How Analytics and New Rules Are Changing Baseball

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ABOUT THE EPISODE Theo Epstein, Senior Advisor and part owner of Fenway Sports Group and former executive with the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs, explains how integrating analytics with scouting built championship organizations, how reforms like the pitch timer reshaped the pace of play, and how Major League Baseball can reenergize its national appeal.

ABOUT THE PODCAST Sports is a game of numbers. Wharton experts Eric Bradlow, Shane Jensen, Cade Massey, and Adi Wyner team up to tackle the world of sports, from current events to longstanding issues such as: What sports streaks are the most impressive? How do you rank the best players? Can athletes be compared across sports? Moneyball Highlights explains how decision-makers in the game can avoid the common mistakes and embrace the data. Episodes are recorded at the Wharton School.

#BaseballAnalytics #MLBStrategy #PitchingDevelopment #ModernBaseball #BaseballInjuries #StrikeoutEra #BaseballRules #Sabermetrics ----- The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania is committed to sharing its intellectual capital through Knowledge at Wharton, the school’s online business analysis journal.

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  1. Welcome. Welcome everyone to this week's edition of Wharton Moneyball. My favorite time of the week where two of
  2. my favorite subjects, sports and data science collide. This is Eric Bradlo, professor of marketing statistics and
  3. data science here at the Wharton School. I'm joined today by my longtime friend,
  4. collaborator, co-author, and co-host, professor of statistics and data science, Audi Winer. some combination of
  5. the two of us, Kade Massie and Shane Jensen are here every week on the Wharton podcast network version of
  6. Wharton Moneyball. Well, Audi, you and I have been at this for almost 12 years together. Been friends for 30 years.
  7. Today's a very special week. Um, I always say one of the greatest things we get to do here on Wharton Moneyball is
  8. we get to talk to people that are living statistics and data science and its application to sports in the real world.
  9. I would say today is no exception. But today really, you and I were talking about this off the air. I would think
  10. you and I would both consider this a pinnacle of everything we've been trying to achieve with Wharton Moneyball is uh
  11. interviewing our guest today, Theo Epstein. Um, for those of you that don't know, I don't know how you could not
  12. possibly know who this is, but what the hell? I'm going to read a bio anyway. And by the way, Theo, just so you know,
  13. this was generated by a large language model to show you the whole world knows this. We'll see how accurate it is.
  14. >> Yeah, we worry about that. >> Yeah, we'll see. Exactly. Theo Epstein is one of the most influential baseball
  15. executives of the modern era. Best known for helping end two of the sport's longest championship droughts. After
  16. rising quickly through the Boston Red Sox front office, he became MLB's youngest general manager and hate build
  17. helped build the roster that won the 2004 World Series for the Red Sox, the franchise's first title in 86 years. and
  18. later another championship in 2007. He then took over baseball operations for the Chicago Cubs and helped the
  19. organization to a historic 2016 World Series victory ending a 108-year title drought. Widely respected for blending
  20. scouting, player development, and analytics. Epstein has also been a prominent voice on the future of the
  21. game, including pace of play and competitive balance. So, Theo, please, on behalf of Audi and myself and all of
  22. our listeners, welcome to Wharton Moneyball. Thanks for having me. I appreciate uh I'm not sure I'm the
  23. pinnacle of anything, but I I appreciate that kind intro. >> Now, I should warn you, by the way, you
  24. know, I don't know if you've ever listened to our show. Um you broke our hearts cuz just so you Oh, listen.
  25. >> Yeah, he's going to get it out there right early. >> I might as well let you know there's no
  26. two more diehard Yankee fans than Eric Bradlow and Audi Winer. But withstanding that, we do have respect for everything
  27. that went on in 2004, 2007, 2016, and beyond. >> Yeah. I'm I'm breaking my rule of being
  28. outnumbered by Yankee fans. >> Yeah, I'll roll with it. >> Well, Audi, let me turn things over to
  29. you, please. >> Sure. Okay. So, um there's a I thought it was a pretty accurate bio. Um, but in
  30. the in the process of doing a little bit of research, I remember that when you first started at the Red Sox, um, Billy
  31. Bean was in hot pursuit by the Red Sox and he and he obviously turned them down to stay at at the Oakland A's and he and
  32. at least the the story is is that he actually recommended they just hire you. Um, so you can confirm or deny that
  33. that's up to you, but I wanted to ask you specifically, how influenced were you by what Bean was doing at Oakland
  34. A's? And just to be more specific, um, how what we would call saber, meaning sports analytics oriented or baseball
  35. analytics, were the Red Sox back in back in the day when you first took over because it's a different time now than
  36. it was then. >> Yeah. Well, first off, it's it's true that Billy recommended me, but not
  37. before I recommended him. So, I was I was actually running the search process uh for the GM. I was the assistant GM.
  38. I'd been there a year. um my boss, the interim general manager, Mike Port, had been let go at the end of the or removed
  39. from that role at the end of the O2 season. So, we had a search process that I led and uh Billy was the top guy, the
  40. guy that we all wanted and it was sort of a long very public pursuit and he ended up accepting the job, got a record
  41. contract and then, you know, the Moneyball the movie sort of has it a little bit right and and there's more to
  42. it. But >> he uh he called me 24 hours after taking the job and asked if I was sitting down
  43. and and and then after I sat down, he told me that he had decided he couldn't take the job. And so I had to go back
  44. with my tail between my legs to um John Henry and Tom Warner and Larry Lucino and told them we had to start the
  45. process over again. They met and yeah, a day or two later they they called me and
  46. said, "Well, we just want you to do it. that's what Billy said we should do and we've gotten to know you over the last
  47. year and we think you're the right person for the job. So, um, as to how influenced I was by Billy and what
  48. Oakland was doing, I'm definitely absolutely took note of it. I mean, they were doing remarkable things on a small
  49. budget. I think it's probably accurate to say both Billy and I and Billy's um mentor Sandy Alderson were all sort
  50. of influenced by Bill James and by men and by you know the school of sabertric thought that had always existed sort of
  51. outside uh the walls at MLB up to that point. You know, I grew up in the 80s watching baseball, playing baseball, but
  52. then also reading Bill James baseball abstracts. And I know Sandy, he he's talked about this that when he got the
  53. job, he saw it as an opportunity to apply a lot of Bill's concepts. And frankly, a lot of that dates back to
  54. like George Weiss and the and the Yankees. you know, he had his own >> personal statistician and he made a lot
  55. of decisions based on >> um you know, the hidden value of numbers in baseball. Branch Ricky the same the
  56. same way and a lot of so a lot of it dates way back. But Bill Bill's masterful mind um sort of just made it
  57. crystal clear that there's this whole other world, other way to evaluate players, other way to understand the
  58. game. Sandy, I think understood that, weaponized it. Billy took it to another level. And then and then when I took
  59. over the Red Sox, um it was at a time, it was before Moneyball had come out, there were only a handful of teams
  60. really using statistical analysis in a meaningful way uh to make decisions. And so that made it uh that left a lot of
  61. lowhanging fruit. And then my personal philosophy having come up with the Padres's under Kevin Towers, I had I had
  62. the benefit of, you know, my my cubicle was literally situated between the scouting director, uh, Brad Sloan, and
  63. the statistical director, Eddie Epste, no relation. And those two had completely opposite views of the world.
  64. Brad Sloan >> didn't want to know a player stats. He just wanted wanted us to evaluate them
  65. by watching them play. He thought it would it would uh bias his opinion or scouts opinion if he knew what the
  66. player's performance was. And Eddie was the opposite. He didn't want to see him play. He just wanted to to take a
  67. sophisticated look at the players track record, run it through his models, and make a projection. So those two guys had
  68. opposed views of the world. But I I ended up soaking up a lot from both of them and and sort of came to the
  69. conclusion that the right answer is not just looking through the traditional scouting lens and not just looking
  70. through the the uh object objective analysis lens but whenever possible using both to try to get to the clearest
  71. picture of the player. And so watching what Billy was doing successfully in Oakland and taking over in Boston,
  72. knowing that we had a lot more resources than they did, and I I had uh this personal approach trying to blend uh
  73. analytics and scouting, I just saw it as sort of a great opportunity to learn from a lot of great people and and go
  74. off and try to apply it the best we could with a new approach. >> Just to say just to jump in here and
  75. then I know Audi's going to continue on with some other questions. Couple things. One is um I I'm a strong
  76. believer like you are Theo. Apparently we you know in statistics we might call that an ensemble estimator. We get two
  77. we get a scouting approach. We get a more analytics approach. Any I mean every theorem of statistics says you get
  78. optimal solutions when you blend both. Neither is 100% correct and you do better. The second thing you'll be proud
  79. of this. Last week our guest was Josh Rawitz uh the president of the National Baseball Hall of Fame. Um we of course
  80. recommended you for the Hall of Fame. We hope that you know seriously we hope it
  81. happens someday. And the other person we talked about was Bill James and we said
  82. but unfortunately for Bill there isn't like the same path there is for you as an executive. And we just told Josh we
  83. did this on the air we just said something has to be fixed like how Theo Epstein's not in the Hall of Fame and
  84. how Bill James is not in the Hall of Fame. Like to us there is no Hall of Fame. And he gave a very good answer. He
  85. said, "Well, I don't know if there'll be a day where a plaque of Bill James will
  86. be in the Hall of Fame, but Bill James is in the Hall of Fame. It's the Hall of Fame and Museum. You can't talk about
  87. the history of baseball without talking about Bill James." And I thought that was a very thoughtful answer, but we
  88. wanted I just want to know on the record, we want you both in the Hall of Fame. >> Appreciate the the support there. But
  89. yeah, Bill Bill's had a had a transformational impact on the game and on a lot of others who went on to make
  90. their own impact as well. So my that actually leads me to my second question because Bill James um obviously his his
  91. role is incredible but as you pointed out a lot of these ideas particularly the ones that most people will talk
  92. about the the the value of the OBP the home run and the the poverty of the batting average as a metric um shifts
  93. and things like this. These were known for a long time. And in fact, when I teach um students at all levels, I
  94. emphasize that Moneyball the book and the movie especially is actually a it's people think it's a baseball book. It
  95. sort of is. Um people often think it's a statistics book. It sort of is that, but
  96. it's really a management book. It's really about getting an organization that didn't value certain things to
  97. change and become and value them. And we know like in and we always ask the question, how did it take basketball so
  98. long to figure out that three is bigger than two? It's just how do you miss that? Um and and the answer is actually
  99. complicated. And and so I guess my question for you is >> how did you transition a team from doing
  100. things historically into what I mean everybody does now to varying degrees understands completely that that you
  101. have to use the numbers the way they are done now. How did that transition actually how did how did that take
  102. place? Um, well, we had the benefit of having an owner and John Henry who really set the tone for that. I mean, he
  103. the >> my first meeting with John after I um got the job, you know, he said, "Oh, we
  104. need to arm you, you know, with some some experienced adviserss because you're young and it'll help you. It'll
  105. also make it look better." and and so Bill Lejoy who was um you know a great general manager we we brought in uh put
  106. the 84 Tigers together um and then John suggested Bill James and I said great so
  107. let's call him never forget sitting in John Henry's office we just cold called Bill James and uh Bill Bill's answer he
  108. goes well he goes I have I have a a rule I I try to live by which is never say no
  109. to if a billionaire wants to meet with you never say no so he agreed to fly to Austin and we ended up hiring him as an
  110. adviser. But um so we had we had great alignment throughout the organization because John set the tone. He had made
  111. his fortune um in the in the markets using models and algorithms and um understanding trends and trend following
  112. in the markets. And so he was he was a Bill James reader. he was um very driven by data and and so um I guess I guess
  113. the way I approached it initially was was um you know to to to make make it clear that we were going to take some
  114. risks that um you know the Red Sox had at the time what 84 years or or so of of of of not having success and we were
  115. going to try things a different way that we weren't afraid to be wrong. Um, but that but that just because we were going
  116. to build an infrastructure that allowed us to work successfully with data didn't
  117. mean that we didn't place tremendous value on scouting. It didn't mean that we didn't place tremendous value on
  118. player development and that there that there was room for everything. We tried to um be transparent and open with the
  119. organization that you'll remember back then at the time there was a lot of animosity really for you know from the
  120. old guard to the new guard scouts computers were going to come and take their jobs and
  121. >> um so we just tried to um >> cross-pollinate as best we could share information. And we'd send our analysts
  122. out on the road with the scouts to get them to understand how hard their job was and to understand what they bring to
  123. the table and share ideas. We'd bring our scouts into the draft room and and and in preparation for the draft and
  124. show them the models that that we were going to use. And we had some some early wins um that uh helped create some some
  125. momentum behind some of the ideas we were using. And you tried to just create a culture of thoroughess using all the
  126. information possible, creativity, trying to innovate, you know, that there were sort of no bad
  127. ideas. And you know, when you're when you're trying to find a competitive advantage, um, in baseball, you do a lot
  128. of R&D, probably 99 projects can lead nowhere. And the hundth one might help you getting a
  129. little bit of insight, something actionable, help you position the fielder a little bit better, help you
  130. evaluate a player in the draft a little bit better. and just tried to foster that culture of there are no bad ideas
  131. and that it was, you know, but but good ideas would be rewarded and brought down
  132. to the clubhouse or or or or you know, show up on the GM's desk. So, it was, you know, sort of a culture change uh
  133. project as as as much as anything else. >> I'm loving this format, Audi, where you
  134. ask questions, Theo answers. Now, I get to chirp in here. So, let me just chirp in. Yeah. Um, one is Theo, you said
  135. something that makes me think of today, which is, you know, you people were worried back then that computers were
  136. going to take their jobs. Wow. If we just replace that with the word AI, we're in we're in 2026. And so that's
  137. one thing. Uh, the second is our listeners on Morton Moneyball knows this. I started the data science team at
  138. the Philadelphia Eagles, our home football team. Jeffrey Lur has a PhD in sociology. He's a quant guy. He
  139. contacted me and it starts from the top. when you know it was him and Howie Roseman that I reported to. how he's a
  140. very quantoriented guy that would you know I hate to say it but you know the rest of the organization fell in line
  141. when the owner says we will be data oriented and we'll use it as a you didn't use these exact words but it's
  142. what you bent it's a decision support tool by no it's no one's looking to automate draft decisions to Eric
  143. Bradlo's statistical model but it's another input into the decisionm so I I really everything you said really
  144. resonated a lot with me >> and there was it was a time when there was so much lowhanging fruit that we
  145. would have been negligent in in not >> and not not picking them up. I give you an example. You know, I'd been in the
  146. draft room um with the Padres's in the in the mid 90s and late 90s and there were there were no stats in the room
  147. whatsoever. And I remember one year we had these extra picks and I was up high and I was the night before the draft I
  148. was in a panic because I could tell from the way we were setting up our board and
  149. the way we were talking about certain players that we were going to end up with a handful of players who who had
  150. subpar performance at small colleges and we were going to draft them just based on some scouting looks and expect them
  151. to go out and you know perform their way through the minor leagues and perform in
  152. the big league against better competition. And so like in a panic, I remember calling the night before the
  153. draft, calling sports information directors at the respective colleges and and and asking them to fax me their team
  154. stat sheet. So I'd at least have, you know, the ability to stand up on a soap box and say, "Why are we about to draft
  155. a kid from Texas Pan-American with a five and a half erra, you know, at the bottom of the first round?" And
  156. >> and and we did and he didn't get that aball. But so when I got to the Red Sox,
  157. literally the first project we did, we sent a team of interns to NCA headquarters um and had them look
  158. through file cabinets and photocopied 30 years worth of college baseball stats just trying to answer the simple
  159. question um what do great big leaguers look like when they're in college? And so just, you know, simple process,
  160. building a database, run some regression analyses, came up with a very simple set of formulas. one was ISS iso ISO
  161. power over strikeouts, ISOP over K. And it just basically showed that if if you if you slug, it doesn't have to be
  162. homers, but if you have isolated power, if you slug in in college ball and and you make a lot of contact and don't
  163. strike out, you tend to project really well. So, we took that into the draft in 2004.
  164. And Dustin Pedroya was, you know, not a not a prototypical high pick because he didn't hit for a
  165. ton of power. Although he hit a a lot of doubles and some triples, he only had a
  166. handful of homers, but he never struck out. And so he did extremely well in the ISOP over K. We moved him up to the
  167. point where he became our first pick. And uh you know, you know, good scouting reports, great makeup, but
  168. also you know, we moved him where we needed to because he lit up this metric that we had just devised. And then you
  169. know, obviously the rest is history. Rookie of the year. Yeah, we know all about it. Yeah, we don't want to.
  170. >> So, it's just but it's just an example of, you know, there was so much low hanging fruit. You could you go from one
  171. year this you're with an organization you're not using any stats in the draft and they're not allowed to a couple
  172. years later now you have some formulas where you think you can identify what good big leaguers look like in college.
  173. You can weaponize that. And we had we ended up being the best drafting team of the decade.
  174. mainly through great scouts and great process but also because we were one of the first teams to to really incorporate
  175. that kind of data and that kind of innovation into the draft room. So I think it's fair uh to say that I want to
  176. I want to scroll us in time to today to 2026 teams all over are using these these are now fan graphs it's every you
  177. get all this information so so I don't even want to entertain that but let's ask a question I'll start with an
  178. example uh some of the one of the most recent papers I wrote in baseball surprisingly I write more papers now um
  179. baseball's still my favorite sport in football and other things because there's so much widespread interest and
  180. in some level more to do but I did write a paper on on something which every time
  181. you watch a baseball game and it's late in the game. The announcers keep yapping
  182. away about what they call a third time through the order effect. So if you actually see how it's implemented in the
  183. game, the way they implement it is what we would call statistically based on what uh the idea of a discontinuity. So
  184. that the pitcher once he turn the line lineup turns over, you're now dealing with batters who have seen the pitcher
  185. twice and they have now an advantage. That's a discontinuity. So and therefore you should react accordingly. the
  186. pitcher is going to be hit, more likely to be hit. So, what I did was look at the data. I did this with my my former
  187. PhD student Ryan Bril, and we discovered that while it's very obvious that the pitcher starts to break down in the
  188. third time through the order, it's not because of a discontinuity. It's because of a combination of getting exhausted
  189. and that the everyone's watching the pitcher. So, at some level, it is batter learning. They are watching the pitcher,
  190. but it's not a discontinuity. And the reason why that's distinction is because there's no real reason to pull the
  191. pitcher just because they're heading into the third time through the order if they're having a good game and that it's
  192. not a it's not a discontinuity. So I take that as something that that is it is a widespread practice that I believe
  193. as an academic status is wrong. So my question to you is uh what are the analytics that are either using being
  194. used too much uh and maybe ineffectively and and is there another analytics thing
  195. uh or an avenue an area of baseball where analytics isn't being applied enough? So where is it over the top and
  196. where is it um not being underused and this is in today's game? Do you have anything you could
  197. >> Yeah. Where is it being used too much? Um >> so I I I my example was the third time
  198. there trying to do it too much with the relievers and not looking almost in the oldfashioned way. How is that pitcher
  199. doing on that day? >> Well, I think it's a process, right, where we're like when when you can first
  200. quantify something, it becomes over relied upon. So, right, you know, team I think people have always known, yeah,
  201. you have to be careful with pitchers as they get later in games. Then it was, oh
  202. wow, look what happens third time through the order. Oh, we can quantify it. Here's a third time through the
  203. order penalty. Let's make sure we don't fall victim to that. And then, um, you know, overreact and start pulling
  204. pitchers too early. I think then there's more sophisticated thought. Oh, let's separate fatigue from the exposure
  205. element. Um, we can and and then you have to take into account, you know, what the alternative is just because you
  206. may not be as effective the third time of the order, you have to then look at, you know, well, what's what are my
  207. probabilities of getting outs, you know, with with the alternatives. And so I think most teams by this point have now
  208. gotten to a point where they'll have their manager prepared with a card that shows sort of the appropriate third time
  209. through the order penalty, but then also what the what the matchup is for a fresh
  210. each available reliever facing for the first time. I mean, he can make a comparison so that you're, you know, if
  211. you look at the information in context and better understand it visa the alternatives, you're you're more likely
  212. to make a decision than just overreacting to some sort of newly discovered phenomenon. I I feel like a
  213. lot of baseball um new new data streams or new insights fall into that pattern. like when you
  214. know we first started to be able to quantify defense um there were a lot of overreactions and sort of like
  215. misattribution of of skill in certain ways we didn't have we had some data but it wasn't perfect data and we wasn't
  216. taking all the factors into consideration. Um so back to your original question which is um where is
  217. it being underutilized where is it being under um uh where is it being underutilized? sort of being
  218. overutilized. Um I don't know. I think um I mean think about that. I think I think
  219. you know personally I think there's sort of too much data being used in in-game decision making right where
  220. >> you where like the manager Yeah. He needs some basic information which he probably
  221. >> understands because managers prepare really well for games to begin with. But
  222. there is something to the flow of a game to understanding your personnel to being
  223. in the dugout. Um to feel is a real thing just because it's not like quantifiable and driven by numbers.
  224. Managers have a pretty good understanding of of of of how to run a game. I think you lose a little bit of
  225. that when there's too heavy a hand, too much information being forced upon on on
  226. the manager. I wouldn't want a manager who's underprepared, who doesn't understand their percentages. And but at
  227. the same time, I wouldn't want to put a manager in a position where he doesn't have the ability to take in all the
  228. factors, including those that are harder to quantify and and and make decisions where there's probably not enough data
  229. in the game and where there's a race to properly incorporate data is like injury
  230. prevention, right? We're just um that's I think the next big breakthrough. It it's already started in player
  231. development using obviously data and tech to improve player development and to sort of engineer training for certain
  232. outcomes that are that are really important to >> let's hope AI and motion data also helps
  233. with that video analysis now that can be done at large scale with motion data as
  234. well. >> Absolutely. And all and what all all that will do is is um you know increase
  235. the data set and give you enough information where then now >> your analyst or AI or a combination
  236. thereof um can can go about analyzing a big enough data set where >> we will hopefully find some leading
  237. indicators of injury that we can sort of uh develop and and and and uh around and
  238. and put players in a better position to stay healthy. It's a billion dollar question. It's it's also an arms race
  239. because right >> you know they they get very advanced training methods which is giving you
  240. more ability to train harder and longer but now you get more injury and you get methods to prevent that and so it's
  241. almost like it's still I don't think the injury rates have >> really have they gone up they've gone
  242. down and they where are they they constant I mean >> yeah they're they're really constant and
  243. what's amazing and Bill James used to make this point too um and this gets to your point about third time through the
  244. order and fatigue but you know the the >> the pit pitch limits and pitch counts and innings limits. You
  245. know, we've we've changed pitcher usage so dramatically over the year. It really
  246. started like with remember when Billy Martin had the four aces in Oakland >> and they were on the cover of Sports
  247. Illustrated and everyone thought, "Oh, they have this dominant pitching staff that's young. They're going to be
  248. together forever." And then all four of those guys got hurt and and blew out in the course of a year. And what happened?
  249. Billy Martin lost his job >> because that in and Bill's theory is that all because if you look at the data
  250. that's when the most dramatic change in pitch pitcher usage occurred where we started going from you know 275 innings
  251. to you know 250 225 200 now you know 180 170 pitchers used to throw you know upwards of 200 pitches a game and then
  252. there was a huge drop off obviously now we're like below 100 but >> that was that was sort of this
  253. inflection point in Bill's series that the the ma managers notice that if you blow out your very talented, very
  254. valuable pitchers, you're more likely to lose your job. So, usage dramatic a bit.
  255. Look, look how far we are from where pitchers were a couple generations ago throwing so much less. It's such less
  256. lowered volume and injury rates are exactly the same. And >> the main reason for that is because
  257. obviously when you throw less, you throw with more max. >> Yeah. This the entire modern game. We've
  258. had lots of biomechanics people on our show that have talked to us about what really matters in their view, love your
  259. view on this, is not so much the number of pitches, but how much how many max effort pitches?
  260. >> Yeah, exactly. And so people ask all the time um you know, well, a how do you um
  261. how do you keep pitchers healthier? And then B is also sort of how do you how do
  262. you rein pitching in a little bit so that the strikeout rate gets back under control, balls are in play a little bit
  263. more, pitchers can go deeper in games, restore the value of the starting pitcher. And I think, you know, it's
  264. it's obviously not a new concept, but this idea of if if you could get to a point where you have real limits on the
  265. number of pitchers on a pitching staff, you know, when when I was growing up, there were 10 pitchers on a staff, then
  266. it went to 11 and 12 and 13 and 14 and 15. We've obviously ran it back in with the 13 pitcher limit. But if you could
  267. ever gradually work it down, so say, "Hey, we're going to we're going to move that limit to 12 pitchers two years from
  268. now. So train your pitchers accordingly." And then if we don't get the strikeout rate um under control, but
  269. you know, if we don't hit a certain metric, two years after that, we're going to 11 pitchers. And if we don't
  270. get the strikeout rate, you know, under 22% or by then we're going to go to 10 pitchers. You would just have to draft
  271. and develop pitchers differently and bring back the art of pitching. you know, the and the number of pit the
  272. percentage of pitches thrown at max effort would go down because that, you know, the job of the starting pitcher
  273. used to be go as deep in the game as you possibly can, if not pitch the whole thing. And so pitchers would modulate
  274. their effort. They'd come out throwing 90 miles an hour and if they really needed it in a big spot, they'd reach
  275. back and throw a max effort fast and get more. But now the the whole job description has changed because of
  276. optimization. and we understand how hard it is to hit a, you know, maximum stuff,
  277. throw them with max effort. And so now the job description of the pitcher is get me as many outs as you can, but miss
  278. as many bass as you can along the way. And don't worry if you have to come out after four and two/3 because I've got,
  279. you know, eight guys and you are throwing 99. One of my Theo, just so you know, one of Audi and my favorite
  280. moments on our show was when we interviewed John Smoltz and we asked him, you know, you know, who wouldn't
  281. even make the major leagues? And he said, "Oh, there's no way Greg Maddox would make the major leagues today with
  282. the stuff he had." Like, who would have seen that a guy, you know, who can barely throw 90 that hits all his spots
  283. would win whatever 300? >> That's actually not true. That's actually not true because when Greg
  284. Maddox was drafted out of high school and then his his early years in the minor leagues, he was actually throwing
  285. he threw quite hard. He was throwing five miles an hour. But what Maddox >> learned is that he he could be just as
  286. effective, toning it back, hitting his spots and using movement and changing speeds to be effective. I think if Greg
  287. Maddox were drafted today, they would said, "Hey, you throw 95. >> Now throw 98.
  288. >> Let's put let's put you on a velocity program to make sure you throw 98." and
  289. he would have thrown a fraction of the the amount of innings and probably never would have developed.
  290. >> So that actually leads me to my next kind of question and topic is you were really influential in changing a bunch
  291. of the rules that that were really I think it had a tremendously positive impact on MLB the pitch clock uh the
  292. bases the the the pickoff uh limitation and the size of the bases. Um I guess I want to confirm that that that this was
  293. you were studying this with the MLB. Um and I love the changes. Um, I want you to comment that, but but um but
  294. particularly the the um the time between pitches, what has that done to the pitcher? Does that force them to not
  295. throw as hard because they don't have a 35 minute, 45 seconds to a minute to catch their breath and rare back another
  296. 100 mph fast or is it just making their time through the game shorter? What is what is the impact of that? And and how
  297. do you reflect on on that change in particular? You proud of it? I mean, I love it.
  298. >> Yeah, know it's true. I had been on the when I was serving as general manager, I
  299. had been on the competition committee for, you know, over a decade and um so I had given those issues a lot of thought
  300. and frankly it was kind of frustrating because we just couldn't we couldn't get much done on the competition committees
  301. and so when I was getting reaching the end of my time with the Cubs, I reached out to Commissioner Manfred and and
  302. asked if I could have a role at Major League Baseball just help helping out with um the rule change projects. and he
  303. was great and and brought me in. So with Morgan Sword and his staff of at baseball operations at Central Baseball,
  304. I was allowed to be one of the leaders of um uh those projects and it was a lot of fun. There were a lot of different
  305. components to it. There was a sort of like research component. We we relied on a lot of club analysts and a lot of very
  306. smart people try to model all the changes. There was a a sort of scientific method experimentation
  307. process where we we were able to we had this great petri dish of the Myer Leagues where we could experiment a
  308. little bit, make sure we >> um uh sort of planned and and and determined any unintended consequences
  309. and sort of understood what worked about the proposed changes, what didn't in in
  310. in not just in theory but in practice. and we were able to test over the course of 8,000 minor league games to so that
  311. by the time we were ready to implement at the major league level, we were really confident, we understood that the
  312. rules worked, what the outcome would be, and that they were fair to players. And
  313. then there was a sort of like political campaign element of the rule change process too where we were trying to win
  314. hearts and minds and um you know sort of plate traditionalists as well as as as as sort of younger fans and get the
  315. players and the managers and the media on on board. And then the execution element where you know you had to make
  316. sure the adjustment period was as as small as possible and that that went pretty well. I think by
  317. >> pretty much by like the end of April that first year, people just didn't notice the pitch timer and all they all
  318. they noticed was this really crisp, beautiful pace uh to the game and that they were getting home at a at a more
  319. reasonable hour. But as far as the pitch timer's impact on on pitchers, I mean the pitch pitch timer um
  320. was going to have a lot of effects um ultimately I think like on on pitchers on hitters um on on on the pace of play
  321. on fans and ultimately they were like all going to be really positive right with with with pitchers. One of the
  322. secondary impacts on pitchers was going to be um that this trend of pitchers taking a lot of extra time between
  323. pitches in order to be able to recover and throw max effort was going to be mitigated a little bit. So, I think
  324. pitchers figured out and and and and a lot of people at the clubs figured out that, you know, to to throw more pitches
  325. at max effort, you could you could accomplish that by pacing yourself. And conversely, if you have to work at a
  326. more rapid pace, you have to modulate a little bit. Now, the strikeout rate didn't go down directly because of that
  327. because it's a it's a multiffactorial issue and a complicated um equation. Um, but I think it helps a little bit. And
  328. then obviously you have to balance that with the concern that um, recovery is a good thing and that if you ask pitchers
  329. to do too much, you could potentially run the risk of hurting them. But I think the data has backed up that what
  330. we saw in the minor leagues, I think what's held true in the in the major leagues is that the pitch timer is not a
  331. contributing factor to the increased injury rate. It's simply um the desire to throw max effort um as as as
  332. frequently as possible that's really leading to these injuries. >> I think they probably have to pull it
  333. back just because they just don't have the the uh the the energy. But I'm I'm surprised that the strikeout rate didn't
  334. go down. Um and that probably was in It didn't go up though, did it either? >> Yeah, it went it stabilized a it
  335. stabilized a a little bit >> because we don't have the counterfactual. I would imagine it would
  336. have gone it would have gone up a little bit and probably kept it from rising and
  337. just sort of stopped stopped that trend. >> Again, I think it's just going to be um
  338. there are sort of other interventions that ultimately will be necessary to lower the strikeout rate and we tested
  339. all kinds of things even we even tested mound distance where >> in one of the independent leagues.
  340. >> Yeah, we heard that that ran this joint venture. we moved it back from 60 ft 6
  341. in by >> I think it was a foot and um again it's sort of like a dynamic environment. So
  342. that alone doesn't lower the strikeout rate because then you breaking balls actually break a little bit more from
  343. that distance and it >> there's a huge adjustment period for hitters to to who have trained their
  344. whole lives seeing pitches at 60 feet six inches. How long is do they have to be exposed to this new input before they
  345. can adjust as well? So, I still think there's something there uh to toy with, but you know, lot lot of different
  346. things you can a lot of different levers you can pull to try to get the strikeout
  347. rate um back under control. I think ultimately the most important thing is we have to ask a little bit more from
  348. our pitchers in terms of volume whether through it it's its pitcher roster limits or through like mandating the
  349. length of starts be certain innings unless you know you have to go you lose your DH if you know or you can't come
  350. out of the game unless you've gone five innings or give up five runs or um unless there's an injury concern. Um,
  351. but just change the job job description for more volume. So that so that pitch pitching is not about power and missing
  352. bats exclusively. It's also an art where you're where you need to be efficient. So that you know there's a reason to
  353. throw under certain game situations throw a one-1 sinker down the middle. Know that
  354. >> there's only aso as the famous quote I think it was Sandy Kofax said right? I
  355. became a good pitcher when I stopped trying to guy make guys miss the ball. Yeah. And and under the current
  356. environment, teams are asking pitchers, hey, if you want to be a good pitcher, miss as many bats as you can, right?
  357. >> And because that's an optimization under the current system. So, putting in constraints that change the equation,
  358. change the incentives, soon you'll start rewarding pitchers that can go deep in games and that throw
  359. volume even at reduced strikeout rates. But under the current system, teams would be crazy to pay for anything other
  360. than bat missing. That's the that's the one way to know you're you're going to get guys out.
  361. >> So, I want to ask about the the I guess the fan experience, which is one of the
  362. things that the pitch clock really helped. It moved the game along. Now, I'm a traditionalist and my view is you
  363. brought it back to where it was. >> Yeah, exactly. >> The game pace was back to where it was
  364. and why it would be very against changing the distance because one of the beauty things, beautiful things about
  365. baseball is you can say, "Yeah, Sandy Kovac was playing the same game as they're playing today." And they really
  366. are. Um, so I'll add two things. because I actually went to a Phillies game um this past season and there weren't any
  367. strikeouts and there was a lots of lots of ground balls, lots of terrific fielding and one of the things that's
  368. great about a game in person is you really feel what a spectacular fielding play. You don't catch that on TV that's
  369. missing but you really feel that in person. There was there were stolen bases. So I I'll just an anecdote. You
  370. know back in the day stealing bases was considered something you needed to do. And one of the things the analyst showed
  371. that if you're not doing that on average twothirds of the time, although there's
  372. some variance in that depending on context, you're not getting any value out of that. And
  373. >> even so Babe Ruth used to steal tons of bases when he was young and he was actually somewhat quick, but he was not
  374. successful at it very much half the time. He was actually costing his team a lot of value. We know that now. But from
  375. a fan experience, all those balls in play, all that action makes the game fun to watch. Yeah.
  376. >> And so the the new rules about stolen bases have have made the game more exciting. I think you you would concur.
  377. Um so my question is two things. Um >> how do we get the I mean as you know and and Eric and you were all roughly the
  378. same age. You're a little younger than we are but not too much. Um baseball was once the the national game. Um and
  379. football has overtaken and I I think that's largely to do with the TV the beauty and elegance it has on
  380. television. Um, but what we have is what we I say we we uh baseball has the advantage of having a great experience
  381. in the ballpark and 162 games and I think all of us I don't know I know Eric and I we got to be baseball fans from
  382. our childhood from the experience of going to games and maybe you did in something similar are playing. How do we
  383. get baseball to bring back fans and be attracted to it? How do we make the fan experience better? Is that something
  384. that's that you're thinking about? I know that some people are trying to get engagement that really um connects with
  385. fans through computers, through their phones, through through like forecasting. Um but the how do we how do
  386. you think about the fan experience? And you can think about stolen bases an example and maybe jumping on from that.
  387. >> Yeah. Um so the entire rule change project that led to the pitch timer bigger bases and and um the shift
  388. changes was was um intended to give fans more of what they like and less of what
  389. they don't like. And the reason I I I love that project is you I'd worked 29 years for for teams where you're really
  390. only focused on winning, right? So, I'm a huge baseball fan, but you have to almost stop thinking like a fan in order
  391. to be a GM and your your currency is wins. And so, you're you're trying to optimize your player selection, your
  392. player deployment, your player development just simply to win. So, um, you know, for instance, if if you know
  393. that, uh, the stolen base attempt is only a good play if you're going to be successful 70% of the time, then you ask
  394. your your base runners not to go unless unless, you know, everything adds up, all the math adds up that they're going
  395. to be successful more than 70% of the time, even though it's a very entertaining game. So, we started that
  396. project with with a ton of fan outreach, trying to determine what is it that fans
  397. really like about baseball? What is it that they don't like? We're trying to create the most joyful, most
  398. entertaining version of baseball. Figuring that if you do that, that's the single best thing you can do to to bring
  399. fans back. Turns out, you're right, fans like action. They like the ball and play. They like athleticism on display.
  400. Their favorite uh three events at a baseball game are triples, doubles, and stolen bases. Their least favorite
  401. events are anything that has to do with uh inaction or inactivity. So, they don't like uh pitching changes. Um they
  402. don't like intentional walks. They don't they don't like things where there's dead any dead time whatsoever. So, we
  403. knew we wanted to try to incorporate some rules that would change the math on stolen bases to make it a little bit
  404. better percentage play so that there'd be more attempts and more stolen bases and more athleticism on display on the
  405. bases. So, you know, you mentioned being a traditionalist as well and you could you never want to change 60' 6 in. Well,
  406. the same is sort of true of the base paths. You know, they're they've been set out um 90 ft um
  407. >> in shorter now. >> Well, no, but it's not it's See, this is what's interesting. I'll tell you this
  408. anecdote. Um it's not 90 ft between bases. It's a 90 90 foot square at which the bases are set out with first base is
  409. is uh on one end of that square. Second base is the midpoint of the base. >> Uhhuh. on on the 90 degree uh corner.
  410. Second base, third base is within there. So, it's actually le it's always been less than 90 feet between bases,
  411. >> right? >> So, we were sitting around, we said, well, one way we can encourage soul and
  412. base activity is to shorten the distance between bases, but we could never get away with that because everyone thinks
  413. it's 90 ft between bases. It was actually an analyst at the Cubs, Chris Jones, who we were having a meeting
  414. about this and he just he he came up he just said bigger bases. I said, "What do
  415. you mean bigger bases?" He said, "Well, that's that's that's another way to shorten the distance between bases
  416. without having to change the geometry of the game." So, fast forward a year later,
  417. >> I'm leading this project at MLB and I'm on a Zoom with all 30 major league managers.
  418. >> And I asked them, okay, uh, how wide is home plate? And they all knew 17 inches.
  419. And I said, well, how what's the distance between home plate and the pitchers mount? They all knew 60 feet 6
  420. in. And I said, well, let me ask you this. What are the dimensions of a major league base? No idea.
  421. >> Guess how many of the 30 you knew. >> None. >> Correct. >> Beautiful. >> No one knew that it was
  422. >> I don't know. And I'm a numbers fan. >> Yeah. So, it was 15 in by 15 in, right?
  423. 15 in squared. >> And so, I said, "Well, look, if you guys don't even know how big a base is, then
  424. I don't want I don't want to hear that we're ruining the game by going by adding 3 in on the base." And so when
  425. you add three, you make the base uh 18 in by 18 in, which is what we did. Now all of a sudden, the distance between
  426. first base and second base is shorter by 4 1/2 in because you gain 3 ft at first
  427. base and you gain an inch and a half at second base. So 4 and 12 in is like the length of your finger. So all those all
  428. those bang bang plays where you're just out at second base by less now all of a sudden you're safe. So the stolen base
  429. became a better percentage play by shortening the distance between bases doing it in a way that didn't offend the
  430. traditionalist because you weren't messing with 90 ft. You were just messing with the size of the base which
  431. not even the major league managers knew about. And it ended up being a very successful rule change because the math
  432. worked. We tested it in the minor leagues. There were once you shorten the distance, more stolen base attempts,
  433. higher percent higher success rate. And that's exactly what happened in the minor le in the major leagues. And so,
  434. you know, we were we we had gotten down to a point where guys were leading the big leagues in stolen bases with like 40
  435. bags. And we just realized it's a better game when guys can steal 70 80 bags. And
  436. so now there's a lot more guys running, a lot more guys getting, you know, 30 bags and it's a better pickups, right?
  437. How much how would you distribute the increase to the pickoff limitation versus the
  438. >> Yeah, I think you that was definitely part of it. You know, as part of the pitch timer rule, you had to put in the
  439. the the pickoff throw limitation. It's really a disengagement. It's really a limit on how many times you can
  440. disengage from the rubber as a pitcher. um the the the data shows that um it's it's not that's not as significant as as
  441. as you would you would think, but certainly helps and certainly moves the needle the right direction. Everyone
  442. everyone was saying, "Oh, once you get to, you know, once you've disengaged once, you only have one left or once
  443. you've disengaged twice and you have to put the runner out or else it's an automatic 90. It's going to be an
  444. automatic bag." And that that fear did not play out. If you look if you look behind the data, it hasn't ruined the
  445. game. You don't hear too many people talk about it. Now it's just another another part of the batter the pitcher
  446. runner dynamic. >> So go ahead. Go ahead. >> Yeah. Let me let me ask you a few last
  447. questions for us here. >> Um first >> without giving out any secret sauce about what you're specifically working
  448. on now, which I'll ask you in a second. Um, how do all of us, how do all the teams, whether it's our Yankees, your
  449. Red Sox, whether formerly the Cubs, how do we compete with the Dodgers today? Like, if you know, one way to think
  450. about it is we need to go in an entirely different direction. Like, they're good
  451. on these dimensions and so we can't compete. We can't be better than them on the dimensions in which they're really
  452. strong. Another option would be, you know, we have to invest in, I don't know, purely, you know, we're going to
  453. be the best defensive team and so we'll try to create as many outs that way. How
  454. do you think about competing with a team that's now the two-time champion and, you know, team spender?
  455. >> Yeah, they're they're they've gotten better. They're the biggest spender. like how how do teams even think about
  456. compet like for example you know you've been a general manager long enough you know you remember when our Yankees were
  457. the three-time repeat champions and were an out or two away from fourtime repeat
  458. champions in 2001 h how did you think about it then and how do you think about it now
  459. >> yeah look I think obviously the Dodgers have tremendous resources and have done a
  460. remarkable job of of using them and growing them and creating this cycle where um they've had so success that
  461. their revenues have grown. They're up over like a billion dollars in revenue, I think, now, and it's just this
  462. perpetuating cycles. They've done a phenomenal job. But look, it's it's it's baseball. So, the you know, Billy
  463. famously said the playoffs are a crapshoot, and I don't I don't fully agree that it's not a crapshoot, but
  464. there's there's no team that's actually um you know, can get anywhere close to a
  465. 50% chance of winning the World Series there. So, the Dodgers still are still underdogs. compared to the field. And so
  466. the answer is is you you try to build a team that has sustained success and gets
  467. into the playoffs as often as possible and then lean into the ingredients that make for a successful October baseball
  468. team and chance plays a huge part in what happens in October. The Dodgers themselves were an inch away from not
  469. being champions last year and then they became. But um there are certain elements of of the game and elements of
  470. the roster that that take on added emphasis in October. So our goal when I was with the Red Sox was always, you
  471. know, build a team that wins, you know, a foolproof team to win 95 games a year.
  472. You know, anything that could get in the way of us winning 95 games a year, uh we
  473. needed to attack and create redundancies and depth because you couldn't look up and say injuries are excuse or this is
  474. an excuse. So win 95 and get in and then make sure your roster is is built for for October as well. And that worked
  475. then with the Cubs different landscape. Now there's wild card teams lowers the bar a little bit. 93.
  476. >> You don't need 95 to be 95 anymore. But you know now that bar has never been lower. You know say
  477. you could either be a fan or a critic of the modern uh playoff structure but the
  478. reality is the bar has never been lower to get into the postseason. And so, um, if I were with a team and said, "How am
  479. I going to compete with the Dodgers?" I would start with build a team that's get
  480. into the playoffs every single year and then lean into the elements that make a team successful in October. Be prepared
  481. and and attack it that way. >> So, maybe two more questions. I lied. Um, >> oh, I got to do a follow-up though to
  482. just jump in. Go ahead. You go ahead. >> What is that? So, we love to argue about
  483. what that actual element is. Some people have said it's starting pitching. Others
  484. said it would be middle relief pitching. Others said, "Is it contact? Is it homers?" If you had to pick one thing
  485. that's that that that that ingredient for October that's different from the 90 95 games in the in in the in the regular
  486. season, what would it be? >> Well, one of my roles now is with Fenway Sports Group, which owns the Red Sox,
  487. and I'm right so I'm an adviser there. So, I'm not going to share >> You're not going to talk about a an
  488. element that's that's kind of obvious and has been publicly discussed. So, it's not showing anything, but you know,
  489. >> uh you're, you know, having like an ace reliever or two or three just absolute
  490. shutdown relievers has added import in in October because they're pitching >> a much greater percentage of the innings
  491. and and and where the the sort of most important innings where the game turns in October. So, you know, so takes
  492. that's why we traded for Raldis Chapman. One of the reasons we traded for old as
  493. Japan with the Cubs is we we were not, you know, doing that to maximize our chances of winning the division and we
  494. were pretty sure we were going in the division. Our calculation was literally based on World Series odds,
  495. >> right? >> And a pitcher like that can change your World Series odds. I think I think
  496. adding him changed our World Series odds from something like um World Series championship odds from something like,
  497. you know, 18% to 22%. I would guess three to 5% which is >> right. And so you got back with one
  498. player. It's it's that and and you know what we don't win game five of the World
  499. Series at Wrigley Field without him. He comes in and >> one out in the seventh and that gets
  500. eight huge outs in a one-run game. So that one that one turned out well. But um so so ace reliever and then you know
  501. it's obvious like you need a really you need you need good fourth fifth starters
  502. sixth seventh eighth starters to get through a season and win enough games to get in the postseason but your fourth
  503. and fifth starters probably don't see the light of day you know in in the postseason and your your ace pitches you
  504. know out of the 1400 innings these days he might be lucky to pitch 200 in the regular season. So, one oneth,
  505. you know, 13 14% whatever that is. Um, but in the postseason, you know, especially if if he can start games 1,
  506. four, and seven, he's pitching a much higher percentage. So, like your your top two or three starters, your top one
  507. or two relievers, obviously those are more important positions in the postseason even than in the regular
  508. season. >> Can you just maybe just last question, you mentioned about the work you're
  509. doing now with the Fenway Sports Group. What is your actual role and title today? And um you know, are we going to
  510. see you back in a general manager? Are you interested in a full-time general manager role again? Or you know, I don't
  511. know if the baseball Josh Raw told the story where you know, the baseball hall of fame called him and he took over the
  512. job. Is there some dream job you'd like to have? Like you know, I don't know when Rob Manfred called you tomorrow and
  513. said, "Theo Epstein, you know, the owners of you know, we need you to take over Major League Baseball." I mean, no.
  514. No. Oh, I mean it's not imp you're laughing but I mean none of us would no there's no baseball fan that would would
  515. have a problem with that at all. So what are you doing now for the Penway Sports
  516. Group and what do you see your to me you look like an extremely young man. What do you forecast for the next 30 years of
  517. your career in baseball? >> Um well I appreciate that compliment. I am 52 so it's all age is age is all
  518. relative but um yeah I have two part-time jobs now and and also have the benefit you know after those 29 years in
  519. front offices of of spending more time with my kids I have two boys 18 and 11 so making up for lost time with them but
  520. with Femway Sports Group I guess technically my title is senior adviser and part owner um so I kind of advise
  521. all the different uh uh organizations and companies that we have across the portfolio. So different role with each
  522. organization. So with the Red Sox, I get to play that Bill the Joy role for for Craig Brezlo where I had the benefit of
  523. Bill's wisdom, someone who had done the job and done it successfully. Now I get to be there for Craig whenever he has
  524. questions, help him see around corners, help him with his development in in that
  525. role. And then um we also own the Pittsburgh Penguins, uh Liverpool Football Club and the Premier League. We
  526. have a a NASCAR team, Rous Femway, uh, Racing. We're, uh, I, you know, I can't drive stick, so I'm not sure I'm I'm I'm
  527. a great help there, but we're also the, uh, lead investor in this consortium, um, that that is invested in the PGA
  528. Tour. So, I'm actually doing a lot of work. I'm on this uh competition this uh future competition committee at the PGA
  529. Tour where we're putting in a lot of thought under the leadership of um Brian Rolap who's the new CEO of the PGA Tour
  530. and Tiger Woods who's chairing the committee trying to reimagine the competitive and commercial model uh for
  531. the for the tour. >> Oh, you got to be eating that up. That's got to be right up your You must be
  532. loving that. >> No, it's real. It's really interesting stuff. And my oldest is a big golfer, so
  533. I've got the golf bug myself the last couple years. So, it's good work. And then I'm also an operating partner for
  534. Artos Partners. >> Oh, >> Artos Partners was the first mover in in in the space of institutional capital
  535. coming into the sports world. So they're sports only private equity company started.
  536. >> We know them well here at the Wharton School. We have a partnership with Artos. So
  537. >> that's right. So uh they were the first mover in that space. actually got got
  538. the rules changed at Major League Baseball and subsequently um NHL and NBA and now just uh the last
  539. year or two the NFL. So they have um you know close to 30 investments in in in in
  540. different teams across the the four major sports here in global soccer. So, it's been fun. You know, after sort of
  541. working for for owners um for 30 years, I recognized what a sea change this was going to be with institutional capital
  542. coming in and creating liquidity and some growth capital. And so, it's been fun to advise. I definitely do not ever
  543. want to consider myself a finance guy and I and I do not. Um but getting exposure to that world and they're doing
  544. some real exciting work on the phone with commissioners and sports owners every day. It's been been a lot of fun.
  545. So, as far as the future, yeah, as my kids get older and can see myself jumping back in full-time, if it's with
  546. a team, you know, I definitely want to I I've seen the the power of great ownership in sports, like what you can
  547. do to make an impact in your city. Um, how you can um align the team around certain values on and off the field. So,
  548. um, yeah, if I'm back helping run a team again someday, I definitely want to be do it from from, you know, an ownership
  549. position to sort of maximize the impact. And, um, yeah, who know? Like I I was lucky enough to work at Major League
  550. Baseball and help with the rule change project. I I you started to allude to earlier how you think it's a better
  551. world when baseball truly is the national pastime. I completely sign off on that. I agree. So, anything I can
  552. ever do to help baseball in any capacity and help help restore it to its place at
  553. top the pecking order, I think we're all we're all better off. And you you know,
  554. you asked earlier about what can we do. I mean, baseball has some incredible advantages relative to the other sports.
  555. I we have twice the content uh in a world where live content is king in the media and entertaining landscape these
  556. days. So, um, you know, Rob and and the powers at BM baseball are really starting to be strategic and creative
  557. and how we can, um, use that going forward in next collective bargaining agreement, next set of media deals to
  558. sort of like maximize uh, engagement and and and lift the the impact of the sport. We um, we take place every day.
  559. It's sort of, you know, the news cycle is so short now. We don't, you know, unlike football and hockey, we don't
  560. wear helmets on our players. like our players should be the biggest stars in all sports because they're very
  561. accessible. They're out there every single day. We play twice the amount of games. Baseball has unbelievable
  562. narrative arcs, you know, watching a starting pitcher out there perform or play within the course of the season.
  563. So, you know, we lean into that. You you expand um the fan base, you know, you attract casual fans who might be in it
  564. more for human interest than for all the inside baseball stuff. And um you know,
  565. it's sort of unlimited potential. And as it is, look, we draw more fans than any
  566. other sport by by by a 3x multiple. The second most attended sport in in in this
  567. country is minor league baseball. There more people go to minor league games than go to the NFL or NBA or NHL. And
  568. >> it's also a family game. You if you go to a baseball game, you see families there. You don't see that.
  569. >> Absolutely. Absolutely. And it's just it's a good the the pace now of the game
  570. is back restored as you said earlier to this naturalism. you can talk to people,
  571. you can enjoy it without being completely locked in. Um, and it's uh, you know, it's a good antidote for
  572. what's happening in the rest of the country with our addiction to screens and this constant demand from different
  573. sources for our attention and the polarization that you find sort of like everywhere. Baseball's a great unifier.
  574. So, I just think we have so many natural advantages as as the best game there is
  575. that over time as we adjust to new societal norms and lean into the advantages we have. We're going to be in
  576. good shape. >> Well, Theo Audi and I would like to thank you for joining us here on Wharton
  577. Bunnyball and the Wharton Podcast Network. Uh we've been talking to Theo Epstein, a man who I'm going to make a
  578. statement now. I assume when he's either in Boston or Chicago or possibly many other cities will never spend a money on
  579. a beer for the rest of his life. Well, I like what you said though. Do people recognize me in Boston?
  580. >> No. So, one one quick anecdote about that. So, we said everyone came up to me
  581. after we won in '04 and said, "You'll never buy a beer in Boston again." So, we had kind of a disastrous spring
  582. training in 2005 where our whole rotation got hurt and Kurt Schilling was down. He was going to start opening day.
  583. Next thing, you know, we had to throw David Wells out there. Opening day, Sunday night baseball, Yankee Stadium.
  584. He gets bombed. Matt Clement, our big free agent signing, like didn't get out of the fourth inning in game two. And by
  585. the time by the time we got home uh to to start our first home stand of the year, trust me, we Tito and I were
  586. joking around. We were paying full freight for dinner and everything else. The honeymoon period is short in the in the
  587. good baseball market. >> By the way, remember you're sitting here talking to two fans whose team has won
  588. one championship in 26 years. So if you had told us that in 2000, we would have said that's not possible. I keep talking
  589. about the I you call the dice roll or whatever the playoffs. If you would told Audi and I that the end of the 2000
  590. season, the Yankees would have one championship in 26 seasons, we would have said, "How is that possible? It's
  591. not possible." >> And they're the winningest team in baseball over that 26 years.
  592. >> Yeah. >> In terms of regular season. >> Well, there we go. But a but um Theo,
  593. we'd like to thank you for joining us on Wharton Moneyball. On behalf of myself,
  594. this is Eric Bradlo. On behalf of my co-host today, Audi Winer, this has been one hour of Wharton Moneyball. Uh some
  595. combination of myself, Audi, Cade Massie, and Shane Jensen are here every week talking sports and statistics. For
  596. our producer, uh Dion Simkins, for our big the big boss man, Marissa Rena, we'd like to thank you. And thank you again
  597. for Theo Epstein for this week on Wharton Moneyball.

Brief Summary

Theo Epstein discusses his career, analytics in baseball, and recent MLB rule changes to enhance gameplay and fan experience.

Key points

  • Theo Epstein Joins Wharton Moneyball. The influential baseball executive discusses his journey and impact on the game.
  • The Hall of Fame Debate. The hosts advocate for Theo Epstein and Bill James to be inducted into the Hall of Fame.
  • The Third Time Through the Order Effect. A discussion on the misconception of the third time through the order effect in baseball.
  • Pitch Clock Changes. Exploring the impact of the pitch clock on pitchers and the pace of play.
  • The Evolution of Pitching. Exploring how pitching strategies have changed and the importance of efficiency.
  • Fan Experience and Game Pace. How rule changes aim to enhance the fan experience by increasing action.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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