Managers Playing it Safe
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📂 Management 🏷️ Research
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- so my research basically looks at why managers may not always act in the best interest of
- shareholders uh and what are things that investors can do to sort of discourage bad behavior by managers now generally
- speaking we think of there as being sort of three main ways in which managers behave poorly one is that they may not
- exert enough effort right because ex effort's costly if we don't monitor them as an investor they won't exert it the
- second is that they may actually take actions that benefit themselves but not the shareholders Okay the third is where
- my research is focused and that is that managers may do what my co-author and I call play it safe and that they may not
- take the risk that are necessary to create value for the shareholders now managers may not do that because they
- have a lot tied up into these companies if it goes uh South their career could be adversely affected their personal
- wealth could be affected much more so than a diversified shareholder so they're going to want to take less risk
- so my co-author are trying to determine whether this plan it safe is sort of a Salient problem for investors and the
- way which we did that is we looked at well what are firms do when they become protected from a hostile takeover okay
- so what happened is that in the US a bunch of different states pass these laws which made it difficult to do a
- takeover of a company located in those States uh now that's interesting because we and finance think of a takeover as
- sort of a a disciplining device on a manager and that if that manager is performing poorly uh doing things that
- destroy shareholder value it's going to push down their share price and it's going to basically make it easier for
- another group of investors to come in buy out the company fire the manager and improve value so now if I'm a manager
- and I'm not worried about that anymore because my state just passed a law that kind of protects me from a takeover I
- can now act more on my own interest rather than that of shareholders so the question is is well what do managers do
- when they become protected and so what my co-author and I found is that when they became protected by these state
- level laws they took less risk uh we observe stock volatility go down we observe cash Holdings go up we also
- observed them begin doing more diversifying Acquisitions which prior research is shown as one way in which
- managers try to reduce their risk and it doesn't look like this behavior is in the interest of shareholders a we can
- see that these Acquisitions have negative announcement returns uh and we can also see that they're concentrated
- among the companies where we would think that this planet safe is more important
- firms that at greater risk of distress and firms where the managers have more personal exposure to the company's
- risk I would say one of the key takeaways of our research is that this plane at Behavior by managers this
- incentive to not take on risk that may create value can have implications for a company's overall value investment and
- growth right if you think about it in order to create value for shareholders at some level you have to take risk
- products that have turned out to be great in the past someone took a risk to create that product if managers aren't
- doing that then they're not necessarily creating value uh another sort of takeaway is that this planet safe in
- general is probably going to be very hard to detect for a shareholder right we don't observe what are the the
- Investments that the managers choose in between and we don't observe what the expected returns are what the risk are
- we don't know if that managers may be sort of avoiding certain projects that could create a lot of value but they're
- worried about the risk and the personal exposure to that risk or you know we see
- these companies holding more cash now these companies say they're holding cash because they're trying to make sure they
- have investment you know the cash they to do an investment if it comes along is that true or is it they're holding the
- cash because they're worried about distress and they're just trying to make sure the company doesn't run into
- problems in the future and it's not really creating value for shareholder that's hard for a shareholder to know
- but sort of what our research is trying to point out is that managers May in general be trying to take on less risk
- than what we' prefer them to do and therefore it might be important to actually encourage more
- risk-taking I wouldn't say it surprised me but I suspect it would surprise others and that conclusion was is that
- we observed that this sort of plan at safe Behavior by managers was concentrated among those that had the
- largest ownership stakes in their companies now typically we would teach our students here at Wharton that if you
- want to encourage managers to work hard and not waste cash you give more stock in the company more of an ownership
- stake uh now it's true that that will make them work hard and not waste cash but what is often overlooked in practice
- is that it can actually make some problems worse particularly the planet safe by giving them more ownership
- you've just exposed them to more of the company's risk you've given them incentive more to play it safe and
- that's what we picked up in the data is that when they had more ownership Stakes
- this conflict appeared to be uh prevalent in the data so I would say one of the Practical
- implications of our findings is that as an investor as a shareholder if you don't think the manager is taking on
- actions that are going to create shold of value it's important to understand why they may not be doing that if you're
- going to try to solve it right I'll give you an example so the Wall Street Journal ran a really nice article last
- summer where basically the uh author of the article was bemoaning in their view that uh firms in the US and Entre in the
- US have become soft and risk and because these companies aren't taking risk in the US this is why the US growth and
- investment has been weak over the last 5 10 years but the question is is why aren't they taking these risk right if
- we as shareholders think it's because it just requires a lot of effort the managers don't want to exert that effort
- well then one solution is give more ownership in the company okay on the other hand if they're not taking that uh
- risk because they want to play it safe they're worried about their careers then the solution becomes quite different and
- that you don't necessarily want to give more ownership because that it just exposes them more of the firm's risk
- instead you might want to think about other things like granting them options which past research including my own has
- shown encourages risk-taking in terms of playing it safe in our research we looked at large US
- companies that are mostly public but my guess is that this planet safe is also Salient for entrepreneurs right so think
- of like a student that graduates from here at whorton right all of them are going to have an opportunity to go get a
- great job at a company that has a a nice salary good benefits and good health insurance now some of these students may
- also have a great idea for a new company or a new product that they could go do it instead but obviously going and
- starting your own company is risky and I would guess that many of these individuals don't go and do that uh and
- instead they just going to go take the safe job that has the salary and the fixed health benefits rather than go
- start a new company and I would term that as potentially playing it safe and I think it could be quite important
- uh I think probably the biggest misperception that our study might dispel is this idea that giving managers
- greater ownership stakes in their companies necessarily ensures that they behave in the best way right and that
- there's a lot of attention paid recently because of the financial crisis and that
- you want to give managers more ownership stake you want to give them these restricted stocks that tie them to the
- long-term risk of the company uh now that's probably going to get rid of some problems but it could actually make
- other problems worse and in particular playing it safe now if they're tied to the the long run risk of the company
- they have a lot more to worry about they may actually take on less risk than what
- we as shareholders want them to they may for go doing these projects that would create a lot of value just because
- they're risky I think one thing that's different about my research relative to other
- research on why managers might B misbehave is that most past researchers focused on the idea that managers don't
- exert enough effort uh and that they want to live what we call the quiet life they don't want to work hard uh whereas
- my research is showing that in fact managers may be exerting a lot of effort but this effort is not directed in ways
- that are necessarily trying to create shareholder value rather it's effort directed at maybe reducing the company's
- risk uh for the manager's personal benefit but not that of shareholders one thing that I've been
- thinking about looking at next which I haven't started yet was whether maybe the recent healthc care law has an
- effect on individual's choice to being entreprene rur right so if you think about it prior to the healthcare Lobby
- in pass if you're an individual and you start a company uh it's really hard to get health insurance as an individual
- and so your alternative was to go get that 9-to-5 job where you can at least have the health insurance uh now that
- the Law's passed and we have the marketplace and these it's much easier for individuals and my guess is that
- you're probably going to see a lot more people choosing to go and start their own companies knowing that they can get
- this health insurance without having to go get that steady 95 job [Music]
Brief Summary
Managers may prioritize personal safety over shareholder value, leading to risk-averse behavior that can harm company growth.
Key points
- The Risk of Playing It Safe. Research shows that managers often avoid risks, impacting shareholder value negatively.
- Ownership Stakes and Risk Aversion. Higher ownership stakes can lead to managers taking fewer risks, contrary to expectations.
- Implications for Investors. Understanding why managers avoid risk is crucial for shareholders aiming to create value.
Episode highlights
- The Risk of Playing It SafeResearch shows that managers often avoid risks, impacting shareholder value negatively.“Managers may do what my co-author and I call play it safe.”0:33Dec 10, 2014
- Ownership Stakes and Risk AversionHigher ownership stakes can lead to managers taking fewer risks, contrary to expectations.“Giving them more ownership...can actually make some problems worse.”4:14Dec 10, 2014
- Implications for InvestorsUnderstanding why managers avoid risk is crucial for shareholders aiming to create value.“If you don’t think the manager is taking actions that create value, understand why.”4:34Dec 10, 2014
Tension
45/ 100Some tension





