Show Me the Money

Knowledge at Wharton

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Episode Description

Richard Herring, Professor of Finance, The Wharton School

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  1. Your committee is also looking at the important issue of leverage for banks. It gets a little complicated, but it's
  2. it's it's actually critical to preventing the kind of crisis that we saw uh starting in 2008. So, the example
  3. cited in the pre uh press release by your committee uh compared tier one capital of 141 billion versus its equity
  4. of just 98 billion. So, it's a matter of choosing which one of those numbers you plug into the
  5. formula to judge how sound liquid, how much leverage this bank has. Can you explain that because it's really
  6. critical, little complicated, but very worth understanding. Uh yes, it's one of the problems we have with the multiple
  7. regulatory definitions of capital. Uh both regulators and banks tend to use the definition that makes them look
  8. best. But in fact, if you're worried about a bank's ability to absorb loss without being reorganized or without
  9. receiving assistance from taxpayers, you're really only interested in a subset of the things that regulators
  10. used to call capital. For example, sub debt won't work because um you have to go through a bankruptcy proceeding
  11. before that becomes available. Um a lot of preferred debt won't work. It's really equity that is the primary uh
  12. shock absorber. So that if a bank takes a hit on the asset side, the equity holders have nothing to do but say ouch
  13. and you can keep the bank going. But that's that's your foundation. The equity is the foundation of the bank.
  14. And that in fact was the really important innovation in Basel 3. uh in Basel 3 they made a very clear
  15. distinction between capital that was able to uh absorb loss and permit the institution
  16. to keep going that is going concern capital and what they called gone concerned capital or capital you could
  17. only use after the institution went through some sort of resolution or bankruptcy process. Now, it turns out
  18. they were simply following the market because during the crisis, it was in almost every case true that whenever an
  19. institution failed, its regulator was was caught in the really awkward position of having a press conference
  20. where they had to explain why the institution failed despite the fact they had a riskadjusted capital ratio that
  21. was far above the peers. Their numbers looked good. The numbers looked terrific because they were manipulated. they
  22. invited manipulation. Um, one of the best examples of this is that City Bank had, I think, one of the highest tier
  23. one riskadjusted ratios of all the banks at a time when its share price was trading at about a dollar a share. So
  24. that the the clear distinction between what the regulators somehow thought and what the market believed was just
  25. completely uh stark and obviously it it it undermined all credibility in the regulatory approach. So where is that
  26. today? Is that it's is it being fixed? Is it not being fixed? Is it is it being fudged? Well, it's being fixed, but um
  27. it's being taken up reluctantly. The US has long had a leverage ratio. Um the FDIC uh who views itself as paying the
  28. bill when things go wrong has always insisted on it and uh it led to a long delay in the US acceptance of Basel 2.
  29. Um at during the crisis however a number of other countries became persuaded that
  30. we were right that leverage was a much better indicator of a bank's ability to absorb loss than the very elaborate and
  31. very um obscure riskadjusted ratios. Uh and so the new version Basel 3 does include a leverage ratio of 3%. They
  32. have a very clear methodology of of comparing uh basically uh shareholder net worth to assets that are augmented
  33. to reflect um offbalance sheet positions. Uh that is not yet however baked into the hard number test because
  34. a number of Europeans had no hope of meeting it. Actually the British just reported it. They're the first country
  35. to have reported their uh banks information that way uh earlier this week. And of the five leading banks, um,
  36. one didn't make it, one that we would have thought was the best and two others were just at the line. We don't actually
  37. know how it would play for US banks because it's a little different than we, uh, actually compute it. But it's by
  38. using a different ratio as the Fed did in its recent stress test, you can make a a big difference in how banks look.
  39. You can make a big difference in the numerator as you indicated by including things other than common equity. So you
  40. can get to tier one by adding a lot of things that are kind of like equity but not really and that's why you had uh
  41. those two examples Morgan Stanley and city were taken because the differences are very large in that case. So this is
  42. the fudge factor. That's a fudge factor in the numerator. But it's also possible
  43. to fudge the denominator. And that's even more worrisome because during the first quarter, we saw a lot of
  44. improvements in these ratios. But when you looked behind the numbers, it was because banks had so-called refined the
  45. risk models, which is to say the risk models had been adjusted to give them lower risk weights. Um, and we've also
  46. had a recent study by the Basel Committee that shows that if you give the same portfolio to several different
  47. leading banks, you're going to end up with very very different risk numbers. And so, uh, these things are really not
  48. reliable because they are so subject to manipulation. Moreover, they make it impossible for anyone on the outside to
  49. compare one bank to another because you have to know the details of all of its models, which in some cases can be as
  50. many as 200 million calculations, which is just, you know, impossible. Um, and so, uh, we were concerned that the Fed
  51. was going to lose an opportunity, as it turns out, they did, to actually use the
  52. new clean leverage ratio as the hallmark of the strength of US banks in reporting
  53. the results of the simulation tests. So, on the road to making the global financial system more safe and to
  54. preventing the kind of meltdown that we had five or six years ago, um, we haven't gotten very far. uh not nearly
  55. as far as we should be, but um at least putting leverage into the regulatory mix
  56. was an improvement. Uh now if they would fortify it and uh actually use it more frequently as a reporting and comparison
  57. device, I think uh we would have made an advance. Thanks very much for joining us. Thank you.
  58. [Music]

Brief Summary

The episode covers bank leverage, capital definitions, and Basel 3's impact on financial stability.

Key points

  • Understanding Bank Leverage. Explains the critical nature of understanding bank leverage and its implications for financial stability.
  • The Foundation of Banks. Discusses the importance of equity as the primary shock absorber for banks.
  • Manipulated Numbers. Critiques the reliability of banks' reported capital ratios during the financial crisis.
  • Regulatory Progress Post-Crisis. Reflects on the slow progress in regulatory reforms aimed at preventing future crises.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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