Explaining the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) Collapse & Its Financial Impact – Wharton's Itay Goldstein

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Itay Goldstein, Wharton Professor of Finance, explains to Wharton Business Daily what led to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, and examines the government and the Fed's responses to forecast its financial impact.

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  1. well the questions of what happened and what caused the failures with Silicon Valley Bank are still being worked
  2. through but what is known is that the potential impact from this failure and as well Signature Bank could have
  3. impacts well beyond the banks themselves etai Goldstein is Professor of Finance at the Wharton School and joins us to
  4. take a deeper look at this etai great to talk to you again great being with you thank you
  5. so a larger scale what is it that you believe happened that led to the collapse of SBB
  6. you know what's so striking about the collapse of svb is just how classic of a bank run it is
  7. uh you didn't have any esoteric uh Investments or complicated risks it was kind of a textbook of the kind of risks
  8. that banks are taking they did the maturity transformation that banks are usually doing
  9. um you know one thing I would say is they didn't hedge it uh very much they probably could have done uh more of that
  10. at the end of the day they were exposed to the risk of an interest an interest rate uh increase which we all know
  11. happened and this is why the value of their assets uh dropped now what happens in those cases is depositors can take
  12. the money out at any moment and deposit those here I think were a little unique because depositors were all very
  13. sophisticated and we're also communicating with each other so the rumors kind of spread like wildfire and
  14. then they all decided to take their money out around the same time and the bank collapsed so it was really kind of
  15. an old school Bank Run we thought we were out of the wounds with this kind of risks without the risks that we Face
  16. will move in the non-bank sector but then this one came and reminded us that these risks are still alive so is most
  17. of your focused then on the bank itself and and what it what the bank did and maybe the leadership of the bank and how
  18. they reacted to it because there's obviously a lot of other theories that are being thrown out there in terms of
  19. you know with the rates but how the FED reacted uh you know some of the moves in
  20. the questions of you know should the San Francisco fed have been able to foresee
  21. this and maybe able to do more um you know I I think we will need to look at that more going forward uh
  22. certainly uh there is some blame to to be shared I think some of it is the bank itself but some of it is also uh what
  23. Regulators could have done and uh perhaps could have predicted uh you know some of the regulation that was enacted
  24. after the 2008 crisis was rolled back and this is why a bank like uh svb was not subject to such strict rules as as
  25. before um I think this will need to be looked at uh so certainly I'm not saying that
  26. others should not have seen that um I was just describing the the kind of portfolio and uh Dynamic among the
  27. positives that I think led to the immediate collapse in terms of the move by the government
  28. to backstop the uh the the losses that were there a good move overall uh I think that's a very loaded question
  29. so um certainly I understand where it's coming from I think there was a concern uh that this is going to become systemic
  30. uh now I have to say uh you know svb itself is not really a systemically important bank it's not one of the
  31. biggest banks it's the number 16 I think in size in the US so it's kind of a mid-sized bank and not very strongly
  32. connected to other Banks so it's not kind of the usual type of systemic risk uh that that we are thinking about uh
  33. but there was some concern because it's a bank with a lot of visibility uh the fact that it was so widely covered I
  34. think suggested that other people in other Banks could look at this and say wait a second what's going on if this
  35. bank is failing maybe our bank is going to fail as well and then this is going to trigger Bank runs across other Banks
  36. so I think there was this concern there was also the concern that uh the tech industry a lot of the startups were
  37. highly dependent on this Bank a lot of small firms were holding money there millions and millions of dollars and
  38. payable payments dependent on what's going to happen with this bank so there was some concern that if there is a
  39. failure of this bank and there is no reaction by the government a lot of firms are going to lose money and this
  40. is going to trigger a crisis in the tech industry and the real economy as a result of that so I certainly understand
  41. those concerns and the fact that the fed and the government wanted to step in quickly and take an action however uh
  42. one has to wonder whether we needed to have such a broad guarantee because remember at the end of the day when you
  43. think about Deposit Insurance it is structured in a particular way uh in short deposits are up to 250 000 uh
  44. people know that if they want to keep their money insured they need to keep it up to that level and if they want more
  45. insurance they have to spread it across different banks uh now you know it's very difficult to know exactly what is
  46. the optimal level of Deposit Insurance I worked on this myself and I know how difficult it is to to pin it down but at
  47. the end of the day there is uh some meaning to having intrude versus uninsured now when the government comes
  48. in and says okay everything is effectively insured from now on I think that changes the the rules of the game
  49. and I think that going forward this may have some undesirable consequences for the banking industry the way people
  50. think about their Bank deposits the risks that banks are taking the risks that depositors are taking and and so on
  51. so one has to wonder does it even mean anything right now that there is a Deposit Insurance limit uh what is the
  52. difference between insured and uninsured deposits going forward I think all these
  53. questions are up in the air and and we'll need will need to deal with them in the aftermath of this crisis but I
  54. would imagine that probably a lot of banks and maybe even smaller and Regional Banks were probably after this
  55. started to occur looking at their own sheets and making sure that they were in a pretty good position so that they
  56. wouldn't feel some of you know potentially the same type of contagion right um I will assume this is the case yes I
  57. think that uh you know going back to what I said in the beginning uh svb did not do a lot of risk management and I
  58. think it could have done more uh and I think that other banks are now looking at what happened with SBB and probably
  59. looking for the same types of risk and and considering how they could change that but remember once the government
  60. comes in and guarantees a bunch of deposits and uh make the failure less painful uh then it also reduces the
  61. incentive of other Banks to manage their risks so this is the downside of providing such a broad level of
  62. guarantee and I guess that's that's really a situation that is only going to occur at least right now for this
  63. specific case in terms of the backstop provided there may be other situations where it'll at least be considered and
  64. reviewed as we move down the road but as you said I I and I think a lot of people
  65. said this as well the concern that you have is that this potentially does is open the door if you have full-time full
  66. guarantee backstop the potential for other types of activities to go on that may not be in the best interest of the
  67. banking sector in general yes exactly and you know this is the classic moral hazard problem that we keep emphasizing
  68. now you know it's very easy to talk about mobile Hazard uh when things are calm uh in a time of a crisis you know
  69. when the house is burning you're not thinking about moral hazard you just want to stop the fire uh and I think
  70. this is the justification uh that the the FED would give why they did what they did however the question is whether
  71. the house was indeed uh in such a severe fire whether it necessitated such a drastic uh move uh in 2008 for example
  72. uh you know we had a crisis that lasted for months and months uh before we saw actions at that scale
  73. um I think here uh you know this was basically kind of going over a weekend uh and immediately they provided this
  74. level of guarantee effectively a bailout so one has to wonder whether they acted
  75. a little uh too too quickly they certainly got worried that things are going to get out of control very quickly
  76. and this is why they decided to do it um I think there is the concern that it might have gone a little uh too far too
  77. quickly how much also does this and obviously with what is going on with Credit Suisse
  78. and and a couple of the other Banks this becomes even a larger more global perspective of of really kind of taking
  79. a deeper dive into kind of the structure and and the the deposits and and everything that the bank is doing on a
  80. daily basis yes you know uh Credit Suisse says uh now the ongoing uh episode that uh we
  81. are still watching uh I think certainly Credit Suisse has the potential to be a much bigger issue it is a big uh global
  82. bank um I think it is going to be very difficult to uh save uh Credit Suisse given that it is so big uh so resolving
  83. it is is going to be a big issue I I hope uh we're watching it as we speak I I hope there will be uh a good uh
  84. solution with uh could it swiss but but certainly if this one uh fails uh this might be very painful and this can start
  85. something that is much bigger than uh what we had with svb uh certainly you know this is the thing to watch right
  86. now and and this I think is going to be critical uh as to whether we are going to face a bigger financial crisis or not
  87. so in regards to SVP svb as this starts to move forward or what are you most watchful for right now what is it that
  88. you're looking to see how the how this will play out in the next several weeks um so so I think what we are looking to
  89. see is what happens with other banks that are kind of similar to svb you know mid-size Regional uh Banks uh to see
  90. whether there are more runs down the road more failures down the road um this is exactly what the Fed was uh
  91. trying to to stop uh when they did what they did um and I think uh you know it's still
  92. kind of tense in the financial system I think everyone is watching to see if there are more failures
  93. um I think SVP itself is kind of a done a done deal with kind of know uh what what happened to it um and and there is
  94. the guarantee on it but really the big question is whether this is going to continue to spread uh to to other Banks
  95. I I think the the other thing to watch going forward that is also a very important implication of uh the policy
  96. that was uh enacted is uh you know what what is the Fed going to do with monetary policy because
  97. um you know for a while now the Affair is increasing rates in order to fight inflation and I think the indication was
  98. that it was going to continue to do that because inflation was not cooling off as
  99. quickly as expected we always knew that there is a trade-off there is price stability on the one hand and there is
  100. financial stability on the other hand and it was well known that as you increase rates very quickly this can
  101. open cracks in the financial system and lead to episodes of fragility and and crisis
  102. um and you know for a while now rates were increasing and there wasn't any major cracks so I think there was the
  103. hope that maybe we dodged a bullet and it's not going to happen I think that svb maybe above all was a very Vivid
  104. reminder that this risk is there and that this is a very real uh trade-off so I think the other interesting uh
  105. interesting thing to watch going forward is what the FED is going to do with the
  106. interest rate and to what extent the FED will continue with Titan meaning the monetary policy

Brief Summary

Etai Goldstein analyzes the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank and its implications for banking regulation and monetary policy.

Key points

  • The Collapse of SVB. A classic bank run led to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, exposing risks in the banking sector.
  • Government Intervention. The government's quick response to backstop losses raises questions about future banking risks.

Tension

60/ 100Some tension

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