Why Wall Street Traders Keep Making a Fortune

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New research from Wharton's Vincent Glode finds that the specific tasks that workers perform in finance have a big impact on how firms compete for their services. More: http://knlg.net/1LgWB4Q 📂 Finance & Accounting;Human Resources 🏷️ Research

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  1. in my paper with Richard Larry from the University of Texas at Austin we try to understand how the specific tasks that
  2. workers and finance perform will affect their compensation we think this is an important topic because the financial
  3. sector is a big part of the economy in the US the financial sector represents 10% of US
  4. GDP also a lot of the money that is flowing through the financial sector and ends up being used to compensate workers
  5. typically a Wall Street firm will use 50% of it of its revenues to pay its workers so there's a lot of money that
  6. is Flowing from the US economy to financial workers and we try to understand how that works so what we do
  7. in the paper is we propose a labor market model where Financial firms compete for the services of a limited
  8. supply of skilled workers and these workers can be as allocated or they can be hired to become traders who speculate
  9. with other firms about the value of an asset or they can be uh hired to create a surplus by finding profitable
  10. investment opportunities so for the first task what they do is a zero sum game they participate in a zero sum game
  11. they help the firm extract Surplus away from rival firms on the other hand if they if these workers are hired to find
  12. investment profitable investment opportunities like finding the next Tesla or finding the next Facebook they
  13. create a surplus for the whole sector and we show in this paper that the externalities that these workers impose
  14. on other firms will affect their compensation and by specifically modeling these tasks like speculative
  15. trading or investment we're able to talk about how the compensation and the employment of workers in finance can be
  16. affected by the investment opportunities the liquidity needs and the trading networks that we
  17. observe so the key takeaway of my paper is that the specific tasks that workers perform in finance will have a big
  18. impact on how firms compete for their services for example take a financial engineer who is hired to find better
  19. ways to hedge interest rate risk so that engineer by innovating by finding that better hedging strategy will benefit his
  20. employer but also all the other firms in the sector who will then be able to to use this strategy to hedge their risk so
  21. when firms bid for the services of this worker when they're trying to compete for the uh the this worker they're not
  22. as aggressive because they know they can still Ben benefit from the innovation of
  23. that worker even though they don't hire this financial engineer now take a speculative Trader
  24. whose job is to take advantage of other financial institutions right take advantage of the counterparties better
  25. value the Securities that are being traded between his or her employer and their counter parties right now
  26. acquiring the expertise of this this Trad is very important because instead of gaining say $5 million by better
  27. valuing the Securities that are about to be traded The Firm might lose $5 million to
  28. that to the firm that employs this Trader so we go from a profit of $5 million to a loss of $5 million so now
  29. firms are willing to pay up to $10 million for the services of this worker first $5 million for the profits that he
  30. creates but also $55 million to make sure that this worker is not used against them that second $5 million
  31. amount is what we call the difference premium this is how much you're willing to pay for a worker to make sure he he
  32. or she does not work for one of your counterparties and and use is competitive competitive advantage
  33. against you so that's one thing that's a key Insight another Insight is has to do
  34. with the interactions between different types of jobs right think of a situation
  35. where a firm's counter parties hired a lot of Traders a lot of good Traders and these Traders are able
  36. to trade or value the Securities that your financial Engineers have created what that means is if you hire Financial
  37. Engineers you're going to lose a lot of the Surplus that these Financial Engineers create to other firms because
  38. they have good Traders so what that that means is that in equilibrium your financial
  39. engineer and financial Engineers will earn less if other firms have hired a lot of smart speculative
  40. Traders on the other hand if other firms have hired a lot of Smart Financial Engineers that means they have created a
  41. lot of good Securities that might need to be traded in the future so the compensation you willing to offer for
  42. your Traders will go up if these guys have hired a lot of financial engineer so not only are two traders who might
  43. have this very similar skills not only are they paid differently but also the compensation of
  44. one type of worker will be comp will be affected greatly by how many workers of a different type are hired by rival
  45. firms first we find that eye compensation for financial workers might arise in cases
  46. where only a few firms are competing for their services right when there's only a
  47. few firms in the sector trading Securities they only a few of them can hire these Traders so in most models you
  48. will say well that's bad for the workers lower compensation When there's less demand for their services but since a
  49. lot of the compensation that we observe in our model comes from the externalities it actually helps the
  50. traders to have few firms trading or competing for their services and the reason is that if there are only a few
  51. firms then the externalities are greater and the defense premium is greater M leading to high compensation for Traders
  52. the opposite can be said said about these Financial Engineers if there's if there are very few firms that are
  53. looking to hire their their U the these Financial Engineers the externality that
  54. they impose on these firms are big and therefore there's very little compensation for them their compensation
  55. is low now there's the other surprising fact too and it is that when there's more entry in the financial sector when
  56. there are more workers who want to work in finance we might have com the average
  57. compensation paid to these workers go up and the reason has to do with the allocation of workers how workers are
  58. assigned to different tasks take the extreme example where a firm first needs to hire a final engineer to design a
  59. security and then everyone else that this firm hires will end up being assigned to the trading task to
  60. speculative trading so now if there's only one worker being employed by that firm that one worker is a financial
  61. engineer okay and earns the lower compensation but but then everyone else afterwards starts making more money
  62. because these new workers that are hired by The Firm are imposing negative externalities on the firm so we start
  63. with only one worker making a low salary and we keep adding more workers who benefit from this this defense premium
  64. overall as the supply of or or as the number of workers increases we have higher average compensation
  65. our model helps us understand a few recently documented empirical facts about compensation and finance first we
  66. know that top Wall Street firms tend to pay their uh interest rate option Traders about twice as much as they pay
  67. their foreign exchange option Traders this could be puzzling if you only uh thought about the skills that these guys
  68. bring to the table but our model highlights the the role that trading comp concentration can can play for this
  69. difference right the interest rate option Market is a lot more concentrated than the foreign exchange option Market
  70. therefore we should observe that the traders of interest rate options should earn a higher defense premium and a
  71. higher compensation than foreign exchange option Traders the other thing that our model helps us understand is
  72. why we've seen in recent decades an increase in the average compensation in finance this despite the the the many
  73. people who have entered this sector so we have a lot of graduate students or undergraduate students who enter the
  74. market yet the compensation keep going up the last thing is is kind of a more broad uh kind of a broader takeaway as
  75. and it has to do with the fact that our model highlights our compensation might not necessarily be
  76. linked with the social value that is created by a worker or by a task so some tasks might be underpaid
  77. undercompensated like Financial Innovation and some tasks might end up being overpaid or overcompensated in
  78. equilibrium task like speculative trading and this might help people understand how to uh better regulate or
  79. better uh think about the compensation that is offered in the market we carefully consider the tasks
  80. that that Financial workers perform for their firms right unlike in other Industries where most workers produce
  81. help the firm produce Goods the the workers in our in our model they trade Securities which
  82. imposes negative externalities on other firms or they find uh new Financial Innovation they identify new Financial
  83. innovations that will create a surplus for all sector and the fact that we model these interactions among firms
  84. allow us to uncover the effect of externalities on compensation in a model without
  85. externalities or where we don't model the we don't look at the interactions across firms we will see all workers
  86. with the same ability level making the same amount of money but in our model we have externalities among firms the firms
  87. when they bid for these workers when they try to hire them they consider these externalities as part of the
  88. equation and in the end what we get is that workers who impose negative externalities on other firms the the
  89. speculative traders who are are part of a zero SU game they are they earn more money they make they they have a higher
  90. compensation than the financial Engineers the bankers and the other types of workers who impose positive
  91. externalities on the firms that failed to hire them [Music]

Brief Summary

Richard Larry discusses how tasks in finance affect worker compensation and firm competition.

Key points

  • Understanding Financial Compensation. This paper explores how specific tasks in finance impact worker compensation.
  • The Role of Externalities. The model reveals how externalities affect compensation in finance.

Tension

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