Show Me the Money
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Episode Description
Richard Herring, Professor of Finance, The Wharton School
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- Your committee is also looking at the important issue of leverage for banks. It gets a little complicated, but it's
- it's it's actually critical to preventing the kind of crisis that we saw uh starting in 2008. So, the example
- cited in the pre uh press release by your committee uh compared tier one capital of 141 billion versus its equity
- of just 98 billion. So, it's a matter of choosing which one of those numbers you plug into the
- formula to judge how sound liquid, how much leverage this bank has. Can you explain that because it's really
- critical, little complicated, but very worth understanding. Uh yes, it's one of the problems we have with the multiple
- regulatory definitions of capital. Uh both regulators and banks tend to use the definition that makes them look
- best. But in fact, if you're worried about a bank's ability to absorb loss without being reorganized or without
- receiving assistance from taxpayers, you're really only interested in a subset of the things that regulators
- used to call capital. For example, sub debt won't work because um you have to go through a bankruptcy proceeding
- before that becomes available. Um a lot of preferred debt won't work. It's really equity that is the primary uh
- shock absorber. So that if a bank takes a hit on the asset side, the equity holders have nothing to do but say ouch
- and you can keep the bank going. But that's that's your foundation. The equity is the foundation of the bank.
- And that in fact was the really important innovation in Basel 3. uh in Basel 3 they made a very clear
- distinction between capital that was able to uh absorb loss and permit the institution
- to keep going that is going concern capital and what they called gone concerned capital or capital you could
- only use after the institution went through some sort of resolution or bankruptcy process. Now, it turns out
- they were simply following the market because during the crisis, it was in almost every case true that whenever an
- institution failed, its regulator was was caught in the really awkward position of having a press conference
- where they had to explain why the institution failed despite the fact they had a riskadjusted capital ratio that
- was far above the peers. Their numbers looked good. The numbers looked terrific because they were manipulated. they
- invited manipulation. Um, one of the best examples of this is that City Bank had, I think, one of the highest tier
- one riskadjusted ratios of all the banks at a time when its share price was trading at about a dollar a share. So
- that the the clear distinction between what the regulators somehow thought and what the market believed was just
- completely uh stark and obviously it it it undermined all credibility in the regulatory approach. So where is that
- today? Is that it's is it being fixed? Is it not being fixed? Is it is it being fudged? Well, it's being fixed, but um
- it's being taken up reluctantly. The US has long had a leverage ratio. Um the FDIC uh who views itself as paying the
- bill when things go wrong has always insisted on it and uh it led to a long delay in the US acceptance of Basel 2.
- Um at during the crisis however a number of other countries became persuaded that
- we were right that leverage was a much better indicator of a bank's ability to absorb loss than the very elaborate and
- very um obscure riskadjusted ratios. Uh and so the new version Basel 3 does include a leverage ratio of 3%. They
- have a very clear methodology of of comparing uh basically uh shareholder net worth to assets that are augmented
- to reflect um offbalance sheet positions. Uh that is not yet however baked into the hard number test because
- a number of Europeans had no hope of meeting it. Actually the British just reported it. They're the first country
- to have reported their uh banks information that way uh earlier this week. And of the five leading banks, um,
- one didn't make it, one that we would have thought was the best and two others were just at the line. We don't actually
- know how it would play for US banks because it's a little different than we, uh, actually compute it. But it's by
- using a different ratio as the Fed did in its recent stress test, you can make a a big difference in how banks look.
- You can make a big difference in the numerator as you indicated by including things other than common equity. So you
- can get to tier one by adding a lot of things that are kind of like equity but not really and that's why you had uh
- those two examples Morgan Stanley and city were taken because the differences are very large in that case. So this is
- the fudge factor. That's a fudge factor in the numerator. But it's also possible
- to fudge the denominator. And that's even more worrisome because during the first quarter, we saw a lot of
- improvements in these ratios. But when you looked behind the numbers, it was because banks had so-called refined the
- risk models, which is to say the risk models had been adjusted to give them lower risk weights. Um, and we've also
- had a recent study by the Basel Committee that shows that if you give the same portfolio to several different
- leading banks, you're going to end up with very very different risk numbers. And so, uh, these things are really not
- reliable because they are so subject to manipulation. Moreover, they make it impossible for anyone on the outside to
- compare one bank to another because you have to know the details of all of its models, which in some cases can be as
- many as 200 million calculations, which is just, you know, impossible. Um, and so, uh, we were concerned that the Fed
- was going to lose an opportunity, as it turns out, they did, to actually use the
- new clean leverage ratio as the hallmark of the strength of US banks in reporting
- the results of the simulation tests. So, on the road to making the global financial system more safe and to
- preventing the kind of meltdown that we had five or six years ago, um, we haven't gotten very far. uh not nearly
- as far as we should be, but um at least putting leverage into the regulatory mix
- was an improvement. Uh now if they would fortify it and uh actually use it more frequently as a reporting and comparison
- device, I think uh we would have made an advance. Thanks very much for joining us. Thank you.
- [Music]
Brief Summary
The episode covers bank leverage, capital definitions, and Basel 3's impact on financial stability.
Key points
- Understanding Bank Leverage. Explains the critical nature of understanding bank leverage and its implications for financial stability.
- The Foundation of Banks. Discusses the importance of equity as the primary shock absorber for banks.
- Manipulated Numbers. Critiques the reliability of banks' reported capital ratios during the financial crisis.
- Regulatory Progress Post-Crisis. Reflects on the slow progress in regulatory reforms aimed at preventing future crises.
Episode highlights
- Understanding Bank LeverageExplains the critical nature of understanding bank leverage and its implications for financial stability.“It's really critical, little complicated, but very worth understanding.”0:38May 8, 2013
- The Foundation of BanksDiscusses the importance of equity as the primary shock absorber for banks.“The equity is the foundation of the bank.”1:36May 8, 2013
- Manipulated NumbersCritiques the reliability of banks' reported capital ratios during the financial crisis.“Their numbers looked terrific because they were manipulated.”2:33May 8, 2013
- Regulatory Progress Post-CrisisReflects on the slow progress in regulatory reforms aimed at preventing future crises.“We haven't gotten very far, not nearly as far as we should be.”6:29May 8, 2013
Tension
45/ 100Some tension





