Why Private Credit Investors Can't Always Cash Out

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ABOUT THE EPISODE Private credit has attracted billions from investors looking for higher returns. But what happens when they all want their money back?

Itay Goldstein, Wharton Professor of Finance, explains the liquidity risk inside semi-liquid private credit funds. He examines why funds holding illiquid loans can struggle to meet redemption demands, how AI-driven concerns over software borrowers intensified recent pressure, and why new investment flows can dry up at the exact moment investors seek to exit.

The conversation also considers what liquidity really means for private credit investors, the risks of expanding these products to retail investors, and how funds can better prepare for periods of financial stress.

ABOUT THE PODCAST Every day, business scholars answer pressing questions in their research - but what do their insights mean for you? In this podcast, Wharton faculty dive into what inspired their studies and how their findings resonate with the world today. Learn how research insights translate into knowledge you can use, with host Dan Loney.

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  1. So, with the private credit funds, it's interesting. They started offering all these deals where they
  2. say, you know, we're not going to give you all your money out when you want, but we're going to give you the ability
  3. to take out up to 5%. And then before you know it, they experienced this massive demand for redemptions where investors said,
  4. you know what, we want our money now. Welcome to the Ripple Effect, the podcast that
  5. takes you on a journey through the minds of work and faculty. I'm your host, Dan Loney.
  6. And in each episode, we'll be diving deep into the inspiration behind the groundbreaking research that
  7. Wharton professors have conducted and exploring how their findings resonate with the world today.
  8. Private credit funds have been drawing a lot of attention in the last few months as
  9. investors have tried to cash out in certain circumstances. But many have not been able to receive
  10. the level of liquidity that they had been expecting. That's partly tied to the fund and the
  11. fact that several of them might be considered semi-liquid. Wharton finance professor Etai Goldstein, along with two
  12. of his colleagues, wrote a paper on why this may be occurring, and he joins us to discuss it.
  13. Etai, great to talk to you again. How are you? Great, great to be with you, Dan.
  14. Thank you. And I guess let me start with having you explain the research and why it is
  15. becoming so important right now. OK, let me just say that this is joint research with Yao Zeng, who is here
  16. at Wharton, and Chuck Fung, who was our PhD student and is now at Drexel. And over the years, I've been working on
  17. different types of financial institutions, the extent to which they provide liquidity transformation and the extent
  18. to which this exposes them to fragility. In the context of banks, we have the well-known phenomenon bank run.
  19. And that's kind of the classic form of liquidity transformation causing fragility because the bank is
  20. holding very illiquid assets, but then offers depositors the ability to take their money out whenever
  21. they want. And this is causing a bank run phenomenon. Now, this has been known for well over
  22. a century. And then we had institutions like deposit insurance that are meant to alleviate this.
  23. We saw this type of phenomenon migrating into mutual funds. And I've done research on mutual funds investing
  24. in illiquid assets and exposing themselves to fragility. And now we see it kind of in
  25. this new type of institution, kind of a hybrid institution that is the private credit fund,
  26. semi-liquid private credit funds. So we thought it would be interesting to see how these things are manifested there.
  27. And obviously, it has been all over the news in the last few months. I think I talked to you for a
  28. different forum about that as well, but we saw it happening. So we wanted to study it a little
  29. more closely. Right. And one of the names which obviously is being talked about a lot in this instance
  30. is Blue Owl Capital. So from what we have read in the media and what you've seen, what is it
  31. that has gone wrong in this instance? Right. So, you know, we have here the classic
  32. dilemma in finance. On the one hand, you want to invest in illiquid assets because some of the returns,
  33. some of the progress that we can get from finance is coming from the illiquid assets.
  34. On the other hand, when you're thinking about investors, many investors are demanding liquidity.
  35. If you tell them, look, put your money here and see you in five years, they're going to be nervous and they're probably going
  36. to look for other vehicles to put their money in. So with the private credit funds, it's interesting.
  37. They started as closed-end funds where basically they hold illiquid assets and they don't offer
  38. their investors any liquidity. They don't tell investors you can take your money out.
  39. But then as they grew and they tried to attract capital for more and more investors,
  40. this became a problem. So they started offering all these deals where they say, you know, we're not going to
  41. give you all your money out when you want, but we're going to give you the ability to take out up to five percent
  42. of the value of the assets. And this is where the semi-liquid fund name is coming from.
  43. And Blue Owl was kind of the postal child of this. They started offering these deals.
  44. And then before you know it, they experienced this massive demand for redemptions where investors said,
  45. you know what, we want our money now. And I should say, I think you're going to ask about that.
  46. But let me just preempt that a little bit. I should say, you know, it was kind of a perfect storm where on the one
  47. hand they're offering this semi-liquidity and then on the other hand, the business model where
  48. they are investing and giving loans to software companies came under question with the rise of
  49. A.I. So with these two things coming together, we basically saw that there was a
  50. wave of redemptions and a wave of fragility. All right. And so those redemption rates being supposed to
  51. be in and around five percent, that's kind of the standard, the norm for the industry.
  52. Right. So the semi-liquid structure was basically mostly saying, you know, we are not going to
  53. allow more than five percent being redeemed in a quarter. And they said, you know, five percent is
  54. something we can handle and it's not going to cause a full blown run. And we have enough resources to pay for
  55. it. One thing that we show in our paper is that this is really not the case because five percent is still pretty challenging.
  56. But is there something specific in this instance where those people were asking for such a
  57. higher rate of redemption at this particular time? Right. So I would say part of it is
  58. coming from what's going on with A.I. and the fact that A.I. has advanced so quickly and really put under question the
  59. business model of some of the software companies. Software companies are saying, look, what we are
  60. going to do is we're going to develop all this software that is going to help businesses and individuals.
  61. But then with A.I. tools, a lot of people say, well, we can now do it ourselves.
  62. So why do we need the software companies? Now, many of these private credit funds were
  63. giving loans to the software companies. And now as we start seeing the challenges
  64. with software companies, people are starting to question, can they pay back the debt to the
  65. private credit funds? And now you have a private credit fund that is highly exposed to software company and
  66. the underlying investors say, well, you know, I have an opportunity here to take my money
  67. out. So maybe I should just go ahead and do it. But then the problem is that many people
  68. are thinking the same at the same time. And the fact that you think others will do it will cause you to do it
  69. even more. And supposedly from what I read in the paper, it's also a time where the inflows
  70. declined. So that, I think, kind of doesn't it magnify the problem? And then you have the outflows going out,
  71. but the inflows are not coming in as fast as they would probably like. Yes, yes, absolutely.
  72. Because, you know, these private credit funds will say, well, we can handle five percent redemption
  73. because we have cash. We get some income from the loans and then there will be inflows coming in.
  74. So everything is going to work out. The problem is exactly the same reason that causes people to want to take their money
  75. out is also causing new people not to want to put new money in. So the decline of inflows and the increase
  76. of outflows are highly correlated because they are tied to the same underlying problem.
  77. Does there need to be then also a look at the true definition of liquidity and what it needs to be moving forward, especially
  78. with a lot of these situations going on? Yes, I think so. I mean, I think, you know, one thing
  79. that we show in the paper and then there was some coverage in the Wall Street Journal based on this that was digging even
  80. deeper into this particular angle. You know, it's really difficult to know what is the right definition of liquidity here.
  81. And different funds are adopting different practices in measuring their liquidity.
  82. But when they say liquidity, what exactly do they mean? I mean, many of them, you know, if
  83. you think about the classic form of liquidity, it's just the cash buffer and super liquid
  84. assets. But then there are different levels of liquidity and some of them are starting to count
  85. other types of assets that are not as liquid. And the problem is, you know, in time
  86. of stress, when investors are knocking on the door trying to take their money out, then
  87. those other assets that are not super liquid will become even more difficult to cash.
  88. And as a result, this is becoming challenging. So I think there needs to be more
  89. clarity exactly what we mean by liquidity. And then if you think about, say, cash,
  90. OK, if I have a cash buffer of 5 percent, that doesn't mean that I can cover 5 percent of outflow because I will
  91. need to maintain some of my cash buffer. So it's really becoming tricky. So I think we need to take a
  92. closer look at that. How much then does also the design of the process need to be looked at, especially
  93. when you're talking about the retail access to these funds? Right. So I think the retail access is certainly
  94. part of the problem here, because, you know, when these funds were only catering to institutions,
  95. then they could safely remain closed and not offering this redemption opportunity, this liquidity to the
  96. investors. The problem is that once you start expanding and you want to attract retail investors, retail
  97. investors are more nervous about that and they would like liquidity. So then you start offering this redemption windows
  98. and you start offering this what we call semi liquidity. So I think the question we need to
  99. ask ourselves is, do we want to offer this kind of product to retail investors? And if we want to offer this kind
  100. of product to retail investors, what exactly do we tell them? You can't tell them, look, you have this
  101. opportunity to liquidate every quarter, because that's probably not the case. We see it now.
  102. I mean, they say 5 percent, but then there are 13 percent coming on the door and asking for liquidity and they can't get
  103. it. Do you and your colleagues look at what maybe needs to be looked at moving forward
  104. in order to have a more solid flowing process in place so we don't have these occurrences in the future?
  105. Yeah. So I think part of the output of this research, where it can go, is to think about how can we design the system?
  106. And as I said, maybe part of the design is you don't offer liquidity to the underlying investors.
  107. Maybe part of the design is, OK, you do offer liquidity, but then you think you take into account that every once in a
  108. while there will be this crisis and things are going to look like they're going to
  109. blow up. You know, crises are not necessarily a disaster, right? Maybe the financial system has to live with
  110. some level of crisis period every once in a while. I think that's also something we need to
  111. consider. A version of a reset, correct? Right. Yes, exactly. And we need to take into account that
  112. if you want to have this form of liquidity transformation, meaning holding illiquid assets but allowing
  113. investors to take their money out periodically, then crises might be unavoidable.
  114. And every once in a while we will have that thing happening. But if you think that this is the
  115. end of the world and you absolutely don't want to be exposed to any form of crisis, then just don't offer this product and
  116. say, look, this is illiquid. If you want to put your money here, be prepared. You're not going to be able to take
  117. your money out for the next X years. Itai, great to talk to you again. Thanks very much, sir.
  118. Thank you very much. Great talking to you. Thank you. Itai Goldstein, finance professor here at the Wharton
  119. School. Thank you for listening to The Ripple Effect. We hope you found this episode informative and
  120. engaging. Don't forget to subscribe and leave us a review so that we can continue to bring
  121. you the best insight from the Wharton School.

Brief Summary

Etai Goldstein discusses liquidity issues in private credit funds and investor redemption challenges, particularly in relation to AI's impact on software companies.

Key points

  • The Ripple Effect Podcast Introduction. Join host Dan Loney as he explores groundbreaking research from Wharton professors.
  • Liquidity Challenges in Private Credit Funds. Investors are facing unexpected liquidity issues in private credit funds amid rising demand for redemptions.
  • The Role of AI in Financial Fragility. AI advancements are raising questions about the viability of software companies funded by private credit.

Tension

60/ 100Some tension

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