The Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
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Episode Description
📂 Finance & Accounting;Public Policy
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- Our Guest today is Andrew Davidson and he's the head of Andrew Davidson company which is a a risk analytics company uh
- and they do consulting services around Residential Mortgages and mortgage back Securities yes thanks for joining us
- thank you um we want to talk about the state of play with fenny May and Freddy Mack which are the two huge government
- agencies uh that uh help to securitize mortgages um and uh pass them on into into the market so they provide
- liquidity for Residential Mortgages um and a huge percentage of US Residential Mortgages passed through those two
- entities at some point uh they blew up in 2008 along with a lot of mortgage related things um uh the government
- bailed them out as I understand it most of that bailout has been repaid or more than repaid uh but nevertheless it was
- almost $200 billion involved and of course there's a lot of interest in preventing that from happening again and
- so um while they were taken over the thought was always that well they were quazi owned uh or quazi run government
- entities before they had a government Charter but really they were run as a as private companies but when they blew up
- the government had to come in and take over uh and the idea has been that someday that would get reversed and
- there's been lots of plans put forth and none of them have seemed to have worked
- out um and we may be getting to a point there's a couple of new papers out by folks like Mark xandi who's with Moody's
- Analytics who you were just uh involved in a seminar with so you would you you'll be fresh on this topic and I
- understand you have a new paper coming out and I think what might be different about these papers is that there're
- starting to be a realization that maybe these entities can't be run as as private companies and maybe the
- government really needs to be involved and I'll let you take it from there sure so uh you know in 2008 when these
- entities were shut down secretary Paulson at the time said there should be a timeout and I think now the timeouts
- seems like the game instead of the timeout but uh you know he was sort of hoping that people could reexamine how
- these entities were run and say you know how do we make some adjustments um so we
- went through a process after that where different people had you know a wide range of proposals um on how to change
- Fanny and Freddy uh some to make them more private some to make them closer to the government um but so of none of
- these proposals really sort of could capture sort of a large percentage of Congress you know supporting them um in
- the meantime uh the regulator of Fanny and Freddy fhfa um has actually made a number of changes to these organizations
- and uh I think some people are starting to realize that the changes that have been occurring are maybe gsse reform and
- that this is sort of a path Way Forward is to look at what's happened already and say you know can we do something to
- continue to change the entities rather than throw them out and start all over because that was been that's been one of
- the suggestions like they're irretrievable we just have to start from the ground up yeah I think if you look
- at almost any of the proposals from 2008 through last year they all started with
- either wind down the gsse or shut down the GS or eliminate the GSS and I think this sort of new round of proposals The
- xandi Proposal as well as my proposal say let's start with what we have and how do we take what we have now and turn
- it to what we want so there's some fresh thinking around this I think it's worth
- pointing out that gsse government sponsored entity which Fanny and Freddy are or
- were it's it is this quazi this is this hybrid thing so even back before 2008 before the financial crisis although
- they were considered private companies most people thought yeah but if they get in trouble we all kind of know the
- government's going to bail them out other people would say no no no they're private they're you know the
- shareholders will take the hit but when push came to shove and and things were collapsing not just them but so much of
- the financial system um the government did come to the rescue so those who thought that would happen ended up being
- correct so it's not that much of a stretch to say now I mean is it really so different what you're talking about
- from the way things were run for probably decades so I think think think about is that the shareholders actually
- did lose you know almost all their money or all their money depending on how litigation comes out so the government
- did not rescue the shareholders but what the government did do is step in and protect the bond holders so those people
- who are investing in the mortgage back Securities in the secondary markets right or the debt of these instrum of
- these entities and I think almost everyone thought that the government would step in okay on that so um the
- rating agencies for a long time have said that you know due to government sponsorship we view the debt instruments
- of Fanny and Freddy to view the highest credit quality and based on the capital that those entities had there's no way
- that they would have thought that otherwise so so I think you have to sort of separate out the equity investors
- from the bond investors okay and U so one of the important things in gsse reform is to just be explicit about that
- rather than sort of have a wink relationship sort of a fudging going said um oh you know no we don't
- guarantee any of those assets you know it's in big bold letters on the front page of the Fanny May and Freddy Mac
- bonds these are not government guaranteed bonds but s you know privately saying oh sure you know we're
- not going to let those fail and the the rates were set in a way that reflected what would happen if they were
- guaranteed correct exactly right so the market said they're really yes they're really guaranteed and so rather than
- live in that world why not live in a world where you say yes the government will guarantee certain instruments
- created by these entities because we recognize that in order to have a giant real estate market and housing market
- like we do in the United States we like to have a 30-year fixed rate mortgage and a 30e fixed rate mortgage functions
- much better with a government guarantee than without one and so if you believe that then you say we need the guarantee
- and so let's start from the idea that we will have a guarantee and it will be explicit but we still have to figure out
- who the entities are that are going to create these loans which is kind of where your paper probably starts so tell
- us the title of your paper and where where people can find it and then tell us what's in it please so the paper I
- don't think it's up yet but it'll be on the uh Urban Institute website um it'll also be on our website my company Andrew
- Davidson and Company ad- zoo.com uh the paper is called uh I believe uh four steps forward and the
- four steps are to streamline share risk wrap and mutualize so by streamline says let's make these entities smaller
- than they are now by share risk it says that we don't actually have to put all of the capital for bearing credit risk
- into these two entities that they've actually started to sell off their credit risk through these what credit
- risk sharing trans transactions which are basically ways where Fanny and Freddy buy insurance from the market and
- then they're also buying some insurance from reinsurers and maybe some insurance
- from the mortgage insurance industry and so that program is now $30 billion or so
- of money that actually now stands in front of the taxpayers if there's credit losses on Fanny and Freddy mortgages uh
- so that program should be expanded uh the third step is w and that's what we were talking about before which is
- there needs to be an explicit government W and that W has to be structured in such a way that the government only is
- liable if there's catastrophic losses so you have to have very bad performance in
- both the housing market and unemployment before the government would need to pay
- something but the government will know that's when they've got to put the money in but that government is taxpayers
- taxpayer bailouts right right but the so you know I don't know if I'd consider it
- taxpayer bailouts so the the government would be running an insurance program it's going to be collecting premiums for
- that you know when the FDIC makes good on Deposit Insurance we don't call that a bailout um when they make good on
- saving a company maybe that should have failed maybe that's a bailout but you know it's an insurance program and
- they're paying the money you know that they've been earning premiums on so they're creating a reserve that will
- that will cover a certain percentage of front but you're saying beyond that if there's something
- catastrophic there's the reserve only goes up to a certain percentage correct so the reserve is only going to cover
- you know so much losses but you know and then the government can either recover or not recover that afterward but the
- point is to structure that so it's much further out on the probability curve you
- know than we stand now with this current implicit guarantee so most people are talking about Fanny and Freddy you know
- having either capital or reinsurance that covers you know four to 5% of losses right versus before they they
- only needed to hold 45 basis points or less than half a percent of coverage of losses so you know if they had 200
- billion do of capital more than they had before then there wouldn't have been this need for the bailout of the
- entities as they were before and that was definitely a bailout because I say there was no mechanism in place to say
- that they were buying some insurance right well let's be clear about that because that's that's really an
- interesting point so if what you're proposing had been in effect in 2008 I think what you're saying is things
- would not have happened the way they happened that there would have been enough cushion enough of a shock
- absorption there to prevent at least Fanny and Freddy maybe you know not not talking about everyone else this
- probably you know the subprime market you know had its own problems and this wasn't going to help that but Fanny and
- Freddy would have had enough capital or enough reinsurance to cover the losses so most people are talking about loss
- coverage probably about double the experience of the 200 uh 2008 time period so yeah and then so that's WRA
- and then the the fourth one is okay now we have these entities we have a functioning system but they're still in
- conservatorship how should we spin these back out into the market and uh so in my
- proposal I think they should be turned into mutual companies owned by The Originators and the mutuals should um
- own Fanny and Freddy they should put up some Capital based on how much they use those entities
- um and that those entities will um basically fill the same functions that Fanny and Freddy are doing now but they
- wouldn't become stockholder owned company they'd become Mutual owned companies the uh xandi Proposal with his
- co-authors is almost exactly the same as mine up to this point um except that instead of being a mutual they believe
- that it should become a government corporation I see so that the so it wouldn't be a government agency like uh
- FHA it would be more of a government corporation FDIC sort of an example of a government corporation um and then other
- people have said these should entities should become utilities or if you go to the back to the Johnson crepo law it
- would have said these entities should have become competitive guarantors so at this point we'd really be talking about
- differences in governance of this residual entity but I think any discussion along that line is a big step
- forward from saying let's shut them down and start all over again so what are the big benefits to all this from from
- your point of view you're you're you're pointing out of course that um there'll be more of a cushion if there was some
- kind of meltdown so that seems like a a public good right but also um this is going to preserve the 30-year mortgage
- which is um really so important to to Americans and uh they're they're they'd be very disappointed if somehow market
- conditions didn't allow that to continue so does this accomplish that yes the by
- um by creating the government WRA it's really the essential ingredient in order to continue the 30-year fixed rate loan
- there just really aren't investors who are willing to invest in that kind of interest rate risk and also take on
- credit risk and what the guarantee does it just splits those two risks apart um so you know certainly that's one
- important G um Advantage uh another important Advantage is that uh a lot of people are very concerned about
- maintaining access to credit uh in two different ways one is that every borrower who's a qualified borrower and
- can you know afford a loan over time should be given the opportunity to have a loan and by having sort of a national
- entity you can sort of have that National entity responsible for making sure there's people operating in every
- Market uh so preventing discrimination of some sort or another you know and you say oh this you know we don't serve this
- particular Market because it's too far out of the way or you know a national entity can either do it itself or
- encourage the banks who are its members to say you know someone who needs to serve this market so is this addressing
- the idea of affordability is that the point yeah so it's so there's access and then there's affordability as well and
- affordability is handled in several different ways like right now Fanny and Freddy actually um don't price each loan
- individually there's some averaging of the risk and so by averaging the risk the people with the Better Credit
- actually subsidized to some degree of people with worth worse credit so that helps with affordability uh the other
- thing that most of the proposals have is some of the money that the government earns from providing the wp goes into a
- fund that also directly supports affordable lending I see U affordable in the sense of subsidized rat some sort of
- some sort of subsid kind of subsidy okay okay um so you know another important part of uh these proposals is uh what
- happens to the profits that are made by Fanny and Freddy right so Fanny and Freddy made a lot of profits when they
- were private entities so one of the advantages of being a mutual company is that if they're making a lot of profits
- those profits go back to the owners who are also mortgage Originators and they're competitive and so then that can
- feed back into lowering prices or lowering rates for borrowers so if you move from sort of a competitive market
- where you have stockholders outside of the mortgage Market to the stockholders inside the mortgage Market even if you
- do end up with Monopoly profits they recycle back into the system but most Mutual is there a problem with
- diversification there though if everyone's sort of in the same family of the mortgage World um versus in the past
- maybe shareholders were just interested in in in diversifying you know and chose
- that as uh you know one of their Investments so so so one of the things that makes this work now is the
- existence of these credit risk sharing deals and so you know I think about 75% of the risk that's created should be
- moved outside of this system and so by using different Bond structures or reinsurance structures the credit risk
- doesn't all sit inside Fanny and Freddy so it doesn't actually have to sit those
- Originators so they're going to get other people to take that risk so the diversification happens through the
- capital markets um yeah I think otherwise you would have this situation where it's like you know 200 300 billion
- dollars worth of capital sitting at one or two entities and um you would need to
- find a way of diversifying the shareholders little too ancest the industry couldn't take on that much risk
- okay on the other hand you know we do believe in skin in the game and so to me part of having the members also part of
- this Mutual is that they are responsible jointly and severally for you know the activities that they're creating what
- else is it important to know about your proposal um you know I you know I don't know whether or not it would happen but
- you know I think that there's a pretty clear pathway to get there um like say it doesn't require creating all new
- entities um it just requires changing the ownership structure of existing entities and uh by doing that it sort of
- takes us out of having a transition plan that lasts you know 10 or 20 years which
- you know you who knows what or longer who knows what would happen over the that time Horizon thanks for coming in
- and shing with us [Music]
Brief Summary
Andrew Davidson discusses reforms for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stabilize the mortgage market and ensure affordability.
Key points
- The Role of Fanny and Freddy. Exploring the crucial functions of Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac in the mortgage market.
- Government Involvement in Mortgages. Discussing the necessity of government involvement in mortgage entities post-2008.
- New Proposals for Reform. Andrew Davidson outlines his four steps for reforming mortgage entities.
Episode highlights
- The Role of Fanny and FreddyExploring the crucial functions of Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac in the mortgage market.“They provide liquidity for Residential Mortgages.”0:33Jun 8, 2016
- Government Involvement in MortgagesDiscussing the necessity of government involvement in mortgage entities post-2008.“Maybe these entities can't be run as private companies.”1:49Jun 8, 2016
- New Proposals for ReformAndrew Davidson outlines his four steps for reforming mortgage entities.“The paper is called four steps forward.”6:35Jun 8, 2016
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