The Unintended Consequences of Affordable Housing Lotteries

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ABOUT THE EPISODE Judd Kessler, Wharton Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy and author of Lucky by Design, tells how affordable housing lotteries function, why they generate hidden markets, and how better design could improve outcomes for renters.

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  1. There is a bit of a housing crisis right now in America, and it is driven by a variety of factors. One of the areas of
  2. most concern is affordable housing, and this is a problem seen quite a bit in our bigger cities. Things like rent control
  3. have led cities to rely on lotteries in order to provide housing benefit to its citizens. But this isn't always a good
  4. thing, because it can develop a hidden market in housing. Pleasure to be joined right now by Judd Kessler, who's Professor
  5. of Business, Economics and Public Policy here at the Wharton School. He is also author of the book <i>Lucky By</i>
  6. <i>Design</i>, which looks at these hidden markets. And he joins us right now. Hi, Judd, great to catch up again.
  7. Thanks so much for having me. Happy to be here. All right, so you and I have talked about these hidden markets, but specifically, you
  8. wrote an article recently about kind of a hidden market within the housing sector. So kind of explain what you're seeing.
  9. Yeah. So a hidden market is, as you described, a market where there's more people who are demanding something at the
  10. prices that they're being charged than we can reasonably serve. So economists like me call this excess demand, more
  11. people who want something than we have available. And in these markets, we need different rules to decide who gets access to the
  12. scarce resources and who does not, because the normal mechanism of the price goes up, and some people decide they'll
  13. buy it, and some decide that that it's too expensive. That doesn't work when the hidden market is setting the price too
  14. low. So you mentioned this hidden market in housing, and the dynamic that's playing out is, in a lot of these cities,
  15. mostly kind of the large democratic cities in the country, we have for decades, not allowed there to be as much
  16. housing development as would be necessary to meet population growth and other kind of demands in these towns and cities. So
  17. as a result, rents and property values have been going up steadily. This is kind of typical supply and demand,
  18. right? You restrict supply, demand goes up. Prices are going to rise. And so as a— as a consequence, or as a kind of
  19. reaction to that, affordable housing, housing that is set up so that tenants only have to pay a fraction of their income— so
  20. it's— typically 30% is the kind of maximum that you can ask a potential tenant to pay. There are developments that are set up
  21. or sets of units within developments that will be offered for— as affordable housing for folks who won't have
  22. to pay market rate rents. So will pay below-market rate rents, to the level that they can afford. Now the issue with that
  23. is, of course, there are many more people who want to have an affordable unit, because the affordable units are much
  24. cheaper than the market rate units. And that is what creates the hidden market. Because now you're going to have thousands of
  25. people who might want to live in the same unit because they would only have to pay, you know, a few $1,000 a month, instead of
  26. what might be twice that if they got it on— outside of the affordable housing system. - Right.
  27. And no matter what, when you have the component of lower cost versus supply, lower cost is always going to win out, isn't it?
  28. If you are offering something at a below market price, so at a discount, and you're always going to get more people who
  29. want to buy the thing than there are available. That's kind of by definition. That's what it means to be offering at a below-market
  30. price. And so that's what you see in, you know, live event tickets, when ticket prices are very low relative to what you
  31. could get away for charging. Or a lot of people want to get into a hot restaurant, and they're giving away the reservations for
  32. free, right? These are all situations where you have a below market price. You're going to get a ton of people who want
  33. to be the ones to clean it. So then, in these cities, they have lotteries to try and help
  34. determine who gets these lower- cost living spaces. What kind of impact is the lottery having on kind of the— you know, the
  35. general scope of real estate in some of these cities? Yeah. So, you know, there's lots of ways that you
  36. could try to allocate these limited set of scarce resources to the many, many people who want to live there. So
  37. lotteries are not the only way, although they're becoming more and more common, I think because the other ways have been
  38. revealed to have their own problems. So often, cities will do things like long waiting lists. Like, I sign up to— say I
  39. would like to get a spot in a subsidized apartment or in public housing. But those waiting lists in some cities
  40. stretch decades. Like, you sign up now in the hopes that 25 years from now, you'll get a apartment in Chicago public
  41. housing. And that obviously is going to be untenable for lots of families. So the lottery is a potentially— I mean, it's a
  42. fair kind of potential solution to this, where the way that it works is, a new development is getting built. The development—
  43. the city is going to require it to have a certain fraction of its units be affordable, so be kind of rented in this
  44. particular way, at below market prices. And typically, they'll get some kind of tax credit, or the ability to kind of build
  45. more units than they would otherwise, if they consent to this affordable housing, building some affordable housing.
  46. And then, so that the units can be rented immediately by people who need them, they will put them into a lottery, and the
  47. lotteries will have hundreds of people applying for each unit. So in the last full year of data that I saw in New York
  48. City, there were 10,000 units that became available in these lotteries, and there were 6 million entries in those
  49. lotteries. So in any given— for any given unit, if you enter the lottery, you have a one in 600 chance of winning. Now, of
  50. course, the right strategy for you as a market participant is just, like, enter into every lottery that you have a chance
  51. of winning, because that's just kind of more draws. More draws, more bites of the apple, so to speak. But of course, not every
  52. housing unit is your ideal unit. So you often end up entering in lotteries that are for places that you would be
  53. happy to live at the very cheap rate, but not your ideal place to live, not necessarily your— even your ideal neighborhood.
  54. That was going to be my next question. Because, you know, you're dealing with the component of where these
  55. properties are. And it may or may not be a place that you would want to move to in the first place.
  56. And this is one of the problems with using these lottery systems. At least as they're designed, where I enter a
  57. lottery for each housing development, one at a time in a serial fashion. Because say you and I both want
  58. affordable housing. Say you want to live in neighborhood A, I want to live in neighborhood B, those are our first choices. But
  59. of course, we'd be happy to live anywhere if we could get below- market rates. We could end up winning the— entering, you
  60. know, all the lotteries, winning in the other person's favorite lottery. So I get a spot in your favorite neighborhood. You get a
  61. spot in my favorite neighborhood. There's no mechanism for us to swap our wins, right? I just happened to
  62. get lucky in the lottery that you cared more about. So one of the things I talk about in the article is, look, if this is
  63. where we're going to be, we're going to be in a world where we're going to be doing allocations of these affordable
  64. housing units by lottery. Let's at least try to solve this low- hanging fruit of kind of, how can we at least give people some
  65. way of signaling what their preferred lotteries are, so we don't end up in these situations where people are kind of winning
  66. a lottery and then stuck in that housing development, because there's no easy way to swap out. And if you're saving a few
  67. thousand dollars a month on rent, you know, you're going to feel tied to that particular unit. You know, maybe we could design
  68. these lotteries better so we don't have these problems. Well, and it sounds like it's a little bit like what we're seeing going
  69. through right now with interest rates, in that if you've got a low mortgage rate, why would you want to move if you got a three
  70. and a half percent mortgage rate, to potentially get one that's six, six and a half percent? So the people that get
  71. into these rent-controlled buildings, the last thing they want to do is move, even if it is maybe not the best location.
  72. Yeah. So— and it's— it's a very similar phenomenon of, you know, kind of— we call it golden handcuffs, right? Even
  73. though we're— these are— these are units that you're in where you're saving thousands of dollars a month, the same way that if your
  74. interest rate is three and a half percent on your mortgage, you might be saving, you know, a substantial sum versus six and a
  75. half percent. And yeah, if— in this situation, where it's the city deciding who gets— you know, how the lotteries are run,
  76. the city can make improvements. They could say, "All right, we're going to not have people enter lottery by lottery by lottery,
  77. but we're going to— you know, every three months, we're going to take all of the developments that are going to be lottery
  78. units, and we're going to let you enter simultaneously in all of them, and we're going to let you rank which ones you want
  79. more than others. And that's not— you know, in New York City, we— families are familiar with that kind of system because we
  80. do it for getting our kids into a public school in New York. So in the next couple of weeks, people who want to send their
  81. kids to kindergarten in New York City public schools are going to rank kindergarten programs. My first favorite program,
  82. second favorite program. So these systems are straightforward to design and explain to folks, and at least
  83. then we could make sure that, you know, if I'm going to be stuck with golden handcuffs somewhere, it was the place that
  84. I wanted to be, not, you know three— three neighborhoods over, and, you know, where my commute is much longer to work.
  85. Judd, great to talk with you. Thanks very much for your time. And again, all the luck with the book.
  86. Thanks so much for having me. Thank you. I said that intentionally. <i>Lucky By Design</i> is
  87. the name of the book. Judd Kessler, Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy here at the Wharton School.

Brief Summary

Judd Kessler discusses the housing crisis, hidden markets, and lottery systems for affordable housing allocation in American cities.

Key points

  • The Housing Crisis in America. The housing crisis is driven by various factors, particularly affecting affordable housing in cities.
  • Understanding Hidden Markets. Judd Kessler explains hidden markets in housing and their implications for affordability.
  • The Lottery System for Housing. Lotteries are becoming a common method to allocate affordable housing units in cities.

Tension

40/ 100Low tension

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