Are Eurozone Banks Good to Go?

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📂 Finance & Accounting

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  1. i want to welcome wharton finance professor richard herring to knowledge of wharton today to discuss
  2. the recently completed european bank stress tests and that was done by the european central bank on the eurozone's
  3. 130 largest banks dick maybe you could tell us a little bit about the background behind these tests and
  4. what they might mean it's an interesting lineage and to see the inspiration for it all you really
  5. need to turn back to 2009 in the united states most people now mark that as the turning point in our
  6. crisis where we regained confidence in banks and it was a similar exercise the bank regulators devised a stress
  7. test with three scenarios and insisted that banks show that they could remain adequately capitalized even
  8. under the worst scenario the interesting thing about our experiment is that they they forced 19 banks to undergo the
  9. experiment and 10 of them failed ordinarily you'd think that was not a good outcome
  10. but it was accompanied with a scap program so immediately they were forced to uh take funds from scap to
  11. recapitalize which they repaid over time it's gap being just gap being the supervised capital adequacy program and
  12. tarping the troubled asset relief program which was this amount of money the europeans tried it seeing that it really
  13. did work in the united states and it's i think it worked only because we had that
  14. very deep government pocket backing it up and the problem with europe at the first
  15. time they tried it of course is that they were they're really a group of independent states that sort of each
  16. have national champion banks and most of the supervisors do not want to say anything harsh about their banks
  17. so they did a a stress test but it wasn't really very stressful and a few days after it
  18. completed ireland went under the irish banks went under the state of ireland tried to bail them out it went
  19. under and set off the debt crisis so that's called egg on your face i think absolutely
  20. and the second time they tried it it wasn't a lot more convincing because uh there again you had a major player that
  21. that succumbed within a month or so um this time the stakes were much higher because
  22. the eu has decided to have a single banking authority they really are trying to integrate regulation and supervision
  23. of the entire banking system in the euro area and the european central bank is going
  24. to take it on as a subsidiary this has been you know years in the negotiation but the debate which was mainly the
  25. germans against everybody else was what do we do with the losses that are already in the system
  26. and they said looking ahead we can anticipate that we would have some sort of mutual
  27. obligation to support the system going forward but we do not want to be on the hook for legacy losses
  28. that was what this was designed to do so this is uh uh more of a of a true exam than a
  29. little minor quiz which is seems to be what they had in the past it's they're you know we still don't know for
  30. sure because only time will tell but there there's every reason to believe it was much more serious
  31. um they were very much aware first of all the odds are higher because um after this the european central bank
  32. owns the problem so if you accept a dodgy bank from one of the nation states there are costs to everybody in the rest
  33. of europe secondly they were aware of the tendency of supervisors to perhaps be a little bit gentle with their own
  34. supervisees and so they designed examination teams that included a national supervisor but also included
  35. a supervisor from another country and a supervisor that was hired by this european central bank so you had
  36. essentially three different perspectives and a much greater chance that you were
  37. going to actually get it right does this mean then you say only time will tell but let's
  38. let me ask this why don't we go back to the issue of how stressful it was because that's an interesting parallel
  39. with the united states um one of the surprising things about the united states was when they finally got around
  40. to announcing the results of the stress test we were already in a more stressful
  41. macro situation than the stress scenario so that too makes it a bit puzzling that
  42. it worked in the european case people have have been concerned that it didn't consider what many people worry about in
  43. looking ahead at europe such as a deflationary impact so there are always issues about that
  44. but there are also technical issues about the way in which stress was measured they looked to a definition of capital
  45. to risk-rated assets that covered up at least two pretty serious problems one they used a definition of capital
  46. that included two categories of accounting terms that are no longer accepted internationally one is they
  47. permitted banks to count deferred tax assets that's fine if you're going to make profits in the future but if you're
  48. a bank that is headed for resolution that's not going to be worth anything and they also
  49. permitted banks to count good will and you can ramp up goodwill however you like by simply overpaying the
  50. accountants make the charitable assumption that you knew what you were doing it's the ultimate asterisk isn't
  51. it absolutely yeah and then the denominator is fudge too because they maintain the polite fiction that all
  52. government debt is riskless that it will be repaid in full and one of the fundamental problems in
  53. europe is that european banks tend to hold large amounts of sovereign debt and although it's diminished a lot since the
  54. crisis began there were large amounts of cross-border debt if you assume the euro is going to work
  55. and that everybody will be repaid there is a real tendency to put the higher interest rate stuff that was in riskier
  56. countries on your books one of the things you mentioned i thought was interesting and that you
  57. said they they weren't taking into account possible deflation in europe which is
  58. has been a threat since the crisis but recently has been seen as an even greater threat as uh
  59. inflation seems to be dropping even more i believe um so is this a case of generals fighting the
  60. last war looking at well we know that we think that these stress tests would have
  61. prevented catastrophic failures if it was the same kind of crisis we had in 2008 but of
  62. course the next crisis is likely to be different i think i'd put it a little differently
  63. i think they were trying to remove one part of what they viewed as deflationary pressures
  64. and the concern had been that european banks were so weakly capitalized that they really couldn't
  65. provide loans that would help fuel recovery in europe now it's well to remember that in europe
  66. this is a much more serious problem than it would be in the united states not that our banks aren't important
  67. but they account for about 20 to 30 percent of of lending and in europe it's more like 70 plus
  68. so having a banking sector that is not able to um supply credit to the the private sector means that you're really
  69. not going to have robust growth so part of the idea behind these tests was to prove to everyone and to remove
  70. from sort of the public debate it's a problem that our banks are too weak it's now pretty clearly if you
  71. believe the test results a problem that demand is much too weak and they're going to have to focus on that
  72. that's really interesting because that's uh um that's a big change then you know so so
  73. it's not a lack of confidence in the bank that's keeping the european economy so far below its potential for the last
  74. five or six years we hope that's true there were some indications uh in terms of the rates that banks paid right after
  75. the test that there was at least some positive movement in confidence in european banks
  76. and you know it's the same problem we faced in the united states why is it we don't see more bank lending
  77. is it because banks are trying to deliver and can't really don't want to make loans
  78. if you ask banks they say they've never been more liquid they're always looking for opportunities um or is it because
  79. there's not enough demand that's what banks say but when you talk to entrepreneurs and people are looking for
  80. mortgages they say this is really tough to get so it's hard to measure um that's interesting you would think that
  81. there'd be some way to know what was really going on there but uh so so the evidence is just conflicting is that it
  82. yeah it's uh we haven't really been very good at sorting out um the effects of sort of rationing of credit well we know
  83. that rationing takes place but whether um we're not seeing more robust demand because the demand isn't there from
  84. entrepreneurs and investors possibly because they don't see much in the way of attractive opportunities and
  85. they themselves are worried about being over leveraged or because banks just don't feel strong enough to lend
  86. they may have as in the case of europe probably two years ago weak assets they haven't
  87. revealed yet and so they want to try to build up earnings to be able to somehow absorb the losses before they
  88. have to make them public and it's you know it's complicated so it's been a week now uh and um
  89. i mean i guess one could say that the markets seem to have accepted uh the verdict of the ecb
  90. in these stress tests as you say at least for now and time will tell yeah all the rest of it but they didn't react
  91. in a way that said oh these these tests were just a fiction no they didn't and that in itself was a triumph because
  92. this was a real really difficult test for the the new european banking authority this was essentially
  93. how you were going to qualify banks to enter the new system and if it had been a complete softball
  94. sort of test and they'd passed everybody as some europeans thought they would because
  95. they argued they'd all been raising capital for a while i think it would have had no credibility we've sort of
  96. seen that that movie before and we know it ends badly on the other hand they were in a position where if they
  97. actually were to fail one of the very large banks it isn't clear they had the mechanism in
  98. place to resolve it because there really isn't that much funding at the european level and depending on
  99. which state it is they may or may not have enough funding to do it so that's interesting so this was the ultimate
  100. curved test in a way they wanted to have some failures i think they looked the largest was the oldest bank in the world
  101. monta de pescado siena and uh i think their stock dropped 20 percent i think so twenty percent uh that okay um from a
  102. not very high level i would add because it's an already just slightly distressed
  103. level um one of the numbers that was really buried uh in the report but which a couple of analysts did pluck out and
  104. and i i noticed also was this uh something called the comprehensive assessment of the stock of bad loans
  105. they actually call it non-performing exposures we can we call it non-performing loans in the us basically
  106. it's bad loans loans that have a a high chance of never being paid back and you know in that number there's all
  107. kinds that are more or less likely to be paid back i guess that number was really big and
  108. in dollar terms it was uh over a trillion dollars and in fact as they went through the stress tests they
  109. uncovered something like 138 billion more in these non-performing or bad loans than than
  110. the authorities did that is than they thought was was going to be there and um and it's a big number it is
  111. actually uh nine percent of the eurozone's gdp so it's it's pretty big on the other hand um
  112. the authorities said that the bank's capital shortfall was only about 25 billion so i just wanted to
  113. find some way of reconciling that big gap so you've got all these potentially bad loans but they're telling the banks
  114. oh you've only got to increase your your uh you know your your share of money that you're holding on to to account for
  115. that by 25 billion well it it's a little more complicated than that because the normal process and and
  116. by the way it's typical of any bank examination process that examiners will find assets on the book that they think
  117. are not properly valued and they will almost never say something is undervalued so almost always one of the
  118. results is look you've got this many more assets that we think are dubious and in order to
  119. get to a safe and sound position we want you to accumulate more reserves and that means provisions
  120. out of current income so that if these assets should go bad it won't affect your income or capital
  121. so you're sort of anticipating the worst now these are forward-looking and that's one of the
  122. fascinating features of the stress tests it's a real sea change in the whole attitude toward bank supervision
  123. before the crisis virtually all bank supervision was sort of looking at what we see in today's figures which is kind
  124. of like looking at the future with the rear view mirror these really try consciously to look
  125. ahead uh by forecasting what your position will be under a variety of positions so
  126. the notion behind these assets would be that these assets might well not be paid in full
  127. the number is less than people thought it would be so in that sense uh it was a pleasant surprise people thought it
  128. would be even worse um but in fact depending on the definition they've used and i haven't haven't looked at the
  129. document carefully enough to know but typically you'll start classifying loans or assets
  130. according to how much past due they are and typically in the u.s you'll use a 90-day
  131. period and if they remain not paid for longer than that then you are supposed to allocate more and more
  132. to it so that unless it happens just abruptly by the time you finally have to declare
  133. a loss you will have reserved enough to to be able to absorb it okay those were all my questions is there
  134. anything else we should be covering on this that would be particularly important for viewers well
  135. it all sounds like a within the eu kind of issue that is more than a little technical but we actually do have a lot
  136. riding on it if the european banking system doesn't regain health not only is it a problem
  137. for our financial system but it's a huge problem for the european economy and they haven't been a significant source
  138. of aggregate demand in the world we could hope that they would finally get there not only for their sake but
  139. for everybody else's as well you

Brief Summary

Wharton professor Richard Herring discusses the European bank stress tests and their implications for the eurozone's banking system and economy.

Key points

  • European Bank Stress Tests. A discussion on the recent stress tests conducted by the European Central Bank.

Tension

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