Franklin Allen on Lessons from the Subprime Crisis
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Episode Description
Wharton Professor Franklin Allen takes a long view of the subprime crisis, drawing on an international perspective of financial services.
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- so what's the cause of all this well the major cause as as both of them have already said is the property
- bubble I think there there's little doubt now that there was a bubble in property prices and I I would put that
- to a large extent at the door of the Federal Reserve when they reacted to the recession following the collapse of the
- tech bubble and then the 9/11 events they kept interest rates low for a long time and I think that's what sparked the
- bubble and helped fuel it now one interesting question is what point should we have realized that there
- was a bubble now Jeremy gave this data that if you look back in the US you find that there's no year that the
- average across the entire country has fallen since the Great Depression so there was about 70 75 years of data
- suggesting that house prices on average couldn't fall and that's the data that was used by the rating agencies and many
- others now the interesting thing is that about the same same kind of time 2004 2005 2006 if you'd gone to the new stand
- and bought a copy of the economist what you would have found is many articles suggesting that house prices were
- getting too high and there might be a bubble and by the time 2006 came they were definitely saying that and they
- used a number of very simple metrics of course if you look outside the US it's quite clear that there were a lot of
- property bubbles Jeremy mentioned briefly Japan I'll talk about that in a minute but property
- prices in Japan fell 75% roughly speaking over 15 years there were also these huge bubbles in Hong
- Kong and Singapore and many other places in Asia so there were a lot of places where property prices had fallen but not
- in the US and one of the big problems is how do we extrapolate evidence from other countries
- to our own situation so in any case we we had the bubble it it started to burst what
- happened then well property prices started to go down and default rates started to go up on
- the subprime now that's a problem but you know relative to Assets in the US it's not
- such a huge problem in terms of of um dollar amounts now back in July of 2007 people suddenly realized that these
- amounts that were falling these subprime they were much riskier than people had realized and so they started to
- rebalance their portfolios now there was a period of a few days in July when prices of AAA tranches of
- subprime securitizations fell dramatically and that that when things started to go B
- bad because these were assets which were thought to be extremely safe not much different than treasury Securities and
- people had had relied on that in the AAA tranches now they fell dramatically and the question is what
- was happening then was that because we were learning about default rates or what now my own view is that something
- somewhat different was happening there was some learning about default rates but in fact what I think happened was
- that the liquidity capacity of these markets which were fairly thin and IL liquid was overwhelmed and the prices
- fell when it was overwhelmed now normally you say it' be like Finance 601 today well the prices fall to L too low
- people should go in and Arbitrage that and hold them and then they'll make a profit now the problem with this was
- that the link between fundamentals and prices had been broken and it was broken for long enough that it became a risky
- Arbitrage now Jeremy was describing how the investment Banks were doubling down they thought that this these assets were
- underpriced so they bought more of them now of course what happened was the price went down further and caused a lot
- more problems now the reason that I I think that this was a problem with the Arbitrage pricing
- going wrong was it wasn't just subprime AAA securitizations that had problems within that period of a few days in July
- many other securitizations with completely different fundamentals also had problems so commercial backed
- securitizations the AAA tranches of those also started to fall and credit default swap
- securitizations on the riskiness of firms they also started fall and the co- movements spiked
- dramatically so the problem was the prices got out of line and they have stayed in my view out of line because it
- is a very risky Arbitrage and that's exacerbated the problems considerably now as we
- saw there have been these effects so first of all the interbank markets froze and so the the central banks started to
- try and unfreeze them they cut interest rates they did a lot of things now it wasn't really until this March that
- things really got serious in the sense that we started to see failures and be Sterns was a very interesting case I
- think the FED probably did the right thing there they didn't know much about their positions and they were faced with
- a weekend to try and find out it's not enough so what they did was play it safe what they were worried about was
- contagion risk that the notion that if be Sterns had failed a lot of other places who had claims on be Stern would
- have suffered a a problem they might have started to sell assets to try and deal with some of those problems that
- would have caused asset prices to fall further and we get into this meltdown and things go bad with a whole chain of
- bankruptcies now after they rescued best ears they gave access to the other investment Banks and as
- uh as is well known I think the quidd pro quo for that access was that the New York fed got to put examiners in there
- and they were allowed to look at all the books so when Leman came along they knew
- pretty much what their positions were and what the effects of allowing them to go bankrupt would be so this time they
- were able to let them go without too much risk of systemic risk of this contagion that we're talking
- about now Fanny and Freddy Joe talked a lot about that my own viewers they had to act there that is such a major player
- in the property markets they needed to stabilize that and what they did there was
- appropriate I think one of the things that I learned is that uh th is a very smart man and on Sunday when he realized
- that uh there may or may not be a deal done with Leman what he should do is to prevent meril Lynch being on the Block
- this week is to just go and see if anybody wanted to buy them and they did and he got a very good price for
- Merill so this week is AIG now I haven't kept I've been teaching all day so I don't know exactly what happened uh
- Jeremy seems to be more informed I I don't think they've done a deal from what he said and from what I understand
- but he hasn't been final it hasn't been finalized so we'll see what what happens
- with that again the feds are going to be worried about this contagion risk I'm not sure they know enough about uh aig's
- positions to make a snap decision and usually in those positions they do the risk averse thing which is to uh to bail
- them out or to make sure that there's no spread now is this the end well I don't
- think so I think that we will have problems going forward forward in in the US so if you look at uh credit default
- swaps on City Group they're beginning to rise dramatically and they may be next there may also be some of the smaller
- Banks like Washington Mutual and maybe wacovia and some of these other ones that have
- problems but I think the real risk is overseas and particularly in Europe so if we have a problem here even if City
- Group which is a massive Bank goes down the treasury can step in and arrange a bailout make sure that the systemic risk
- isn't realized now the big problem in the world today though is Big banks in small
- countries and in Europe there are many of them so in particular if you think about Belgium and the Netherlands first
- of all they have massive Banks and the one which has lots of problems at the moment is Fortis so Fortis will come
- come under scrutiny fairly soon in the next few weeks now you say but isn't Belgium part of the EU the answer is yes
- and they have a a memorandum of understanding about how things will be done but they don't specify exactly how
- burdens will be spread out and what that means is that if Fortis gets into trouble for
- example there's going to be a delay and that's going to lead to this kind of contagion risk that we've been talking
- about but the real country that is problematic in my view is Switzerland they have two massive Banks which are
- UBS and credit Swiss and they have assets which are six times the GDP of Switzerland UBS has lots of problems you
- know if you followed the problems about the tax avoidance and so on they have a lot of ethical issues there they've also
- had iner trading scandals in various countries and so on they've had a lot of problems with
- subprime loans and a lot of problems with their Risk Management Systems now if they have a big problem the Swiss
- government cannot afford to bail them out and that is where the problem comes because if they go down the kind of
- sequence of events that the FED talks about when it justifies rescuing bare Sterns that can happen in real time in
- Europe and then spread to the US and to other parts of the world and I think that's the real danger now hopefully it
- won't happen hopefully Jeremy's right everything will now calm down but I think that's that's the worrying thing
- what Joe was talking about is also very worrying property prices have got a ways
- to go in my view if it spills over into commercial property that's a big problem
- and then we get into the other major problem facing us which is the feedback effect all this is assuming that things
- don't go too bad in the real economy things haven't gone too bad yet but they may well do if people start losing their
- jobs if we have a lot of dis more disruption in the financial system and that's the real worry now Jeremy
- mentioned Japan my own view is Japan actually didn't do too badly you know if you want
- to look at the way not to deal with this the ultimately bad example is the Great
- Depression when unemployment went to 25% or so and it lasted for many years now if you look at some other instances if
- you look at Asian crisis again or you look at the Scandinavian crisis they got into deep
- recessions Japan didn't it stopped growing it had the last decade but it didn't have ordinary people suffer great
- pain now you know the the interesting question is what are the in feedback effects how far is this going to spread
- and where are we going to be 5 to 10 years from now
Brief Summary
The episode analyzes the property bubble's causes and the financial crisis implications, focusing on the Federal Reserve's role and global bank risks.
Key points
- The Property Bubble. Experts agree there was a significant property bubble fueled by low interest rates.
- Global Financial Risks. Concerns arise over the stability of banks in Europe and their potential impact on the US.
Episode highlights
- The Property BubbleExperts agree there was a significant property bubble fueled by low interest rates.“There was a bubble in property prices.”0:26Sep 17, 2008
- Global Financial RisksConcerns arise over the stability of banks in Europe and their potential impact on the US.“If they go down, the sequence of events can happen in real time.”11:20Sep 17, 2008
Tension
60/ 100Some tension





