Richard Herring on What's Next for Investment Banks

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Episode Description

Wharton Professor Richard Herring looks at failures of ratings agencies and other factors besetting investment banks.

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  1. Um what about investment banks? Um it was shocking quite frankly to see that uh the Fed bailed out bear because it
  2. was something they had a pretty firm policy against doing for um the entire uh t modern era in the US. We had taken
  3. the traditional view that investment banks could not be a source of systemic risk. Why was that? Well, one for one
  4. thing, unlike a bank where a bank deposit depends on the health of the bank if you want to get your money back.
  5. If you're a customer of an investment bank, I didn't say an investor, mind you, I said a customer of an investment
  6. bank, those securities are segregated, you don't really have to depend on the investment bank to get your uh
  7. securities out. And you're seeing right now a very easy, very straightforward lift out of Layman Brothers of all of
  8. the accounts that that um they have with nobody really afraid that they're not going to in fact layman is continuing to
  9. trade for you today. Uh but they'll be lifted out and put in another investment bank with absolutely no harm. Uh there's
  10. also cypic insurance to back it up. So there's really not a risk that would cause customers to run as there is in a
  11. bank where bank depositors do need to worry about the quality of their bank. The other argument was that investment
  12. banks hold mainly marketable securities and that means that should they face a liquidity crisis, they can delever very
  13. easily because all they need to do is sell securities so that their balance sheet matches their funding base. A and
  14. finally um the argument was that you didn't need to worry about them from a systemic perspective because their
  15. access to the important clearing and settlement system was through banks. So you could really regulate investment
  16. banks indirectly through banks. We in fact had a test of that hypothesis, not one that anybody
  17. especially wanted to run, but the most profitable firm on Wall Street uh during the 1980s was Drexelburn and Lombair.
  18. And in 1990, it was forced to um uh go into chapter 11 bankruptcy. Um there was absolutely no public intervention except
  19. that the Bank of England and the New York Fed acted as honor honest brokers in order to unwind their positions. But
  20. it had so little systemic consequence that the stock market actually went up the day that bear that uh Drexel Burnham
  21. went down. The EU in contrast to the US has long had the very opposite view of investment banks. Part of that is
  22. because almost all of the large European investment banks have long had investment banking powers. So they
  23. really don't recognize the difference in the category. The other reason is that the big five US investment banks all
  24. have important banking operations in Europe um uh usually in London but also in other places as well. So earlier this
  25. decade, the EU insisted that we subject investment banks to credential oversight
  26. comparable to that applied to large US banks. Now we had a law that permitted us to do that. Um the uh Graham Leachch
  27. Blly modernization act which was passed in 1997 uh set up financial service holding
  28. companies where the Fed would be the supervisor or they permitted the possibility of an investment bank
  29. holding company which would permit the SEC to be the oversight supervisor. Investment banks however were free to
  30. decide to do it or not. None of them wanted to be regulated by the Fed and one can well understand why not. Um nor
  31. did they really want to be regulated by the SEC. The compromise that was arrived
  32. at was that they would become voluntary consolidated supervised entities with SEC oversight. And um as far as we can
  33. tell it amounted to none at all. Uh the SEC has still not been able to describe what they did. Well, what's changed
  34. since the days of Drexel Burnham? uh because that was a tough time too. The US economy was in recession. It was not
  35. a time when anybody really wanted to run an experiment of letting a a major firm
  36. go. Well, it's not your father's investment bank these days. What's happened over time is that investment
  37. banks have become more and more like commercial banks. Their portfolios have shifted sharply in favor of lower
  38. quality, less liquid assets. They no longer have balance sheets that are mainly treasury bills and things they
  39. can sell in a price. The proportion of of uh leveraged loans, for example, has grown eightfold from 2001 to 2007 on
  40. their balance sheets. The other thing that's happened is that their funding base has has and they themselves have
  41. become much more international. Now, that could be a good thing because diversification and funding is usually a
  42. good thing. But it means that if you get into trouble, you're going to have to deal with the authorities in one country
  43. to take funds from that country to help you in the country where you may have a deficit. And typically supervisors and
  44. regulators look after their own first and so it becomes an innovation. The other enormous difference in the
  45. investment banking business is that they've become much much more leveraged. This isn't even counting the embedded
  46. leverage in the instruments that they hold, the swaps, the futures, um, and the uh, CDOS's and various sorts of
  47. securitized debts. This is just looking at net leverage. Bear Sterns had a 32:1 ratio, which is just incredible if you
  48. think about it. It works really, really well when profits are high, and that's why these firms were so profitable in
  49. good times. But it doesn't take much of a hit to turn such an institution into an insolvent institution.
  50. The other major change in investment banks has been the importance of repos. Now repos in 1990 were about 13% of
  51. federally insured bank deposits. Repos uh last year were 60% of federally insured bank deposits. So repos have
  52. become a huge factor. Um, we thought that it was a way for a firm to borrow without reference to its own credit
  53. risk, but somehow uh experts and the profession mix missed the point that counterparty risk can be very very
  54. important. And as we've heard before, they've become very involved uh in in all sorts of over-the-counter markets,
  55. particularly the credit default spot market, which is more than 60 trillion in in size. Uh now Bear Sterns was in a
  56. very precarious position. It was obvious as soon as their two hedge funds blew up. Their equity price fell to almost
  57. nothing. Um their liquidity position which is something they really should have been watching at year in 2007 was
  58. the lowest of the five investment banks. they were the most leveraged and you could see in the credit default spreads
  59. against Bear Sterns that in fact um they were much higher than for any other investment bank in uh January and
  60. February and of course in March. Yet nonetheless uh and I think Jeremy made the argument and and uh it is I think
  61. quite believable the Fed was caught by surprise. Um the rapid demise of Bear Sterns really did startle them. um the
  62. prime brokerage specialty at the thing at which Bear Sterns was really good became a liability as the hedge funds
  63. grew worried and withdrew all of their funds. Um and you found that over-the-counter derivatives parties um
  64. really didn't want to have them as a counterparty. They didn't want to take the the uh counterparty risk. Lenders
  65. wouldn't lend to them and some banks even refused to clear for bear. So it was essentially dead. The Fed then did
  66. something really quite startling. Um, they bailed them out. It was a shotgun marriage with JP Morgan Chase, but they
  67. uh put in $30 billion. It's true Chase will have the first billion in loss, but there's still 29 billion of taxpayers
  68. money at risk. And it's at risk in a very untransparent way. In a world where SPEs and special purpose vehicles have
  69. gotten us in trouble, what did the Fed do? Well, they created an SPE and had it managed off balance sheet. Nobody's sure
  70. what's in it. They claim it's good quality stuff, but but we don't really know. Why did the Fed do that? Why did
  71. the Fed um uh make this incredible break with with its past? Well, they were concerned that if we applied regular
  72. bankruptcy laws, now we don't do that to banks, but to investment banks, we do. Uh and we're seeing how the experiment
  73. works with Layman Brothers. We by no means know exactly how it works. There are stays that are automatically applied
  74. and these stays which have a rationale uh of letting the court figure out what the assets are and what the liabilities
  75. are and uh make sure that everybody gets paid in an appropriate way um can have a
  76. devastating effect on financial markets. it can cause um counterparties to be unable to hedge and uh the lack of
  77. clarity regarding positions can cause major failures. So we found a situation where the Fed was not willing to take a
  78. chance. Um what happened with layman brothers? Well, one of the problems of intervening as the Fed did is that it
  79. creates moral hazard. Um, and the moral hazard isn't just that investors won't monitor as well. Not just that the
  80. investment banks have a bigger incentive to take risks. It's a moral hazard in solving the problem, a private sector
  81. deal. Why was it that it wasn't Sunday morning that we uh had didn't know that layman wasn't going to find a partner?
  82. Well, they didn't fully believe that the Treasury and Fred would let it go. And there was good reason not to believe.
  83. Layman Brothers was more than twice as large as Bear Sterns. It had all of the same interconnections. What was
  84. different was that the Fed knew a lot more about it because as Franklin mentioned, they've had examiners in
  85. there every day since since March. And um uh the political factors uh may have well entered in as well um because they
  86. had just taken on six trillion with Fanny, Freddy, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system. Um so we're in a situation
  87. where um we're playing an experiment that they were afraid afraid to play in March. It's hard to argue that markets
  88. are in much more stable situation and we'll just have to see how it goes. Well, as I mentioned,
  89. one of the uh things that's gone wrong is risk management. A lot of the things we thought we knew about risk management
  90. turned out not to be true. And it's true of each of the traditional silos of risk
  91. management. market risk. Well, typically when you look at market risk, you use some sort of value at risk model that
  92. looks at prices. But as trading rooms increasingly trade in securities that are credit risk intensive, you've got to
  93. look at credit risk and liquidity risk as well. And most firms were simply not set up to do that. Um, credit risk um,
  94. uh, also was a problem because, uh, people didn't really understand its relationship to liquidity risk.
  95. Operational risk proved a problem because most firms didn't have management information systems that
  96. could tell them what their full exposure to these markets were. And so, you had this embarrassing series of
  97. announcements of even bigger and larger um, uh, exposures and losses. and uh operational risk failed to have a good
  98. discipline for pricing these securities. Um there's an interesting BIS paper that
  99. shows the differences in pricing. Some of them were very naive, looked uh basically just at um the ratings and uh
  100. had no real backup system. But there was also a failure across silos. There was a
  101. failure to anticipate that correlations were not going to be stable. there was a
  102. failure to realign risk management with um uh the convergence of risk types. But
  103. I'd like to finish um with um a plug for a book that we're sponsoring at the uh financial institution center. It's going
  104. to be called the known, the unknown, and the unknowable in financial institutions.
  105. And um I think it summarizes some of the the lessons learned. Among the known, we
  106. thought we knew a lot about models, ratings, and insurance. And it turns out we knew a lot less than we thought we
  107. did. And um things you think you know that just ain't so are really what can bite you in a big way. The uh unknown
  108. are things where there's sort of a big variance. You just don't really know with precision what the answer is. Um
  109. and the problem is that regulation is now insisting on a precision that's simply impossible. that they're
  110. insisting that institutions have capital that will protect them against all but 003%
  111. of the risk of default during a year. And the fact is we just don't know what those tales are like. And uh we're
  112. deluding ourselves by playing that. Finally, the unknowable. It may be that modern financial systems are simply so
  113. complex and the dynamics are so complicated that um we really don't understand them and probably can't
  114. because they move very quickly. What's the answer to that? Well, that means that there's a lot of value in firms
  115. stockpiling liquidity in extra capital and in resiliency. The problem is um in a world of takeovers and aggressive
  116. hedge funds, it's not so clear that u banks and insurance companies and other financial institutions can get can get
  117. by with having that kind of redundancy in their balance sheets. Thanks.

Brief Summary

The episode covers the Fed's bailout of Bear Stearns and systemic risks in investment banking.

Key points

  • Investment Banks vs. Commercial Banks. Investment banks have evolved to resemble commercial banks, raising new concerns.
  • The Fed's Surprising Bailout. The Fed's unexpected bailout of Bear Stearns marked a significant shift in policy.

Tension

65/ 100Some tension

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