Can Independent Directors Remain Independent?
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Episode Description
In the realm of corporate governance, recent research has confirmed a finding that should instinctively make sense: When a company’s board has a higher proportion of independent directors, the company itself behaves in a more transparent way. 📂 Management 🏷️ Research
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- the research focuses on the board of directors as being a a Cornerstone a focal point of of good corporate
- governance and when I say that I mean that that the shareholders of a of a corporation are going to appoint a board
- of directors that then gets involved in the Strategic decision making and the monitoring of management to make sure
- managers are doing uh what shareholders would like them to do um and many of these uh these individuals on the board
- of directors are independent directors meaning they're independent of management so they can act as sort of a
- a watchdog or a monitor of managers but the tricky part there is to make sure those Outsiders um those independent
- directors are well informed about what's going on at the firm these are busy individuals with typically high-profile
- jobs they're only spending four five or six days a year involved with the company and so it's a critical issue as
- to how you make sure they have the inform information uh that they need to to Monitor and advise managers and so in
- this paper we focus on um how do firms how does management how does the board of directors uh take actions uh to
- ensure and have a degree of comfort that they're getting good information that they can use to to to make good
- decisions uh the key takeaways from our this particular research project are to realize the interconnection between
- information and uh monitors and decision makers that those two really need to go
- together and that to have a certain type of director in place uh that requires a
- certain type of information uh environment or certain uh level of transparency uh so the big tension or
- tradeoff when looking at a board of directors is between independent and inside directors inside directors are
- affiliated with the firm they're more involved on a day-to-day basis they have a lot more background information uh so
- they're not going to be as uh reliant on external information sources uh as an independent director uh is is only going
- to be there uh five six days a year typically uh so they need to information source that can get them informed up to
- speed quickly to facilitate uh their decision- making making sure they're asking the right questions uh things
- like that so the independent director is Al also needs to think about uh their own
- personal reputation and the risks that they face so one of the the biggest costs of being an independent director
- is yes you have to put in some time but you're concerned that if something goes bad you're going to be blamed for it and
- you could be litigated against you could be sued uh and it could severely damage
- your reputation so those independent directors are only going to want to sit on a board where they feel that they're
- going to be getting good information so they're appointed from the outside if you if you thought about picking up a
- set of financial statements and just using the public information that's available about a firm I don't think any
- of us would feel like we could make strategic decisions for that company just by looking at their their SEC
- filings you need a much deeper richer set of information so those outside directors come in and they have to get
- themselves up to speed so they are typically interviewed by management they're interviewed by the existing
- board of directors uh and then once they sit on the board they have regular meetings with managers managers present
- budgets managers present ideas managers present lots of things um and that certainly is a very important sort of
- Channel by which information would get conveyed to the directors but again in in Most states of
- the world in most situations that might be perfectly reasonable place for directors to get information but where
- they're concerned is and we've seen lots of cases where managers get up to some Financial Shenanigans or some Earnings
- management or doing things that they shouldn't be doing in those in those very important settings in the the very
- settings where you'd like to get the best information managers are not going to give you that information so your
- channel for getting information about things that the managers don't want you to know pretty much get get shut down
- and so the Board needs to then figure out well how do I ensure that the the the tires have been kicked properly if
- you will and so there's lots of people that are looking at the firm analysts are looking at the firm Auditors are
- looking at the firm Regulators are looking at the firm creditors are looking at the firm Supply ERS uh
- employees there's lots of different part institutional shareholders it might be some hedge funds or private Equity that
- has a a large share of block holders that have investment so all of those individuals and institutions are kicking
- the tires if you will and so the board wants to make sure that you have enough of those other people out there kicking
- the tires that they can potentially Fair it out things or figure out things um that the board members just either don't
- have the time or the information or simply can't can't do themselves and so it's a very complicated information
- environment but uh the key issu is to remember that the the most the you know the things you care most most about as a
- director if you're trying to do some monitoring is making sure you get information when managers are least
- likely to want to give it to you I think what surprised the maybe I know sort of surprised us but but you
- know one of the the interesting facts that that we observe in the paper is that uh the relation between information
- and the structure of boards goes goes in both directions and specifically what I
- mean by that is that uh trying to force Upon A firm more independent outside directors when that firm uh is is po
- informationally opaque or if that firm has difficulty communicating information to outside directors trying to force
- outside directors into that firm may not work those directors simply may not be able to get the information they need to
- do a good job at the same time we also find that there is some element of when you do Force independent directors onto
- a board they do try to take actions to get better information and so it's this very complex and dynamic information
- structure where uh the directors have some ability to to force the firm to become more transparent but at the same
- time going too far and trying to have too many of the directors independent uh can sometimes uh cause informational
- problems where those directors simply aren't able to get all the information they need to give you a little bit of
- background uh about the the study um without getting too technical we we use a uh certain regulation that
- the uh stock exchanges the listing exchanges uh put in place it required companies to have a certain uh
- proportion of independent directors um um so before getting into the analysis the question we asked ourselves is why
- did the companies have uh the board structure that they did to begin with so where where are they moving from and uh
- I think that helps uh helps understand our our Point thinking about it from that
- perspective so the the basic idea behind the paper the methodology was to um observe a there a regulation that was
- passed in the early 2000s um some of was related to the the exchanges the major stock exchanges and they required uh a
- majority of the board of directors to be comprised of independent directors um before that there were lots of boards
- that were dominated by inside directors and and this new regulation forced uh a majority to be Outsider independent
- directors and so when that happened uh firms had to shift their board structures dramatically so it's this
- exogenous shock this regulation that forced these firms to add more independent directors and then we
- observe well how do firms react to that um do they struggle to get the information in the hands of those new
- independent directors so if if prior to the regulation you had say eight inside directors and two independent directors
- and after that you had seven outside directors or independent directors and only three or four inside directors
- somehow you have to get those outside directors up to speed uh on information so we look at um do firms change the
- financial reporting quality do firms uh use the auditing process in a different way do firms uh uh disclose more public
- information in the form of management forecasts or analyst forecasts so you know does does the firm take actions uh
- that would potentially get better information in the hands of directors Beyond just the internal information
- that the directors will get from managers so simply asking managers to give us good information is often not
- good enough or not a credible information Source right so the regulation provided the immediate
- consequence was these companies that didn't have a majority of independent directors had to get a majority and our
- papers focus on well what's the what's the second level of consequences once those independent directors are there
- perhaps even before uh while they're trying to uh attract and and get these independent directors how do they make
- changes to the information environment to accommodate uh this new board structure that's going to uh be in place
- after the regulations so the regulation is sort of like the first Domino that fell and then
- we're looking at uh subsequent consequences one of the common misperceptions in general with corporate
- governance is that there there are certain best practices that firms can use and I think the whole the notion of
- a a single best practice in corporate governance is is a is is a misnomer I don't think it really describes the way
- corporate governance works so what might be a good practice for one firm could be
- a disaster for another firm or very costly for another firm so uh and so we focus on Boards of directors and we make
- the point that that simply forcing a firm to have lots of outside directors is not necessarily a good thing if those
- outside directors are going to be making decisions in the dark so unless those outside directors are informed they're
- not going to be able to do a good job and you can to take that same idea and you can impose that on on virtually
- every other simple governance structure so another one that people often talk about are uh the CEO should not Al also
- be the chairman of the board that there should be a an independent chairman of the board the CEO and those two roles
- should be separate uh and there's extensive literature that shows that sometimes having the CEO be the chairman
- of the board is good and sometimes having the CEO be the chairman of the board is bad and you can go right down
- the list with you know staggered boards with executive compensation with with stock options and stock ownership and
- just about every component of governance and it's important to keep in mind that
- there simply is not one single best practice but it needs to be conditional on the firm's setting and that's the way
- people should think about it even beyond that just stopping to ask well why did why why are there differences in the
- first place before we start trying to push everyone to the the same direction and thinking about what gave rise to why
- do some companies already have a majority independent directors While others don't well it could be the ones
- that don't are engaged in a lot of research and development a lot of uh proprietary information that would be
- difficult to credibly communicate to Independent directors or maybe they don't want to for proprietary reasons
- and it makes sense for that company to have a majority of uh of uh non-independent
- directors uh well one practical implication is where do the uh independent directors get the
- information inform that they're using and uh we use a variety of different measures that are relatively common in
- the corporate finance uh literature uh we look at analyst forecast we look at management forecast and management is
- often uh an information Source in terms of the uh frequency with which they issue forecast or the Precision uh we
- look at uh evidence from from uh stock market trades we also look at uh some accounting measures uh there in terms of
- audited Financial reports so those are all uh different pieces that go into the information mix that uh directors and
- especially uh independent directors draw on for uh when they're making their decisions and what that means from from
- the corporation's perspective is that if the corporation is trying to put in some
- changes with respect to governance so if they're thinking about changing their board structure they're thinking about
- adding new directors to the board they need to be cognizant of these informational issues so they need to
- give some thought as to how are we going to make sure that those busy people that
- are only that have have a limited amount of time to spend with us are making good
- decisions and it's in the firm's best it's in Management's best interest to make sure that the board is informed
- because otherwise they're imposing their voting and imposing their power over management uh without the information to
- sort of move the firm in the right direction so it's sort of uh the research I think says something about
- what what firms should be thinking about when they're making these changes to corporate governance and I think it also
- could potentially guide Regulators so to the extent that Regulators are going to
- make changes and they've been making a lot of changes to corporate governance over the last 10 or 15 years in the last
- 10 or 15 years The Regulators have decided that uh the majority of every Board of Public board of directors will
- be comprised of a majority of independent directors the audit committee needs to be 100% independent
- directors the compensation committee needs to be 100% independent directors the nominating committee for nominating
- board members needs to be made uh comprised of 100% independent directors so The Regulators have been over the
- last 10 or 15 years imposing more and more cost risk time uh on these independent directors and so more and
- more of the decision making in public corporations is is in the hands of independent directors and that's only
- going to work uh if those independent directors have the information that they need so The Regulators need to be
- cognizant of that as well uh when they're when they're imposing govern governance standards another regulatory
- uh aspect that we uh I would say take as a given in our paper is there there have
- also been uh regulatory changes over the last 15 years uh with respect to uh what's disclosed about governance and
- what I have in mind is in particular is the compensation disclosures have gotten
- a lot uh a lot more uh a lot better and a lot more transparent over the last 15 years
- so now we can uh we as researchers and presumably shareholders analysts Regulators have a lot more information
- about what the compensation package of the CEO and the top Executives looks like for example uh so there um to the
- extent that these other uh these other uh economic actors are also doing some of the monitoring that information uh is
- potentially facilitating uh their decision making and their their monitoring one thing we were talking
- about uh ahead of time uh in terms of a topic that's in the news is uh shareholder voting has uh gotten a lot
- of attention in the business press lately uh one uh specific examples SE un pay voting uh so where the companies
- have to put the CEOs uh compensation package to a shareholder vote once every three years um in the US it's a
- non-binding vote uh but it is a way for shareholders to to express their sentiment about the compensation package
- um but that's symptomatic of what what seems to be a push towards more uh more shareholder empowerment uh in
- terms of governance giving shareholders more voting and in light of our research
- that raises a question well uh just like independent directors we need to think about where are they getting their
- information when you're talking about dispersed shareholders who have uh potentially smaller Stakes uh less of an
- incentive to monitor uh where are they getting their information how are they going to be processing it so that's
- something that needs to be kept in mind if you're going to if Regulators for example are going to push for uh uh more
- shareholder empowerment the reason the paper made a contribution to the academic literature
- in this area um was it built on prior literature that essentially argued that um that the information environment that
- the firm was was wrapped up in was was essentially fixed or exogenous to the firm and and the prior literature argued
- that there was really very little that the firm or the board could do to alter the the amount of
- transparency uh that that might be uh there with with the firm between the board and the firm um and so what that
- literature argued is that uh in firms that aren't very transparent they simply can't have a lot of independent
- directors and in firms that are fairly transparent they can now that literature is primarily in in an um now coming at
- it from an accounting perspective there's a lot of accounting literature that focuses uh very closely on how
- firms can make financial reporting decisions and and alter the auditing process to make the firm more
- transparent when it when it's not and so our research took the perspective of well we think that uh it is possible for
- the board of directors to step in and actually make some changes for management to make some changes that
- could actually facilitate more indep dependent directors and so I think I made the point earlier that kind of goes
- in both directions the the information environment dictates the the the proper governance structure that be put in
- place in terms of board Independence but board Independence likewise can influence the information environment
- and so the two things uh tend to work together move together we're working on a a survey
- paper talking about governance uh in particular in the context of uh financial institutions and Banks and
- we're trying to apply some of what we learned from this paper and and other papers in the literature uh in the
- context of of Banks and financial institutions in particular um that raises some interesting issues such as
- financial institutions uh have an inherent level of of complication complexity uh that that most other
- organizations don't have so uh from an accounting perspective their financial statements tend to be longer a lot more
- is disclosed in the footnotes so there's a lot more information uh the information processing demands are uh uh
- presumably much higher in that setting so uh that raises the question well how do independent directors uh acquire
- process this information in inherently complex uh potentially opaque institution uh in the financial
- institutions uh setting there's also the Regulators uh who play a very important
- role and to some extent can substitute for uh some of these other governance mechanisms so it's another another set
- of eyes on management and uh they have informational demands as well and thinking about how those are going to
- get resolved becomes very important and just putting in a little bit more context and in the wake of the financial
- crisis certainly one of the the issues of the concerns were that managers were up to certain things taking certain
- risks that shareholders and the board was not was not aware of and so there was a concern that that the information
- of transparency wasn't n there between what managers were up to and what the board and what shareholders knew and so
- the the bank Regulators have sort of tried to to move forward on that and see what they can do about it so this work
- Chris was talking about uh We've brought in a co-author that's uh that that works
- with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York um and so this paper will be published with with him as a co-author
- and there we do focus on specific issues that Banks face uh that are unique to Banks and and trying to move forward on
- on increasing transparency between the board of directors and shareholders and potentially even regulators and and
- [Music] managers
Brief Summary
This episode covers corporate governance, focusing on independent directors, information transparency, and regulatory impacts on board structures.
Key points
- The Role of Independent Directors. Independent directors act as watchdogs for management, but they face unique challenges.
- Information Transparency and Governance. The relationship between board structure and information transparency is complex and dynamic.
- Regulatory Changes Impacting Governance. Recent regulations require a majority of independent directors on boards, affecting governance dynamics.
- Increasing Transparency in Banking. A new paper aims to enhance transparency between banks, boards, and shareholders.
Episode highlights
- The Role of Independent DirectorsIndependent directors act as watchdogs for management, but they face unique challenges.“Independent directors need to be well informed to monitor effectively.”0:33Jun 17, 2015
- Information Transparency and GovernanceThe relationship between board structure and information transparency is complex and dynamic.“Trying to force independent directors onto opaque firms may not work.”5:56Jun 17, 2015
- Regulatory Changes Impacting GovernanceRecent regulations require a majority of independent directors on boards, affecting governance dynamics.“The regulation forced firms to shift their board structures dramatically.”7:53Jun 17, 2015
- Increasing Transparency in BankingA new paper aims to enhance transparency between banks, boards, and shareholders.“This work focuses on increasing transparency between the board of directors and shareholders.”20:11Jun 17, 2015
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