Why Wall Street Traders Keep Making a Fortune
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New research from Wharton's Vincent Glode finds that the specific tasks that workers perform in finance have a big impact on how firms compete for their services. More: http://knlg.net/1LgWB4Q 📂 Finance & Accounting;Human Resources 🏷️ Research
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- in my paper with Richard Larry from the University of Texas at Austin we try to understand how the specific tasks that
- workers and finance perform will affect their compensation we think this is an important topic because the financial
- sector is a big part of the economy in the US the financial sector represents 10% of US
- GDP also a lot of the money that is flowing through the financial sector and ends up being used to compensate workers
- typically a Wall Street firm will use 50% of it of its revenues to pay its workers so there's a lot of money that
- is Flowing from the US economy to financial workers and we try to understand how that works so what we do
- in the paper is we propose a labor market model where Financial firms compete for the services of a limited
- supply of skilled workers and these workers can be as allocated or they can be hired to become traders who speculate
- with other firms about the value of an asset or they can be uh hired to create a surplus by finding profitable
- investment opportunities so for the first task what they do is a zero sum game they participate in a zero sum game
- they help the firm extract Surplus away from rival firms on the other hand if they if these workers are hired to find
- investment profitable investment opportunities like finding the next Tesla or finding the next Facebook they
- create a surplus for the whole sector and we show in this paper that the externalities that these workers impose
- on other firms will affect their compensation and by specifically modeling these tasks like speculative
- trading or investment we're able to talk about how the compensation and the employment of workers in finance can be
- affected by the investment opportunities the liquidity needs and the trading networks that we
- observe so the key takeaway of my paper is that the specific tasks that workers perform in finance will have a big
- impact on how firms compete for their services for example take a financial engineer who is hired to find better
- ways to hedge interest rate risk so that engineer by innovating by finding that better hedging strategy will benefit his
- employer but also all the other firms in the sector who will then be able to to use this strategy to hedge their risk so
- when firms bid for the services of this worker when they're trying to compete for the uh the this worker they're not
- as aggressive because they know they can still Ben benefit from the innovation of
- that worker even though they don't hire this financial engineer now take a speculative Trader
- whose job is to take advantage of other financial institutions right take advantage of the counterparties better
- value the Securities that are being traded between his or her employer and their counter parties right now
- acquiring the expertise of this this Trad is very important because instead of gaining say $5 million by better
- valuing the Securities that are about to be traded The Firm might lose $5 million to
- that to the firm that employs this Trader so we go from a profit of $5 million to a loss of $5 million so now
- firms are willing to pay up to $10 million for the services of this worker first $5 million for the profits that he
- creates but also $55 million to make sure that this worker is not used against them that second $5 million
- amount is what we call the difference premium this is how much you're willing to pay for a worker to make sure he he
- or she does not work for one of your counterparties and and use is competitive competitive advantage
- against you so that's one thing that's a key Insight another Insight is has to do
- with the interactions between different types of jobs right think of a situation
- where a firm's counter parties hired a lot of Traders a lot of good Traders and these Traders are able
- to trade or value the Securities that your financial Engineers have created what that means is if you hire Financial
- Engineers you're going to lose a lot of the Surplus that these Financial Engineers create to other firms because
- they have good Traders so what that that means is that in equilibrium your financial
- engineer and financial Engineers will earn less if other firms have hired a lot of smart speculative
- Traders on the other hand if other firms have hired a lot of Smart Financial Engineers that means they have created a
- lot of good Securities that might need to be traded in the future so the compensation you willing to offer for
- your Traders will go up if these guys have hired a lot of financial engineer so not only are two traders who might
- have this very similar skills not only are they paid differently but also the compensation of
- one type of worker will be comp will be affected greatly by how many workers of a different type are hired by rival
- firms first we find that eye compensation for financial workers might arise in cases
- where only a few firms are competing for their services right when there's only a
- few firms in the sector trading Securities they only a few of them can hire these Traders so in most models you
- will say well that's bad for the workers lower compensation When there's less demand for their services but since a
- lot of the compensation that we observe in our model comes from the externalities it actually helps the
- traders to have few firms trading or competing for their services and the reason is that if there are only a few
- firms then the externalities are greater and the defense premium is greater M leading to high compensation for Traders
- the opposite can be said said about these Financial Engineers if there's if there are very few firms that are
- looking to hire their their U the these Financial Engineers the externality that
- they impose on these firms are big and therefore there's very little compensation for them their compensation
- is low now there's the other surprising fact too and it is that when there's more entry in the financial sector when
- there are more workers who want to work in finance we might have com the average
- compensation paid to these workers go up and the reason has to do with the allocation of workers how workers are
- assigned to different tasks take the extreme example where a firm first needs to hire a final engineer to design a
- security and then everyone else that this firm hires will end up being assigned to the trading task to
- speculative trading so now if there's only one worker being employed by that firm that one worker is a financial
- engineer okay and earns the lower compensation but but then everyone else afterwards starts making more money
- because these new workers that are hired by The Firm are imposing negative externalities on the firm so we start
- with only one worker making a low salary and we keep adding more workers who benefit from this this defense premium
- overall as the supply of or or as the number of workers increases we have higher average compensation
- our model helps us understand a few recently documented empirical facts about compensation and finance first we
- know that top Wall Street firms tend to pay their uh interest rate option Traders about twice as much as they pay
- their foreign exchange option Traders this could be puzzling if you only uh thought about the skills that these guys
- bring to the table but our model highlights the the role that trading comp concentration can can play for this
- difference right the interest rate option Market is a lot more concentrated than the foreign exchange option Market
- therefore we should observe that the traders of interest rate options should earn a higher defense premium and a
- higher compensation than foreign exchange option Traders the other thing that our model helps us understand is
- why we've seen in recent decades an increase in the average compensation in finance this despite the the the many
- people who have entered this sector so we have a lot of graduate students or undergraduate students who enter the
- market yet the compensation keep going up the last thing is is kind of a more broad uh kind of a broader takeaway as
- and it has to do with the fact that our model highlights our compensation might not necessarily be
- linked with the social value that is created by a worker or by a task so some tasks might be underpaid
- undercompensated like Financial Innovation and some tasks might end up being overpaid or overcompensated in
- equilibrium task like speculative trading and this might help people understand how to uh better regulate or
- better uh think about the compensation that is offered in the market we carefully consider the tasks
- that that Financial workers perform for their firms right unlike in other Industries where most workers produce
- help the firm produce Goods the the workers in our in our model they trade Securities which
- imposes negative externalities on other firms or they find uh new Financial Innovation they identify new Financial
- innovations that will create a surplus for all sector and the fact that we model these interactions among firms
- allow us to uncover the effect of externalities on compensation in a model without
- externalities or where we don't model the we don't look at the interactions across firms we will see all workers
- with the same ability level making the same amount of money but in our model we have externalities among firms the firms
- when they bid for these workers when they try to hire them they consider these externalities as part of the
- equation and in the end what we get is that workers who impose negative externalities on other firms the the
- speculative traders who are are part of a zero SU game they are they earn more money they make they they have a higher
- compensation than the financial Engineers the bankers and the other types of workers who impose positive
- externalities on the firms that failed to hire them [Music]
Brief Summary
Richard Larry discusses how tasks in finance affect worker compensation and firm competition.
Key points
- Understanding Financial Compensation. This paper explores how specific tasks in finance impact worker compensation.
- The Role of Externalities. The model reveals how externalities affect compensation in finance.
Episode highlights
- Understanding Financial CompensationThis paper explores how specific tasks in finance impact worker compensation.“The specific tasks that workers perform in finance will have a big impact on compensation.”2:15Oct 15, 2015
- The Role of ExternalitiesThe model reveals how externalities affect compensation in finance.“Workers who impose negative externalities earn more than those who impose positive ones.”11:31Oct 15, 2015
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