Fannie and Freddie Move towards Privatization

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The long quest to re-privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is pushing ahead. Wharton’s Susan Wachter explains where they are heading. More: http://knlg.net/1CPfMxI 📂 Finance & Accounting;Real Estate 🏷️ Research

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  1. Fannie and Freddie have been around for a very long time. They've operated as private entities, shareholder entities
  2. with an implicit guarantee but specifically without an explicit government guarantee so that they were
  3. not in fact federally owned organizations or controlled organizations, but as of
  4. September 8th, 2000 and 8 strike that, as of September 7th, 2008 they they came under government control. With
  5. the crisis in the overall housing market, with the demise of Lehman it was clear that Fannie and Freddie
  6. were illiquid, ill insolvent, and required a government intervention to prevent their meltdown, which of course
  7. would have brought down the entire housing market. At the time the housing market was in freefall, but this would
  8. have clearly without support of Fannie and Freddie taken a great recession and made it into great depression 2.0.
  9. The intervention was necessary. At that point, Fannie Freddie became regulated entities and controlled by the Federal
  10. Housing Finance Agency, FHFA which is a separate independent entity, and Fannie and Freddie are now under
  11. conservatorship directed by FHFA. Clearly keeping FHFA in the oversight position forever with Fannie and Freddie
  12. in a conservatorship what that means is that the taxpayers on the line for all losses, totally on the line for losses
  13. in Fannie and Freddie. And this is not a long-run viable solution. Having basically a nationalized housing
  14. finance system is not something that's viable for the long run for the United States.
  15. So, alternatives are must be considered and are being considered. But they range from one side of the
  16. spectrum to the other side of spectrum, and getting to consensus is been problematic.
  17. Well, there are and the dialogue has evolved on this. And there are broad areas of agreement, not perhaps 100% but
  18. among many parties, again across the political spectrum there has uh agreement has come about on some very
  19. important aspects of how to reform Fannie and Freddie. First, the need for a 30-year fixed-rate
  20. mortgage going forward, that this is an instrument that provides protections to homeowners and that it there is a need
  21. for this mortgage product in the United States. Uh secondly, the need for a liquid
  22. mortgage-backed securitization market to support the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage.
  23. Third, the need for private capital to be in a first-loss position so that the taxpayer is not on the hook,
  24. but in fact private capital, appropriately so, takes the risk and if uh puts and and evaluates what the risk is and
  25. charges appropriately for the risk in mortgage rates and in mortgage insurance rates. This is private markets' role of
  26. setting up incentives and and taking on losses appropriately. So, that's a second key. A third key is
  27. that when there's a catastrophe, that that's the role for the government to be there in place for a catastrophic
  28. risk occurrence. And this consensus that that's the appropriate role for the government, and
  29. only appropriate role for the government to step in. In addition to this, to hopefully ensure a more stable market
  30. going forward there's a consensus on the need for transparency. A platform for standardization of
  31. mortgage-backed securities mortgage terms and a public uh le available set of characteristics of the mortgages and the
  32. mortgage-backed securitization. Some sort of utility that would be able to verify mortgage terms over time and and
  33. put into place standards for mortgages and mortgage-backed securitization. And finally, there is some agreement for
  34. some role for affordable housing. So, the combination of factors that there is agreement on is pretty
  35. substantial at this point, but the implementation of how do we get there is where there's a great deal of
  36. disagreement. There are two major proposals that are uh that have gotten some support. The first
  37. is the um uh protecting of the American Taxpayer and Homeowner Act, which was introduced
  38. by Hensarling in the House in 2013. Uh and that did come out of the House Committee on
  39. Financial Services. It hasn't made it any further than that. Uh that proposal is basically to privatize
  40. Fannie and Freddie entirely, to withdraw support for Fannie and Freddie 100%. They would have no no no support,
  41. implicit or explicit. Uh there would be a common securitization platform, a utility that
  42. the proposal calls for, and the utility would support mortgage securitization standardization. It wouldn't impose
  43. standardization, but it would make whatever mortgage-backed security standards were being used,
  44. make them transparent and and and call for the mortgage lenders and securitizers to
  45. abide by whatever standards were set out. But that's as far as the government or public would go, just set up utility
  46. to oversee the securitization platform that was that was put forth. The second proposal,
  47. the second major proposal is by Johnson-Crapo, and it received support across the political spectrum. However,
  48. did not receive sufficient support to come out of the Senate Banking Committee this past spring in 2014.
  49. But it it did go very far along in terms of getting consensus among many parties.
  50. There are still obviously points of major disagreement, which is why it did not come out of committee. But to first
  51. go to the points of agreement that were embodied in this first of all, there's a first-loss capital
  52. in private capital in the first-loss position, very key. Secondly, some provision for affordable housing.
  53. Third, a platform for trading a single security that would be have to be approved by a regulator, to
  54. be very much like the FDIC, with Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation, which would insure mortgages that were then
  55. would be explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. MBS that would then trade would be
  56. insured by by aggregators who would have to be approved also by FMIC. There would
  57. then be competition among the aggregators to provide for the to provide mortgage-backed securities at
  58. and and also the corporations that provided the the insurance for the mortgage-backed securities would trade
  59. and there would be private capital up front. So, this proposal, in fact, if you went go through the the different
  60. positions of consensus that we discussed earlier, goes very far along in embodying those positions of consensus.
  61. And in fact, it was the run-up to the Johnson-Crapo Act that I think brought about the sense of okay, this
  62. among this is this is what we can agree on. So, that's really where the state of the debate is
  63. at this moment. In the Johnson-Crapo proposal, the mortgage-backed securities are insured
  64. explicitly by the federal government under the regulation of the new entity Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation,
  65. similar to the FDIC providing insurance for demand deposits. And the borrower ultimately pays
  66. in mortgage rates for an insurance fee, which is then paid to the federal government to the entity that's
  67. overseeing the CFMIC, which means of course that investors are not receiving, they must pay through the aggregators.
  68. The aggregators must pay up front an insurance fee to the federal government for the right to this explicit insurance
  69. in case of catastrophic risk. And this so what it so the ultimate is that the mortgage-backed securitized
  70. securities that are trading have no risk to the investor to the in the mortgage-backed securities because these
  71. are fully guaranteed explicitly by the federal government. In order for the uh the aggregators to receive this
  72. insurance, to get the stamp of approval by the federal government, the eagle stamped on their mortgage-backed
  73. securities, to make them no credit risk, zero default risk to the investor, they must pay for insurance
  74. from the federal government. And also they must abide by standards set up by the FMIC as
  75. well. Well, there is a one one very large question. What should be the risk premium? And of course there's similar
  76. questions over demand deposits. What should be the risk premium for FDIC? And whether this risk premium will be
  77. priced accurately over the cycle. These are all very large questions. And then there are two other related questions
  78. which are um well, will there be lenders who are issuing mortgage-backed securities that
  79. do not have government insurance? And will those expand over the cycle because they will be competitively at an
  80. advantage since they do not have to pay the tax? And there is nothing in this legislation
  81. which prevents that. The implementation questions of course are key. One question of implementation
  82. which was perhaps one of the reasons why in the end Johnson-Crapo did not get out
  83. of committee is where's the private capital to support the first loss position which in the legislation is
  84. required to be 10%. The mortgage-backed securities market is last estimated $5 trillion. That's $500 billion. Where is
  85. that capital going to come from? Who's volunteering to put up $500 billion worth of first loss capital equity to
  86. take the losses in front of the government. So that's one question. A second question is what's the guarantee
  87. fee? And of course that will affect the profitability of the mortgages and the interest and willingness of private
  88. capital to come to the game. Uh the and a third question is well, what about all
  89. the other mortgages out there that could be issued and securitized without a tax?
  90. Will they compete against the mortgages that do receive the explicit insurance and will that competition be
  91. pro-cyclical? That is will these mortgages expand during the boom period of the cycle? And then during the bust
  92. period they'll be out there uninsured and potentially causing systemic risk. So that I think was the one of the most
  93. important questions that was brought to the structure of Johnson-Crapo. But a second important question was where's
  94. the role for affordable housing? Both of those questions get back to an underlying uh aspect of the proposal
  95. which is this single security which is a to be um implemented, regulated, overseen by the federal
  96. government since it would receive the federal government's explicit backing. Well,
  97. who is in fact overseeing the single security? What are the characteristics of a single security? What is the risk?
  98. What are the terms? And do these vary among the insurers, the aggregators that are participating
  99. in this market and that are putting up the first loss position? If so, do we actually have a liquid market for
  100. the mortgage-backed securities that allow a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage? Those were all questions which the
  101. legislation as close as it got to being uh to coming out of the committee at that point, these questions were raised
  102. in terms of the pretty much the fundamentals of the of the proposal which go to the question
  103. would in fact such a uh imp such a such a structure support the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage? Would such a
  104. structure be stable over the cycle? And third, would such a structure support affordable
  105. financing or more simply financing broadly available for those who qualify over the cycle? And those were all
  106. questions which are yet to be answered and still have to be addressed before a consensus can emerge.
  107. Well, there's a real range of um estimates on that and some estimate that it will be de minimis and some estimate
  108. that it will be several hundred basis points which of course would be uh would make these non-competitive against
  109. uh securitizations that did not need to pay 100-200 basis point tax. Uh to my mind the question is how are they
  110. priced over the cycle? So it's not just a question of a static pricing. It's a dynamic pricing. And that of course
  111. depends on how risky the overall market becomes which depends on the entry and the withdrawal of capital into this
  112. market from other sources. So it's a very difficult question to answer without answering that other question of
  113. what's the structure of the mortgage-backed securitization market over the cycle.
  114. One I just reform Fannie and Freddie. Uh question is what do we mean by reform? There is some consensus on what we might
  115. mean by reform, no portfolio going forward. And we're moving in that direction in any case and that's where
  116. the riskiest loans were. Uh a second part of the uh consensus is that there should be transparency in the
  117. mortgage-backed securities. There should be a common securitization platform to provide transparency so we can track
  118. what loans are in fact being securitized going forward. And that too is in place.
  119. Uh but then the third component is really where there is big questions which is how do we get
  120. private capital into Fannie and Freddie to take the first loss because there is consensus that there should be private
  121. capital at risk prior to the taxpayer. That's a key point where there's major disagreement and part of this major
  122. disagreement because it it hinges on the question who owns Fannie and Freddie? And there are major
  123. lawsuits right now on who owns Fannie and Freddie that need to be resolved. And there may also need to be
  124. congressional weighing in on that question of who owns Fannie and Freddie because Fannie and Freddie were
  125. originally chartered and still are chartered through Congress. These are federal
  126. national charters which are not state chartered but chartered by Congress. So we will need
  127. Congress to weigh in on that. However, there is um there is movement as we speak in terms
  128. of that third component of bringing at risk capital, private capital. And both Fannie and Freddie have instituted a new
  129. uh uh uh a new derive um a new security uh just for that purpose to bring private
  130. capital in in front of the taxpayer. Uh those are trading and they are in fact um bringing private capital in to to
  131. take first loss credit risk and to price that credit risk and to do so transparently. This is
  132. a new development and it's it's um increasing very rapidly. So in fact while it seems as though nothing is
  133. happening, much is happening. Uh these new instruments uh go by the name of STACR and uh in the case of um
  134. uh of uh Freddie and Connecticut Avenue securities in case of of um Fannie. And they are um very large at this point
  135. and they're taking a major share of the credit risk of both entities. Uh and of the new issues of of both
  136. entities. So this is a very good development because in fact what we do need is we do need not only regulators
  137. to oversee the risk of the mortgage market, we need a transparent way for private capital to uh price and reveal
  138. the pricing of the risk of the credit of the mortgages that are being issued and
  139. either implicitly or explicitly uh being supported by the federal government.

Brief Summary

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's reforms focus on privatization, mortgage transparency, and private capital involvement to stabilize the housing market.

Key points

  • Government Control of Fannie and Freddie. Fannie and Freddie came under government control during the 2008 housing crisis to prevent a meltdown.
  • The Need for Reform. There is a consensus on the need for reform in the housing finance system, but implementation remains contentious.
  • New Developments in Risk Capital. New securities are being introduced to bring private capital into Fannie and Freddie, taking first loss credit risk.

Tension

40/ 100Low tension

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