Fannie and Freddie Move towards Privatization
Ask about Knowledge at Wharton
Episode Description
The long quest to re-privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is pushing ahead. Wharton’s Susan Wachter explains where they are heading. More: http://knlg.net/1CPfMxI 📂 Finance & Accounting;Real Estate 🏷️ Research
Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
- Fannie and Freddie have been around for a very long time. They've operated as private entities, shareholder entities
- with an implicit guarantee but specifically without an explicit government guarantee so that they were
- not in fact federally owned organizations or controlled organizations, but as of
- September 8th, 2000 and 8 strike that, as of September 7th, 2008 they they came under government control. With
- the crisis in the overall housing market, with the demise of Lehman it was clear that Fannie and Freddie
- were illiquid, ill insolvent, and required a government intervention to prevent their meltdown, which of course
- would have brought down the entire housing market. At the time the housing market was in freefall, but this would
- have clearly without support of Fannie and Freddie taken a great recession and made it into great depression 2.0.
- The intervention was necessary. At that point, Fannie Freddie became regulated entities and controlled by the Federal
- Housing Finance Agency, FHFA which is a separate independent entity, and Fannie and Freddie are now under
- conservatorship directed by FHFA. Clearly keeping FHFA in the oversight position forever with Fannie and Freddie
- in a conservatorship what that means is that the taxpayers on the line for all losses, totally on the line for losses
- in Fannie and Freddie. And this is not a long-run viable solution. Having basically a nationalized housing
- finance system is not something that's viable for the long run for the United States.
- So, alternatives are must be considered and are being considered. But they range from one side of the
- spectrum to the other side of spectrum, and getting to consensus is been problematic.
- Well, there are and the dialogue has evolved on this. And there are broad areas of agreement, not perhaps 100% but
- among many parties, again across the political spectrum there has uh agreement has come about on some very
- important aspects of how to reform Fannie and Freddie. First, the need for a 30-year fixed-rate
- mortgage going forward, that this is an instrument that provides protections to homeowners and that it there is a need
- for this mortgage product in the United States. Uh secondly, the need for a liquid
- mortgage-backed securitization market to support the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.
- Third, the need for private capital to be in a first-loss position so that the taxpayer is not on the hook,
- but in fact private capital, appropriately so, takes the risk and if uh puts and and evaluates what the risk is and
- charges appropriately for the risk in mortgage rates and in mortgage insurance rates. This is private markets' role of
- setting up incentives and and taking on losses appropriately. So, that's a second key. A third key is
- that when there's a catastrophe, that that's the role for the government to be there in place for a catastrophic
- risk occurrence. And this consensus that that's the appropriate role for the government, and
- only appropriate role for the government to step in. In addition to this, to hopefully ensure a more stable market
- going forward there's a consensus on the need for transparency. A platform for standardization of
- mortgage-backed securities mortgage terms and a public uh le available set of characteristics of the mortgages and the
- mortgage-backed securitization. Some sort of utility that would be able to verify mortgage terms over time and and
- put into place standards for mortgages and mortgage-backed securitization. And finally, there is some agreement for
- some role for affordable housing. So, the combination of factors that there is agreement on is pretty
- substantial at this point, but the implementation of how do we get there is where there's a great deal of
- disagreement. There are two major proposals that are uh that have gotten some support. The first
- is the um uh protecting of the American Taxpayer and Homeowner Act, which was introduced
- by Hensarling in the House in 2013. Uh and that did come out of the House Committee on
- Financial Services. It hasn't made it any further than that. Uh that proposal is basically to privatize
- Fannie and Freddie entirely, to withdraw support for Fannie and Freddie 100%. They would have no no no support,
- implicit or explicit. Uh there would be a common securitization platform, a utility that
- the proposal calls for, and the utility would support mortgage securitization standardization. It wouldn't impose
- standardization, but it would make whatever mortgage-backed security standards were being used,
- make them transparent and and and call for the mortgage lenders and securitizers to
- abide by whatever standards were set out. But that's as far as the government or public would go, just set up utility
- to oversee the securitization platform that was that was put forth. The second proposal,
- the second major proposal is by Johnson-Crapo, and it received support across the political spectrum. However,
- did not receive sufficient support to come out of the Senate Banking Committee this past spring in 2014.
- But it it did go very far along in terms of getting consensus among many parties.
- There are still obviously points of major disagreement, which is why it did not come out of committee. But to first
- go to the points of agreement that were embodied in this first of all, there's a first-loss capital
- in private capital in the first-loss position, very key. Secondly, some provision for affordable housing.
- Third, a platform for trading a single security that would be have to be approved by a regulator, to
- be very much like the FDIC, with Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation, which would insure mortgages that were then
- would be explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. MBS that would then trade would be
- insured by by aggregators who would have to be approved also by FMIC. There would
- then be competition among the aggregators to provide for the to provide mortgage-backed securities at
- and and also the corporations that provided the the insurance for the mortgage-backed securities would trade
- and there would be private capital up front. So, this proposal, in fact, if you went go through the the different
- positions of consensus that we discussed earlier, goes very far along in embodying those positions of consensus.
- And in fact, it was the run-up to the Johnson-Crapo Act that I think brought about the sense of okay, this
- among this is this is what we can agree on. So, that's really where the state of the debate is
- at this moment. In the Johnson-Crapo proposal, the mortgage-backed securities are insured
- explicitly by the federal government under the regulation of the new entity Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation,
- similar to the FDIC providing insurance for demand deposits. And the borrower ultimately pays
- in mortgage rates for an insurance fee, which is then paid to the federal government to the entity that's
- overseeing the CFMIC, which means of course that investors are not receiving, they must pay through the aggregators.
- The aggregators must pay up front an insurance fee to the federal government for the right to this explicit insurance
- in case of catastrophic risk. And this so what it so the ultimate is that the mortgage-backed securitized
- securities that are trading have no risk to the investor to the in the mortgage-backed securities because these
- are fully guaranteed explicitly by the federal government. In order for the uh the aggregators to receive this
- insurance, to get the stamp of approval by the federal government, the eagle stamped on their mortgage-backed
- securities, to make them no credit risk, zero default risk to the investor, they must pay for insurance
- from the federal government. And also they must abide by standards set up by the FMIC as
- well. Well, there is a one one very large question. What should be the risk premium? And of course there's similar
- questions over demand deposits. What should be the risk premium for FDIC? And whether this risk premium will be
- priced accurately over the cycle. These are all very large questions. And then there are two other related questions
- which are um well, will there be lenders who are issuing mortgage-backed securities that
- do not have government insurance? And will those expand over the cycle because they will be competitively at an
- advantage since they do not have to pay the tax? And there is nothing in this legislation
- which prevents that. The implementation questions of course are key. One question of implementation
- which was perhaps one of the reasons why in the end Johnson-Crapo did not get out
- of committee is where's the private capital to support the first loss position which in the legislation is
- required to be 10%. The mortgage-backed securities market is last estimated $5 trillion. That's $500 billion. Where is
- that capital going to come from? Who's volunteering to put up $500 billion worth of first loss capital equity to
- take the losses in front of the government. So that's one question. A second question is what's the guarantee
- fee? And of course that will affect the profitability of the mortgages and the interest and willingness of private
- capital to come to the game. Uh the and a third question is well, what about all
- the other mortgages out there that could be issued and securitized without a tax?
- Will they compete against the mortgages that do receive the explicit insurance and will that competition be
- pro-cyclical? That is will these mortgages expand during the boom period of the cycle? And then during the bust
- period they'll be out there uninsured and potentially causing systemic risk. So that I think was the one of the most
- important questions that was brought to the structure of Johnson-Crapo. But a second important question was where's
- the role for affordable housing? Both of those questions get back to an underlying uh aspect of the proposal
- which is this single security which is a to be um implemented, regulated, overseen by the federal
- government since it would receive the federal government's explicit backing. Well,
- who is in fact overseeing the single security? What are the characteristics of a single security? What is the risk?
- What are the terms? And do these vary among the insurers, the aggregators that are participating
- in this market and that are putting up the first loss position? If so, do we actually have a liquid market for
- the mortgage-backed securities that allow a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage? Those were all questions which the
- legislation as close as it got to being uh to coming out of the committee at that point, these questions were raised
- in terms of the pretty much the fundamentals of the of the proposal which go to the question
- would in fact such a uh imp such a such a structure support the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage? Would such a
- structure be stable over the cycle? And third, would such a structure support affordable
- financing or more simply financing broadly available for those who qualify over the cycle? And those were all
- questions which are yet to be answered and still have to be addressed before a consensus can emerge.
- Well, there's a real range of um estimates on that and some estimate that it will be de minimis and some estimate
- that it will be several hundred basis points which of course would be uh would make these non-competitive against
- uh securitizations that did not need to pay 100-200 basis point tax. Uh to my mind the question is how are they
- priced over the cycle? So it's not just a question of a static pricing. It's a dynamic pricing. And that of course
- depends on how risky the overall market becomes which depends on the entry and the withdrawal of capital into this
- market from other sources. So it's a very difficult question to answer without answering that other question of
- what's the structure of the mortgage-backed securitization market over the cycle.
- One I just reform Fannie and Freddie. Uh question is what do we mean by reform? There is some consensus on what we might
- mean by reform, no portfolio going forward. And we're moving in that direction in any case and that's where
- the riskiest loans were. Uh a second part of the uh consensus is that there should be transparency in the
- mortgage-backed securities. There should be a common securitization platform to provide transparency so we can track
- what loans are in fact being securitized going forward. And that too is in place.
- Uh but then the third component is really where there is big questions which is how do we get
- private capital into Fannie and Freddie to take the first loss because there is consensus that there should be private
- capital at risk prior to the taxpayer. That's a key point where there's major disagreement and part of this major
- disagreement because it it hinges on the question who owns Fannie and Freddie? And there are major
- lawsuits right now on who owns Fannie and Freddie that need to be resolved. And there may also need to be
- congressional weighing in on that question of who owns Fannie and Freddie because Fannie and Freddie were
- originally chartered and still are chartered through Congress. These are federal
- national charters which are not state chartered but chartered by Congress. So we will need
- Congress to weigh in on that. However, there is um there is movement as we speak in terms
- of that third component of bringing at risk capital, private capital. And both Fannie and Freddie have instituted a new
- uh uh uh a new derive um a new security uh just for that purpose to bring private
- capital in in front of the taxpayer. Uh those are trading and they are in fact um bringing private capital in to to
- take first loss credit risk and to price that credit risk and to do so transparently. This is
- a new development and it's it's um increasing very rapidly. So in fact while it seems as though nothing is
- happening, much is happening. Uh these new instruments uh go by the name of STACR and uh in the case of um
- uh of uh Freddie and Connecticut Avenue securities in case of of um Fannie. And they are um very large at this point
- and they're taking a major share of the credit risk of both entities. Uh and of the new issues of of both
- entities. So this is a very good development because in fact what we do need is we do need not only regulators
- to oversee the risk of the mortgage market, we need a transparent way for private capital to uh price and reveal
- the pricing of the risk of the credit of the mortgages that are being issued and
- either implicitly or explicitly uh being supported by the federal government.
Brief Summary
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's reforms focus on privatization, mortgage transparency, and private capital involvement to stabilize the housing market.
Key points
- Government Control of Fannie and Freddie. Fannie and Freddie came under government control during the 2008 housing crisis to prevent a meltdown.
- The Need for Reform. There is a consensus on the need for reform in the housing finance system, but implementation remains contentious.
- New Developments in Risk Capital. New securities are being introduced to bring private capital into Fannie and Freddie, taking first loss credit risk.
Episode highlights
- Government Control of Fannie and FreddieFannie and Freddie came under government control during the 2008 housing crisis to prevent a meltdown.“The intervention was necessary.”1:08Apr 17, 2015
- The Need for ReformThere is a consensus on the need for reform in the housing finance system, but implementation remains contentious.“What do we mean by reform?”14:56Apr 17, 2015
- New Developments in Risk CapitalNew securities are being introduced to bring private capital into Fannie and Freddie, taking first loss credit risk.“Much is happening.”17:13Apr 17, 2015
Tension
40/ 100Low tension





