Managers Playing it Safe

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📂 Management 🏷️ Research

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  1. so my research basically looks at why managers may not always act in the best interest of
  2. shareholders uh and what are things that investors can do to sort of discourage bad behavior by managers now generally
  3. speaking we think of there as being sort of three main ways in which managers behave poorly one is that they may not
  4. exert enough effort right because ex effort's costly if we don't monitor them as an investor they won't exert it the
  5. second is that they may actually take actions that benefit themselves but not the shareholders Okay the third is where
  6. my research is focused and that is that managers may do what my co-author and I call play it safe and that they may not
  7. take the risk that are necessary to create value for the shareholders now managers may not do that because they
  8. have a lot tied up into these companies if it goes uh South their career could be adversely affected their personal
  9. wealth could be affected much more so than a diversified shareholder so they're going to want to take less risk
  10. so my co-author are trying to determine whether this plan it safe is sort of a Salient problem for investors and the
  11. way which we did that is we looked at well what are firms do when they become protected from a hostile takeover okay
  12. so what happened is that in the US a bunch of different states pass these laws which made it difficult to do a
  13. takeover of a company located in those States uh now that's interesting because we and finance think of a takeover as
  14. sort of a a disciplining device on a manager and that if that manager is performing poorly uh doing things that
  15. destroy shareholder value it's going to push down their share price and it's going to basically make it easier for
  16. another group of investors to come in buy out the company fire the manager and improve value so now if I'm a manager
  17. and I'm not worried about that anymore because my state just passed a law that kind of protects me from a takeover I
  18. can now act more on my own interest rather than that of shareholders so the question is is well what do managers do
  19. when they become protected and so what my co-author and I found is that when they became protected by these state
  20. level laws they took less risk uh we observe stock volatility go down we observe cash Holdings go up we also
  21. observed them begin doing more diversifying Acquisitions which prior research is shown as one way in which
  22. managers try to reduce their risk and it doesn't look like this behavior is in the interest of shareholders a we can
  23. see that these Acquisitions have negative announcement returns uh and we can also see that they're concentrated
  24. among the companies where we would think that this planet safe is more important
  25. firms that at greater risk of distress and firms where the managers have more personal exposure to the company's
  26. risk I would say one of the key takeaways of our research is that this plane at Behavior by managers this
  27. incentive to not take on risk that may create value can have implications for a company's overall value investment and
  28. growth right if you think about it in order to create value for shareholders at some level you have to take risk
  29. products that have turned out to be great in the past someone took a risk to create that product if managers aren't
  30. doing that then they're not necessarily creating value uh another sort of takeaway is that this planet safe in
  31. general is probably going to be very hard to detect for a shareholder right we don't observe what are the the
  32. Investments that the managers choose in between and we don't observe what the expected returns are what the risk are
  33. we don't know if that managers may be sort of avoiding certain projects that could create a lot of value but they're
  34. worried about the risk and the personal exposure to that risk or you know we see
  35. these companies holding more cash now these companies say they're holding cash because they're trying to make sure they
  36. have investment you know the cash they to do an investment if it comes along is that true or is it they're holding the
  37. cash because they're worried about distress and they're just trying to make sure the company doesn't run into
  38. problems in the future and it's not really creating value for shareholder that's hard for a shareholder to know
  39. but sort of what our research is trying to point out is that managers May in general be trying to take on less risk
  40. than what we' prefer them to do and therefore it might be important to actually encourage more
  41. risk-taking I wouldn't say it surprised me but I suspect it would surprise others and that conclusion was is that
  42. we observed that this sort of plan at safe Behavior by managers was concentrated among those that had the
  43. largest ownership stakes in their companies now typically we would teach our students here at Wharton that if you
  44. want to encourage managers to work hard and not waste cash you give more stock in the company more of an ownership
  45. stake uh now it's true that that will make them work hard and not waste cash but what is often overlooked in practice
  46. is that it can actually make some problems worse particularly the planet safe by giving them more ownership
  47. you've just exposed them to more of the company's risk you've given them incentive more to play it safe and
  48. that's what we picked up in the data is that when they had more ownership Stakes
  49. this conflict appeared to be uh prevalent in the data so I would say one of the Practical
  50. implications of our findings is that as an investor as a shareholder if you don't think the manager is taking on
  51. actions that are going to create shold of value it's important to understand why they may not be doing that if you're
  52. going to try to solve it right I'll give you an example so the Wall Street Journal ran a really nice article last
  53. summer where basically the uh author of the article was bemoaning in their view that uh firms in the US and Entre in the
  54. US have become soft and risk and because these companies aren't taking risk in the US this is why the US growth and
  55. investment has been weak over the last 5 10 years but the question is is why aren't they taking these risk right if
  56. we as shareholders think it's because it just requires a lot of effort the managers don't want to exert that effort
  57. well then one solution is give more ownership in the company okay on the other hand if they're not taking that uh
  58. risk because they want to play it safe they're worried about their careers then the solution becomes quite different and
  59. that you don't necessarily want to give more ownership because that it just exposes them more of the firm's risk
  60. instead you might want to think about other things like granting them options which past research including my own has
  61. shown encourages risk-taking in terms of playing it safe in our research we looked at large US
  62. companies that are mostly public but my guess is that this planet safe is also Salient for entrepreneurs right so think
  63. of like a student that graduates from here at whorton right all of them are going to have an opportunity to go get a
  64. great job at a company that has a a nice salary good benefits and good health insurance now some of these students may
  65. also have a great idea for a new company or a new product that they could go do it instead but obviously going and
  66. starting your own company is risky and I would guess that many of these individuals don't go and do that uh and
  67. instead they just going to go take the safe job that has the salary and the fixed health benefits rather than go
  68. start a new company and I would term that as potentially playing it safe and I think it could be quite important
  69. uh I think probably the biggest misperception that our study might dispel is this idea that giving managers
  70. greater ownership stakes in their companies necessarily ensures that they behave in the best way right and that
  71. there's a lot of attention paid recently because of the financial crisis and that
  72. you want to give managers more ownership stake you want to give them these restricted stocks that tie them to the
  73. long-term risk of the company uh now that's probably going to get rid of some problems but it could actually make
  74. other problems worse and in particular playing it safe now if they're tied to the the long run risk of the company
  75. they have a lot more to worry about they may actually take on less risk than what
  76. we as shareholders want them to they may for go doing these projects that would create a lot of value just because
  77. they're risky I think one thing that's different about my research relative to other
  78. research on why managers might B misbehave is that most past researchers focused on the idea that managers don't
  79. exert enough effort uh and that they want to live what we call the quiet life they don't want to work hard uh whereas
  80. my research is showing that in fact managers may be exerting a lot of effort but this effort is not directed in ways
  81. that are necessarily trying to create shareholder value rather it's effort directed at maybe reducing the company's
  82. risk uh for the manager's personal benefit but not that of shareholders one thing that I've been
  83. thinking about looking at next which I haven't started yet was whether maybe the recent healthc care law has an
  84. effect on individual's choice to being entreprene rur right so if you think about it prior to the healthcare Lobby
  85. in pass if you're an individual and you start a company uh it's really hard to get health insurance as an individual
  86. and so your alternative was to go get that 9-to-5 job where you can at least have the health insurance uh now that
  87. the Law's passed and we have the marketplace and these it's much easier for individuals and my guess is that
  88. you're probably going to see a lot more people choosing to go and start their own companies knowing that they can get
  89. this health insurance without having to go get that steady 95 job [Music]

Brief Summary

Managers may prioritize personal safety over shareholder value, leading to risk-averse behavior that can harm company growth.

Key points

  • The Risk of Playing It Safe. Research shows that managers often avoid risks, impacting shareholder value negatively.
  • Ownership Stakes and Risk Aversion. Higher ownership stakes can lead to managers taking fewer risks, contrary to expectations.
  • Implications for Investors. Understanding why managers avoid risk is crucial for shareholders aiming to create value.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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