How to Regulate Innovation -- Without Killing It

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Regulations don’t always evolve as quickly as technological change — at least that’s the perception. So what should policy makers and regulators do? More: http://knlg.net/2jLJ4ez 📂 Innovation 🏷️ Research

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  1. Digital innovation is giving rise to new business models. Uber and Airbnb are household names today when not so long
  2. ago we were all learning about the sharing economy. But regulations don't always evolve as quickly as uh technolog
  3. technological change at least that's a perception. Uh so what should policymakers and regulators do? Here to
  4. talk about some his some of his insights is uh Wharton professor Kevin Warbach. He recently wrote a policy brief for the
  5. pen Wharton policy public policy initiative. Uh welcome Kevin. Thanks. Glad to be here. So in your article you
  6. mentioned something called the internet of the world. Can you tell us what that is? Well I think there's something big
  7. going on and it's it's a bigger trend than most people realize. There are three trends that each in of themselves
  8. is significant. One is uh what we often call the sharing economy. I think it's really more the ondemand economy. It's
  9. not just about sharing resources, but services like you mentioned like Uber and Airbnb which give ondemand access to
  10. resources. The second piece is the internet of things, all kinds of devices, billions and billions of
  11. devices gettingororked. And the third is big data and analytics, the ability to understand and manipulate trends coming
  12. out of all those devices. What those three things together mean is that all of the world potentially isworked. It's
  13. not just that you go somewhere to a computer, you go to your phone to get access to information. It's that
  14. potentially everything is a generator of data and all that data can be integrated
  15. and analyzed and processed and manipulated. Um, and so what that means is the kinds of trends and the kinds of
  16. developments that we saw online are now happening offline. they're happening to things and physical objects in the world
  17. as well. You also point out that the scale of ondemand services is potentially much greater than the legacy
  18. industries they challenge. How so? So there's this uh kind of cheap talk about new technologies disrupting old
  19. technologies. And actually the theory of disruptive innovation which goes back to
  20. Clayton Christensen at Harvard Business School is a a serious academic theory. Uh but far too often people in business
  21. and entrepreneurship and the media kind of use the word disruption as just kind of a synonym for new technology. And the
  22. reality is it's not that you have one market and suddenly a bunch of new companies come in and replace that
  23. market. Often what happens and this is what we're seeing with things like ondemand economy is that the new markets
  24. are different. So it's not that Uber takes the taxi market and every taxi gets replaced by an Uber driver. Uh in
  25. fact Uber has put out some numbers for the past several years that show that the scale of the market they are tapping
  26. into is actually much bigger. So they generate far more revenue in the cities where they are mature than the taxi
  27. industry as a whole does. So what that means is it's not just a competitive threat and certainly it is a competitive
  28. threat to the incumbent industries but it's creating something new. It's unlocking latent demand that the
  29. previous approaches didn't reach. You also say that um you also pointed out that throughout the different techn
  30. technological waves since the 1990s we went through e-commerce, social media, now mobile that regulations have always
  31. been seen as an enemy of innovation. But you say that this digital dichotomy is actually misunderstood. Can you explain
  32. that? Sure. So there's two pieces to it. One is the term that you reference that
  33. I use in the paper called the digital dichconomy. That is a misunderstanding that the online world is inherently
  34. different from the offline world. Uh and the reason that's not true is what I said at the beginning. Um increasingly
  35. there is no difference even if you're using a physical thing. So take the Uber example and it's such a perfect example.
  36. Uh the per there's a person there's a physical person driving a physical car but from your standpoint running the app
  37. and pushing a button and saying make a car appear. It's as though that's something that's in cyerspace. It's as
  38. though it's something digital. an extension of the software infrastructure of Uber. Uh even though it's a physical
  39. thing, a physical person driving a physical car. Um and so we tend to assume that there's one set of rules for
  40. the real world, there's one set of rules for the digital world. And that's a mistake because increasingly there is
  41. just the world. Software, technology, networks, all these trends in what I call the internet of the world are
  42. affecting everything. So that's the first piece. the assumption that uh we can just ignore the rules of the
  43. physical world because we need totally new rules for the digital world. Um the larger issue though uh is this question
  44. of innovation and regulation and again there's this common assumption that innovation needs to thrive with no
  45. regulation and anytime government gets involved that's a check and a drain and a block on innovation and that's not
  46. really the case and what I talk about in the article you referenced uh and the larger larvy article it's based on is
  47. that if you go and look at the history uh how the internet developed how electronic commerce developed in the
  48. 1990s A surprising amount of the time it was government action actually facilitating
  49. innovation and uh the emerging startups actually pushing for that government innovation to help create a more
  50. innovative marketplace. That's an interesting point and uh in your article you also pointed to uh one challenge for
  51. regulators and that is um a lot of these new startups don't really fit neatly into industry categories. So uh and the
  52. example you pull up you use is uh Uber versus Skype. Can you go through that example? Sure. So I should be clear.
  53. It's not that regulators always get it right. They make mistakes and they have lots of flaws and lots of reasons why
  54. they act in a certain way. Uh and we should definitely criticize bad regulations. Um we just shouldn't assume
  55. necessarily that they are bad and necessarily what what startups do is good. Um the Skype and Uber comparison
  56. is basically that both of them were companies that when they started were illegal in most jurisdictions. So Skype
  57. which is the very popular internet communication service originally voice calling now also video and messaging and
  58. so forth eventually now owned by Microsoft. Uh Skype was illegal in most of the world when it launched because
  59. there were rules saying you could not do a communication service, a telephone service outside of the existing
  60. regulatory infrastructure in the US because of what we did. I was at the Federal Communications Commission in the
  61. 1990s when we had to think about voiceover IP. We very deliberately left open the door. Even though things like
  62. Skype were outside of the regulatory structure, we made a conscious decision to allow them to develop. And that's an
  63. example where regulators consciously deciding not to impose a whole set of rules early on when these were nent
  64. technologies allow them to grow. Um so Uber is similar. Uber is illegal in most of the cities where it operates. Uh and
  65. the story of Skype I think is a hopeful story because what happened with Skype is that first of all you had regulators
  66. like the FCC in the US who understood that these new internet calling technologies were an opportunity. They
  67. were a way to lower prices and create better service and new service and innovation. Uh and so that we shouldn't
  68. rush to impose all the traditional rules on them. And then as these companies grew, they were able to work with
  69. regulators to address the rules that were necessary. So for example, it's a concern if you're using Skype or some
  70. other voiceover IP service. What if you want to call 911? What if you have an emergency? Um those services were all
  71. outside of the infrastructure of the emergency calling system. And that's a problem if you have your phone and which
  72. app you're using determines whether if you have an emergency you get through to the police or the fire department. Um
  73. that's a technical problem that was overcome through regulators working together with the companies. Um and it
  74. could only be done by a willingness to not immediately impose rules that would have shut these companies down on day
  75. one, but work through how they can actually help in addressing some of these concerns. And I think that's the
  76. path forward for companies like Uber and Airbnb as well. What we've started to see is they began with this very strong
  77. keep no regulation, keep it away from us. Uh, and gradually we're starting to see them recognize that they need to
  78. work together with the regulators. But don't you think there's one critical difference between Uber and Skype and
  79. that is, you know, with Uber there's the issue of safety of the users or the writers, but that's not the case with
  80. Skype. So the example I gave about the 911 service, the emergency, that's a safety issue. Um but no question uh all
  81. these companies are different. Uh and it's not the case that there's one set of rules, there's one regulator that
  82. applies to everything. Um I'm making the general point that these new services that spring up outside of the
  83. traditional regulatory structure. Um they raise public policy issues uh and you can't get away from that. So Uber
  84. raises a whole host of issues. It raises issues about worker treatment. It raises
  85. issues about safety of the people in the cars as you mentioned. raises issues about the Americans with Disabilities
  86. Act. Do they have to provide access for people in wheelchairs and so forth? All these issues. Um, and the way to address
  87. those issues is not to say it's new, so therefore regulators stay away, they'll figure it out. The way to address them
  88. is to say, okay, let's look at the issues. So, um, is there a way to address what we really care about in
  89. safety? What we care about is you don't want people to get into a car and someone be an axe murderer who's driving
  90. the car. All right. there's different ways that we can solve that problem and and maybe there are solutions and in
  91. fact Uber because they have all this data and they've got an app and they know everything about the driver maybe
  92. there's a better way they can solve that problem. Um so the way to work that through is to have that discussion and
  93. say identify what it is the regulators are trying to do and figure out how we can do that. The problem is initially so
  94. much of the reaction was the regulators are necessarily bad. um they have nothing to do but to stop the
  95. innovation. Uh and I think that's not a helpful conversation. Uh your point is that government can actually be a
  96. positive force in innovative markets. Can you give us more examples of that? Sure. So we saw a lot of examples with
  97. the growth of the internet and electronic commerce starting 20 years ago. Um one of them was the antitrust
  98. case against Microsoft. So Microsoft was the dominant company on the personal computer with the operating system
  99. market and lots of startup companies, companies like Netscape realized if they wanted to innovate, they wanted to build
  100. the internet economy as we know it today, you couldn't have Microsoft standing there using its power at the
  101. time. It's hard to realize today with what's happened, the growth of Apple and the growth of smartphones and so forth,
  102. just how much power Microsoft had as a bottleneck. Microsoft controlled access to the PC and the PC was the only game
  103. in town. Um, had it not been for that action by the government in filing that antitrust case, Microsoft may have been
  104. able to warp or slow down the growth of the open internet economy. And it turned
  105. out most of the startups were on the side of the government in that case wanting to open it up. Um, a similar
  106. more recent case is the fight over network neutrality rules where lots and lots of startup companies went to the
  107. Federal Communications Commission and said, "We don't want broadband providers, the access providers, the
  108. internet service providers or ISPs as they're called to stop us from getting into the market or to basically tax us
  109. to say, well, you can only get to customers if you pay us this special fee." Um and so they were actually
  110. urging government to act in order to create a more open market. Great. Um you also say that ondemand services would
  111. bring what you call algorithmic competition policy questions to the four. Why is this important? What do you
  112. mean by that? This is a really interesting issue. So competition policy, I gave the example of Microsoft
  113. um is tremendously important to the digital economy and uh the Microsoft case was an example where there was a
  114. new kind of uh business model. Microsoft was one of the first to build this platform network-based business model
  115. where Windows benefited from all the applications on top of Windows. uh but Windows would always want to uh ensure
  116. that none of those applications would then compete with it. Um and there was tremendous benefits of that model. You
  117. know, Microsoft did great things for innovation. Uh but uh the Microsoft case put a spotlight on some of the dangers
  118. and the downsides. What we're seeing now with these next generation platforms, these ondemand platforms is a new twist
  119. on that model. Um companies like Uber and Airbnb are built on algorithms. are built on software that understands
  120. supply and demand uh and matches people on both sides of the network. Um and again that's a tremendous boon for
  121. competition and innovation. I'm not saying it's bad by any means but it does put the platform owner in a position of
  122. unimaginable control. Um how do you know that what you are paying for that Uber ride is the efficient price? Uber says
  123. well by definition it's what the algorithm gives you. Well but who controls the algorithm? Um, and what
  124. stops the algorithm from colluding with someone else's algorithm uh behind the scenes to fix prices? And again, we have
  125. antitrust doctrines about things like price fixing, but those are based on people in a smokefield room saying,
  126. "Okay, you're going to charge this and I'm going to charge that and if you defect." Um, now it's all happening
  127. silently through software. Um, and so I think this is one of the great competition policy challenges of our age
  128. is how to prevent those kinds of mechanisms from uh raising costs and raising prices and hurting consumers
  129. while still allowing flexibility for companies to innovate and do things that most of the time actually wind up uh
  130. helping consumers. So that brings us to the point you made about algorithmic cartels. So how could
  131. those come about? Uh well so again uh the algorithms can talk to other algorithms and we see this um already
  132. you look at uh pricing on Amazon.com. So Amazon has this platform that allows anyone else to sell on Amazon.com and
  133. they can set their price and a lot of the companies that are sophisticated that do this uh set their prices
  134. algorithmically. So they might say Amazon is charging this price automatically charge 2% less than
  135. Amazon's price. So when it comes up they're the cheapest price. Um, but what happens is you get this increasingly
  136. complex uh war between the algorithms because they're all basing their prices on each other and so forth. And what can
  137. potentially happen is uh companies decide well no let's both agree we'll set a price higher as opposed to
  138. competing and a race to the bottom and we'll both be better off but who's worse off is consumers. So um that's a concern
  139. that we're starting to see on platforms like Amazon and it's more of a concern on these digital ondemand platforms
  140. where again everything is in software uh and where you have lots of different actors coming together um and uh we
  141. don't even know what the mechanism is to get access to the data to see if that's
  142. what's happening. So how do you regulate that? Uh well so it's a good question. The first is you start to have a
  143. conversation where the regulators say here's what we're trying to achieve and the companies say here's what we're
  144. doing and you figure out what's possible. Um ultimately as I said there needs to be access to the data. Uh and
  145. this is a great opportunity because these new platforms generate tremendous amounts of data. uh and if they uh and
  146. they use the data internally to be more efficient and to provide better service,
  147. but if they could provide more transparency of that data um that would give regulators the opportunity to
  148. identify what the market performance is and this can be done in a secure way in a way that doesn't uh harm them with
  149. competitors and so forth. um but it's actually making the regulation itself more algorithm making the regulation
  150. itself more datadriven which is a healthy and a good thing and so I think this is potentially the new model we're
  151. going to come to uh but it takes the company's willingness to work together and not to you know make these sort of
  152. great you know statements uh that oh we don't need any regulation so you mentioned alternatives to direct
  153. direct regulation which are self-regulation and what you call co-regul regulation and delegated
  154. regulation. Can you explain the differences among all those? Yeah, these are models that actually are used much
  155. more widely elsewhere in the world, especially in Europe for things like internet content. Um, and there's a
  156. whole variety of different models, but basically u they start with the notion that um companies individually and
  157. industry collectives and industry groups um potentially know the most about their
  158. market. uh and if they're well-meaning, they can come up with mechanisms that achieve the goals of regulators without
  159. government having to be intrusive and without government having to be inefficient. Um because regulatory
  160. agencies don't have the data and they're not set up to operate in that way. The problem is you need some accountability.
  161. So just saying let companies regulate themselves is meaningless because there's already always incentives for
  162. companies to cheat or to game the system or to basically help themselves at the expense of the public. Um but there's a
  163. variety of mechanisms where for example government sets goals and then gives industry or either individually or
  164. industry groups uh uh opportunities to meet it and then to report on how they're doing and again to provide
  165. transparency of the data. Um they're mechanisms that basically say all right in the first instance you have this
  166. opportunity to act but if you don't act in a way that we find appropriate then we're going to intervene. Um and uh
  167. again there's a variety of different variations on these mechanisms. Uh but it's an approach that says instead of
  168. everything starts with the regulator the regulator says yes or no before anything
  169. happens in the marketplace. It says, "All right, companies can come into the marketplace, especially new companies."
  170. Goes back to what I was saying before, nent small innovators, should have lots of running room. Uh because even a good
  171. rule will kill them off when they're too small. Um but that doesn't mean that when you've got an Uber, which is a $65
  172. billion company, it's one of the, you know, the largest companies in the world, even though it's not even public,
  173. and has hundreds of millions of uh people that it's serving around the world. They're not a small company. um
  174. they're fairly new, but but they're now a large player that's having big impacts. It doesn't make sense to say
  175. that that approach makes sense for them anymore. Um so the question is, can we allow them in and then have a process to
  176. then collaboratively have them work with government uh and have them be more transparent? And again, there's a
  177. variety of ways to do that. And I'm not arguing for any particular one as being perfect. I'm arguing for an openness and
  178. a recognition um that um regulation isn't a dirty word. Any final thoughts for policy makers and regulators?
  179. Um so regulators have to take action here too. It's not that they need to just stay where they are and expect the
  180. companies to come to them. Um often there's lots of legacy in regulation and some of it is regulators fault and some
  181. of it is the fault of for example the legislators that set up the rules. Um, a lot of what we're seeing in these
  182. markets is the need for legislative change, for um, governments to change the structure of the rules because the
  183. rules use terms that no longer make sense or they have categories that no longer make sense. Um, and so there
  184. needs to be a lot of dialogue between industry and regulators and legislators to say, all right, where are these
  185. glitches? Let's fix them. Um, and regulators need to be part of that and not to just assume that the status quo
  186. is the right approach. Um, regulators also need to be open. They need to go to these uh companies and say to them,
  187. "Okay, we have shared goals here. We're not here to put you out of business. Um,
  188. but we care about consumers and we trust that you do too. So, let's let's come up
  189. with a solution." Um, and so it really has to go both ways and and ultimately this is about trust. There needs to be a
  190. mutual process of generating trust between these industries and the regulators. Um, and in a lot of cases
  191. that's lacking, but I'm hopeful and I think the examples that we saw with the growth of the internet really are a
  192. story about um, good work on both sides uh, that facilitated this extraordinary explosion of innovation and wealth
  193. creation that we saw. That's very well said and thank you so much for joining us. Thanks. My pleasure.
  194. [Music]

Brief Summary

Kevin Warbach discusses digital innovation, regulatory challenges, and the evolving relationship between startups and government in the on-demand economy.

Key points

  • The Internet of the World. Kevin Warbach discusses the merging of online and offline worlds through technology.
  • Disruption Misunderstood. Warbach clarifies that disruption isn't just about new tech replacing old.
  • Regulation and Innovation. Warbach argues that regulation can facilitate innovation rather than hinder it.
  • Algorithmic Competition Policy. The rise of ondemand services brings new challenges for competition policy.
  • The Role of Regulation. Regulation is essential for innovation and trust between industries and regulators.
  • Building Trust. A mutual process of trust is crucial for collaboration between companies and regulators.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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