Can Independent Directors Remain Independent?

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In the realm of corporate governance, recent research has confirmed a finding that should instinctively make sense: When a company’s board has a higher proportion of independent directors, the company itself behaves in a more transparent way. 📂 Management 🏷️ Research

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  1. the research focuses on the board of directors as being a a Cornerstone a focal point of of good corporate
  2. governance and when I say that I mean that that the shareholders of a of a corporation are going to appoint a board
  3. of directors that then gets involved in the Strategic decision making and the monitoring of management to make sure
  4. managers are doing uh what shareholders would like them to do um and many of these uh these individuals on the board
  5. of directors are independent directors meaning they're independent of management so they can act as sort of a
  6. a watchdog or a monitor of managers but the tricky part there is to make sure those Outsiders um those independent
  7. directors are well informed about what's going on at the firm these are busy individuals with typically high-profile
  8. jobs they're only spending four five or six days a year involved with the company and so it's a critical issue as
  9. to how you make sure they have the inform information uh that they need to to Monitor and advise managers and so in
  10. this paper we focus on um how do firms how does management how does the board of directors uh take actions uh to
  11. ensure and have a degree of comfort that they're getting good information that they can use to to to make good
  12. decisions uh the key takeaways from our this particular research project are to realize the interconnection between
  13. information and uh monitors and decision makers that those two really need to go
  14. together and that to have a certain type of director in place uh that requires a
  15. certain type of information uh environment or certain uh level of transparency uh so the big tension or
  16. tradeoff when looking at a board of directors is between independent and inside directors inside directors are
  17. affiliated with the firm they're more involved on a day-to-day basis they have a lot more background information uh so
  18. they're not going to be as uh reliant on external information sources uh as an independent director uh is is only going
  19. to be there uh five six days a year typically uh so they need to information source that can get them informed up to
  20. speed quickly to facilitate uh their decision- making making sure they're asking the right questions uh things
  21. like that so the independent director is Al also needs to think about uh their own
  22. personal reputation and the risks that they face so one of the the biggest costs of being an independent director
  23. is yes you have to put in some time but you're concerned that if something goes bad you're going to be blamed for it and
  24. you could be litigated against you could be sued uh and it could severely damage
  25. your reputation so those independent directors are only going to want to sit on a board where they feel that they're
  26. going to be getting good information so they're appointed from the outside if you if you thought about picking up a
  27. set of financial statements and just using the public information that's available about a firm I don't think any
  28. of us would feel like we could make strategic decisions for that company just by looking at their their SEC
  29. filings you need a much deeper richer set of information so those outside directors come in and they have to get
  30. themselves up to speed so they are typically interviewed by management they're interviewed by the existing
  31. board of directors uh and then once they sit on the board they have regular meetings with managers managers present
  32. budgets managers present ideas managers present lots of things um and that certainly is a very important sort of
  33. Channel by which information would get conveyed to the directors but again in in Most states of
  34. the world in most situations that might be perfectly reasonable place for directors to get information but where
  35. they're concerned is and we've seen lots of cases where managers get up to some Financial Shenanigans or some Earnings
  36. management or doing things that they shouldn't be doing in those in those very important settings in the the very
  37. settings where you'd like to get the best information managers are not going to give you that information so your
  38. channel for getting information about things that the managers don't want you to know pretty much get get shut down
  39. and so the Board needs to then figure out well how do I ensure that the the the tires have been kicked properly if
  40. you will and so there's lots of people that are looking at the firm analysts are looking at the firm Auditors are
  41. looking at the firm Regulators are looking at the firm creditors are looking at the firm Supply ERS uh
  42. employees there's lots of different part institutional shareholders it might be some hedge funds or private Equity that
  43. has a a large share of block holders that have investment so all of those individuals and institutions are kicking
  44. the tires if you will and so the board wants to make sure that you have enough of those other people out there kicking
  45. the tires that they can potentially Fair it out things or figure out things um that the board members just either don't
  46. have the time or the information or simply can't can't do themselves and so it's a very complicated information
  47. environment but uh the key issu is to remember that the the most the you know the things you care most most about as a
  48. director if you're trying to do some monitoring is making sure you get information when managers are least
  49. likely to want to give it to you I think what surprised the maybe I know sort of surprised us but but you
  50. know one of the the interesting facts that that we observe in the paper is that uh the relation between information
  51. and the structure of boards goes goes in both directions and specifically what I
  52. mean by that is that uh trying to force Upon A firm more independent outside directors when that firm uh is is po
  53. informationally opaque or if that firm has difficulty communicating information to outside directors trying to force
  54. outside directors into that firm may not work those directors simply may not be able to get the information they need to
  55. do a good job at the same time we also find that there is some element of when you do Force independent directors onto
  56. a board they do try to take actions to get better information and so it's this very complex and dynamic information
  57. structure where uh the directors have some ability to to force the firm to become more transparent but at the same
  58. time going too far and trying to have too many of the directors independent uh can sometimes uh cause informational
  59. problems where those directors simply aren't able to get all the information they need to give you a little bit of
  60. background uh about the the study um without getting too technical we we use a uh certain regulation that
  61. the uh stock exchanges the listing exchanges uh put in place it required companies to have a certain uh
  62. proportion of independent directors um um so before getting into the analysis the question we asked ourselves is why
  63. did the companies have uh the board structure that they did to begin with so where where are they moving from and uh
  64. I think that helps uh helps understand our our Point thinking about it from that
  65. perspective so the the basic idea behind the paper the methodology was to um observe a there a regulation that was
  66. passed in the early 2000s um some of was related to the the exchanges the major stock exchanges and they required uh a
  67. majority of the board of directors to be comprised of independent directors um before that there were lots of boards
  68. that were dominated by inside directors and and this new regulation forced uh a majority to be Outsider independent
  69. directors and so when that happened uh firms had to shift their board structures dramatically so it's this
  70. exogenous shock this regulation that forced these firms to add more independent directors and then we
  71. observe well how do firms react to that um do they struggle to get the information in the hands of those new
  72. independent directors so if if prior to the regulation you had say eight inside directors and two independent directors
  73. and after that you had seven outside directors or independent directors and only three or four inside directors
  74. somehow you have to get those outside directors up to speed uh on information so we look at um do firms change the
  75. financial reporting quality do firms uh use the auditing process in a different way do firms uh uh disclose more public
  76. information in the form of management forecasts or analyst forecasts so you know does does the firm take actions uh
  77. that would potentially get better information in the hands of directors Beyond just the internal information
  78. that the directors will get from managers so simply asking managers to give us good information is often not
  79. good enough or not a credible information Source right so the regulation provided the immediate
  80. consequence was these companies that didn't have a majority of independent directors had to get a majority and our
  81. papers focus on well what's the what's the second level of consequences once those independent directors are there
  82. perhaps even before uh while they're trying to uh attract and and get these independent directors how do they make
  83. changes to the information environment to accommodate uh this new board structure that's going to uh be in place
  84. after the regulations so the regulation is sort of like the first Domino that fell and then
  85. we're looking at uh subsequent consequences one of the common misperceptions in general with corporate
  86. governance is that there there are certain best practices that firms can use and I think the whole the notion of
  87. a a single best practice in corporate governance is is a is is a misnomer I don't think it really describes the way
  88. corporate governance works so what might be a good practice for one firm could be
  89. a disaster for another firm or very costly for another firm so uh and so we focus on Boards of directors and we make
  90. the point that that simply forcing a firm to have lots of outside directors is not necessarily a good thing if those
  91. outside directors are going to be making decisions in the dark so unless those outside directors are informed they're
  92. not going to be able to do a good job and you can to take that same idea and you can impose that on on virtually
  93. every other simple governance structure so another one that people often talk about are uh the CEO should not Al also
  94. be the chairman of the board that there should be a an independent chairman of the board the CEO and those two roles
  95. should be separate uh and there's extensive literature that shows that sometimes having the CEO be the chairman
  96. of the board is good and sometimes having the CEO be the chairman of the board is bad and you can go right down
  97. the list with you know staggered boards with executive compensation with with stock options and stock ownership and
  98. just about every component of governance and it's important to keep in mind that
  99. there simply is not one single best practice but it needs to be conditional on the firm's setting and that's the way
  100. people should think about it even beyond that just stopping to ask well why did why why are there differences in the
  101. first place before we start trying to push everyone to the the same direction and thinking about what gave rise to why
  102. do some companies already have a majority independent directors While others don't well it could be the ones
  103. that don't are engaged in a lot of research and development a lot of uh proprietary information that would be
  104. difficult to credibly communicate to Independent directors or maybe they don't want to for proprietary reasons
  105. and it makes sense for that company to have a majority of uh of uh non-independent
  106. directors uh well one practical implication is where do the uh independent directors get the
  107. information inform that they're using and uh we use a variety of different measures that are relatively common in
  108. the corporate finance uh literature uh we look at analyst forecast we look at management forecast and management is
  109. often uh an information Source in terms of the uh frequency with which they issue forecast or the Precision uh we
  110. look at uh evidence from from uh stock market trades we also look at uh some accounting measures uh there in terms of
  111. audited Financial reports so those are all uh different pieces that go into the information mix that uh directors and
  112. especially uh independent directors draw on for uh when they're making their decisions and what that means from from
  113. the corporation's perspective is that if the corporation is trying to put in some
  114. changes with respect to governance so if they're thinking about changing their board structure they're thinking about
  115. adding new directors to the board they need to be cognizant of these informational issues so they need to
  116. give some thought as to how are we going to make sure that those busy people that
  117. are only that have have a limited amount of time to spend with us are making good
  118. decisions and it's in the firm's best it's in Management's best interest to make sure that the board is informed
  119. because otherwise they're imposing their voting and imposing their power over management uh without the information to
  120. sort of move the firm in the right direction so it's sort of uh the research I think says something about
  121. what what firms should be thinking about when they're making these changes to corporate governance and I think it also
  122. could potentially guide Regulators so to the extent that Regulators are going to
  123. make changes and they've been making a lot of changes to corporate governance over the last 10 or 15 years in the last
  124. 10 or 15 years The Regulators have decided that uh the majority of every Board of Public board of directors will
  125. be comprised of a majority of independent directors the audit committee needs to be 100% independent
  126. directors the compensation committee needs to be 100% independent directors the nominating committee for nominating
  127. board members needs to be made uh comprised of 100% independent directors so The Regulators have been over the
  128. last 10 or 15 years imposing more and more cost risk time uh on these independent directors and so more and
  129. more of the decision making in public corporations is is in the hands of independent directors and that's only
  130. going to work uh if those independent directors have the information that they need so The Regulators need to be
  131. cognizant of that as well uh when they're when they're imposing govern governance standards another regulatory
  132. uh aspect that we uh I would say take as a given in our paper is there there have
  133. also been uh regulatory changes over the last 15 years uh with respect to uh what's disclosed about governance and
  134. what I have in mind is in particular is the compensation disclosures have gotten
  135. a lot uh a lot more uh a lot better and a lot more transparent over the last 15 years
  136. so now we can uh we as researchers and presumably shareholders analysts Regulators have a lot more information
  137. about what the compensation package of the CEO and the top Executives looks like for example uh so there um to the
  138. extent that these other uh these other uh economic actors are also doing some of the monitoring that information uh is
  139. potentially facilitating uh their decision making and their their monitoring one thing we were talking
  140. about uh ahead of time uh in terms of a topic that's in the news is uh shareholder voting has uh gotten a lot
  141. of attention in the business press lately uh one uh specific examples SE un pay voting uh so where the companies
  142. have to put the CEOs uh compensation package to a shareholder vote once every three years um in the US it's a
  143. non-binding vote uh but it is a way for shareholders to to express their sentiment about the compensation package
  144. um but that's symptomatic of what what seems to be a push towards more uh more shareholder empowerment uh in
  145. terms of governance giving shareholders more voting and in light of our research
  146. that raises a question well uh just like independent directors we need to think about where are they getting their
  147. information when you're talking about dispersed shareholders who have uh potentially smaller Stakes uh less of an
  148. incentive to monitor uh where are they getting their information how are they going to be processing it so that's
  149. something that needs to be kept in mind if you're going to if Regulators for example are going to push for uh uh more
  150. shareholder empowerment the reason the paper made a contribution to the academic literature
  151. in this area um was it built on prior literature that essentially argued that um that the information environment that
  152. the firm was was wrapped up in was was essentially fixed or exogenous to the firm and and the prior literature argued
  153. that there was really very little that the firm or the board could do to alter the the amount of
  154. transparency uh that that might be uh there with with the firm between the board and the firm um and so what that
  155. literature argued is that uh in firms that aren't very transparent they simply can't have a lot of independent
  156. directors and in firms that are fairly transparent they can now that literature is primarily in in an um now coming at
  157. it from an accounting perspective there's a lot of accounting literature that focuses uh very closely on how
  158. firms can make financial reporting decisions and and alter the auditing process to make the firm more
  159. transparent when it when it's not and so our research took the perspective of well we think that uh it is possible for
  160. the board of directors to step in and actually make some changes for management to make some changes that
  161. could actually facilitate more indep dependent directors and so I think I made the point earlier that kind of goes
  162. in both directions the the information environment dictates the the the proper governance structure that be put in
  163. place in terms of board Independence but board Independence likewise can influence the information environment
  164. and so the two things uh tend to work together move together we're working on a a survey
  165. paper talking about governance uh in particular in the context of uh financial institutions and Banks and
  166. we're trying to apply some of what we learned from this paper and and other papers in the literature uh in the
  167. context of of Banks and financial institutions in particular um that raises some interesting issues such as
  168. financial institutions uh have an inherent level of of complication complexity uh that that most other
  169. organizations don't have so uh from an accounting perspective their financial statements tend to be longer a lot more
  170. is disclosed in the footnotes so there's a lot more information uh the information processing demands are uh uh
  171. presumably much higher in that setting so uh that raises the question well how do independent directors uh acquire
  172. process this information in inherently complex uh potentially opaque institution uh in the financial
  173. institutions uh setting there's also the Regulators uh who play a very important
  174. role and to some extent can substitute for uh some of these other governance mechanisms so it's another another set
  175. of eyes on management and uh they have informational demands as well and thinking about how those are going to
  176. get resolved becomes very important and just putting in a little bit more context and in the wake of the financial
  177. crisis certainly one of the the issues of the concerns were that managers were up to certain things taking certain
  178. risks that shareholders and the board was not was not aware of and so there was a concern that that the information
  179. of transparency wasn't n there between what managers were up to and what the board and what shareholders knew and so
  180. the the bank Regulators have sort of tried to to move forward on that and see what they can do about it so this work
  181. Chris was talking about uh We've brought in a co-author that's uh that that works
  182. with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York um and so this paper will be published with with him as a co-author
  183. and there we do focus on specific issues that Banks face uh that are unique to Banks and and trying to move forward on
  184. on increasing transparency between the board of directors and shareholders and potentially even regulators and and
  185. [Music] managers

Brief Summary

This episode covers corporate governance, focusing on independent directors, information transparency, and regulatory impacts on board structures.

Key points

  • The Role of Independent Directors. Independent directors act as watchdogs for management, but they face unique challenges.
  • Information Transparency and Governance. The relationship between board structure and information transparency is complex and dynamic.
  • Regulatory Changes Impacting Governance. Recent regulations require a majority of independent directors on boards, affecting governance dynamics.
  • Increasing Transparency in Banking. A new paper aims to enhance transparency between banks, boards, and shareholders.

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