One on One with Neel Kashkari
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Episode Description
Last October, in the middle of the financial crisis, Congress approved a $700 billion bailout package to prevent major firms from going belly up. The government official in the eye of that storm was Neel Kashkari, a former investment banker from Goldman Sachs, who had followed his previous boss, Henry Paulson, into the Treasury department. Kashkari was responsible for building a team to oversee the bailout and also for deploying government aid to stabilize the financial system. How did the Treasury department work with the Federal Reserve to make the decisions it did? What kind of regulations should derivatives be subjected to in the future? In an exclusive interview at Wharton San Francisco with Knowledge@Wharton, Kashkari, who left the Treasury two weeks ago, discusses these issues and more. ๐ Finance & Accounting ๐ท๏ธ Great Recession
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- our guest today is neel kashkari Neil thank you so much for joining us today it's my pleasure thanks for having me
- you have a background in aerospace engineering and after you finished your MBA at Wharton you joined goldman sachs
- i wonder if you could we could start by talking a little bit about what you did at goldman sachs and what really
- attracted you to public service sure as an engineer I really enjoyed technology development and I went to Wharton to try
- to find a way to learn about business and marry my technology skills with business and I was a technology
- investment banker at Goldman in San Francisco advising tech companies on mergers and acquisitions and financings
- such as I POS for as long as I can remember I've had an interest in government and I had been at Goldman for
- four years and getting to go with henry paulson to the treasury department was a
- once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and i jumped at it as soon as i had the chance now when you giant henry paulson at
- Treasury what was their expectation about what was your job going to be and when did it and how did it become
- apparent that basically what you were being called upon to do was to arrest the meltdown of the US financial system
- you know for the I didn't know what my job would be I came in as senior adviser to secretary Paulson to work on a
- variety of policy issues the first year I was there I spent a lot of my time on energy policy developing a new
- alternative energy program to encourage the development of alternative energies to replace oil I did work with him on
- India increasing Treasuries economic engagement with India it was after about a year in august of 2007 that he asked
- me to lead the Treasury Department's work on the housing market we were beginning to see real strain in the
- housing market especially in subprime and as the chief government official in charge of the economy he wanted to make
- sure that Treasury had a strong view on housing and so that's where I first started getting involved in the credit
- crisis and that then later evolved and developed into my role on financial stability and ultimately the tarp help
- you understand since you had such an insider's view of the whole process but as different signs of the economic
- crisis became a pan and large institutions began to face problems how is the decision-making
- process within Treasury and the Fed managed and how did you develop your strategic response to these situations
- there was very very close collaboration between Treasury in the Fed between secretary Paulson Chairman Bernanke and
- then New York Fed President Geithner I would call us co-equal partners where we were literally looking at every tool
- available and trying to figure out what would be the right policy response for the country not looking at it from a
- Treasury perspective or a Fed perspective and I think that that collaboration and that trust was
- absolutely essential as the crisis progressed our tactic shifted you know we started out pushing the private
- sector to raise capital and to recognize losses hoping that the private sector could adjust and deal with the housing
- correction on its own at some point it became apparent that it couldn't and when we realized that risk we began
- contingency planning treasuring the Fed together on what we would do if the prime if the government had to step in
- to stabilize the private sector how for example where decisions made about whether an institution should be allowed
- to fail or whether it needed a rescue I see ultimately that was the combined judgments of Treasury and the Fed
- secretary Paulson Chairman Bernanke then president Geithner at the New York Fed there was no one test that we looked at
- it was a combination of understanding that institution understanding how connected that institution was to other
- institutions what stresses and strains were in the credit markets in the financial markets what was the state of
- the economy if you look at Bear Stearns as an example it is very possible that if Bear Stearns had run into similar
- trouble two or three years ago it may have been allowed to fail but given the state of the credit markets and the
- broader economy the decision was made that we needed to step in to prevent a collapse and arrange the merger with
- JPMorgan and so there's no one metric I can point to ultimately it's the combined judgment of Treasury in the Fed
- that made those decisions now did you have any debates for unissued say for example like moral hazard and
- how did how did you arrive at consensus and what did that experience teach you about making decisions under pressure
- sure we talked about moral hazard all the time from the earliest days of the credit crisis and it's known publicly
- that you know we offered a perspective that if the government had to step in to help stabilize Bear Stearns that the
- barrister and shareholder should not be rewarded for that specifically because of the moral hazard issue so something
- that we've been aware of the entire time at the end of the day though the test was is the cost of action more or less
- than the cost of inaction and when the cost of inaction is potentially so damaging to our economy and to every
- American citizen then it's an easy decision to make even if it's an unpleasant decision to make in terms of
- making decisions under pressure I learned a lot about myself and my ability to build a team and lead a team
- under excruciating pressure and get that team to perform but at the end of the day let's not forget secretary Paulson
- was driving this was making the ultimate decisions on our big strategic moves and
- you know he handles pressure well and he drove us and steered us in the right direction and working closely with
- Chairman Bernanke ultimately made the tough calls when we had to make the tough calls in October Congress approved
- the 700 billion bailout package and and then you had to head the office for financial stability did you have a team
- in place at that time that could do what needed to be done how did you go about building that team not at all you know
- Treasury is a policy department so year in year out what treasure is good at is writing papers writing proposals doing
- analysis of policy options we had to build an investing function to be able to deploy seven hundred billion dollars
- in a very short period of time in very complex investments so we had to build that from scratch and that was although
- I was very involved in the policy making my primary responsibility was building the team recruiting the team and
- executing so we started out by recruiting the very best senior government officials we could from
- around the government and we drafted them and said we need you here tomorrow and we were
- able to recruit the very best room across the government I would call it bringing on board the best athletes we
- could find regardless of what their specific skillset was each of those folks was charged then with building out
- their specific operations let's say the CFO function or the investing function or the compliance function getting our
- operations going and then finding and hiring their replacement so we drafted great professionals very experienced
- people people who are much more experienced than I am to come in and run different parts of this with me setting
- the direction for the team and then building the operation hiring their successors that worked extremely well by
- the time I left two weeks ago after seven months we'd hired about 135 people who all of whom were non-political it
- was very important for me that we'd be able to hand a new administration a fully functioning office of financial
- stability and that meant I didn't want political appointees I wanted the very best career professionals from
- government from the private sector so that the new administration would get a fully staffed office and we achieved
- that so clearly that that's that goes to the heart of the toughest part of your job I would imagine what would you see
- the main challenges and how did you overcome them well honestly the toughest part we recruited wonderful people who
- were committed to doing whatever they could to try to help us implement our program successfully and they were not
- interested in credit or money or glory it was just about doing the right thing for the country so that was not the
- hardest part that took a lot of effort but it was solvable because we had wonderful people who are committed to
- this the hardest part was communicating the very complex issues that we're dealing with you know the vast majority
- of Americans had nothing to do with creating this crisis they didn't buy homes they couldn't afford or make risky
- investments yet because the credit crisis has triggered the recession it affects every single American family so
- everyone is suffering because of this and trying to explain to the American people why we have to step in to
- stabilize an institution that made bad decisions with the money of the American people is extremely complex and our
- programs are so complex we've really struggled with that communication challenge that's been the hardest part
- of this you know it that's very interesting and it's absolutely true i would guess that
- the pr challenge was probably the hardest one in fact i saw in the washington post did recently described
- you as the sponge for congressional anger in terms of coming up with your own communication strategy did you
- consciously choose not to have too many press conferences and so forth or was it
- did you weigh the pros and cons between having a high communication strategy in a low communication strategy how do you
- think about that I focused on I didn't do any television interviews until I left Treasury and even since I've only
- done one with Charlie Rose and now this interview I was focused on getting as much information out to the people and
- to the markets as possible so I focus my own personal communications on major speeches that I gave once every couple
- weeks and then testimony when I testified before Congress I testified five or six times on average four to
- five hours each time and if you would go back and read my speeches of my testimony it was very detailed because
- in a crisis in my experience people want information they want to know what we're
- doing the details of what we're doing why we're doing it and so I tried to provide as much detail as possible in
- hindsight I don't know if that was the right answer because while I was providing tremendous details on what we
- were doing we were still struggling to get some of our broader messages out to the general population in terms of why
- we're tapping to take this action and what the consequences are if we don't take this action if I could do it again
- I'm a change my communication strategy and in fact focus less on details because and more on the broader messages
- many experts were asking us for details and I think a lot of my communication was focused on meeting their needs
- rather than needing some of the broader needs of why we're taking these actions I think that that that's very very
- interesting how did you formulate your bailout strategy for tarp the specifically and again this goes to the
- communication issue how would you how did you respond to critics who may have charged that form of Wall Street
- insiders were using billions of dollars taxpayer money to rescue greedy or incompetent you know Wall Streeters
- again every action that we took was taken to try to minimize damage to our economy for the American people not
- about Wall Street not about bankers that's the lens through which we look through everything we have finite
- resources seven hundred billion dollars is a tremendous amount of money but it's
- a finite amount of money and we receive I personally received phone calls from homeowners from mayor's from governor's
- from business leaders around the country talking about the stress and strain they
- feel because of the credit crisis if we went out to everybody individually who needed help the money wouldn't go far
- enough wouldn't come close so we tried to focus our resources on the parts of the financial system that would provide
- the most bang for the buck if we could stabilize the system as a whole then credit would flow out to all the
- individuals the businesses in the cities that need it so we were always evaluating where are we going to get the
- maximum benefit given our finite resources and we were using every tool in the federal government's arsenal to
- try to solve this problem so we also wanted to use the right tool for the right job you know the Fed can lend
- money and so there's no reason that we should use the tarp as a lending facility if the Fed can do that so again
- the tarp was the only facility in the federal government's arsenal that could inject equity or fundamentally take a
- risk in our financial system you know when the Fed lends money they need to be secured so they're not taking much risk
- because the private sector was unwilling to take risk we needed to take risk in the financial sector now how do you
- think the situation might play out in the future because as I understand it the banks that have these toxic assets
- will no longer be required to mark them to market how do you think these toxic toxic assets will get absorbed well I
- don't think that's true i think that the account fazli has made some changes on how mark to market is interpreted I
- think that it's too strong a statement to say they will not have to mark them to market okay i think that the
- practical implication of that is unclear at this point because it depends on how
- the accountants and the company's interpret some of these faz be rules I think that we're seeing the actions we
- took in the fall putting in capital in the bank's fundamentally stabilize the system when we were facing financial
- collapse now the focus is on getting lending out to consumers and businesses to minimize damage to our economy
- secretary Geithner has announced a public-private partnership to combine private sector resources with government
- resources to go after some of these assets and I'm optimistic that that program will help restart these markets
- it's not a silver bullet and buy itself will not solve all problems but I think it's one important complementary tool
- well you have a very unique perspective because you were on Wall Street Goldman Sachs before but you also were at
- government how has your view of some of these exotic financial products changed and we see like credit default swaps for
- example they seem to create the impression that they transfer risk but in practice sometimes they almost appear
- to make risk invisible do you think that we really need products like these exotic financial products I think
- financial innovation has served our economy very well over the years and I think clearly it got ahead of itself in
- recent years and I wouldn't point to the CD s market necessarily i would point to
- things like CDOs or CDO squared where people thought that they were reducing distributing risks when they really
- weren't i think that financial innovation is important but we need to really understand the products
- understand how they can behave in unexpected ways i mean a fundamental assumption behind almost all the
- analysis that was done by the by the rating agencies by the banks by hedge funds by the investors was that home
- prices can only go up if all of your models are built on that assumption and that assumption proves to be false no
- financial product will work the way it was intended and so I think that we all can do better in terms of understanding
- risks and testing those risks and some of those financial products will never come back again we may never see a CDO
- squared again and maybe that's a good thing but I don't think we should throw out all financial innovation our country
- has really benefited from it that's that's it that's absolutely true and not moves that are foot to standardize
- derivatives so they can be traded on exchanges backward collateral and so forth is
- there any downside to this any of you to be did we ever really need the high degree of customization that
- characterize these markets I don't know enough to know for certain I mean I can see the benefits of customization if you
- are an institution not necessarily a bank an industrial company with a specific risk that you're trying to
- hedge it seems rational to me that there may not be a standard product and then if you can find someone to do a contract
- with that it makes sense in both cases nonetheless I think that more standardization is a good thing more
- transparency more disclosure is a good thing I think for all of us we clearly need to make regulatory changes my hope
- is that we do not rush and try to make too many changes in the middle of the crisis we need to put the fire out get
- the crisis behind us with the benefit of hindsight then take a deep breath and look at what changes we need to make so
- that we make rational changes going forward what lessons did your experience teach you about government and Wall
- Street and also what what did lyrics lessons did you learn about yourself you know when I was in the private sector I
- foolishly had the perspective the people in government don't work hard and let me
- tell you something there are people who have been working night and day career people again not for glory or for pay or
- for-profit just to try to serve their country and do their best to help the economy working night and day and
- Treasury and the Federal Reserve in the regulators and I have tremendous respect
- for those folks that I didn't appreciate when I was in the private sector they work every bit as hard or harder than
- people on Wall Street without the glory or the pay so that was an important humbling lesson for me when I came in
- and had the privilege of working alongside them in terms of learning about myself I feel incredibly blessed
- to have had this experience to get to serve at this important time in our history I hope that in the future I have
- the chance in ten years to come back to government to serve again I learned a lot about myself and my ability to
- handle pressure and to try to build a team and motivate people to perform under exclusive
- getting scrutiny and excruciating pressure and I'm proud of what we accomplished and I'm proud of the team
- that I left behind that are now continuing our programs just one final question what advice would you give to
- CEOs about working with the government and should business schools start teaching MBA is more about government
- relations the latter question I think definitely I think that careers in government can be incredibly rewarding
- and I think that business schools preparing their graduates for potential careers and government will not only
- help those who go into government I think it will help those who go into the private sector who later have to do
- business with the government better understanding between both sectors I think will be helpful what was the first
- part of your question what advice would you give CEO is about looking with the government I think in this time the
- private sector should over communicate to the public sector don't assume that in government we're hearing all the
- messages from the private sector all of the perspectives i would say pick up the
- phone call you don't have to call the secretary call the staff make sure your voice is heard so the government has the
- benefit of the best information we can get from the private sector so we understand your perspective what's
- happening in the markets and then we can design policies that strike the right balance you'll thank you so much for
- joining today and good luck to you thank you it's my pleasure you
Brief Summary
Neel Kashkari discusses his role in the financial crisis and the importance of communication and collaboration in government decision-making.
Key points
- Neel Kashkari's Journey to Public Service. From Goldman Sachs to Treasury, Neel Kashkari shares his transition to public service.
- The Decision-Making Process During the Crisis. Kashkari discusses the collaboration between Treasury and the Fed during the financial crisis.
- Building a Team Under Pressure. Kashkari reveals how he built a team to manage the financial crisis effectively.
- Lessons Learned from the Crisis. Kashkari reflects on the lessons learned about government and Wall Street during his tenure.
- Advice for CEOs on Government Relations. Kashkari shares insights on how CEOs should communicate with the government.
- The Importance of Communication. Private sector must actively communicate with the government for effective policy-making.
Episode highlights
- Neel Kashkari's Journey to Public ServiceFrom Goldman Sachs to Treasury, Neel Kashkari shares his transition to public service.โIt was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and I jumped at it.โ1:07May 26, 2009
- The Decision-Making Process During the CrisisKashkari discusses the collaboration between Treasury and the Fed during the financial crisis.โThere was very very close collaboration between Treasury and the Fed.โ2:50May 26, 2009
- Building a Team Under PressureKashkari reveals how he built a team to manage the financial crisis effectively.โWe had to build an investing function to deploy seven hundred billion dollars.โ6:35May 26, 2009
- Lessons Learned from the CrisisKashkari reflects on the lessons learned about government and Wall Street during his tenure.โI have tremendous respect for those folks working night and day.โ17:28May 26, 2009
- Advice for CEOs on Government RelationsKashkari shares insights on how CEOs should communicate with the government.โThe private sector should over communicate.โ18:53May 26, 2009
- The Importance of CommunicationPrivate sector must actively communicate with the government for effective policy-making.โDon't assume that we're hearing all the messages.โ18:55May 26, 2009
- Proactive EngagementEncouragement to reach out and ensure voices are heard in policy discussions.โPick up the phone, make sure your voice is heard.โ19:04May 26, 2009





