Why Private Credit Investors Can't Always Cash Out
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Episode Description
ABOUT THE EPISODE Private credit has attracted billions from investors looking for higher returns. But what happens when they all want their money back?
Itay Goldstein, Wharton Professor of Finance, explains the liquidity risk inside semi-liquid private credit funds. He examines why funds holding illiquid loans can struggle to meet redemption demands, how AI-driven concerns over software borrowers intensified recent pressure, and why new investment flows can dry up at the exact moment investors seek to exit.
The conversation also considers what liquidity really means for private credit investors, the risks of expanding these products to retail investors, and how funds can better prepare for periods of financial stress.
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- So, with the private credit funds, it's interesting. They started offering all these deals where they
- say, you know, we're not going to give you all your money out when you want, but we're going to give you the ability
- to take out up to 5%. And then before you know it, they experienced this massive demand for redemptions where investors said,
- you know what, we want our money now. Welcome to the Ripple Effect, the podcast that
- takes you on a journey through the minds of work and faculty. I'm your host, Dan Loney.
- And in each episode, we'll be diving deep into the inspiration behind the groundbreaking research that
- Wharton professors have conducted and exploring how their findings resonate with the world today.
- Private credit funds have been drawing a lot of attention in the last few months as
- investors have tried to cash out in certain circumstances. But many have not been able to receive
- the level of liquidity that they had been expecting. That's partly tied to the fund and the
- fact that several of them might be considered semi-liquid. Wharton finance professor Etai Goldstein, along with two
- of his colleagues, wrote a paper on why this may be occurring, and he joins us to discuss it.
- Etai, great to talk to you again. How are you? Great, great to be with you, Dan.
- Thank you. And I guess let me start with having you explain the research and why it is
- becoming so important right now. OK, let me just say that this is joint research with Yao Zeng, who is here
- at Wharton, and Chuck Fung, who was our PhD student and is now at Drexel. And over the years, I've been working on
- different types of financial institutions, the extent to which they provide liquidity transformation and the extent
- to which this exposes them to fragility. In the context of banks, we have the well-known phenomenon bank run.
- And that's kind of the classic form of liquidity transformation causing fragility because the bank is
- holding very illiquid assets, but then offers depositors the ability to take their money out whenever
- they want. And this is causing a bank run phenomenon. Now, this has been known for well over
- a century. And then we had institutions like deposit insurance that are meant to alleviate this.
- We saw this type of phenomenon migrating into mutual funds. And I've done research on mutual funds investing
- in illiquid assets and exposing themselves to fragility. And now we see it kind of in
- this new type of institution, kind of a hybrid institution that is the private credit fund,
- semi-liquid private credit funds. So we thought it would be interesting to see how these things are manifested there.
- And obviously, it has been all over the news in the last few months. I think I talked to you for a
- different forum about that as well, but we saw it happening. So we wanted to study it a little
- more closely. Right. And one of the names which obviously is being talked about a lot in this instance
- is Blue Owl Capital. So from what we have read in the media and what you've seen, what is it
- that has gone wrong in this instance? Right. So, you know, we have here the classic
- dilemma in finance. On the one hand, you want to invest in illiquid assets because some of the returns,
- some of the progress that we can get from finance is coming from the illiquid assets.
- On the other hand, when you're thinking about investors, many investors are demanding liquidity.
- If you tell them, look, put your money here and see you in five years, they're going to be nervous and they're probably going
- to look for other vehicles to put their money in. So with the private credit funds, it's interesting.
- They started as closed-end funds where basically they hold illiquid assets and they don't offer
- their investors any liquidity. They don't tell investors you can take your money out.
- But then as they grew and they tried to attract capital for more and more investors,
- this became a problem. So they started offering all these deals where they say, you know, we're not going to
- give you all your money out when you want, but we're going to give you the ability to take out up to five percent
- of the value of the assets. And this is where the semi-liquid fund name is coming from.
- And Blue Owl was kind of the postal child of this. They started offering these deals.
- And then before you know it, they experienced this massive demand for redemptions where investors said,
- you know what, we want our money now. And I should say, I think you're going to ask about that.
- But let me just preempt that a little bit. I should say, you know, it was kind of a perfect storm where on the one
- hand they're offering this semi-liquidity and then on the other hand, the business model where
- they are investing and giving loans to software companies came under question with the rise of
- A.I. So with these two things coming together, we basically saw that there was a
- wave of redemptions and a wave of fragility. All right. And so those redemption rates being supposed to
- be in and around five percent, that's kind of the standard, the norm for the industry.
- Right. So the semi-liquid structure was basically mostly saying, you know, we are not going to
- allow more than five percent being redeemed in a quarter. And they said, you know, five percent is
- something we can handle and it's not going to cause a full blown run. And we have enough resources to pay for
- it. One thing that we show in our paper is that this is really not the case because five percent is still pretty challenging.
- But is there something specific in this instance where those people were asking for such a
- higher rate of redemption at this particular time? Right. So I would say part of it is
- coming from what's going on with A.I. and the fact that A.I. has advanced so quickly and really put under question the
- business model of some of the software companies. Software companies are saying, look, what we are
- going to do is we're going to develop all this software that is going to help businesses and individuals.
- But then with A.I. tools, a lot of people say, well, we can now do it ourselves.
- So why do we need the software companies? Now, many of these private credit funds were
- giving loans to the software companies. And now as we start seeing the challenges
- with software companies, people are starting to question, can they pay back the debt to the
- private credit funds? And now you have a private credit fund that is highly exposed to software company and
- the underlying investors say, well, you know, I have an opportunity here to take my money
- out. So maybe I should just go ahead and do it. But then the problem is that many people
- are thinking the same at the same time. And the fact that you think others will do it will cause you to do it
- even more. And supposedly from what I read in the paper, it's also a time where the inflows
- declined. So that, I think, kind of doesn't it magnify the problem? And then you have the outflows going out,
- but the inflows are not coming in as fast as they would probably like. Yes, yes, absolutely.
- Because, you know, these private credit funds will say, well, we can handle five percent redemption
- because we have cash. We get some income from the loans and then there will be inflows coming in.
- So everything is going to work out. The problem is exactly the same reason that causes people to want to take their money
- out is also causing new people not to want to put new money in. So the decline of inflows and the increase
- of outflows are highly correlated because they are tied to the same underlying problem.
- Does there need to be then also a look at the true definition of liquidity and what it needs to be moving forward, especially
- with a lot of these situations going on? Yes, I think so. I mean, I think, you know, one thing
- that we show in the paper and then there was some coverage in the Wall Street Journal based on this that was digging even
- deeper into this particular angle. You know, it's really difficult to know what is the right definition of liquidity here.
- And different funds are adopting different practices in measuring their liquidity.
- But when they say liquidity, what exactly do they mean? I mean, many of them, you know, if
- you think about the classic form of liquidity, it's just the cash buffer and super liquid
- assets. But then there are different levels of liquidity and some of them are starting to count
- other types of assets that are not as liquid. And the problem is, you know, in time
- of stress, when investors are knocking on the door trying to take their money out, then
- those other assets that are not super liquid will become even more difficult to cash.
- And as a result, this is becoming challenging. So I think there needs to be more
- clarity exactly what we mean by liquidity. And then if you think about, say, cash,
- OK, if I have a cash buffer of 5 percent, that doesn't mean that I can cover 5 percent of outflow because I will
- need to maintain some of my cash buffer. So it's really becoming tricky. So I think we need to take a
- closer look at that. How much then does also the design of the process need to be looked at, especially
- when you're talking about the retail access to these funds? Right. So I think the retail access is certainly
- part of the problem here, because, you know, when these funds were only catering to institutions,
- then they could safely remain closed and not offering this redemption opportunity, this liquidity to the
- investors. The problem is that once you start expanding and you want to attract retail investors, retail
- investors are more nervous about that and they would like liquidity. So then you start offering this redemption windows
- and you start offering this what we call semi liquidity. So I think the question we need to
- ask ourselves is, do we want to offer this kind of product to retail investors? And if we want to offer this kind
- of product to retail investors, what exactly do we tell them? You can't tell them, look, you have this
- opportunity to liquidate every quarter, because that's probably not the case. We see it now.
- I mean, they say 5 percent, but then there are 13 percent coming on the door and asking for liquidity and they can't get
- it. Do you and your colleagues look at what maybe needs to be looked at moving forward
- in order to have a more solid flowing process in place so we don't have these occurrences in the future?
- Yeah. So I think part of the output of this research, where it can go, is to think about how can we design the system?
- And as I said, maybe part of the design is you don't offer liquidity to the underlying investors.
- Maybe part of the design is, OK, you do offer liquidity, but then you think you take into account that every once in a
- while there will be this crisis and things are going to look like they're going to
- blow up. You know, crises are not necessarily a disaster, right? Maybe the financial system has to live with
- some level of crisis period every once in a while. I think that's also something we need to
- consider. A version of a reset, correct? Right. Yes, exactly. And we need to take into account that
- if you want to have this form of liquidity transformation, meaning holding illiquid assets but allowing
- investors to take their money out periodically, then crises might be unavoidable.
- And every once in a while we will have that thing happening. But if you think that this is the
- end of the world and you absolutely don't want to be exposed to any form of crisis, then just don't offer this product and
- say, look, this is illiquid. If you want to put your money here, be prepared. You're not going to be able to take
- your money out for the next X years. Itai, great to talk to you again. Thanks very much, sir.
- Thank you very much. Great talking to you. Thank you. Itai Goldstein, finance professor here at the Wharton
- School. Thank you for listening to The Ripple Effect. We hope you found this episode informative and
- engaging. Don't forget to subscribe and leave us a review so that we can continue to bring
- you the best insight from the Wharton School.
Brief Summary
Etai Goldstein discusses liquidity issues in private credit funds and investor redemption challenges, particularly in relation to AI's impact on software companies.
Key points
- The Ripple Effect Podcast Introduction. Join host Dan Loney as he explores groundbreaking research from Wharton professors.
- Liquidity Challenges in Private Credit Funds. Investors are facing unexpected liquidity issues in private credit funds amid rising demand for redemptions.
- The Role of AI in Financial Fragility. AI advancements are raising questions about the viability of software companies funded by private credit.
Episode highlights
- The Ripple Effect Podcast IntroductionJoin host Dan Loney as he explores groundbreaking research from Wharton professors.“Welcome to the Ripple Effect, the podcast that takes you on a journey through the minds of work and faculty.”0:27Sep 15, 2026
- Liquidity Challenges in Private Credit FundsInvestors are facing unexpected liquidity issues in private credit funds amid rising demand for redemptions.“Many have not been able to receive the level of liquidity that they had been expecting.”0:54Sep 15, 2026
- The Role of AI in Financial FragilityAI advancements are raising questions about the viability of software companies funded by private credit.“A.I. has advanced so quickly and really put under question the business model of some software companies.”6:15Sep 15, 2026





