John Mack on Saving Morgan Stanley, Inside the Bunker

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Episode Description

During the depths of the global financial meltdown in September 2008, John Mack faced the most critical moment of his tenure as CEO of Morgan Stanley. The investment bank was nearly out of cash, its stock price was plunging into the single digits and Treasury officials were pressuring him to sell the firm to JPMorgan Chase for a price as low as $1. During a recent Wharton Leadership Lecture, Mack offered an insiders take on his battle to preserve thousands of jobs as well as one of the best-known names on Wall Street.

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  1. John Mack: The notes that people gave me, they wanted— let's talk about leadership. And I can't think of a better time than one
  2. year ago, the crisis that we went through. Not only Morgan Stanley, but clearly the industry. And I want to take you
  3. through a week after Lehman Brothers goes bankrupt, Merrill Lynch is bought by Bank of America. And I'm going to start
  4. just a little bit of a run-in, going to that weekend. This would be September the 12th, 13th, 14th, where we met at
  5. the Fed, and then move you very quickly through the week on what was happening to Morgan Stanley, and secondarily to Goldman
  6. Sachs. Now, going into this crisis, clearly, we knew Bear Stearns sold in the early spring of '08. And then we knew the
  7. problems that were going on with Lehman Brothers. So we get a call from Tim Geithner, head of the New York Fed, Friday
  8. afternoon, sometime around 5:00, 4:30. And says, "John, can you come down to the Fed, we're going to have a meeting."
  9. So we get the call, "Come downtown," we're at midtown, 48th Street. We get in the car with my CFO, we start down the drive,
  10. we get to about 40th Street. Traffic's not moving. It's raining in New York. There's no way we're gonna make it downtown to
  11. get to the Federal Reserve. My driver, who is a ex-policeman, says to me, "Hey, boss, you see that bike lane over there? Does
  12. that go all the way down to the Battery?" I said, "Yeah, Joe, it does." Next thing I know we're in the bike lane. Going all the way
  13. down. We actually got there in five minutes. It's amazing. Now, a couple of bikers threw things at us. But we made the meeting
  14. and got there on time. Basically, the meeting was about Wall Street coming together to create enough capital to set up
  15. a bad bank for Lehman's low quality assets. And after hemmin' and hawin' and sayin' "Why us?" we finally figured out we really
  16. needed to do something as an industry. It was clear that Secretary Paulson did not have the political capital to go to
  17. Washington after Freddie and Fannie, after Bear Stearns, and get more money. So he was asking the Street to help out.
  18. The conversation around the table— basically, it was, "Look, Hank, if we do this, what are you going to do when AIG gets in
  19. trouble? Everyone's talking about AIG. And I think John Thain was here not long ago speaking to you," and someone
  20. said, "How about Merrill Lynch? They're going to be next." So all those things were talked about very openly. So we go through.
  21. Bank of America backs away from Lehman. Barclays backs away from Lehman. Lehman declares bankruptcy that night. That's a
  22. Sunday night. I think it was— I think it was the 14th. It may have been the 13th. I knew that Morgan Stanley would be next in line.
  23. We went into that week, with $181 billion in cash, not in securities, not in treasuries, not in IBM stock. Cash. Because
  24. we knew there would be a run on the bank. On Monday, our stock started down. I think we went into the week in the— in the low-
  25. 30s and probably ended up in the mid-20s after the first day. We were two days away, on Wednesday, of announcing our earnings,
  26. which were very strong earnings. On Tuesday morning, given the way the market acted on Monday, we were thinking about, should we
  27. accelerate our earning? Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman announced their earnings Tuesday morning, right before the opening. I
  28. think they had like a 7% return on equity. In this crisis, was, I thought, very good. We were to announce on Wednesday, and we
  29. said, "No, let's accelerate. we'll do it Tuesday afternoon." Tuesday afternoon we announced our earnings, 16.2% return on equity,
  30. 1.8 billion PBT. Next day our stock opens down 30%. And just so you understand what was going on, what was going on— fund
  31. managers would come in to Morgan Stanley, and somewhat to Goldman but we were the next in line. They would ask, at 2:45, for all
  32. their credit balances and their margin balances. Short our stock, and buy credit derivative swaps. So as the spread on
  33. credit derivative swaps got wider, it's an indication your credit is weaker. And then the clearing banks would call — Credit
  34. Suisse, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank. "If you want us to clear for you, you need to post "10 billion more in collateral."
  35. So that was the spin we were in. Money running out the door. It was a classic run on the bank. And, you know, Lloyd, again,
  36. Blankfein at Goldman, and I talked constantly. And he always kept saying, "John, you gotta hold on because I'm 20 seconds behind
  37. you." So the whole game was to hold on, to find other sources of capital. At the same time, you were reading the paper, or you
  38. would turn on CNBC, and you would see— and I gave Maria Bartiromo grief about this, you would see "Does Morgan Stanley make it?"
  39. Which, if you're an employee of our firm, or an investor in our firm, or a client of our firm, you have grave concerns. So we
  40. had a number of of town hall meetings and tried to say to people, "Here's what's going on, here are the facts. You need to
  41. know what's rumor and what's not rumor." So in our first meeting, after the stock was getting crushed, after our earnings
  42. report, I lead off with, "If you want to sell your stock, sell it. We're not keeping notes on who sells and who doesn't
  43. sell. You need to be comfortable with your personal situation." And then we went through some of the rumors. And the point I
  44. tried to make to them, that, "Let's not focus on it. There's going to be a rumor a minute. What you need to focus on is your
  45. colleagues, your clients, and make sure they know as much as you can tell them about markets and our position." And then we
  46. did a O&A. And I'd answer any question anyone asked. It was very open, very forthright. And they had more information, I am
  47. told, versus their colleagues who had been at other firms that were also going through this right before us. I think the key
  48. thing that I said to them— "This is not the time to be angry. This is not the time to say it's someone's fault. This is the
  49. time to focus on the firm and your clients." That careers are long careers. We don't want to get even, we want to do business
  50. and we want to stabilize the firm. So on Wednesday, with the stock continuing to fall, we had called one of our investors, CIC,
  51. which is one of the super-wealth funds in China who we had done some transactions with and had invested in us a year earlier.
  52. They came in and— good friends of mine, but the Chinese love to negotiate. And in our first round, a year earlier, we came
  53. into a room not quite this big, but they sat on one side, we sat on one side and we spent four days kind of working our way to
  54. the middle. And once we had a deal, they said, "Wasn't that a lot of fun?" And at that time, when you don't need the money,
  55. it was a lot of fun. We actually enjoyed it. It was give and take and push and argue and debate. But this time, we did not have
  56. the luxury of starting on the other side of the room. We started right in the middle. And for a lot of reasons we could
  57. not come to an agreement. At the same time, Tim Geithner, head of New York Fed, who I think had done just a superb job, was
  58. calling me saying, "What is Plan B? What are you going to do?" And you know, we were talking to the Chinese. We had put out a feeler
  59. to the Japanese. We talked to Buffett, we talked to everyone in trying to figure out how can you put some calmness into this
  60. market and get people to stop the run on the bank. On— on Wednesday, it was clear in talking to my manage committee—
  61. and we did everything as a team. It was clear they felt like we needed an alternative. So I'd received a call from Vikram
  62. Pandit at Citi. As many of you know, he used to work at Morgan Stanley. And he said, you know, "Great earnings. You know, if you
  63. need us, we're here to help you." I got a call from Jamie Dimon. "Great earnings. You know, if you need us, we're here to help you."
  64. Then I got a call from one of the Vice Chairmen at Citi. He said, you know, "Great earnings. We'd love to merge with you." So, on
  65. Thursday, I called Vikram and said "You've said you want to merge. We'd interested in talking to you." He said, "We'd love to do it.
  66. I'll come back to you. I need to talk to my board." Jamie Dimon had called my CFO, and called James Gorman, who will be CEO in
  67. three months. And they were saying they called— Jamie called him and asked, you know, "What can I do to help you? What's
  68. going on?" Things like that. "Clearly, John, the reason that you're calling us"— he wants to do a deal. So I call Jamie and I
  69. said, "Jamie, you know, you're calling my CFO and my President, clearly, you must want to do a deal. Is that why you're
  70. calling?" He said, "No, I was just calling to be helpful." And I said, "If you want to be helpful, you talk to me. You don't talk
  71. to my CFO and CEO— President. We need to do business. We've got to be direct. I don't want you going around me." It was an
  72. information-gathering exercise. I don't blame him for it, maybe I would have done the same thing. So we go through
  73. Wednesday, Thursday. No one really wants to do a deal. Our stock is probably in the— I'm gonna guess low teens. Tim
  74. Geithner is constantly saying "What is Plan B? Why don't you call Jamie?" I say, "Well, I talked to Jamie, he has
  75. no interest in the firm." So we get into Friday. Again, I get a call from the Fed. "We want you to find a partner. Would you
  76. talk to so and so?" I said, "I've done that. They don't want the firm. And if they did want the firm, they would pay no price
  77. for it." On Friday afternoon, we found out that the Japanese had interest in talking to us. And they would call me at 6am Monday
  78. morning Tokyo time, which would be Sunday afternoon in New York at 5pm. Hank Paulson, through all this, was probably the most
  79. supportive of all the regulators, calling and saying, "We're gonna get through this. We need an independent Morgan Stanley and
  80. others." There was only one other. He didn't have to use the name. And we talked constantly on ways of raising money, of working with
  81. the Chinese, working with the Vice Premier Wang Qishan, who— who I know really well, and Hank knows really well. But by Friday, we
  82. were getting nowhere. We'd been turned down at every place we've gone. Lloyd called me and said, "Do you think if we were a bank
  83. holding company that would help us through this crisis?" And I say, "Clearly. in the long run, it would. I'm not sure if— in the short
  84. run, if it would." But started to do some work on looking at being a bank holding company. The board is called in for Saturday,
  85. because I'm not sure if we will make it. So the board comes in on a Saturday. We have our first meeting. We take them through the
  86. situation. It looks dire. We don't know about the Japanese. That is really our hope, and, or, would the federal government do
  87. anything to help us? Again, milling around and our next meeting was going to be that evening, Saturday evening. So I
  88. think the lowest point for me, came Saturday afternoon. I got a call from Hank Paulson. And Hank said, "John, the markets are
  89. fragile. We cannot have Monday morning open without a solution to your firm. You have to find a partner." And I was pretty
  90. aggressive on— on pushing back. I said, "Hank, you know, you've been my biggest supporter. You've been helping
  91. us the whole way. Now you're— you're breaking away. I can't believe, given everything you've said to me during the week, now
  92. this is happening." He said, "Look, John, it's not about Morgan Stanley. It's about financial meltdown on a global
  93. basis. You need to find a partner." I said, "Well, look, I believe that the Japanese are going to invest in us, and that's my
  94. partner." He said, "You and I both know they will never make a decision that quickly." And I said, "Hank, I don't know that.
  95. They hired us to do a hostile takeover of a minority piece of Union Bank. Japanese firms are not known for doing hostiles.
  96. They did a hostile. They listened to us. We bought them NRDPs. they stay true to their word. I believe they'll invest." So Hank
  97. and I agree to disagree. Hung up to the phone and just really had to pull myself together because I felt Hank was the one person
  98. who really understood the culture of the business. What Morgan Stanley meant, not— not just to the people of the— of the
  99. firm, but also in the financial system. So we go to the board, we take them through it. Now the board has hired outside advisors.
  100. Outside law firm and outside investment bank. Small, boutique bank. Most of the people are staying. Staying, spending the
  101. night in the office. We come in Sunday, the board doesn't come in 'til midday. We really have nothing to do. We're waiting for
  102. 5:00 in the afternoon, which would be Sunday morning in Tokyo. So my secretary walks in and says, "John, Hank Paulson is
  103. on the phone." So for some reason I got up from my desk. I walked over to my couch, and I picked up the phone. Hank said, "John,
  104. I'm on here with Ben Bernanke. And Tim Geithner. We want to talk to you." And I said, "Well, Hank,
  105. I'd like to put my general counsel on the phone." So we hit the speaker button. So Gary Lynch, my general counsel on our
  106. on the phone, but again, there are 15, 20 people in the room, and the conversation goes something like this. "We're worried about
  107. financial markets on a global basis." This is Hank speaking. "We cannot have chaos on Monday morning. We need you to do
  108. something with your firm." Ben Bernanke said, "John, we see things you don't see. This is much bigger than any one firm. It's
  109. about a global crisis. And we have to have a solution and we need a solution for your firm." And Tim Geithner, who had been
  110. very persistent about Plan B said, "I want you to call Jamie, Jamie Dimon at JP, and he'll buy your bank."
  111. I want to stop there for a second, because a number of people have asked me, internally,
  112. "Well, you know, were you upset with them? Did you think they were doing the right thing or the wrong thing?" Well, I
  113. disagreed with him. But I'm not upset with them. Their job is to have financial stability. My job is to protect the firm and keep
  114. it going. We weren't nefarious, it wasn't mean, it wasn't— it was just practical. They did a superb job. So Tim Geithner says
  115. to me, "Call Jamie." I said, "Tim, I've called Jamie. He doesn't want the firm." "He wants it now." I said, "No, he doesn't. I've
  116. spoken to him. He does not want the firm." "Call him. He'll buy the firm. I said, "Yeah, he'll buy the firm for $1." Don't laugh. That was
  117. the price. I said, "Let me ask you a question. The three of you. I have 45,000 employees. In New York City, AIG, Lehman Brothers,
  118. Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and other layoffs, there's probably 40,000 jobs have been lost. From a public policy point of view,
  119. does this make sense?" Tim said, "It's not about public policy. It's about stability. And that's what we're focused on. And we
  120. want you to do something with your firm." So I said, I think very calmly, I think people in the room would say that.
  121. "I have the utmost respect for the three of you. What you do for this country? Makes you
  122. patriots. But I have 45,000 employees. I won't do it. I'll take the firm down." Click.
  123. That was the conversation. So you're in there. It is surreal, because you're going through this. Trying to protect the firm,
  124. trying to do what's right. They're trying to do their job. So now, in 30 minutes, I'm on
  125. the phone with the Japanese. Paul Taubman [?] and Ji-Yun Li [?], who's his chief of staff, are in there with me, the doors shut. And I
  126. speak into the phone to my partner in Tokyo. I wait 10 seconds, 30 seconds. He interprets. He does the
  127. translation. I wait, he talks back and forth. It's— it's very kind of— if you've been with interpreters, you gotta stay
  128. very focused on what you're going to say. So my secretary comes in and says, "Tim Geithner is on the phone. He wants to
  129. talk to you." I said "Tell Tim I gotta call him back. I'm on the phone with the Japanese." We go back to the conversation. I talk, I wait,
  130. back and forth. My secretary comes in, says, "Hank Paulson is on the phone. He wants to talk to you."
  131. All I can tell you, I'm wired now. "Tell Hank, I'll call him back, I'm on the phone with the Japanese."
  132. Go back, back and forth, back and forth. She comes back in about three or four minutes and says, "Tim Geithner is on the
  133. phone and he wants to talk to you now." "Tell Tim Geithner to get [bleeped]." When you come that close to really going out of business,
  134. call it near death— death experience— the end of the— whatever you want to call it, your only focus is to make sure
  135. your company survives. I had no fear of the three of them. They were doing their job. I had to do my job. The team around me
  136. were superb. We communicated, we worked together, we had single focus. And we got it to work. We did survive. I went home, went
  137. to the city, my wife came into the city. And we went over to my kids' apartments. And I went in and I said to Christie, I said, "Chris,
  138. I may lose the firm." Emotional. I go into the living room, walk around and get my composure. I come back and I said to her, "But
  139. I'd rather be doing this than reading a book in North Carolina." The action was wild. The team was unbelievable. And
  140. how people worked— from my experience, it was— I never want to go through it again. But I'm glad I went through it once.
  141. In these points on leadership— and you know, you don't call yourself a leader, people say you're a leader. All I know is
  142. that one thing I could not do was let my team see how concerned I was. And I don't think they ever did. And I tried
  143. to, oftentimes, make light of what was going on or make jokes. So one of the things I did, I had a hand-held blood
  144. pressure gauge. So we go to meetings, and I'd say "Check your blood pressure." And matter of fact, one of my guys actually went to
  145. the hospital after he checked his blood pressure. We found out it was stress. Also, it was over one of the Jewish holidays. And he
  146. had told me that last year, his 12-year-old son, who didn't have to fast, would come in and eat food in front of him all the
  147. time to punish him. And so I decided to, even though I was not being disrespectful, I had a pizza delivered every hour on
  148. the hour for seven hours. He said his housekeeper really liked it. And he thought it was very funny that during the
  149. crisis, I'm thinking about silly things like that. I think you had to keep a sense of humor. The stress and the intensity was
  150. more than anything I've ever seen. And what my guys don't know, when my CFO walked out of my office and said, "We're gonna
  151. be out of money in three days," I shut the door. And I took— I don't think I've ever taken deeper breaths than I took after
  152. he walked out the door. But that was all in my office by myself just trying to stay focused. So the key is, I mean, some of
  153. these things were very straightforward on leadership. Clearly, we recognized it was a crisis. We communicated at least
  154. six or seven times with all of our employees on a global network, so they knew what we knew. We never sugarcoated it. We
  155. told them the truth. From day one. Everyone knew how serious it was. Everyone trusted us. We had a lot of integrity. They
  156. knew we weren't trying to trick them. I never said, "Go buy the stock." I said, "If it makes you feel better, sell the stock." A
  157. lot of people sold stock. I don't know who they are. I don't want to know and I don't care. People had to be comfortable. We
  158. had to set a tone that as much as the crisis was was tough, I think if you talk to my executives, I went out of my
  159. way— I'll never forget coming out of the meeting with— with the Japanese, and I saw my Chief of Staff and I said— it was— it was
  160. the last day the Yankees were playing in Yankee Stadium. And I said, "I thought you're going to the Yankees game." Always trying to
  161. deflect and say there were other things to do, things to talk about, things to joke about. So, I guess the point you want to
  162. walk away with— and I don't know if it's leadership or responsibility, but when you take on jobs, doesn't have to be a
  163. big job, you have a responsibility to do what you think is right. And stand up, sometimes when the odds are
  164. against you and people are pushing you. I think there— there are enough stories you can read about in the paper, where if
  165. people would have done that, they wouldn't be in the pickle they're in now. So I guess if you leave here, the thing to
  166. think about is, stand up for what you believe in. Do what you think's right. Be prepared to suffer the consequences. But
  167. don't be pushed around when you know in your heart of heart, it's the wrong thing to do.

Brief Summary

John Mack discusses leadership during the 2008 financial crisis at Morgan Stanley, detailing challenges and key decisions made during a turbulent week.

Key points

  • A Race Against Time. Mack describes the frantic efforts to secure a meeting at the Federal Reserve amidst worsening conditions.
  • The Crisis Unfolds. John Mack recounts the events leading to the financial crisis, highlighting the urgency of leadership during turmoil.
  • Desperate Measures. Mack shares how they navigated the crisis, including a call from the Fed and the need for capital.
  • The Final Call. In a critical moment, Mack is urged to call Jamie Dimon for a potential deal.
  • The Weight of Responsibility. Mack reflects on the pressure of leading during a crisis, emphasizing the importance of communication.
  • A Lesson in Leadership. Taking on responsibility means standing up for what's right, even against the odds.

Tension

75/ 100High tension

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