One on One with Neel Kashkari

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Episode Description

Last October, in the middle of the financial crisis, Congress approved a $700 billion bailout package to prevent major firms from going belly up. The government official in the eye of that storm was Neel Kashkari, a former investment banker from Goldman Sachs, who had followed his previous boss, Henry Paulson, into the Treasury department. Kashkari was responsible for building a team to oversee the bailout and also for deploying government aid to stabilize the financial system. How did the Treasury department work with the Federal Reserve to make the decisions it did? What kind of regulations should derivatives be subjected to in the future? In an exclusive interview at Wharton San Francisco with Knowledge@Wharton, Kashkari, who left the Treasury two weeks ago, discusses these issues and more. ๐Ÿ“‚ Finance & Accounting ๐Ÿท๏ธ Great Recession

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  1. our guest today is neel kashkari Neil thank you so much for joining us today it's my pleasure thanks for having me
  2. you have a background in aerospace engineering and after you finished your MBA at Wharton you joined goldman sachs
  3. i wonder if you could we could start by talking a little bit about what you did at goldman sachs and what really
  4. attracted you to public service sure as an engineer I really enjoyed technology development and I went to Wharton to try
  5. to find a way to learn about business and marry my technology skills with business and I was a technology
  6. investment banker at Goldman in San Francisco advising tech companies on mergers and acquisitions and financings
  7. such as I POS for as long as I can remember I've had an interest in government and I had been at Goldman for
  8. four years and getting to go with henry paulson to the treasury department was a
  9. once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and i jumped at it as soon as i had the chance now when you giant henry paulson at
  10. Treasury what was their expectation about what was your job going to be and when did it and how did it become
  11. apparent that basically what you were being called upon to do was to arrest the meltdown of the US financial system
  12. you know for the I didn't know what my job would be I came in as senior adviser to secretary Paulson to work on a
  13. variety of policy issues the first year I was there I spent a lot of my time on energy policy developing a new
  14. alternative energy program to encourage the development of alternative energies to replace oil I did work with him on
  15. India increasing Treasuries economic engagement with India it was after about a year in august of 2007 that he asked
  16. me to lead the Treasury Department's work on the housing market we were beginning to see real strain in the
  17. housing market especially in subprime and as the chief government official in charge of the economy he wanted to make
  18. sure that Treasury had a strong view on housing and so that's where I first started getting involved in the credit
  19. crisis and that then later evolved and developed into my role on financial stability and ultimately the tarp help
  20. you understand since you had such an insider's view of the whole process but as different signs of the economic
  21. crisis became a pan and large institutions began to face problems how is the decision-making
  22. process within Treasury and the Fed managed and how did you develop your strategic response to these situations
  23. there was very very close collaboration between Treasury in the Fed between secretary Paulson Chairman Bernanke and
  24. then New York Fed President Geithner I would call us co-equal partners where we were literally looking at every tool
  25. available and trying to figure out what would be the right policy response for the country not looking at it from a
  26. Treasury perspective or a Fed perspective and I think that that collaboration and that trust was
  27. absolutely essential as the crisis progressed our tactic shifted you know we started out pushing the private
  28. sector to raise capital and to recognize losses hoping that the private sector could adjust and deal with the housing
  29. correction on its own at some point it became apparent that it couldn't and when we realized that risk we began
  30. contingency planning treasuring the Fed together on what we would do if the prime if the government had to step in
  31. to stabilize the private sector how for example where decisions made about whether an institution should be allowed
  32. to fail or whether it needed a rescue I see ultimately that was the combined judgments of Treasury and the Fed
  33. secretary Paulson Chairman Bernanke then president Geithner at the New York Fed there was no one test that we looked at
  34. it was a combination of understanding that institution understanding how connected that institution was to other
  35. institutions what stresses and strains were in the credit markets in the financial markets what was the state of
  36. the economy if you look at Bear Stearns as an example it is very possible that if Bear Stearns had run into similar
  37. trouble two or three years ago it may have been allowed to fail but given the state of the credit markets and the
  38. broader economy the decision was made that we needed to step in to prevent a collapse and arrange the merger with
  39. JPMorgan and so there's no one metric I can point to ultimately it's the combined judgment of Treasury in the Fed
  40. that made those decisions now did you have any debates for unissued say for example like moral hazard and
  41. how did how did you arrive at consensus and what did that experience teach you about making decisions under pressure
  42. sure we talked about moral hazard all the time from the earliest days of the credit crisis and it's known publicly
  43. that you know we offered a perspective that if the government had to step in to help stabilize Bear Stearns that the
  44. barrister and shareholder should not be rewarded for that specifically because of the moral hazard issue so something
  45. that we've been aware of the entire time at the end of the day though the test was is the cost of action more or less
  46. than the cost of inaction and when the cost of inaction is potentially so damaging to our economy and to every
  47. American citizen then it's an easy decision to make even if it's an unpleasant decision to make in terms of
  48. making decisions under pressure I learned a lot about myself and my ability to build a team and lead a team
  49. under excruciating pressure and get that team to perform but at the end of the day let's not forget secretary Paulson
  50. was driving this was making the ultimate decisions on our big strategic moves and
  51. you know he handles pressure well and he drove us and steered us in the right direction and working closely with
  52. Chairman Bernanke ultimately made the tough calls when we had to make the tough calls in October Congress approved
  53. the 700 billion bailout package and and then you had to head the office for financial stability did you have a team
  54. in place at that time that could do what needed to be done how did you go about building that team not at all you know
  55. Treasury is a policy department so year in year out what treasure is good at is writing papers writing proposals doing
  56. analysis of policy options we had to build an investing function to be able to deploy seven hundred billion dollars
  57. in a very short period of time in very complex investments so we had to build that from scratch and that was although
  58. I was very involved in the policy making my primary responsibility was building the team recruiting the team and
  59. executing so we started out by recruiting the very best senior government officials we could from
  60. around the government and we drafted them and said we need you here tomorrow and we were
  61. able to recruit the very best room across the government I would call it bringing on board the best athletes we
  62. could find regardless of what their specific skillset was each of those folks was charged then with building out
  63. their specific operations let's say the CFO function or the investing function or the compliance function getting our
  64. operations going and then finding and hiring their replacement so we drafted great professionals very experienced
  65. people people who are much more experienced than I am to come in and run different parts of this with me setting
  66. the direction for the team and then building the operation hiring their successors that worked extremely well by
  67. the time I left two weeks ago after seven months we'd hired about 135 people who all of whom were non-political it
  68. was very important for me that we'd be able to hand a new administration a fully functioning office of financial
  69. stability and that meant I didn't want political appointees I wanted the very best career professionals from
  70. government from the private sector so that the new administration would get a fully staffed office and we achieved
  71. that so clearly that that's that goes to the heart of the toughest part of your job I would imagine what would you see
  72. the main challenges and how did you overcome them well honestly the toughest part we recruited wonderful people who
  73. were committed to doing whatever they could to try to help us implement our program successfully and they were not
  74. interested in credit or money or glory it was just about doing the right thing for the country so that was not the
  75. hardest part that took a lot of effort but it was solvable because we had wonderful people who are committed to
  76. this the hardest part was communicating the very complex issues that we're dealing with you know the vast majority
  77. of Americans had nothing to do with creating this crisis they didn't buy homes they couldn't afford or make risky
  78. investments yet because the credit crisis has triggered the recession it affects every single American family so
  79. everyone is suffering because of this and trying to explain to the American people why we have to step in to
  80. stabilize an institution that made bad decisions with the money of the American people is extremely complex and our
  81. programs are so complex we've really struggled with that communication challenge that's been the hardest part
  82. of this you know it that's very interesting and it's absolutely true i would guess that
  83. the pr challenge was probably the hardest one in fact i saw in the washington post did recently described
  84. you as the sponge for congressional anger in terms of coming up with your own communication strategy did you
  85. consciously choose not to have too many press conferences and so forth or was it
  86. did you weigh the pros and cons between having a high communication strategy in a low communication strategy how do you
  87. think about that I focused on I didn't do any television interviews until I left Treasury and even since I've only
  88. done one with Charlie Rose and now this interview I was focused on getting as much information out to the people and
  89. to the markets as possible so I focus my own personal communications on major speeches that I gave once every couple
  90. weeks and then testimony when I testified before Congress I testified five or six times on average four to
  91. five hours each time and if you would go back and read my speeches of my testimony it was very detailed because
  92. in a crisis in my experience people want information they want to know what we're
  93. doing the details of what we're doing why we're doing it and so I tried to provide as much detail as possible in
  94. hindsight I don't know if that was the right answer because while I was providing tremendous details on what we
  95. were doing we were still struggling to get some of our broader messages out to the general population in terms of why
  96. we're tapping to take this action and what the consequences are if we don't take this action if I could do it again
  97. I'm a change my communication strategy and in fact focus less on details because and more on the broader messages
  98. many experts were asking us for details and I think a lot of my communication was focused on meeting their needs
  99. rather than needing some of the broader needs of why we're taking these actions I think that that that's very very
  100. interesting how did you formulate your bailout strategy for tarp the specifically and again this goes to the
  101. communication issue how would you how did you respond to critics who may have charged that form of Wall Street
  102. insiders were using billions of dollars taxpayer money to rescue greedy or incompetent you know Wall Streeters
  103. again every action that we took was taken to try to minimize damage to our economy for the American people not
  104. about Wall Street not about bankers that's the lens through which we look through everything we have finite
  105. resources seven hundred billion dollars is a tremendous amount of money but it's
  106. a finite amount of money and we receive I personally received phone calls from homeowners from mayor's from governor's
  107. from business leaders around the country talking about the stress and strain they
  108. feel because of the credit crisis if we went out to everybody individually who needed help the money wouldn't go far
  109. enough wouldn't come close so we tried to focus our resources on the parts of the financial system that would provide
  110. the most bang for the buck if we could stabilize the system as a whole then credit would flow out to all the
  111. individuals the businesses in the cities that need it so we were always evaluating where are we going to get the
  112. maximum benefit given our finite resources and we were using every tool in the federal government's arsenal to
  113. try to solve this problem so we also wanted to use the right tool for the right job you know the Fed can lend
  114. money and so there's no reason that we should use the tarp as a lending facility if the Fed can do that so again
  115. the tarp was the only facility in the federal government's arsenal that could inject equity or fundamentally take a
  116. risk in our financial system you know when the Fed lends money they need to be secured so they're not taking much risk
  117. because the private sector was unwilling to take risk we needed to take risk in the financial sector now how do you
  118. think the situation might play out in the future because as I understand it the banks that have these toxic assets
  119. will no longer be required to mark them to market how do you think these toxic toxic assets will get absorbed well I
  120. don't think that's true i think that the account fazli has made some changes on how mark to market is interpreted I
  121. think that it's too strong a statement to say they will not have to mark them to market okay i think that the
  122. practical implication of that is unclear at this point because it depends on how
  123. the accountants and the company's interpret some of these faz be rules I think that we're seeing the actions we
  124. took in the fall putting in capital in the bank's fundamentally stabilize the system when we were facing financial
  125. collapse now the focus is on getting lending out to consumers and businesses to minimize damage to our economy
  126. secretary Geithner has announced a public-private partnership to combine private sector resources with government
  127. resources to go after some of these assets and I'm optimistic that that program will help restart these markets
  128. it's not a silver bullet and buy itself will not solve all problems but I think it's one important complementary tool
  129. well you have a very unique perspective because you were on Wall Street Goldman Sachs before but you also were at
  130. government how has your view of some of these exotic financial products changed and we see like credit default swaps for
  131. example they seem to create the impression that they transfer risk but in practice sometimes they almost appear
  132. to make risk invisible do you think that we really need products like these exotic financial products I think
  133. financial innovation has served our economy very well over the years and I think clearly it got ahead of itself in
  134. recent years and I wouldn't point to the CD s market necessarily i would point to
  135. things like CDOs or CDO squared where people thought that they were reducing distributing risks when they really
  136. weren't i think that financial innovation is important but we need to really understand the products
  137. understand how they can behave in unexpected ways i mean a fundamental assumption behind almost all the
  138. analysis that was done by the by the rating agencies by the banks by hedge funds by the investors was that home
  139. prices can only go up if all of your models are built on that assumption and that assumption proves to be false no
  140. financial product will work the way it was intended and so I think that we all can do better in terms of understanding
  141. risks and testing those risks and some of those financial products will never come back again we may never see a CDO
  142. squared again and maybe that's a good thing but I don't think we should throw out all financial innovation our country
  143. has really benefited from it that's that's it that's absolutely true and not moves that are foot to standardize
  144. derivatives so they can be traded on exchanges backward collateral and so forth is
  145. there any downside to this any of you to be did we ever really need the high degree of customization that
  146. characterize these markets I don't know enough to know for certain I mean I can see the benefits of customization if you
  147. are an institution not necessarily a bank an industrial company with a specific risk that you're trying to
  148. hedge it seems rational to me that there may not be a standard product and then if you can find someone to do a contract
  149. with that it makes sense in both cases nonetheless I think that more standardization is a good thing more
  150. transparency more disclosure is a good thing I think for all of us we clearly need to make regulatory changes my hope
  151. is that we do not rush and try to make too many changes in the middle of the crisis we need to put the fire out get
  152. the crisis behind us with the benefit of hindsight then take a deep breath and look at what changes we need to make so
  153. that we make rational changes going forward what lessons did your experience teach you about government and Wall
  154. Street and also what what did lyrics lessons did you learn about yourself you know when I was in the private sector I
  155. foolishly had the perspective the people in government don't work hard and let me
  156. tell you something there are people who have been working night and day career people again not for glory or for pay or
  157. for-profit just to try to serve their country and do their best to help the economy working night and day and
  158. Treasury and the Federal Reserve in the regulators and I have tremendous respect
  159. for those folks that I didn't appreciate when I was in the private sector they work every bit as hard or harder than
  160. people on Wall Street without the glory or the pay so that was an important humbling lesson for me when I came in
  161. and had the privilege of working alongside them in terms of learning about myself I feel incredibly blessed
  162. to have had this experience to get to serve at this important time in our history I hope that in the future I have
  163. the chance in ten years to come back to government to serve again I learned a lot about myself and my ability to
  164. handle pressure and to try to build a team and motivate people to perform under exclusive
  165. getting scrutiny and excruciating pressure and I'm proud of what we accomplished and I'm proud of the team
  166. that I left behind that are now continuing our programs just one final question what advice would you give to
  167. CEOs about working with the government and should business schools start teaching MBA is more about government
  168. relations the latter question I think definitely I think that careers in government can be incredibly rewarding
  169. and I think that business schools preparing their graduates for potential careers and government will not only
  170. help those who go into government I think it will help those who go into the private sector who later have to do
  171. business with the government better understanding between both sectors I think will be helpful what was the first
  172. part of your question what advice would you give CEO is about looking with the government I think in this time the
  173. private sector should over communicate to the public sector don't assume that in government we're hearing all the
  174. messages from the private sector all of the perspectives i would say pick up the
  175. phone call you don't have to call the secretary call the staff make sure your voice is heard so the government has the
  176. benefit of the best information we can get from the private sector so we understand your perspective what's
  177. happening in the markets and then we can design policies that strike the right balance you'll thank you so much for
  178. joining today and good luck to you thank you it's my pleasure you

Brief Summary

Neel Kashkari discusses his role in the financial crisis and the importance of communication and collaboration in government decision-making.

Key points

  • Neel Kashkari's Journey to Public Service. From Goldman Sachs to Treasury, Neel Kashkari shares his transition to public service.
  • The Decision-Making Process During the Crisis. Kashkari discusses the collaboration between Treasury and the Fed during the financial crisis.
  • Building a Team Under Pressure. Kashkari reveals how he built a team to manage the financial crisis effectively.
  • Lessons Learned from the Crisis. Kashkari reflects on the lessons learned about government and Wall Street during his tenure.
  • Advice for CEOs on Government Relations. Kashkari shares insights on how CEOs should communicate with the government.
  • The Importance of Communication. Private sector must actively communicate with the government for effective policy-making.

Episode highlights

Tension

60/ 100Some tension

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