The Future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

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📂 Finance & Accounting;Public Policy

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  1. Our Guest today is Andrew Davidson and he's the head of Andrew Davidson company which is a a risk analytics company uh
  2. and they do consulting services around Residential Mortgages and mortgage back Securities yes thanks for joining us
  3. thank you um we want to talk about the state of play with fenny May and Freddy Mack which are the two huge government
  4. agencies uh that uh help to securitize mortgages um and uh pass them on into into the market so they provide
  5. liquidity for Residential Mortgages um and a huge percentage of US Residential Mortgages passed through those two
  6. entities at some point uh they blew up in 2008 along with a lot of mortgage related things um uh the government
  7. bailed them out as I understand it most of that bailout has been repaid or more than repaid uh but nevertheless it was
  8. almost $200 billion involved and of course there's a lot of interest in preventing that from happening again and
  9. so um while they were taken over the thought was always that well they were quazi owned uh or quazi run government
  10. entities before they had a government Charter but really they were run as a as private companies but when they blew up
  11. the government had to come in and take over uh and the idea has been that someday that would get reversed and
  12. there's been lots of plans put forth and none of them have seemed to have worked
  13. out um and we may be getting to a point there's a couple of new papers out by folks like Mark xandi who's with Moody's
  14. Analytics who you were just uh involved in a seminar with so you would you you'll be fresh on this topic and I
  15. understand you have a new paper coming out and I think what might be different about these papers is that there're
  16. starting to be a realization that maybe these entities can't be run as as private companies and maybe the
  17. government really needs to be involved and I'll let you take it from there sure so uh you know in 2008 when these
  18. entities were shut down secretary Paulson at the time said there should be a timeout and I think now the timeouts
  19. seems like the game instead of the timeout but uh you know he was sort of hoping that people could reexamine how
  20. these entities were run and say you know how do we make some adjustments um so we
  21. went through a process after that where different people had you know a wide range of proposals um on how to change
  22. Fanny and Freddy uh some to make them more private some to make them closer to the government um but so of none of
  23. these proposals really sort of could capture sort of a large percentage of Congress you know supporting them um in
  24. the meantime uh the regulator of Fanny and Freddy fhfa um has actually made a number of changes to these organizations
  25. and uh I think some people are starting to realize that the changes that have been occurring are maybe gsse reform and
  26. that this is sort of a path Way Forward is to look at what's happened already and say you know can we do something to
  27. continue to change the entities rather than throw them out and start all over because that was been that's been one of
  28. the suggestions like they're irretrievable we just have to start from the ground up yeah I think if you look
  29. at almost any of the proposals from 2008 through last year they all started with
  30. either wind down the gsse or shut down the GS or eliminate the GSS and I think this sort of new round of proposals The
  31. xandi Proposal as well as my proposal say let's start with what we have and how do we take what we have now and turn
  32. it to what we want so there's some fresh thinking around this I think it's worth
  33. pointing out that gsse government sponsored entity which Fanny and Freddy are or
  34. were it's it is this quazi this is this hybrid thing so even back before 2008 before the financial crisis although
  35. they were considered private companies most people thought yeah but if they get in trouble we all kind of know the
  36. government's going to bail them out other people would say no no no they're private they're you know the
  37. shareholders will take the hit but when push came to shove and and things were collapsing not just them but so much of
  38. the financial system um the government did come to the rescue so those who thought that would happen ended up being
  39. correct so it's not that much of a stretch to say now I mean is it really so different what you're talking about
  40. from the way things were run for probably decades so I think think think about is that the shareholders actually
  41. did lose you know almost all their money or all their money depending on how litigation comes out so the government
  42. did not rescue the shareholders but what the government did do is step in and protect the bond holders so those people
  43. who are investing in the mortgage back Securities in the secondary markets right or the debt of these instrum of
  44. these entities and I think almost everyone thought that the government would step in okay on that so um the
  45. rating agencies for a long time have said that you know due to government sponsorship we view the debt instruments
  46. of Fanny and Freddy to view the highest credit quality and based on the capital that those entities had there's no way
  47. that they would have thought that otherwise so so I think you have to sort of separate out the equity investors
  48. from the bond investors okay and U so one of the important things in gsse reform is to just be explicit about that
  49. rather than sort of have a wink relationship sort of a fudging going said um oh you know no we don't
  50. guarantee any of those assets you know it's in big bold letters on the front page of the Fanny May and Freddy Mac
  51. bonds these are not government guaranteed bonds but s you know privately saying oh sure you know we're
  52. not going to let those fail and the the rates were set in a way that reflected what would happen if they were
  53. guaranteed correct exactly right so the market said they're really yes they're really guaranteed and so rather than
  54. live in that world why not live in a world where you say yes the government will guarantee certain instruments
  55. created by these entities because we recognize that in order to have a giant real estate market and housing market
  56. like we do in the United States we like to have a 30-year fixed rate mortgage and a 30e fixed rate mortgage functions
  57. much better with a government guarantee than without one and so if you believe that then you say we need the guarantee
  58. and so let's start from the idea that we will have a guarantee and it will be explicit but we still have to figure out
  59. who the entities are that are going to create these loans which is kind of where your paper probably starts so tell
  60. us the title of your paper and where where people can find it and then tell us what's in it please so the paper I
  61. don't think it's up yet but it'll be on the uh Urban Institute website um it'll also be on our website my company Andrew
  62. Davidson and Company ad- zoo.com uh the paper is called uh I believe uh four steps forward and the
  63. four steps are to streamline share risk wrap and mutualize so by streamline says let's make these entities smaller
  64. than they are now by share risk it says that we don't actually have to put all of the capital for bearing credit risk
  65. into these two entities that they've actually started to sell off their credit risk through these what credit
  66. risk sharing trans transactions which are basically ways where Fanny and Freddy buy insurance from the market and
  67. then they're also buying some insurance from reinsurers and maybe some insurance
  68. from the mortgage insurance industry and so that program is now $30 billion or so
  69. of money that actually now stands in front of the taxpayers if there's credit losses on Fanny and Freddy mortgages uh
  70. so that program should be expanded uh the third step is w and that's what we were talking about before which is
  71. there needs to be an explicit government W and that W has to be structured in such a way that the government only is
  72. liable if there's catastrophic losses so you have to have very bad performance in
  73. both the housing market and unemployment before the government would need to pay
  74. something but the government will know that's when they've got to put the money in but that government is taxpayers
  75. taxpayer bailouts right right but the so you know I don't know if I'd consider it
  76. taxpayer bailouts so the the government would be running an insurance program it's going to be collecting premiums for
  77. that you know when the FDIC makes good on Deposit Insurance we don't call that a bailout um when they make good on
  78. saving a company maybe that should have failed maybe that's a bailout but you know it's an insurance program and
  79. they're paying the money you know that they've been earning premiums on so they're creating a reserve that will
  80. that will cover a certain percentage of front but you're saying beyond that if there's something
  81. catastrophic there's the reserve only goes up to a certain percentage correct so the reserve is only going to cover
  82. you know so much losses but you know and then the government can either recover or not recover that afterward but the
  83. point is to structure that so it's much further out on the probability curve you
  84. know than we stand now with this current implicit guarantee so most people are talking about Fanny and Freddy you know
  85. having either capital or reinsurance that covers you know four to 5% of losses right versus before they they
  86. only needed to hold 45 basis points or less than half a percent of coverage of losses so you know if they had 200
  87. billion do of capital more than they had before then there wouldn't have been this need for the bailout of the
  88. entities as they were before and that was definitely a bailout because I say there was no mechanism in place to say
  89. that they were buying some insurance right well let's be clear about that because that's that's really an
  90. interesting point so if what you're proposing had been in effect in 2008 I think what you're saying is things
  91. would not have happened the way they happened that there would have been enough cushion enough of a shock
  92. absorption there to prevent at least Fanny and Freddy maybe you know not not talking about everyone else this
  93. probably you know the subprime market you know had its own problems and this wasn't going to help that but Fanny and
  94. Freddy would have had enough capital or enough reinsurance to cover the losses so most people are talking about loss
  95. coverage probably about double the experience of the 200 uh 2008 time period so yeah and then so that's WRA
  96. and then the the fourth one is okay now we have these entities we have a functioning system but they're still in
  97. conservatorship how should we spin these back out into the market and uh so in my
  98. proposal I think they should be turned into mutual companies owned by The Originators and the mutuals should um
  99. own Fanny and Freddy they should put up some Capital based on how much they use those entities
  100. um and that those entities will um basically fill the same functions that Fanny and Freddy are doing now but they
  101. wouldn't become stockholder owned company they'd become Mutual owned companies the uh xandi Proposal with his
  102. co-authors is almost exactly the same as mine up to this point um except that instead of being a mutual they believe
  103. that it should become a government corporation I see so that the so it wouldn't be a government agency like uh
  104. FHA it would be more of a government corporation FDIC sort of an example of a government corporation um and then other
  105. people have said these should entities should become utilities or if you go to the back to the Johnson crepo law it
  106. would have said these entities should have become competitive guarantors so at this point we'd really be talking about
  107. differences in governance of this residual entity but I think any discussion along that line is a big step
  108. forward from saying let's shut them down and start all over again so what are the big benefits to all this from from
  109. your point of view you're you're you're pointing out of course that um there'll be more of a cushion if there was some
  110. kind of meltdown so that seems like a a public good right but also um this is going to preserve the 30-year mortgage
  111. which is um really so important to to Americans and uh they're they're they'd be very disappointed if somehow market
  112. conditions didn't allow that to continue so does this accomplish that yes the by
  113. um by creating the government WRA it's really the essential ingredient in order to continue the 30-year fixed rate loan
  114. there just really aren't investors who are willing to invest in that kind of interest rate risk and also take on
  115. credit risk and what the guarantee does it just splits those two risks apart um so you know certainly that's one
  116. important G um Advantage uh another important Advantage is that uh a lot of people are very concerned about
  117. maintaining access to credit uh in two different ways one is that every borrower who's a qualified borrower and
  118. can you know afford a loan over time should be given the opportunity to have a loan and by having sort of a national
  119. entity you can sort of have that National entity responsible for making sure there's people operating in every
  120. Market uh so preventing discrimination of some sort or another you know and you say oh this you know we don't serve this
  121. particular Market because it's too far out of the way or you know a national entity can either do it itself or
  122. encourage the banks who are its members to say you know someone who needs to serve this market so is this addressing
  123. the idea of affordability is that the point yeah so it's so there's access and then there's affordability as well and
  124. affordability is handled in several different ways like right now Fanny and Freddy actually um don't price each loan
  125. individually there's some averaging of the risk and so by averaging the risk the people with the Better Credit
  126. actually subsidized to some degree of people with worth worse credit so that helps with affordability uh the other
  127. thing that most of the proposals have is some of the money that the government earns from providing the wp goes into a
  128. fund that also directly supports affordable lending I see U affordable in the sense of subsidized rat some sort of
  129. some sort of subsid kind of subsidy okay okay um so you know another important part of uh these proposals is uh what
  130. happens to the profits that are made by Fanny and Freddy right so Fanny and Freddy made a lot of profits when they
  131. were private entities so one of the advantages of being a mutual company is that if they're making a lot of profits
  132. those profits go back to the owners who are also mortgage Originators and they're competitive and so then that can
  133. feed back into lowering prices or lowering rates for borrowers so if you move from sort of a competitive market
  134. where you have stockholders outside of the mortgage Market to the stockholders inside the mortgage Market even if you
  135. do end up with Monopoly profits they recycle back into the system but most Mutual is there a problem with
  136. diversification there though if everyone's sort of in the same family of the mortgage World um versus in the past
  137. maybe shareholders were just interested in in in diversifying you know and chose
  138. that as uh you know one of their Investments so so so one of the things that makes this work now is the
  139. existence of these credit risk sharing deals and so you know I think about 75% of the risk that's created should be
  140. moved outside of this system and so by using different Bond structures or reinsurance structures the credit risk
  141. doesn't all sit inside Fanny and Freddy so it doesn't actually have to sit those
  142. Originators so they're going to get other people to take that risk so the diversification happens through the
  143. capital markets um yeah I think otherwise you would have this situation where it's like you know 200 300 billion
  144. dollars worth of capital sitting at one or two entities and um you would need to
  145. find a way of diversifying the shareholders little too ancest the industry couldn't take on that much risk
  146. okay on the other hand you know we do believe in skin in the game and so to me part of having the members also part of
  147. this Mutual is that they are responsible jointly and severally for you know the activities that they're creating what
  148. else is it important to know about your proposal um you know I you know I don't know whether or not it would happen but
  149. you know I think that there's a pretty clear pathway to get there um like say it doesn't require creating all new
  150. entities um it just requires changing the ownership structure of existing entities and uh by doing that it sort of
  151. takes us out of having a transition plan that lasts you know 10 or 20 years which
  152. you know you who knows what or longer who knows what would happen over the that time Horizon thanks for coming in
  153. and shing with us [Music]

Brief Summary

Andrew Davidson discusses reforms for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to stabilize the mortgage market and ensure affordability.

Key points

  • The Role of Fanny and Freddy. Exploring the crucial functions of Fanny Mae and Freddy Mac in the mortgage market.
  • Government Involvement in Mortgages. Discussing the necessity of government involvement in mortgage entities post-2008.
  • New Proposals for Reform. Andrew Davidson outlines his four steps for reforming mortgage entities.

Tension

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