on a Tuesday afternoon.
  8. The show's going to go up on Wednesday. We are in the heat, the heavy heat, at least we are down here in Texas
  9. and baseball season getting a little more serious, football season about to crank up.
  10. We have a guest this show. We're going to bring guests in first half hour, do open line second half hour.
  11. Our guest is the last stand against football guests. Let's put it that way. We're about to roll into pre-NFL, pre
  12. -college, but we got a lot of baseball to talk about. We thought we would stay with baseball a
  13. little while longer. We're delighted to have a first-time guest to introduce him and to lead this conversation
  14. with him. I'm going to pass it over to Adi Weiner. I'm delighted to introduce Adam Otovino.
  15. Cade, thank you. As a baseball fan, we watched you pitch many times, a 15-year Major League Baseball
  16. player, a reliever. You became a star kind of reliever just as there was a transitioning, I think, from
  17. that starter going seven, eight innings to the bullpen starting to play an extremely prominent role.
  18. You pitched for six years in New York, at least three or four with the Yankees, a couple with the Mets.
  19. We have an interlude in Boston. We tried to forget about that. It's delighted to have you here, Adam.
  20. We don't have too many players. We actually want to do more of that. We're actually looking out for players who have
  21. shown an interest during their playing career in thinking about data. You were connected to us through one of
  22. my former students, Jared Faust, who was with the Mets. He's now the director of analytics for the
  23. NBA. He said, you got to talk to Adam. I'm really happy you could come and join us here today.
  24. Thanks, Adam, for joining us. Thank you for having me. All right. Let's just jump in.
  25. Everybody talked about pitching and what has happened to pitching in the last, well, in particular,
  26. the last five years, but you started it earlier than anyone. Give us a sense of how you use
  27. data, technology to really shape your pitching arsenal. Sure. Yeah. It's a pretty long story, I guess, but
  28. I feel like when I was coming up through the leagues, we were still being judged
  29. on a lot of traditional metrics. There's still a lot of valuation going on. Oftentimes, looking back on it now, I realized
  30. that we kind of lucked into player development. We kind of lucked into progression.
  31. Trial and error is the way you would try to fix your pitches or become better at a skill, but the feedback loop was
  32. extremely long and things took a long time in that regard. Then eventually, I got to the major leagues
  33. where there was a lot more resources, and I started digging in on my own performance
  34. and tried to look at numbers of what the best players were doing, and then I tried to reverse engineer that into my own
  35. game a little bit. That was kind of the beginnings of it. Then over the course of the next several
  36. years, the technology and the analytics revolution really went to another level.
  37. For me, the first order of business was figuring out what the good players actually do
  38. in terms of components of their performance and breaking down. You look at overall performance, like what's a
  39. guy's results, but then how are they achieving that? That was the first thing. Then the second thing was going on a
  40. crusade to get better skill-wise and using a lot of the new technology to kind of help me in that way.
  41. Really make that feedback loop when you're trying to improve a skill a lot tighter.
  42. I was luckily maybe a year, year and a half ahead of everybody else. Not everybody, but the majority, large majority of
  43. players. That gave me a leg up, but then before I knew it, this stuff was everywhere.
  44. You started with what? What technology? Was it the Rapsodo? Was it the Speed? How did you get even started down this
  45. path? I'd say even going further back, starting to look at sites like Fangraphs and basically parse
  46. leaderboards and try to figure out what were common denominators of people who were having success.
  47. Trying to look at the pathways to success, whether it's low walk, high strike out.
  48. Just conceptualizing the game differently because when we were coming up, we were taught to pitch
  49. to contact, batting average was still very valued. All of a sudden, over time, it became
  50. clear that we were valuing the wrong thing. Hitting stats and pitching stats are kind of
  51. interchangeable. I can learn a lot from hitting stat. For me, it was like figuring out what
  52. are the non-negotiables? What do I actually have to be able to do results-wise on the field to
  53. get results consistently? It's some combination of high strikeouts, low hits, and low walks.
  54. You can usually be good at two of the three to be successful in the big leagues.
  55. On a very basic level, I want to do that. But then when you're thinking about how do
  56. I increase my strikeouts or lower my walks, you start to get into this conversation of,
  57. well, if I have better stuff, then I can trust it more in the strike zone. That's going to do both things.
  58. It's going to increase my strikeouts. It's going to lower my walks. Potentially, I'll have more options to parse through
  59. a hitter's strengths and weaknesses and limit my hits as well. That leads you into the player development side
  60. of things. Yes, originally, I was using a Rapsodo. What year did you start using it?
  61. I just want to put it in context just to give our listeners some sense. Adam, you started in 2010.
  62. The Moneyball revolution was at the end of the 90s. This idea that you're still being taught things
  63. that the Oakland A's and analytics teams had abandoned almost a decade earlier is really kind
  64. of amazing to think about. When did the Rapsodo start coming on? Is that around that time or later?
  65. Rapsodo wasn't until probably 2016. Through that period, some stuff was being coached
  66. super well. Basically, Dave Duncan, who was the pitching coach for the Cardinals, was basically saying, okay, how
  67. are runs scored? They're scored by free bases, so walks and then slugging percentage, like extra base hits.
  68. That's why his philosophy was so built around ground balls because it reduces slugging percentage and
  69. the idea of throwing strikes. They were also trying to counteract on-base percentage and slugging even at that point in
  70. 2010. In terms of things that you could actually do to improve your skills, that technology didn't
  71. come around until 2015, 16, 17. The big magic year happened for me between 2017 and 2018 when I started my lab.
  72. I was aware of the Rapsodo before that, probably 2015, 2016. Then eventually, that Edgertronic camera, which was to
  73. me one of the bigger breakthroughs because that was the first time we could really see
  74. the ball interacting with my hand, with our hands at release. It's something that we always wanted.
  75. Me and my dad would talk about that even as a kid. Man, gee, wouldn't it be great if I
  76. could see exactly what's happening in perfect clarity at release? The technology just hadn't caught up yet.
  77. Those are the two tools that I worked with initially. Adam, can you just interject here?
  78. Can you just tell us what is a pitching lab? What does that mean to you? You can take that as far as you
  79. want to take it. Nowadays, the pitching labs are gathering data on everything that's happening on the mound, whether it's
  80. ball flight, ball velocity, mechanics, biomechanics. There's force plates in the mound, a million
  81. different things they're trying to get readings on in an effort to understand what's happening in
  82. that dynamic movement. That's what a pitching lab is. Now, I didn't have kinetrax or any type
  83. of biomechanics information at that time. It was strictly ball flight movement. Then also, like I mentioned, the high-speed
  84. camera was allowing a window into maybe a little bit of the how question. Like, okay, I know my breaking ball moves
  85. this way, but how am I doing that? Or I know so-and-so throws this pitch, but how is he doing that?
  86. These were the unanswerable questions before that technology. Now, your iPhone can do it, but at
  87. that point, the edgertronic was the cutting-edge thing. I remember getting wind of this technology and
  88. calling up the company on a whim and basically saying, are you getting baseball people that
  89. have been calling you about your cameras? They said, yes, actually. Then I was like, I knew I was
  90. in the right place. Yeah, that first edgertronic and that year of trying to basically make my stuff better between
  91. 2017 and 2018, that was a big eye -opening moment for me. Did you have a statistician that worked with
  92. you? What did you do with all that data? No. What I initially did that offseason...
  93. 2017 was the worst season of my career. I had come back off Tommy John in 2016, and I had a four-year run,
  94. albeit interrupted by injury there, of being pretty good. I was a little burned out from the
  95. rehab process coming out of 2016. My offseason of 2016 going into 2017 was not up to par.
  96. I struggled to throw consistently. My throwing partner had moved away to Nashville.
  97. Ultimately, I just expected my skill to show up when spring training began. That was a rude awakening.
  98. When I showed up, I was lousy. Long story short, I was really bad that whole year.
  99. I was really out of whack. I realized around August of that year that I was going to need to work on
  100. the skill side of baseball. That side is not just there. You can't just reliably rely on it to
  101. be there all the time. Human nature is that you're always going to be drifting one way or another, whether it's
  102. your mechanics or your physical ability. Things are always changing. That really caught my attention.
  103. I basically was like, I need to start working on this in the offseason, taking advantage
  104. of my time. We started working on getting the space for the lab in August of 2017.
  105. Once we were able to figure that out, I knew that I needed some help. I actually flew out to Kent, Washington, went
  106. to Driveline, which is in the private sector. They do baseball training, data-driven baseball training.
  107. It was probably my first real exposure to that world in earnest. I went out there for a week, mostly
  108. to learn about my camera and how to use it, and also what the best practice was for the workflow of a pitch design
  109. session. I learned a lot that first week. I worked with some people that now run
  110. Major League pitching departments. Sam Breen with the Yankees, Eric Jagers with the Mets, Matt Daniels with the Rockies now.
  111. I worked with all three of those guys, as well as Kyle Boddy, who ran the whole joint, who was with the Red Sox
  112. recently. All these people ended up going all over. At the moment, they were a little ahead
  113. of the game. They knew the workflow. I was learning that. In terms of data, I was basically getting
  114. all the data that I had that mattered, which to me was my game data from the season.
  115. Everything that the Rockies were taking, and getting information on, all the stuff that was available
  116. in the private sector, I was looking at in an attempt to say, okay, what's broken?
  117. What needs to be fixed? But I didn't have a statistician with me. It was mostly my dad who was helping
  118. me set everything up. At the time, we were using these big lights, the tungsten lights to make sure that
  119. you could see my hand on release with the Edutronic camera in perfect clarity. He was doing the shutter all the time.
  120. Then we would go back and review the tape. We were getting ball flight information.
  121. We were tethering that to each rep and understanding what was different here, what was different
  122. there. It was pretty granular, but we were able to make some strides. In that very first year, I fixed my
  123. grip on my two-seam fastball. I basically created a cutter slider pitch out of thin air.
  124. I discovered why my sweeper was good and how to not mess it up, basically. That's how you did it.
  125. You were able to basically construct a bunch of pitches that became dominant. I remember this was your year in Colorado
  126. before you came to the Yankees. You just were incredible. In that first year for the Yankees, I
  127. think your ERA was under two. Basically, it was that, the creation of those pitches.
  128. Let's take us a little forward because you were at the forefront. Now, I feel like everybody does this.
  129. Taken even further, it feels like pitching has gotten advantaged over hitting in Major League Baseball.
  130. Just thinking about a couple of things. First of all, Eric and I can testify that when we were young, Major League staff
  131. had, what, 8 to 10 pitchers on it? That's about it. You used your starters. You had a mop-up guy, two set
  132. -up guys, maybe, and your closer. You had that because you just didn't have that many good pitchers.
  133. Your back end of your starting rotation, outside your closer, your release staff was a little
  134. sketchy. You just didn't have that great pitching. I feel like the depth now is insane.
  135. I think you probably wouldn't disagree, but is it getting out of balance? Are the hitters going to catch up, or
  136. does there need to be a restraint on the pitching? What are your thoughts on this?
  137. Yeah, it's a mess a little bit because, to your point, the supply of pitchers with
  138. stuff is just endless. It's just endless now. I see Shane raising his hand there.
  139. Go ahead. Oh, no. I guess I was going to ask a follow-up just because it sounded like you
  140. were getting into more supply. I thought he was focusing more on the supply side of just more pitchers throwing their
  141. best. I feel like maybe you can speak to the fact that I've always thought that pitching
  142. inherently has an advantage because it's the proactive part of the equation. Hitting is always going to be reactive.
  143. To the extent that analytics can give you strategic edges, I feel like there's a lot
  144. more proactive strategy on the pitching side versus the hitting side. Maybe you can comment on that.
  145. Yeah, no doubt about it. As pitchers, we initiate the action. The hitter doesn't have a choice of what
  146. they get to hit. We dictate that. Their biggest way of combating that is by controlling the strike zone and forcing you in
  147. the strike zone, basically eliminating your ability to make them swing at bad pitches.
  148. It's funny. They've made some strides. They have the traject now where you can basically simulate hitting off of me or anybody.
  149. It's not perfect. It doesn't have variable extension. If a guy strides closer to you or
  150. less close to you, that's not there. You can see the shape of the pitch. You can get more synced with the guy's
  151. timing. Theoretically, you can have 10 at-bats against me before he ever faced me.
  152. That's one thing that they've gotten better at. A big key with that is they use softer balls now too.
  153. You can get jammed as a hitter without any fear of that ruining your session. You can go in and make practice harder.
  154. Also, they have bad tracking data now. You can understand your swing a little bit
  155. better metrically. To me, that's a little bit of a pitching stat. Once I know your bad tracking data and
  156. I can confirm some of that, that gives me another advantage because, again, I am dictating
  157. the at-bat every time. Yes, hitting is always going to be behind. I do think that in the future, we're
  158. going to see hitters who have much more variance in their swing. They're going to find ways to be anticipatory
  159. at a higher level. Things will probably swing back into more of the hit tool type of conversation over time.
  160. Right now, the pitchers have definitely the advantage, especially when we can create stuff so easily,
  161. which has been proven out over the last several years with some of the training that
  162. guys do to add velocity, as well as you see the depth of arsenals that everybody
  163. has because everybody uses that same process I was using before to create new pitches just
  164. to the nth degree. Before I call on you, Kate, just one comment. The way we describe this statistically is the
  165. variance or standard deviation is just much smaller in pitching quality than it is in hitting
  166. quality. Once you go from the best hitter to the middle of your lineup, it's a pretty
  167. big gap. From the best pitcher to the middle of the pitching staff, it isn't such a big
  168. gap anymore. You just have so much, and that's because of all this training. Kate?
  169. Just one follow-up to something you said there, Adam, and this is maybe something that's
  170. talked about a lot that I've missed. I have not heard someone talk about pitchers
  171. using bat tracking data in their preparation or in their strategy for an at-bat.
  172. Can you give us an example of how you as a pitcher would use your knowledge of a particular batter's bat tracking patterns or
  173. habits against him? Yeah, sure. If you go look at some of the basic bat tracking data, a couple of key
  174. metrics, swing tilt, which is essentially how tilted your shoulders are when you go to make
  175. your initial move, as well as attack angle, which is the angle at which you're coming
  176. through the ball. Major League average is about 10 degrees. There are some examples of people that have
  177. extremely low numbers there, and they basically are hitting more down on the ball, so their
  178. bat path is a little quicker but more choppy. Vlad Guerrero has gotten in trouble with that
  179. this year. If you see something like that, and they don't have a lot of variability, if you
  180. can zoom out a little bit and see where their attack angles are all the time, you can get a sense of whether a
  181. guy has actual bat path adjustability or if they're locked into their path. Once they're locked into their path, and you
  182. know that, if it's extremely downhill, then sinkers, change-ups, pitches with downward vertical movement are
  183. going to force them to beat that ball on the ground. They're not going to be able to get
  184. underneath those pitches. If a guy's on the opposite end of the spectrum, and he's got, say, an 18
  185. -degree attack angle, extremely uphill, well, now, force team's going to get above his barrel.
  186. He's going to pop a lot of balls up, especially if you have an elite movement on your four seam.
  187. There's different things that you can mess with. Usually, it helps to understand what fastball to
  188. use. This has been the year of the multiple fastball approach from pitchers. Almost every pitcher in the league now throws
  189. both of their fastballs, four seam and two seam, probably cutter as well. The reason why they do this, even though
  190. it's more than likely that one of their pitches is not elite, is because it helps
  191. you combat the different bat paths. When you're scouting guys, leading up to a start or leading up to a series, you're
  192. definitely aware of what type of swing the guy has, and if there's variability in there.
  193. Anybody who doesn't have a level of variability, they're probably going to get pitched in the
  194. exact way they don't want to get pitched. It becomes an execution game. If I execute, then I'm probably going to
  195. win. This is fascinating, because there's so much to learn about each batter. Does the pitcher expect to keep this in
  196. his head, or is it the catcher, or is it the dugout? Who's figuring all this out before the game
  197. and during the game to make this actually executable? Really, the teams now have taken the onus
  198. on a lot. We've actually seen teams now that are calling pitches from the dugout.
  199. When you get a heat map now from a high-level organization in terms of how to attack a batter, it's your strengths overlaid
  200. with their weaknesses. A lot of things are baked into that. Some of the smarter teams are taking swing
  201. path into account. Honestly, swing path usually shows up in the results anyway. If you have a swing path that's a
  202. certain uphill, you're going to struggle at the top of the zone on four-seam fastballs.
  203. It's just the result of the swing path. It all shows up in the heat maps, and they try to influence you and the
  204. catcher into pitching into those areas that overlay your strength against their weakness.
  205. Sometimes that's not a thing, and you have to try to pivot. For me, the Major League game at the
  206. highest of high levels is actually really played pitch-to-pitch. I think there's quite a few hitters that
  207. do have the ability to be anticipatory and cover both four-seamers and sinkers and things
  208. of that nature. To me, there's a lot of liquid analytics going on while a veteran might be pitching.
  209. They're looking for cues within the hitter to understand where they are timing-wise, where their
  210. barrel is in space in real time, and then they're making adjustments off of that.
  211. But the team does try to dictate a lot of this. Yes, this is a lot of information, and
  212. most pitchers don't want to be crippled by it. Most pitchers leave the onus on the catcher
  213. or on the team to game plan, and they'll just go out there and be a target hitter.
  214. But I think the best pitchers in the game take ownership over this stuff, and they
  215. figure out how it works and how it works within their own context because they have
  216. more information like how convicted they are on a given day to throw this or that.
  217. To me, the best pitchers in the game are aware of this, and they have all this in their Rolodex.
  218. We're talking about a Garrett Cole or a Justin Fairlane or somebody like that. This is so relevant.
  219. You just mentioned this emergence of calling pitches from the dugout. You're the perfect person to ask this question.
  220. What's your position on that? Independent of your position, where do you think the league is going?
  221. I've noted that they're calling pitches from the dugout in the college game, both baseball and
  222. softball, and we know the Marlins had started this. We've tried to get someone from the Marlins
  223. to talk about it, and they're keeping it in the dark. So maybe you can tell us a little
  224. bit about the advantages, disadvantages of the pitch comm coming from the dugout.
  225. Yeah, I think that the ultimate goal organizationally when doing that is basically to keep pitchers
  226. on their optimal usage. If there's a higher level of strategy than that, I'd love to know, because I don't
  227. think you can have a very good vantage point from the dugout. I can't call pitches for the pitcher, tell
  228. them what I suggest without having the pitcher visual or the catcher visual, because I don't
  229. know where every pitch is. I can't necessarily read the swings as well from the dugout.
  230. So I think what they're doing is they're building an optimal usage for that pitcher for
  231. that game versus those batters based off of expected outcomes, and then they're basically funneling that
  232. in there. And I think in the aggregate, it can work really well. But again, I think in the nitty-gritty
  233. big moments, like if you watch World Series games or big playoff games, particularly last year,
  234. Yamamoto, who ended up being the World Series MVP for the Dodgers, him and Will Smith
  235. were doing a great job of reading and reacting in the moment. They had to face the same batters over
  236. and over again. Remember, he pitched in three games of that series. And to me, if it wasn't for his
  237. ability to read things in the moment and adjust on the fly, he would have never parsed that lineup.
  238. If he stayed with the same exact approach over and over again, the Blue Jays would
  239. have adjusted to that. Can you make that concrete? You said read in the moment and make
  240. adjustments on the fly. Can you just tell us an example of his doing that with a batter?
  241. Sure. Say you throw a sinker to a batter and a guy fouls it, but he's underneath
  242. the sinker. And let's say it's middle of the zone and the guy's underneath the sinker.
  243. So that sinker comes with about, for Yamamoto's case, about five or six inches of induced
  244. vertical break. That's the amount that the ball essentially is forced to rise relative to gravity.
  245. But when he's underneath that pitch and maybe a little bit late on it, like if he hits it underneath and out to the
  246. over the first base dugout, if he's facing a righty, that cue right there can tell
  247. him, well, if I throw a four-seam fastball, which has an additional 10 inches of
  248. induced vertical break, and I locate it higher in the zone, so its entry point to
  249. the zone is a lot flatter, its approach angle is a lot flatter, I think that's too much of a gap for the hitter
  250. to be able to adjust in one pitch, his swing plane. He just gave me a clue about his
  251. swing plane in the moment, and now I'm going to go ahead and expose that. So that's something that I did the whole
  252. tail end of my career, even though I was throwing 91 or 92, that's just one example of that.
  253. Another example would be to throw, and this happens a lot, you throw a breaking ball
  254. that looks like a really enticing pitch, it's a strike, it goes maybe an inch or
  255. two off the corner, but the batter has a very comfortable take on that. Basically what he's telling you is that anything
  256. on that outer third, he's already eliminated it. His approach is to look for something inside.
  257. Once you have that information, you can now throw a fastball right on the outside corner
  258. and get a take. So all of those types of things in the moment are super real, but you have
  259. to have a lot of experience kind of playing chess, basically doing the same openings over
  260. and over again, seeing the other guy's reaction and then knowing what to do to kind
  261. of take advantage of that. Whereas if you're just following the sheet and you're just pitching towards zones of perceived weakness,
  262. I think at a certain point that that kind of actually loses its effectiveness. So one of the conversations that we've had
  263. over the years talking about baseball is as things have gotten faster and faster and faster,
  264. we feel like there's a diminishing role for the control specialist. And in fact, we've argued that if you
  265. can't pitch fast, if you're specializing in control, you're never going to make it to the
  266. majors or just looking for a minimum amount of velocity that's gotten so high. So in your experience, is it still possible
  267. to be a dominant major league baseball pitcher who doesn't throw 98, 99? Can you do it at 92?
  268. Yeah, you can do it at 92. You might have a hard time getting signed though, to your point.
  269. Velocity is the way in, right? I mean, the stuff, because it's quantifiable, because
  270. now they can put it into an algorithm and basically spit out how you think those
  271. pitches would perform, those become very powerful tools in the minds of front offices and they're
  272. hard to ignore. So it's your ticket in the door is having good stuff. But if you want to have a long
  273. career in major league baseball, sustainable long career, you better learn the other layers of pitching.
  274. And command is a huge one of those. It's a huge force multiplier. And what you see a lot of guys,
  275. well, a lot of teams doing now is they're actually hunting pitchers who do have command
  276. and then they think they can physically develop them once they're in their system.
  277. You look at Cam Schlittler on the Yankees. He had excellent command as a pitcher at
  278. Northeastern, but he was throwing about 90, 92 miles an hour. So he wasn't particularly sought after.
  279. But now that he throws 98 with those same skills, you see the results. So you're kind of seeing people developing pitchers
  280. in opposite fashion than they used to. But again, you need to have velocity at some level.
  281. It's a prerequisite to get your foot in the door. I do think you can succeed, but you
  282. do have, and you know, the biggest word in baseball, especially pitching is margin for error.
  283. And there's no doubt you have less margin for error with less velocity. Adam, just one quick follow up to that.
  284. Can you tell us one of the things that Adi has brought to our show, has talked a lot about is both inter-game
  285. variability. Do you know within one or two innings of pitching, whether today is a good day
  286. for Adam Modavino or a bad day? Like, do you know it? And if it's a bad day, do you
  287. go to a, do you have a plan B to say, look, I don't have my best stuff. Maybe I don't have as much control or
  288. my pitches aren't breaking as much. How do you, in some sense, update your own belief or how you're doing on a
  289. given day? Probably easier for a starter to pivot within a game and just drop a pitch, you
  290. know, because he's got more innings to throw. It's hard though to project results.
  291. Like it's hard for me to say, oh, I feel great. They're not touching me today because baseball is
  292. not like that. Anything can happen, but I can tell you how I feel and what I can execute
  293. or not execute. And then go from there as a reliever. I mean, I would try to ignore it
  294. mostly because I have to go with my best stuff. Majority of the time, it's my job to
  295. basically stay sharp all the time, you know, find a way to mitigate the outings where
  296. I do not have my slider or something like that. But yeah, I think it's real for starters.
  297. You see them pivot on a dime based off of a team's aggression against them, or maybe they can't throw their change up for
  298. a strike and they just drop it. You got to do that stuff. Sometimes you can't just try to force a
  299. round peg in a square hole. You got to look at the other side of it. Let's take the other side of it.
  300. When you know you've got incredible stuff, let's say you're coming in. I forget, you played a variety of roles
  301. in the relief staff, but take a reliever comes in in the sixth inning, which happens
  302. increasingly often. I mean, even when a starter pitches fantastically for five innings, you regularly see someone come
  303. in in the sixth, which we can talk about whether that's a good or a bad idea. And I have thoughts on that, but we'll
  304. save that for maybe when we talk to a starter. But if you have a sixth, imagine you
  305. came in, Adam Odovino in the sixth inning, and you are exceptional. Well, I feel like the managers will just
  306. take you out in the seventh because they've got a game plan. They don't react to the fact that you're
  307. on your high game, and then maybe you should pitch another inning. Have you thought about it?
  308. I mean, it just seems so programmed the way that relievers are used in a way that seems independent of observation in the moment.
  309. Yeah. I mean, reliever workloads, especially in the first five months of the season, are managed more
  310. for... Well, they should be. They should be managed a little bit more for health.
  311. So sometimes it's tricky to just put a bigger workload on a guy because he's throwing
  312. well. So that's usually what goes into that. That's probably why you see that so often.
  313. A guy dominating, and then they just pull him anyway. Because really, they'd like to have him impact
  314. more games, and they're a little worried about having a crazy variable workload, especially on a
  315. relief pitcher early in a season. It's also like these guys are all redlining, right?
  316. The pitchers you see nowadays that throw 98, 99, it's not what it used to be. They're built to throw one inning as hard
  317. as they can, 20, 25 pitches. So their ability diminishes very quickly if they have to get pitched a 40 or 50
  318. pitch mark or something like that. So they're just not built for it, and that's probably the answer there.
  319. Amazing. Can I just... One second. I just looked up something. I mean, are you an exceptional chess player?
  320. No, I mean, I'm a good chess player. I'm not exceptional. I get wiped out by real chess players.
  321. But it says here you have a 2375 Blitz Peak Blitz rating. No? No, no, no. That's crazy.
  322. That's the internet. No way. And you never played a game. Eric, I think we have time for one
  323. last question, perhaps. Eric Cade will maybe let me know, but I want to get your reaction to ABS.
  324. So how has that affected your view of the pitcher, the bat? Whose benefit? Is it equal?
  325. I think that might not be... It might not actually be equal because of the out pitches were always...
  326. They function differently. So what is your take on it? My take on it is I like it
  327. for the game. I don't want it to become a full -time thing. I like the challenge aspect of it.
  328. The human within the system, if you will. But I think it's a hitter advantage generally,
  329. especially left-handed hitters. Left-handed hitters got screwed off the outside corner for years.
  330. If you go look at the umpire heat maps, for most of my career, they were getting strikes called on them that were outside
  331. way more often than righties were. And that was a little bit unfair. It's changed the game a lot because now
  332. the batters don't chase as much borderline pitches because they know they have the challenge in
  333. their back pockets. Swing decision, plate discipline, it's even more important. It's a little harder to get guys to
  334. be reckless swingers under the ABS, in my opinion. It's a little bit more beneficial if you're
  335. able to freeze guys because the pickup point of the strike zone is midway on the
  336. plate. It's eight and a half inches from the tip. So now you can throw these pitches that
  337. are balls that creep back to the corner a little bit late and maybe break the plane and get that called strike.
  338. But that's easier said than done. So I don't know. I think it's advantage hitter, particularly a left
  339. -handed hitter, but not a huge advantage. It's interesting to hear you say that.
  340. And of course, you're talking about much more subtle effects of batter decision-making.
  341. But in terms of the... The batters are way less successful. The success rates are by far the highest
  342. for catchers, which you'd think would advantage the pitching side more than the hitting side.
  343. But I think they have obviously the best vantage point or whatever. But you're talking about kind of actually a
  344. different kind of... Approach. Kind of effect where the batters are actually changing their approach based on it.
  345. Well, it showed up in league-wide walk rates this year. That's where it shows up much more than
  346. in the challenge. The aggregate challenge, yeah, it's favored the defense because the catchers have been the best on
  347. that. But in the aggregate approach, walk rate has been up this year, league-wide.
  348. And my speculation on that is just they're less willing to chase borderline pitches because they
  349. know they have a challenge in their back pocket. And so, you see slightly better plate discipline
  350. league-wide, which I think benefits the hitters. But you're right. In the aggregate of the challenges, it's benefiting
  351. the defense because the catcher has the best view. That's actually a great point.
  352. So, the statistic shows it benefits the offense. But in reality... I mean, the defense.
  353. But in reality, it might actually benefit the offense because of things you don't actually measure,
  354. their chase rates. One last question for you before we let you go. As a former major league pitcher, what do
  355. you make of a mid, early career drop like we're seeing with Paul Skeens? What causes him to lose three, four miles
  356. per hour, be the most dominant pitcher in baseball, and then all of a sudden look
  357. very human and very vulnerable without an obvious injury? Watching him, to me, it feels like, number
  358. one, his delivery is a little out of sync. He's been a little inconsistent with his timing
  359. and his delivery. Because if you watch him recently, it's a mixed bag of results.
  360. Sometimes the velocity is down a mile an hour or two. Sometimes the command is nowhere to be found.
  361. He's beating himself more out there with that lack of command. That's something that he didn't do the first
  362. two years. But you also look at some other stuff under the hood, and it's like the fastball
  363. has a better swing and miss rate, even being slower. There's a lot of indications that his stuff
  364. is still really good. I just think his delivery has been inconsistent. I also think the workload's likely catching up
  365. with him. He's been on a pretty big run here lately through a historical amount for LSU.
  366. He pitched a crazy workload the last two years, WBC before the year. So at a certain point, it's human nature.
  367. You're going to go through a period where you're just not as calibrated as you want
  368. to be, and there's going to be a downtick in physical ability, and it's going to
  369. affect you. This is normal, really. I know that we expect him to be perfect, but this is normal.
  370. You go look at the velocity up and downs of a career of some of the greatest pitchers.
  371. They're not really defined by their downturns. They're more defined by how they come back
  372. from that. So to me, yeah, this is a bad moment for him. But if he's going to be an all
  373. -time great, he'll solve this problem just like he solved the other problems. And I expect him to be good going
  374. forward. But yeah, it's also like nobody throws 100 forever. When that comes for you, I mean, it
  375. comes for everybody. I can't think of one starter that maintained it forever. Adam, can I just ask you one follow
  376. -up to this as well? I know you're on the YES Network now, I think. Do you have aspirational goals to be a
  377. pitching coach, and why wouldn't someone hire you as a pitching coach? I have no interest in being a pitching
  378. coach. I just think I've been solving the pitching problems for a long time. And pitching coaching on a daily basis is
  379. much more of a therapy role. And those guys are great that do it. I have nothing but respect for all my
  380. pitching coaches. It's just not interesting to me anymore. I'd be much more interested in managing or
  381. running the team, something with a little bit more bang for my time there. Just don't see pitching coaching.
  382. But I mean, I've already been offered those jobs a little bit. So people are on the same page as
  383. you. It just doesn't excite me. Well, why don't we let Adam go there? Greatly appreciate your making time for us, Adam.
  384. Terrific conversation. Wish you the best with everything you have going on. All right, great.
  385. Thanks, guys. Absolutely. That's the first half of this week's Wharton Money Ball.
  386. Come back and join us after the break. Welcome back. Welcome back to Wharton Money Ball.
  387. Welcome to the second half of this week's show. The whole crew is in here. Shane joined a few minutes late, but he
  388. was there for virtually the whole first half. Eric and Adi, you hear this is Cade
  389. just off the lines with a spectacular guest. I assume you baseball boys were happy enough
  390. with that conversation. That was great. Definitely. I learned some things, man. I mean, just fundamental baseball things.
  391. This isn't even fancy, cutting-edge analytics stuff. We learned plenty there, too, but just pitchers
  392. adapting within a net bat to what they're seeing the batters do. That's basic stuff that's been around for 200
  393. years or 150, whatever it is, and just neat to hear him talk that through. We are now open lines, going to hear
  394. what else has caught your eye. We've got a number of sports bouncing around, of course, probably baseball-centric, I'm going to
  395. guess, but why don't we start? Who wants to start us off with? Maybe if we get on our horse, guys,
  396. we can get two rounds in here. What caught your eye in the world of sports? I'll jump in first because I was at
  397. a professional baseball game last time. I went to see the Phillies-Marlins. It's a great game.
  398. What a game. What was striking to me is that I've been watching a lot of Yankees, and the
  399. Yankees can't score, and particularly they can't score without hitting home runs, so it was a
  400. pleasure to see two teams score with singles and base running and not striking out.
  401. It seemed like old-school baseball. By the end of the fourth inning, each team had about eight or nine hits.
  402. It's great to be in the park because the difference of being in the park and watching on TV, you can appreciate the fielding
  403. and the base running in the ways you don't really catch when you're watching on TV.
  404. These are two strong teams, and they're built. On paper, it looks like the Phillies are
  405. a stronger team, but the Marlins are an impressive young team. That's what happened.
  406. The Marlins always develop impressive players for other teams, certainly. If they ever hold on to them for
  407. more than a season or two, then they could potentially build a strong team. What I'll be interested in, Adi, maybe something
  408. you've talked about, is it's clear from watching the Phillies most of the season that their
  409. relievers are not the same quality. That's the weakness of the team is that middle relief.
  410. Do you think that there's a situation in the postseason where Sanchez and Wheeler, and maybe
  411. if it's Lizardo, if he's on, that these guys pitch eight innings? Mattingly just says, look, I can't trust these
  412. middle relievers. You know what? I'd rather just leave this starter, and it's the end of the season.
  413. I'm not going to worry as much. I can. That would be my immediate reaction to say
  414. yes to that. Let's just think about what Adam told us in the first half. These pitchers are built to do a certain
  415. thing, and there's a concern that they might not be able to do something else. I think that's probably overblown in the case
  416. of on performance. I'm not sure they have the data to back up some of the claims about what
  417. happens to them if you do this because they don't really do experiments. Eric was talking about stretching a starter out.
  418. They do six innings and do eight instead, as opposed to, I think, in the context
  419. of the conversation we were having with Adam, who is a reliever that has a really
  420. good first inning. One inning, do you give him a second inning? To a certain extent, that's a much bigger
  421. workload multiplier than stretching out a starter. Also in the playoffs, you can do so
  422. many things at the very end because you know that's the end of your season. You can pull that.
  423. I think that helped the Phillies in the playoffs. Certainly, it was the Dodgers' solution to their
  424. bullpen was last year. Their starting pitchers go eight innings. All right, guys.
  425. Who's up? Well, I texted you guys live on Sunday afternoon. I guess I got to eat a little
  426. bit of crow, a little bit of Texas golfer crow. I'd been on Scotty Scheffler all season for
  427. being the king of second place. Well, I won this last Sunday, I'll tell you that.
  428. As appropriately pointed out by Kate on the text chain, not only did he win by eight strokes, but these are the top 70
  429. golfers this season. It's not like you say, well, there's a bunch of, this is a weak tournament with
  430. a weak field. No, these were the top 70 golfers. Now, you could make an argument that some
  431. of the golfers have that are already in the top 30. Just to remind everybody, it goes 70 this
  432. last week, to 50, to the BMW, to the players championship that's 30. If I'm, I'm going to get up from
  433. Rory McIlroy, who by the way, played horrifically. I think he ended up 20 shots behind
  434. Scheffler, but let's imagine he doesn't play well the next, last week in this. It doesn't matter.
  435. He's in the top 30. As long as he plays well, that last round, he can still win the FedEx.
  436. But I don't remember a round of golf. I watched all day, Saturday and Sunday. I don't think he hit one bad shot.
  437. I mean, this was the Scotty Scheffler. I mean, he plays like that. He's winning every tournament he plays.
  438. No, I'm just, I'm not saying he can play like that all the time, but his iron play.
  439. He can show you he's a master playing almost like that, right? Yeah. No, I'm just saying his, his iron play
  440. was beautiful. He was number one in putting, which people have said is his Achilles heel.
  441. I don't know. You don't win four majors. And also the other thing that's still, again,
  442. I want to point out- Eric, just for a second. When you say number one in putting, how
  443. do they measure that? Is that strokes gained putting or is it - Yeah, strokes gained.
  444. Strokes gained. Okay. Yeah. Strokes gained. It adjusts for, for how, how far you
  445. are from the hole. Absolutely. But Adi, but Adi still thinks that that's a fanciful or rather a random stat, a
  446. noisy stat. I would argue that the reason why he was, he dominated in this one is because
  447. he was number one in putting in this round. I would say it doesn't predict going forward.
  448. Yeah. It has a lot of retrospective value as far as describing what actually happened, but yeah,
  449. prospectively probably next time around. It's basically, Adi's basically telling us it's the,
  450. it is to golf what recovering a fumble is to football. It makes a huge difference in the game,
  451. but it's not predictable. Yeah, except the only issue I would take with that comparison is that there is a
  452. mechanics part to putting. Like if your putting plane isn't level, if you're bringing it outside in, inside out, if
  453. you're moving your head, if your body isn't staying. I would imagine, we've talked about golf being
  454. streaky in the sense that players get locked in, whether it's their, I can imagine the
  455. same being true in golf. So my guess is that the inter-day correlation in putting is higher than you might
  456. think. Well, that's a hypothesis. It's testable, but I'll just tell you what the data shows.
  457. The data shows incredibly clearly that there's almost no over-dispersion in putting success rates.
  458. So if you look at putting success rates among players, if you started with the belief
  459. that everybody's equal, you're still going to see different strokes gain percentages or whatever number you
  460. want to use to evaluate putting across golfers over the course of a season. Why?
  461. Because there's- Real quickly, that's just saying, if we four all flipped coins, just because
  462. we're all flipping fair coins and have equal coin flipping ability doesn't mean we're not going
  463. to have dispersion. There will be dispersion. And you're going to come in and say,
  464. over-dispersion is more than you would get if it was just randomly distributed, and that
  465. would be because somebody actually has skill, positive or negative. Okay, now we understand over-dispersion.
  466. It's a beautiful explanation. And so if you imagine that all the golfers are just tossing coins, you'd see a
  467. certain amount of variability due to randomness. And then any extra variability would be due
  468. to differences in performance. And we know how to measure the amount of randomness you expect to see from randomness.
  469. And there isn't more. There's a tiny bit more. And it's so little that we essentially locate
  470. a couple on the high side and a couple on the low side, but not with power. I think there's about one or two that
  471. pass an FDR threshold that's reasonably strong that we can... Franklin Delavanor Roosevelt did statistics?
  472. Let me say, by the way, Adi, just to support what you said, and this one actually has a reference to it.
  473. According to Gemini, the round-to-round correlation between strokes gained putting, it puts it...
  474. I'll use its exact words, Adi, incredibly low, sitting at 0.05 to 0.1 as opposed to strokes gained off the tee, which
  475. is around 0.4. So it concurs with you that this is not... Matter of fact, Adi, let me just tell
  476. you exactly what it says, which is your words. This means a player's putting performance in round
  477. one has almost zero predictive power about how they will putt in round two. And Eric, we can take it back to
  478. your mechanical hypothesis. And you're right. Of course, there's mechanics involved with the putt,
  479. but imagine how, just consider rather, how much less mechanical is involved with the putt than
  480. with every other swing. I mean, it's just so compressed relative to every other swing.
  481. It has to be the variance in those mechanics is also compressed. Either way, I have full expectation, maybe not
  482. on his putting side, but, you know, Adi, you've talked about this many times. If Scotty Scheffler's hitting the ball eight feet
  483. from the hole and I'm hitting it 20, doesn't matter how hot a putter I am. And so, you know, he's gonna...
  484. I have no reason to believe he's not the heavy favorite for these last two rounds
  485. of the players' championship. Let me just jump in and say, I've enjoyed... I think this may be the first year.
  486. The FedEx Cup's been going on for 20 years. I've never really paid any attention to it.
  487. And I'm only marginally paying attention this time, but the cutdowns are fun. You know, I care more about...
  488. I mean, I care less about Scotty winning the second of four rounds, even though it
  489. was a real tournament, than I do, like, Jordan Spieth just missed the cutdown. So they cut it down to 50.
  490. Spieth was leading, I think, tied for the lead after round one, but he kept on drifting backwards and ends up 52nd, where the
  491. cut was 50. So he's just outside. And another Texas golfer, Pearson Cootey, ended up
  492. like 56th or something. And he was in the running there at the end. So, you know, the guys care a lot.
  493. That cutdown mattered. That was the exemption for all the $20 million tournaments next year, which is the high
  494. level of tournament. And, okay, we've got the BMW this weekend. It's the third of the four rounds.
  495. And the cutdown there is the top 30 after this weekend will advance to the championship
  496. round. And so people are going to really care. So you care about winning the tournament.
  497. All this action at the bottom of the field is also interesting to watch. Agreed.
  498. Great. You're a big guy, Kate, on tournament design. You've done a good job. And they got rid, as we talked about
  499. a couple of weeks ago, of that, you know, different starting points to par in the
  500. last round. All 30 guys are starting at ground zero after, you know, it doesn't matter how many
  501. points you have. It doesn't matter where your place is. One guy, remember, used to be minus 10.
  502. It was scattered all the way down to minus zero. I'd win the tournament by five but lose
  503. because I started seven shots behind. That was all just awful. Well, what about for regular golf tournaments that
  504. like more of a progressive cut? Like, not like, you know, have it like after just one cut after two days, you
  505. cut down each day by like, they could do this within a tournament. You could do it within a day.
  506. You never got to take them around and hook them like in the theater. There's maybe two tournaments a year where they
  507. don't just have the after two-day cut. There are a few tournaments where they have
  508. after two days and then after three days. So, there are just a few. It's not 95% of the tournaments are
  509. after two. I like Shane. Shane, there could be even, you could get pulled if you have a triple.
  510. Yeah, that's right. It doesn't matter if you don't score. If it's triple bogeys, you get pulled and
  511. they walk out and they ceremonially walk you off the court. After like five holes, be like, I don't
  512. think this is going to work out. We'll see you next week, bro. For entertainment purposes, this would be good.
  513. Okay, what else you got? Who's got something? I also actually, I've got something.
  514. I guess it's Patriots lately because he's playing for the Patriots this season. But I thought it was kind of interesting.
  515. I was looking at interception, kind of career interception totals. And Kevin Byard is the current league leader
  516. in interceptions. I think he's had 36 career interceptions. He may be the last player with a
  517. chance for 40 interceptions in the season. We used to have a lot, but there's nobody, I think, even close.
  518. Okay, Shane, so give us the context for this hypothesis. Interception rates going down over time.
  519. Wait, you said 40 interceptions in a season by one player? No, 40 in a career. A career.
  520. Yeah, career. All right. Yeah. Yeah, these are career interception totals. So this is Shane walking his- So
  521. to give you, if you want a little bit more context, I guess like 84 players, I looked at 84 players in NFL history
  522. have recorded 40 plus interceptions. Most recently was Terrence Newman in 2016. So it's already been 10 years since we've
  523. had one. Half of that have had 50 plus interceptions. Last one was Asante Samuel in 2012.
  524. Only 11 players in NFL history have had 60 plus interceptions. Charles Woodson was the last in 2014.
  525. What's interesting, Shane, is it's obviously not because they're throwing the ball less.
  526. No, it's just interception rates are going down at a greater rate than passing rates are
  527. going up. Right. So in the 70s, we had some really sloppy quarterbacks. Terry Bradshaw, Roger Staubach, the greats were also
  528. just kind of slinging them up there. You don't have to go that far back. Brett Favre, we all remember Brett Favre.
  529. That wasn't that long. But I was going to say, but they were also running the ball in the 70s
  530. a lot more. Could it also be a role of analytics in the sense that there's no way I'm
  531. throwing to that guy's side of the field and there's just advanced analytics that just says,
  532. you know, how can you pick the ball off if the ball's not thrown towards you? It would be interesting to kind of, yeah,
  533. yeah, yeah. I always thought it was kind of more just a coaching thing where like, you know,
  534. there's just so much, so much emphasis towards avoiding turnovers. It's more about like hesitance on the part
  535. of the quarterbacks. I'll throw out a hypothesis related to what Adam Modavino and I, and we all talked
  536. about with the depth of leaders, maybe the second and third and fourth wide receivers are
  537. not as different than the first. They used to throw to that guy over and over again.
  538. And because the rest of the team was just good enough. Both of these last two comments are questions
  539. about targets. And you could look at the distribution of offensive targets. Is it less skewed than it used to
  540. be? And then you can look at the distribution of defensive targets because Eric's hypothesis, I think
  541. everyone would grant you shame, the prime mover being a greater emphasis on reducing turnovers.
  542. But Eric's coming up with a secondary, which says, and could they better identify the best
  543. defenders and just more tailor away? And that's an empirical question. Whether the best DBs get thrown at less
  544. than they used to. That's interesting. Sure. That's absolutely, that's interesting.
  545. You could also back to your sling down the field theory, Cade. I'm pretty sure the yards per attempt is
  546. going down in the NFL. So it's more to kick off a six yard pass as opposed to the air choreo,
  547. let's gun it down the field 30 yards and gain big chunks. And that's another possibility is that.
  548. I was going to bring that up that I wonder if, and that's again, a part more on the quarterback side where the quarterbacks
  549. are kind of being trained and offensive systems are being built around more kind of short
  550. passing games and those that, and that's going to just have less interceptions. I also think there's one more to throw
  551. in. I see this a lot because of the kickback rules and the touchback rules and the
  552. kicking rules and the ability of the kickers to kick so far. I feel like there's no desperate long field
  553. passes as much because they just need to be like barely past midfield and they kick
  554. a field goal. So that they don't have to. It's true. Hail Mary's do count. Hail Mary's are a non-trivial source of
  555. intercepts. Yeah. And they'll do that. We want to kind of look at the Hail Mary, like you're right, Audie, that you
  556. need to kind of take that Hail Mary kind of out of it. You're right. And you want to take that out of
  557. the equation anyway. Well, it definitely, it plays more generally to conservatism because with the kickers these days, literally
  558. as soon as you cross midfield, you can, if you don't screw up, you can probably get, you might be able to get a
  559. field goal. And that never used to be the case. So that's, that's all interesting.
  560. Shane, kudos for porting a baseball type question over into football. Because we talked just last week about, there's
  561. never going to be another, you know, 200 win pitcher or whatever it was. And the dynamics of the game lead to
  562. these changes instead. And Shane's like, oh, I see where that applies in football.
  563. And we buy it. We buy it. That's good stuff. We can do that more often, Cade. I feel like there's great questions about what
  564. has happened on the football field relative to sort of talent, the way we see that
  565. in pitching and even hitting. They're just so much better. Are you seeing football players much better than
  566. they used to be in the depth and breadth that we're seeing in baseball, in pitching?
  567. Yeah. The place I go immediately is not where I think you're curious. And that is the distribution of talent in
  568. college football, which is, of course, this is a time of year we're thinking about that
  569. a lot. In fact, one of you, I don't know who, asked a question about Indiana AP poll.
  570. The AP poll just came out. I put that in there. So the AP poll comes out and the
  571. top six go thusly. Ohio State, Oregon, Georgia, Notre Dame, Texas, Indiana. And I'll just give you another one or
  572. two because these are national contenders. Miami, A&M maybe, Ole Miss maybe, but
  573. definitely Miami. Everyone recognizes Miami could win the championship. There are seven teams.
  574. What was the question about Indiana at six, Eric? I was just surprised given, I mean, obviously
  575. they lost Fernando Mendoza, the number one player in the draft, but haven't they gone 27
  576. -2 the last two years, including 16-0 last year? And isn't their coach thought of as pretty
  577. darn good? I was just surprised. I would have expected them to be higher than number six as the defending national champion.
  578. And I have no faith in, I mean, I understand this is not a probability ranking to win the national title.
  579. That's not what this is. Because if it was, I don't see any reason why Oregon is as high as it
  580. is. I have no faith that Oregon's going to win the national title. Notre Dame, I mean, Notre Dame seemed very
  581. far away from winning the national title last year. But can I just kind of norm this
  582. slightly compared to NFL? Because I thought when we looked at this a couple of weeks ago, the Seahawks were
  583. like the fourth or fifth highest team to win the odds to win the Super Bowl this upcoming year.
  584. And there's way more turnover in a college roster than there is in a professional roster.
  585. So it's kind of, if you're shocked that Indiana is this low given only a year, were we that shocked Seattle was that low?
  586. I don't know. Maybe we were. I can't. I think we expect the competition to be tighter, the distribution to be tighter in NFL.
  587. And so maybe you'd just more get mechanical regression. But Eric, I think a lot of people
  588. are optimistic about Indiana and most people would put them on the short list of teams
  589. that could win the national championship. And I think one of the things that you're seeing there is there's just less separation
  590. at the top than there used to be. You can flip that. You can flip any number of teams on
  591. the top six or seven and people aren't going to argue a great deal. I think that's the simplest explanation.
  592. But one more comment just to clarify on Notre Dame. Notre Dame, they've built strongly, I mean, rather
  593. steadily over the last few years, but now they have a huge schedule advantage. They're just don't, they're not playing much and
  594. they have a locked, if they make the top 12, they're in the playoffs automatically.
  595. And so they are probably one of the highest probabilities to win the championship because of
  596. the combination of strong roster plus light hurdles between here and there. I hadn't thought about the point that going
  597. from four to 12 may have benefited them more than anybody else. Yes. And then they got this, just in this
  598. off season, they got this extra guarantee that if they're in the top 12, I think
  599. that's what it is. It's like, well, that would be not a guarantee. There's something special and easier about Notre Dame.
  600. So I guess I've forgotten what it is exactly. Okay, fellas, we're kind of at a time,
  601. but somebody has something I suspect that they'd like to add before we leave. Anything else you want to drop into the
  602. conversation before you leave it for the week? I just think, yes, I think it's going
  603. to be a great finish. I know Shane had been bringing up that Jordan Alvarez, is he still leading?
  604. You have it on the rundown. The AL, I think he's still leading. He is still leading.
  605. Yeah, I believe so. Say more about Jordan Alvarez. Well, he's currently leading the AL in all
  606. of the three triple crown categories. So RBIs, batting average, and home runs, kind
  607. of a old school measure of hitting dominance. I mean, a week from now, he could be not leading.
  608. I mean, it's close contests in all three of those categories, but he is currently leading
  609. the AL. And if he gets that to the end of the season, if that's still the case, we give him the triple crown.
  610. And it's the first time it would have happened in like 15 years. Tell the Martians about Jordan Alvarez.
  611. Where's he playing and how good did people think about him? How highly did they think of him before
  612. this season? I think people knew him to be one of the best sluggers. He plays for the Astros.
  613. He's their designated hitter. I think he was known to be one of the best sluggers in the game up
  614. until this season. I think maybe there's less excitement about him because we're very coastal in general when we
  615. view baseball. And he's a DH, so he's only doing hitting. He's not fielding as well.
  616. So that kind of keeps him a little further down. I think he's only fourth or fifth highest
  617. in war this year, despite dominating at least in these counting stats in the AL.
  618. You're obviously referring to Miguel Cabrera. First of all, I can't believe it's been
  619. 14 years. But he's the only person to win it in the last 60 years. Yeah, it was Yaz before that.
  620. It was Yaz in 67 before that. And as a matter of fact, no one in the National League has won it for
  621. 90 years. I mean, at least among hitters these days, I think batting average and home runs are
  622. kind of those are almost negatively correlated in hitting these days. Right. More so than usual.
  623. That's interesting. That's another empirical question. Okay, guys, before we leave baseball and before
  624. we wrap up the show, I have to say Shane's comment earlier on the rundown pointed
  625. out to me that there are only five teams with winning records in the AL. And is it unusual that that would happen?
  626. There are nine in the NL with five. There's just the whole AL is just awash with under 500 teams.
  627. And I'm not talking about a bunch of 50-50s. They're like three games below. And then one of the five is like
  628. one game above. And so we're about two days away from having four teams that are above winning in
  629. AL. What's going on? Yeah, I mean, honestly, I've been complaining about the AL Central for like a decade now,
  630. so I'm not going to go there. But the usual AL Central not putting up any good teams has now combined with the
  631. AL West good teams so that the AL leader, literally, I think the Blue Jays are still in last place in the AL East,
  632. and they're like a half a game out of the wildcard spot. And they're in last place.
  633. And they're in last place in the AL East. The last place team in the wildcard spot.
  634. Obviously, not all teams from the AL can make the playoffs, but right now it's lined
  635. up so that at least three, four out of the five do. And meantime, the Rays have slipped up to
  636. have tied for the second best record. They're tied with the Dodgers. They're actually ahead of the Dodgers in win
  637. percentage. Second best record in Major League Baseball. That is your division rival, Rays.
  638. Any word on that? I keep expecting them to stop it. I don't know. I'm used to looking kind of up at
  639. that. As a Red Sox fan, I'm not surprised we're kind of looking up at the Yankees
  640. at this point of the season, though the journey the Red Sox have taken has been very weird.
  641. But to still be looking up at the Rays is a surprise to me. This is something people analyze.
  642. If I look at their run differential, I talked about this many times. They're actually only at plus 53 for the
  643. season. The Dodgers are at plus 142. So they have a better winning percentage. And the Yankees and the Red Sox are
  644. way beyond the Rays in terms of run differential. So something about the Tigers, listen to this.
  645. The Tigers are three games below 500, and their run differential is plus 86. The Rays are 26 games over 500, and
  646. their run differential is 53. The trick is to win by a little, and it doesn't matter if you win by
  647. a lot. It doesn't help you. I know, but it also means that the Rays, and this has been true, I know
  648. this is true for the season. I know they're leading the majors, not shockingly, Adi, in one run wins.
  649. They're winning a lot of close games, which means they must have a decent bullpen.
  650. I'm just saying. Or they're getting blown out in their losses, as Adi was saying.
  651. Well, that's another possibility. Guys, go ahead. Y'all are more sophisticated than I am.
  652. You're quicker, certainly, mathematically. You're using run differential as kind of a
  653. proxy for the Pythagorean theorem. And so I'm curious what it doesn't pick up. So run differential is a more fundamental view,
  654. presumably, of the team's ability than their one loss record. But Pythagorean theorem is a better way to
  655. do that. What does the run differential alone not get that Pythagorean theorem? I talk about it in Moneyball every year.
  656. So basically, run differential is the difference. Pythagorean is based on the ratio.
  657. So the Pythagorean is when W over L is equal to run score divided by runs allowed to the power of two.
  658. That's the same formula as the Pythagorean. So it's based on the ratio. So it's a little bit better when you're
  659. looking at very disparate run environments. So you want to know that you care about the ratio of your scoring to allowing.
  660. But in today's game, where the environments are all pretty close, it's completely linear, and you
  661. get essentially the same thing. Kate, you were kind of asking a little bit like what you think is not kind
  662. of picking up on. I think one way in which you kind of see some consistent residuals away from the
  663. Pythagorean expectation is high quality bullpen. So like the Yankees outperformed their Pythagorean expectation
  664. for like an entire decade in the early 2000s. And it was Mariano Rivera, basically.
  665. I mean, and he was obviously an exceptional version of that. But I think that's kind of where you're
  666. sort of, you can kind of get that kind of more. Just to norm this for the race, since
  667. I just computed their Pythagorean expected wins versus actual, they have about six more wins than
  668. expectation right now, based on the Pythagorean formula. So they're 26 games over 500.
  669. They would be about 13 or 14 games over 500. So it's, I mean, you add six, you subtract six wins and add six losses is
  670. what I'm saying. Even the worst version of the race is better than any AL Central or West team.
  671. All right. That's a crazy differential. That's a crazy differential. Six is high.
  672. Six is high. Oh yeah. Oh my God. At the end of the season, it's high. And we're not even at the end of
  673. the season. So at the end of the season, you'd expect it to be higher because well, the
  674. RMSE on wins will be bigger as you get, as the game goes on, but on winning percentage, it's lower.
  675. So it's a lot. And Shane, I'm still pretty confident that when it gets to the playoffs, if the Rays
  676. are playing one of the teams from the AL West, you're still going to flip your coin.
  677. Maybe you'll give them a slight advantage with the coin, but not much. Oh yeah. Yeah, no, that's right.
  678. That's right. It'll still be coin flips at that point for sure. Unless it's the Yankees playing an AL Central
  679. team, in which case you don't even have to use a coin. We love the twins. Okay guys, real quickly, in order to push
  680. against being too coastal, let's recognize that Chicago this week is playing the inner city rivalry,
  681. Sox and Cubs. And I don't know how long it's been since both teams are as good as they
  682. are this year. It must be a long time. The Sox are leading their division, I believe,
  683. and the Cubs would be if not being behind the Brewers. They are both two very good teams this
  684. year playing at Wrigley probably right now, if it's a day game. But good fun. You guys have to tear your eyes away
  685. from the coast periodically. All right, guys, that has been another episode of Wharton Moneyball for the whole crew here,
  686. for Audie Weiner, for Shane Jensen, for Eric Bradlow. This is Cade Massey. Big thanks to Jacob Grodnick and the Grodd
  687. team who make this thing run, and to Dee Patel, our big boss lady, keeping us on track.
  688. Thank you guys for listening. Come back and join us next time. Between now and then, enjoy your sports.

Brief Summary

Adam Ottavino discusses pitching analytics, technology, and the evolving dynamics between hitters and pitchers in baseball.

Key points

  • Introducing Adam Otovino. Cade Massey introduces Adam Otovino, a 15-year Major League Baseball player.
  • The Evolution of Pitching. Adam Otovino shares insights on how pitching has changed over the years.
  • The Evolution of Pitch Calling. Teams are now calling pitches from the dugout, changing the game dynamics.
  • Pitching Strategy and Adaptability. Pitchers must read the game and adjust their strategy in real-time.
  • Velocity vs. Command in Pitching. Velocity is crucial for entry into the majors, but command is essential for longevity.
  • Spectacular Guest Conversation. Cade discusses insights from a spectacular guest, emphasizing fundamental baseball knowledge.

Episode highlights

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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