Wharton Faculty Teach-In October 21, 2008
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Wharton Faculty Teach-In October 21, 2008
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- [Music] this podcast is brought to you by knowledge at Warton please visit knowledge. won. up.edu for more
- information I'd like to add my welcome uh to the fourth uh teach in on the global economic crisis uh thanks to Tom
- Robertson and vice uh Andy Jane for sponsoring the event um and also to the panel members who were just introduced
- uh it's not hyperb to say that the world is a different place today than when we
- started the semester only about seven weeks ago uh the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve have bailed out and in
- some instances taken ownership positions in the largest uh mortgage insurance and
- banking institutions in the country there are large investment banks that uh either cease to exist or no longer exist
- in the same form they've become Bank holding companies with substantially different leverage
- limitations uh asset Market volatility has led us to be relieved on days when movement is only about 3 or 4% rather
- than 8 or 11 uh even those not actively involved in uh financial markets are horrified when they open their 401K
- envelopes or they choose not to open them uh hoping that uh stocks in fact really will be right for the long run uh
- we Face the Spectre of a serious economic downturn uh with a policy Arsenal that's already challenged the
- federal funds Target rate for the FED is already near a historic low it's at 1 and a half% it's it's only gotten down
- to to 1% before and we're at record budget deficits even before we factor in the uh bailout package which is yet to
- be implemented so fiscal policy and monetary policy already strained and we're facing uh a spectre of a a fairly
- significant downturn uh there have been unprecedented coordinated Global responses uh to the credit Market issues
- uh central banks uh have taken efforts to increase liquidity and lower interest rates of course we're in the midst of a
- presidential election and though we uh do not intend to make any partisan statements there certainly are
- challenges for whoever should Prevail in two weeks from now uh so this afternoon
- the four panel members will uh provide some insights on a number of things uh including um the causes of the current
- crisis measures that are presently being taken to alleviate the crisis uh remaining challenges to both financial
- markets and the real economy and their effects on us and then implications for further policy measures including the
- possibility of regulatory issues uh to prevent recurrences um the each panelist will
- have 10 to 12 minutes to make a statement after which they'll be able to discuss uh the the statement just made
- uh after the four uh panelists have finished with their remarks we'll open the floor to questions and there will be
- floor mics run around and so you just raise your hand to indicate your interest in asking a question obviously
- make your questions succinct don't make a speech asking for uh saying is that right at the end otherwise you'll force
- me to use my incredible Powers as moderator uh but with that I think we will go ahead and start with Professor
- Richard marsten well thanks a lot Mart uh I'd like to begin by saying that Tom Robertson was wrong it wasn't Wharton
- that caused the crisis but according to the financial times this morning it was Harvard Business School it's definitive
- they were having their anniversary celebration and Drew fa uh who is the president of Harvard and used to be a
- professor of History here she actually said um you know you ought to change your model it shouldn't be for you to do
- well in the world but to do well for the world and I think that's interesting that Tom actually uh talked about
- something similar um this financial crisis is spread everywhere um what I want to do is is just begin to talk
- about it and then we have uh three of my colleagues to uh talk about other aspects of it and I thought I would
- begin by talking about Where it All Began you know it sort of helps to uh identify the beginning of the crisis um
- this time it was in the mortgage market so what I want to do is I want to show you four charts about housing and um I
- think they'll be a little surprising the first one is um about when the housing crisis
- began began in November 200 five is that amazing because that's confusing to me because during 2006 and
- into 2007 maril Lynch and City group and Bank of America etc etc etc were adding to
- their mortgage back Securities were they unaware that housing had already peaked
- and it was on a downhill slide where it was it's now 62% below where it was before bit of a puzzle you know bit of a
- puzzle um are they so insulated in New York you know they don't have very good Communications there there's so many
- Towers it's difficult to get cell phones so so possibly they didn't know about the housing crisis in America but but
- somehow um as a result they took a lot of positions even in 2006 into 2007 second chart what has happened to house
- prices since that time well you can see the these are these are wonderful indices from uh case and Schiller uh Bob
- Schiller used to be a professor here um what it does it shows you that uh the pain is distributed unevenly across the
- country if you're from New York you're from Boston you're from Chicago there's been relatively little decline in prices
- only 10 or 11% uh but in some regions of the country it's been awful absolutely awful and that's where an awful lot of
- the pain in the Securities Market is originating California Florida as well as of course Phoenix and
- Las Vegas the sad case is Detroit because they never saw a rise in the house price in the beginning to begin
- with and yet they're down so far um so that's the second chart my third and fourth chart address the issue of how
- soon is the housing market going to turn around well actually I'm a pessimist but I must admit I only have
- one data point when you run regressions you probably try to have a whole bunch of
- data points but I only have one I can only look at the last housing crisis the last time we had a boom in housing and
- ask how soon did the housing price reach bottom and I'm going to look at California on the one hand we reached
- the peak in 1989 when did it turn around sometime around 95 96 997 all right now of course there's
- special things going on in California there's always special things going on in California so we have to say uh let's
- move to the other side of the country with my final graph and it shows you basically whoops it shows you New York
- and you can see very similar story reached the peak in 1988 didn't reach bottom until about 6 s years later there
- are those who say well housing has to turn around before the economy turns around let me say I hope that's not true
- I hope the economy turns around long before housing because I think it's going to be a while before housing turns
- around I I told you I only had one data point but I think it's a relevant data point we'll we'll wait and see whether
- or not housing prices will reach bottom sooner rather than later I think it's going to be later so then we began with
- a financial crisis because of the mortgage back Securities originating in housing they started to
- go bad and that generated the financial crisis I'm of the belief that that Financial Risk spreads were down so low
- that we probably would have gotten a financial crisis of some sort from some other source if it had not been in
- housing but it happened to be in housing so we began the crisis and you know the
- details of the crisis what I want to focus on is just a couple of things number one has the FED done its job well
- let's think about what what is a central bank supposed to do in a financial crisis I think there are three things
- they're supposed to do number one you're supposed to lower interest rates the FED
- did its job lowered interest rates they were five and a quarter or somewhere before last and now they're 1 and a
- half% in fact if I were on the Federal Reserve board I would vote against any further declines the problem in America
- is not the level of the FED funds rate it's the fact that you can't get a loan anyways and if you do get loan is going
- to be at a much higher interest rate than the FED funds rate so the fed's done its job in terms of interest rates
- second function is to make sure that the banks have lot lots of liquidity that's
- for the discount window what the FED does and every Central Bank does is it accepts Securities in exchange for
- treasury bills and the treasury bills are like cash well let me tell you they've had to do a lot of that let's
- begin with by showing you the spread of liore over treasuries that's the interbank offer rate in in London it's
- the it's the barometer of interbank lending in the dollar market and let me tell you back in August a year ago it
- looked pretty Grim now normally the spread of into bank interest rates is about half a percent above treasuries
- half a percent but last August a year ago it went way high at that point the European Central Bank and the US Central
- Bank stepped in provided a lot of liquidity they had to do it again at the year end they had to do it again when be
- turns failed in March they had to do it again in July when Fanny May and Freddy Mack got into trouble and you can see it
- um quite a bit of Crisis now at this point um you have to recognize the fed's doing its job in fact it's been it's had
- to be pretty Innovative what it's had to do is actually accept a lot of Securities that it normally doesn't
- accept because they're too risky in order to provide liquidity to the banks so it's done its job but the third role
- is the mo most controversial the central bank is supposed to save the largest banks the banks that are
- so-called too big to fail back in the 1980s that would have meant that the FED would have saved City Bank or chase or
- chemical bank or JP Morgan or Bank of America and perhaps a few others the FED is never specific about how many banks
- it will save but it saves the big Banks because they're too big to fail they threaten the
- system it's going to do it this time the only problem is that the world has changed the old model was based on the
- idea that Banks would accept deposits and make loans so if you save the big Banks you wouldn't necessarily have to
- save the investment Banks you had to save the big Banks it would stabilize the system and we'd live happily ever
- after the problem is that in the meantime securitization has occurred and what has happened is the banks no longer
- hold on to their mortgages no longer hold on to their loans to a large extent what they do is they package them
- together in bonds sell them off you know that already so things have changed that
- means that the risk that the bank is holding is the same risk that is being held by pension plans by insurance
- companies by investment Banks and so on so the the concept of too big to fail has changed and now we realize that the
- treasury and the FED now Define AIG and insurance company is being too big to fail that's what we found out
- four weeks ago you know by the way the treasury and the FED decided that Leman Brothers wasn't too big to fail
- and I guess that's the one big mistake they've made I must admit at the time I thought it was the right decision but
- they should have saved lhan brothers because later that week let me say it delicately later that week the week of
- September 15th remember that date September 15th the week of September 15th all hell broke loose this is the
- liore rate and what happened to the lior rate that week in fact Wednesday afternoon Thursday morning of that week
- the 17th and 18th of September I think were the scariest two days in financial markets in my career they were
- absolutely scary and then sometime in the afternoon Thursday afternoon word got out was leaked out
- that maybe the treasury was going to have a bailout package the market started to CL calm down and you know
- things were looking good by the end of the week but then of course over the next couple weeks we had to watch
- Congress I mean Congress it's watching Congress is like going through a salami Factory I'm told that somebody who goes
- through a salami Factory becomes a vegetarian for the rest of their lives let me tell you it was ugly and in the
- meantime a lot of other things H happened let me tell you uh let's see Washington Mutual had to be taken over
- uh wacovia had to be taken over the market fell 20% boy oh boy and so the treasury had to go
- what I term to plan B Plan B when do you go to plan B when you realize plan a is
- not going to work and what did plan B involve well what it involved was the following problem the banks had kept
- borrowing and borrowing and getting one Capital injection after another and it wasn't
- enough in the second column you can see an estimate by Morgan Stanley a week ago
- on how much each of the banks had lost and on the far column you can see the capital injections if you add up the
- numbers at the bottom what you find is there's a bit of a gap in other words under the best of circumstances the
- banks were deficient they needed some Capital injections and so once again the treasury in the FED came to the rescue
- and let me summarize what they did what this chart does is it shows you the nine
- largest banks with Maryland still separate from Bank of America the capital injection by the treasury in the
- form of preferred shares and we'll talk more about that later on and then finally in the last column the actual
- Equity value of the of that particular firm right at the time of the injection what you can see boy this is a big
- Equity injection let me tell you it's a big Equity injection and uh the natural question to ask would be uh will
- plan B work that's a natural question isn't it let me distinguish between meanings of the word work will the plan
- work in the sense that uh the banks will be sufficiently capitalized well let me
- tell you the treasury is on the plan now if they're not sufficiently capitalized
- we'll come up with more money that's clear so in that sense the plan will work these banks will not go under
- there'll be other banks that the treasury I hope and the FED I hope will allow to fail because not all the banks
- should stay in business and I think dick Herring will talk about more about that
- later on but uh let me tell you these nine banks are not going to fail the treasury is determined to keep them open
- so it will work in that sense but the larger question is will it help the economy and that's the question of
- whether or not these banks will start lending again and that's the the answer to that question we don't know the
- answer we don't know what's going to happen what I suspect is the answer is at least initially no they will not
- start lending again and for that reason I think we're going to have a fairly serious
- recession how bad a recession it's going to be a worse recession than the last time it's going to be a recession with a
- lot of loss of jobs let me show you the latest consensus forecast private consensus as well as the IMF forecast
- for next year for the the United States the European monetary Union U UK as well
- as Japan the industrial world is going into recession I personally believe my colleagues may not agree with me that
- the US economy went into recession in September because the NBR looks at monthly data and the monthly data for
- September were pretty ugly but we won't know for sure until they meet another 12
- months from now in any case it looks Grim short term it's going to be Grim for those of you on the job market um I
- I think we're going to have to worry about just how deep the recession is going to be and I'm waiting to hear from
- Jeremy what he thinks about that um it's interesting that we've done what we can
- but the problem is the banks are impaired regardless of how much Capital injection they get they're impaired and
- as a result they will not be lending as much as they did before and I think we have to face that what will the job
- situation be like well I can't tell you except to say that so far the loss of jobs has been minor compared with last
- time expect worse times ahead uh this is the last recession you can see in the rectangle is the actual timing of the
- recession and notice that even after the recession ended in November 2001 we lost
- a lot of jobs after that some months we lost 200,000 jobs so don't expect this job picture to turn around make your
- plans make your placement plans accordingly uh to try to try to work around this uh terrible job markets that
- we're going to be facing um maybe it won't be any worse than last time but last time I remember uh Wharton students
- had a lot of trouble with the job market I want to end leave plenty of time for my colleagues but I want to end with a
- um with a political chart political chart where does that fit in here well I want to begin by quoting the chief um
- strategist of the Bill Clinton campaign in 1992 you know his name James Carville he's
- now famous um he actually believed that the economy was the key to the election we were officially out of recession at
- the time but uh it looked like we were still in recession and most Americans thought we were still in recession and
- so he forced the entire campaign to focus on the economy with a phrase It's the economy
- stupid and he hung the sign in the campaign headquarters and in fact I think that was the key to Bill Clinton
- winning the election what about this time well what I'd like to do is share with you the timing of the rebound of
- Obama in the campaign the way I'm going to do it is by using Futures contracts intrade.com intrade.com has Futures
- contracts on Obama winning the presidency the prices I'm going to show you are cents on a dollar so if it's 50
- cents on a dollar it's a 5050 race okay at the beginning of the week when Leman Brothers was
- about to fail AIG was going to be taken over and as I said indelicately all hell
- broke loose in the financial markets this was the price of Obama it's a coincidence of
- course it's a coincidence that on September 15th we we reached the bottom of the Obama
- presidency according to the Futures market and ever since that time it's been up and up and up let me give you my
- interpretation of my panelists can disagree with me I actually think what happened is the economy turned very sour
- the average American became very worried about the economy and it's natural to blame the current Administration for the
- economy that's always the case that was the case with Jimmy Carter's Administration it was the case with H
- W's Administration and I think it's the case with the Republicans this year so I'll end on this note isn't that a
- dramatic graph there's probably some other explanations of course there's more than one thing affecting the
- election but you probably think it's because of all the other things in the election think at least of the
- possibility that the financial crisis is what is going to lead Obama to become the next president thank you you know I
- agree totally with uh dick on on the um Leman bankruptcy on the 15th um and uh I think that's when
- we held the first panel was right on that day or uh or the day before that day day after that day the day after
- that day that was and and and it turned out that that is a it turned a a a hugely a pivotal day um uh I didn't
- imagine how much uh uh debt Leman debt was out there uh I mean I was shocked when you know the bankruptcy courts
- finally you know looked at it and you said something like you know $800 billion doll worth of debts now some of
- those were covered definitely with assets but it just it just completely um dwarfed anything else uh a very
- important rate um uh and and and and and uh Professor Maron mentioned was the liore rate rate um it's I'm not going to
- go it's rather interesting that the rate is actually determined in in London by the British Bankers
- Association uh by surveying 16 Banks and their cost of funds over various time periods in various currencies although
- the dollar has usually been the key one only three of the 16 banks are American Banks which has some significance also
- uh JP Morgan City group and and Bank of America uh lior rate are huge in terms of basing loan rates to uh not as much
- as individuals individuals have Prime rates which are it's it's it's it's quite interesting uh the difference is
- more marked now uh but in terms of commercial firms industrial firm big businesses borrowing uh at uh some
- spread over usually three-month Liber sometimes one month uh lior rates uh you have trillions ions of dollars of loans
- that are actually based on on liore and um oops let me get over and this is the um this is the graph over here I don't
- know if this also has a um does it have a uh there we go it does have a laser pointer uh this is going back a couple
- of years normally Li this is the graph of liore against the FED funds Target I I think
- it's more important uh Richard talked about it against treasury bills but the FED funds Target is directly
- controllable and actually treasury bills have sort of disconnected also and normally it's it runs 1015 basis points
- this is precrisis this was the crisis last year in August again in October it's it it went outward but then there
- was a period of three months where it stayed at a very stable 50 basis points above uh the FED funds Target the FED
- funds Target was 2% uh and the liore rate was two and a half now that is that's a large spread
- but it it's a doable spread and it was a very stable spread this is September 15th and you can just absolutely see
- what happened the spread widen to 337 basis points I I bet if you ask any money manager 6 months earlier could
- that ever happen they say that is impossible that could never happen that you get that increase now the
- significance of that increase is is is absolutely huge um because people's loans are based on
- liore and the spread is going up when the FED lowered by 50 basis points as they did about two weeks ago in a
- concerted action of central banks it was completely drowned out by the effect of
- the widening of the spread so in essence instead of it it did not have any effect
- of lowering the cost of capital to anybody based on liore uh it did have an effect if you're
- based on the prime rate because the prime rate is strictly TI is strictly tied to the FED funds Target at 3
- percentage points above the FED funds Target uh so that moved in the right direction but the liore did not move in
- um uh the direction and this actually causes a situation that we used to only teach in history books something
- called the liquidity trap because the liquidity trap which goes back to can's is even if the
- Central Bank lowers to zero it is not low enough to induce uh uh either lending or borrowing uh the cost of
- capital is not going down to the firms and the Central Bank can't cannot go anywhere below zero and that that is
- that was really kind of scary in the sense that my goodness the FED is moving and the borrowing rates are moving in uh
- the opposite direction many times we really had ever seen this before was in the Great Depression in the US situation
- and around the world actually kan's wrote about it in the UK and in Japan after their bubble burst in 1990 and
- they also went down to zero rates and also could not get uh the banks uh lending um now I want to talk a little
- bit about uh the the plan of action uh the the equity injections that are were done under the pson plan and
- have been done in Europe um there's an old expression you can lead a horse to water but you can't
- force them to drink um you can give Banks Capital but you cannot force them to lend uh the there's a lot of people who
- think the only problem with lending was that they were short of capital well that was one problem but not the only
- problem the other problem was that they feared for the solvency of who they are lending to uh you know you could you
- could give me Capital you can give me borrowing rates at zero but if I think there's a 10% probability the person I'm
- lending to is going to go bankrupt I'm not going to lend to them uh and I don't care how much Capital you
- give to me I'm not going to lend to them I think too little attention has been paid to that question uh I I did
- remember Paulson went out and said uh uh we we want the banks to lend you know like you know that's that that
- exhortation is going to let them make them lend uh that's not necessarily going to going to be the case um let let
- me say something else and then I'm going to go through a couple other things when the central banks lowered by
- 50 basis points and that did not help I think that really scared the equity market like it hadn't been scared
- in in decades the central bank is finally out of options lost power you can go down to zero and that's not going
- to help and that is uh kind of a panic situation because you always felt the FED could come to your rescue and what
- was happening with live B rising at the same time fed funds Target was falling was exactly the opposite again an
- absolutely unprecedented situation um I was actually proposing some other things
- that could be done and may still have to be done if the situation gets worse again um how about rebasing liary to the
- FED funds rate like the prime rate is uh the bank maybe the Federal Reserve could
- go in and said hey we're if you if the banks rebase to Fed funds Target instead of Li will will guarantee the lines of
- credit or some such inducement to get them to do so and then you can guarantee the cost of capital is going down maybe
- back up interbank borrowing now there has been some of that among the European Banks not really here in the US uh one
- of the problems is Banks fear other banks are going to go under and that's one reason the liore which is the
- interbank borrowing rate has gone up so much the FED could guarantee in bank borrowings to some extent and lower uh
- lower those costs guarantee private lending the bank Federal Reserve has already set up a commercial paper
- facility uh the first time in its history that is going to uh guarantee uh these the smooth turnover per of
- commercial paper to non-financial firms never done it to non-financial firms at all remember the broker dealers
- and the investment Banks were all classified as Financial firms uh um um maybe the government will have to
- guarantee certain commercial paper and lines of credit these are Extreme Measures I'm saying there's measures
- that can in fact uh be taken uh later on and then of course there always the question if stock market doesn't stop
- falling you can always buy stock index Futures actually there is precedent there are countries who have done that
- uh as a way to support uh the stock market now obviously if you're going to do uh any of the guarantee on lending
- backing it up you've got to take an equity position and and in fact the FED has taken Equity positions in in these
- uh uh uh uh infusions uh warrants on the purchase of uh the common price uh common shares but my main point is that
- there are there are other measures these are emergency me measures uh I I I felt
- that people were slip were falling into the the chasm of the FED is out of options and there are other options
- emergency options the FED in fact can take care of um I'm going to talk about the markets a little
- bit uh stock market and its valuation as a result of the plunge around the world
- uh this is a a Bloomberg screen I just took it this morning it is the PE ratios of the major markets around the
- world and the final three columns the uh third column from the right is the price
- earnings ratio on the basis of the last 12 months of reported earnings current year estimate is on the basis of 2008
- estimated earnings next year is 2009 um the average historical PE ratio of the US market is around 15 just to
- give you a little bit of a benchmark on what the valuations uh are today they they are
- extraordinarily low now I know your earnings are going down and I'm going to address that in in just a moment but as
- you can see on the basis of the Dow the SNP uh 12 uh 1012 this year and next year NASDAQ is a little bit higher uh
- the Toronto is uh 10 and8 Mexican Bola is 10 and N take a look at Europe that that's the middle grouping there I've
- never seen Europe so low the Europe stock 50 is uh is seven across the board even on when you do it on the basis of
- the last 12 months of earnings and going forward on earnings um and you can see markets is
- as far down as four and five PE ratios we the last time we got down to single digit PE ratios in the market was the
- 1970s that was the last time that we had actually gotten down this low in the market and we had a very bad situation
- there because there we had a lot of inflation and we had instead of low interest rates we had extraordinarily
- High interest rates where someone could buy a treasury bill and bond and guarantee themselves 15% interest take a
- look at the third group in Asia um I don't know I'm going to have to ask uh uh dick marsten about this I don't I've
- never seen the Nick selling an 11 and 12 times earnings um it's usually at 25 even
- after the bubble burst usually at 25 and 30 hangen is nine uh 10 the Shanghai index that Shanghai index a year ago was
- selling at 55 times earnings it's at 15 today uh the S&P that's the Australian index 8 9 10 11
- times earnings The Straits times is the Singapore index it's around the world now what
- about the objection yeah but we're in a recession earnings are going down as fast as stock price some people even say
- faster I think we have to look a little bit at how you would value stocks um this is the quarterly earnings of the
- S&P over the last approximately 15 years and uh with this is the recession of 1991 this is a recession of 2001 now
- we're in the the downshift right over here um uh this is the regression trend line people who talk about earnings
- going down down have to remember stock prices are not just based on the next 12 months of earnings in fact when you say
- that a stock has a 15 PE ratio you're saying it's worth 15 times the ongoing earnings only 115th or
- 6% of a Stock's price on average is the earnings of the next 12 months 94% is after that you have to look to the long
- run unless you think we're going to be be in a permanent recession for the next you know 10 or 15 years which hasn't
- been the case um I have 3 minutes left I will I will get done uh at that time um
- let me just mention the red line over there uh is now at a trend line of $23 this is quarterly earnings on the S&P
- 500 so I'm kind of giving you the trend uh this morning the P the S&P was at $981 $92 share is a PE ratio of
- 10.7 now based on normalized earnings as I say um you don't often get down that low that's an earnings yield of between
- 9 and 10% uh going forward um I think extremely attractive here now let me give you a 40-year graph of the stock
- market um this is the S&P 500 over the last 40 years going all the way back to 1970 it's a regression line
- with one and two standard deviations uh off the regression line um if you as I do I do believe in mean
- reversion in long-term stock returns so that there you know you deviate in the short run but you eventually return to
- the to the mean uh we see getting down to the the green line in 1970s uh 1982 which was at uh was
- actually at the bottom of the greatest bull market in US history uh over the next 20 years you also see by the way
- that in 2000 right over here in the bubble we were uh above the two-standard deviation uh and at risk uh let me
- mention that at the bottom where we were two weeks ago you see the fallof right there we were three and a half standard
- deviations below never had been that low in the last five decades below uh the mean um you know that doesn't guarantee
- that you're going to get back there that fast but certainly it is saying that uh
- unless unless our economy is permanently going to fall apart which I don't believe is going to be the case um and
- we can talk about later about whether we you know how longterm and serious this is compared to the 30s or even the
- Japanese situation um uh the uh the case for equities is pretty is pretty uh persuasive and let me say one last
- sentence um I think we all recognize Warren Buffett as a great investor and um there's not very many
- times that an ordinary investor can buy a stock that he buys at a price cheaper than he
- bought but about three weeks ago he bought into General Electric um he bought into Goldman Sachs uh and took
- warrants and options on that at strike prices that are below that are above the current price of those two stocks um and
- which means the ordinary investor can now actually get into the market even as as it's risen and it's you know it's up
- about 10% or 15% almost from it's its low uh at a price that uh Warren Buffett uh uh got in at a higher price so uh he
- has a long-term look and he thinks there as low as they were in the 1970s I say they're as low as they were in the 70s
- if not even lower uh and are attractive um for uh investors thank you we uh know
- we're in a little bit of trouble when Jeremy quotes canes favorably and so but I I agree with him that stocks are
- probably at this point not a bad investment for for the long run um I'm going to shift focus a little bit um
- more towards thinking about uh government regulation and how people behave in this current market and I
- don't have any overheads for my little diet tribe here and so but let me kind of uh start off by with some modesty and
- that is we're in many ways all shooting from the hip here and so there's lots of
- information that's kind of unfolding over time and certainly I'll likely we can't 30% of what I say within
- 6 months from now as more information gets released even by next weekend but at this point like I'm the academic I'll
- speak with great force and uh pretend like I'm have great Authority and know what I'm talking about here um in terms
- of uh let me go through basically I think three points here that I'm I'm trying to cover first is I think people
- do in fact contrary to what lot of Comas will say act stupid even when their own money is on the line
- so that's kind of my first point and so in many ways I'm uh traditional uh rational expectations Economist but I
- think people do in fact make fundamental errors and I will go through some of that but whereas Joe stiglet and others
- would Trace these problems to principal agent problems within the firm I'm going
- to argue and therefore he would argue for more government regulation we need government regulation to protect people
- from their themselves and their mistakes I'm going to argue just the opposite I think government regulation in fact is
- encouraging people to act very stupid and government regulation itself instead of we thinking that we need more
- government regulation we ought to really be rethinking a lot of the government regulation that we currently have and
- that's kind of uh wrapping up with my my third Point whereas where a lot of people are calling for more government
- regulations I I'm going to argue that bad regulations are actually much worse than no regulations when people
- understand their own assets are on the line so let me the first point about people acting very stupid I I think uh
- the usual belief in the economics of course is people are rational I basically agree with that um because if
- people are are really dumb then smart people can come along and Arbitrage away their money and figure out how to take
- their money from them and that's not going to be some like people who last and sustain for a very long time the
- last big mistake that the market supposedly made was in the year 2000 and after the do bust and it was actually
- not clear that people investors in year 1999 with high PE ratios were actually in fact making a mistake um that they
- were actually being irrational at that point in particular one can always tell stories about how Bubbles are really not
- bubbles some people even defend that the Dutch tulet bubbles were not really bubbles that there were reasons behind
- it that made total sense I'm not going to go that far but if you believe that the 2000.com bus was was so easily
- predictable most of those lots of those assets were publicly traded you should be shorting those assets and made a lot
- of money so I think lots of claims that people make after the fact that the 2000
- problem was largely foreseeable is just kind of ego and um a lot of hindsight uh
- but in the current market I think lots of the default rates uh on the in the current situation were in fact very
- foreseeable it it was well known at the time lots of the loans were going to reset and and in particular given the
- underwriting standards that evolve over time with no doc loans with negative arm
- loans where people aren't even making the full interest payments that a lot of people were going to be in really bad
- shape and in fact I was first made made aware of this problem a couple years ago
- spending lots of time in the San Francisco Bay Area a lot of my friends were telling me about these great deals
- that they're getting in their mortgages and um with the three and fiveyear resets with the loan where the interest
- rates suddenly go up and that would be kind of them little warnings and saying it's kind of crazy you can't really
- afford that what's going to happen 3 to 5 years and they'll say oh no no there's
- no problem at all even if I have to sell in three to five years of course I'm going to make a big capital gains and
- you know I'll be making a lot of money maybe I'll find a flight place I can actually afford now that's not a bad
- strategy if you're the only one playing that game but if everybody's playing that game that's obviously a fallacy of
- composition prices are going to go down but the difference between now and then is that it's a little harder in the sub
- crime case for smart people to clear the market as easily in particular um while
- it's true some smart people took bets in terms of the subprime problem and with some there's some limited um trading
- instruments and and it's also true lots of the banks could have issued fewer asset back Securities it's hard to
- directly short another person's home price in particular in other words if I think your home price is is too high
- it's there's not much I can really do about it to to short that that that price and uh yeah there's other
- instruments I can trade that are correlated with that risk and I can maybe U make some money off that but
- there's no reason to believe that home prices overall were going to be were going to be efficient that there is some
- market clearing mechanism and so lots of the asset back Securities the CMOS and others were basically pooling these
- loans and it was well known that they were highly leveraged and exposed to even very small default rates and they
- allowed Equity holders to make loans on barreled money and sell off the loans make more loans of proceeds and so forth
- so Banks and Brokers became Originators of debt but they are no longer bearing the risk associated with the
- underwriting and this leads to an obvious moral hazard problem whenever you divorce the underwriting from the U
- from the risk risk-taking at first glance you would wonder why would anybody buy these packages of Securities
- um given that they should be huge hugely full of junk given that people are underwriting aren't bearing the risk
- well this is where the r agencies came in the rating agencies were supposed to be the control for moral hazard in
- particular junk stuff was going to get priced lower and because it get got a lower rating better stuff would get a
- higher rating therefore priced better the markets were supposed to be efficient again the rating so the rating
- agencies played a very crucial role in all this but what they basically did is that they rated too much based on what's
- called a preferences of the underline Securities that is they would divide these things up into different tranches
- and basically say if if you're first in line will give these a AAA if you're second in line will give this a little
- bit of lower rating and so forth that strategy that trick usually works pretty well when you're talking about stuff
- that's uh a lot of risk subject to firm specific risk but it doesn't work so well when we're talking about stuff
- that's heavily based on system systemic risk and where it doesn't really matter if you're first or ninth in in in line
- and the the fact of the matter is S&P and moody moody the two main rating agencies had pretty lousy models and
- certainly there will be a lot of discussion about how they face conflicts of interest and how they are paid and so
- forth economists would generally argue they care about their reputation that that conflict of interests should not um
- be be such a problem I I I think there there are issues there but a central mistake that investors played in all of
- this was that they were trusting the rating agencies way too much there there are endowments Pension funds and many
- others who basically looked at the looked at these um asset backed debt said hey they're the highest rating not
- really understanding why they were had they were paying a 10020 basis points more than the other AAA ratings and so
- they would buy this stuff and the rating agencies really just play the role of providing cover and they were more more
- than willing to do that for for our price going forward there's another crisis emerging it's much bigger than
- the subprime one and that's the entitlement problems that the United States facing uh in terms of our social
- security Medicare and Medicaid programs um you think the one or two trillion dollars that the government will spend
- on subprime M that's a lot of money we Face a present VAR shortfall in those Pro those entitlement programs about $70
- trillion a much bigger problem so a train wreck is coming the subprime mess is not the train wreck but but there is
- it's more like an appetizer to mix my metaphors for a much bigger train wreck that's that's on its way and right now
- the rating agencies are once again doing a lousy job by looking at a simply explicit paper that that that's printed
- and not looking at uh the the implicit debt the second main point I want to get across is I actually think instead of
- talking saying people are myopic we need more government regulation government regulation itself is a cause of lots of
- myopia in particular I think instead of thinking about government regulation meaning is to save people from
- themselves we all think about how government regul really gives a false sense of confidence
- and and relaxation five examples really quickly here the first one is mortgages it was Freddy and Fanny were
- always a ticking Time Bomb it it was it was obvious that this problem was going to happen why Congress basically used
- Freddy and Fanny to basic and as well as other Community Development programs to
- try to increase the amount of home ownership somehow home ownership do the neighborhood Network effects was a good
- thing we wanted to promote this thing the the problem is fenny and Franny were technically private Market vehicles and
- they were privatized some time some time ago they weren't explicit obligations of
- the US government but it was well known that they were moral obligations the federal government would come in members
- of Congress talked about this and that's a basically the worst possible setup that you can have a private entity out
- there that is has an implicit guarantee associated with it but you have no way of controlling Its Behavior there you're
- just begging for lots of lots of moral ha there was nothing that was being priced into their actions the way to
- think about regulation it's like a good game of tennis a good play of tennis in tennis you want to play aggressively at
- the net or you want to be pretty relaxed and play at the Baseline you never want
- to play in between and regulations really have to be that way either you're going to be aggressive you're going to
- do it right or you're going to play at the Baseline and be pretty minimalistic about it but you don't play in between
- and this is a clear example where the government's playing in between and everything got screwed up
- California saw it this the same way I I was teaching at Stanford at the time California decided to deregulate
- electricity but they didn't really want to deregulate all the way so they kind of went halfway in the middle and so
- because they wanted lower prices but they still wanted government control what did we have we had rolling the gym
- multiple times the lights would go out I mean rolling blackouts and so forth because the government regulation wasn't
- at the net wasn't at the Baseline another example of poor tennis play was basically how the FDIC Works following
- um the deregulation of the glass deagle act in 1999 in particular the FDC of course you
- know guarantees Banks deposits and it it requires therefore Bank Reserves and it's which is a function of the loans
- that are outstanding in made but after the deregulation Banks were able to take off
- some of those loans off its balance sheets with securitization they were able to reduce the amount of um assets
- that they needed to hold in their balance sheets but using complicated transactions they were still
- fundamentally exposed to a lot of the risk and so the the bottom line there is again the government has this guarantee
- it's not properly regulating it's kind of plain again in the middle I also think the government screws up in how it
- validates rating agencies in particular federal government rules around commercial paper money market accounts
- and so forth give a legal authority to select National rating agencies S&P Moody and and I think they just get too
- much government backing too much valid um the fact of the matter is rating agencies stink Moody stinks S&P stinks
- they basically are good at predicting Sol insolvency risk about 24 hours before it happens they they basically
- are terrible in predicting insolvency risk at the time Dimension that's actually useful for writing contracts
- there and why would you give such validation to such incompetent institutions and so I think we should
- really have more capital m in this area more information more and being exchanged and certainly allow more
- contracts being uh designed on more sources of of information and speaking of information I I told you I was going
- to be in my Soap Box sarbanes oxay sarbanes Oxley I think is a is a bill I was part of the administration when we
- wrote that bill it gives a a tremendous Source uh uh a sense of a false sense of
- accountability and a sense of uh accomplishment it has whole provisions on risk management but the the
- provisions of sarban oxy for risk management are extraordinarily weak and they really provide nothing other than a
- a a false sense of confidence I agree in my last example here I agree that September 15th was a was a big day but I
- also want to say that just don't look at the reduction in stock market prices and
- say there's a role for government here I want to turn it around and say government plays a role in causing some
- of those things too treasury in the FED itself I think produced a sense of urgency that was was interpreted by the
- market is having some inside information keep a mark As Jeremy pointed out markets are forward looking I was also
- often been asked by reporters during the last couple weeks was Leman and AIG were
- they really all in that bad of shape and my honest answer is I don't know because
- the thing about these 144a placements and other contracts is that we really don't know their exposure until they
- they declare bankruptcy that's kind of the irony of of of all this we don't really know how bad in shape they they
- were until until that happens I think Treasury and the FED played a kind of a role of of a signaling by saying there's
- a big urgency there's a big problem the market said they have inside information
- there must be a big problem there must be an urgency here and so did they do the right thing my inclination is maybe
- they did do some the right thing but don't simply look at stock prices and say we needed government intervention
- sometimes government intervention creates its own need and we we need to in fact um ask ourselves and these are
- some of the comments that might be amending in six months as more information comes out but we can't just
- simply assume markets are bad therefore we need government sometimes it can it can also work um the other direction so
- in the last two minutes let me ask the kind of the question so what do we need to do going
- forward and there will be certain lots of especially with the new the new Congress and new president um trying to
- discuss and their first inclination in fact the writings on the wall always talking about we need more
- regulation my first suggestion is let's first pause stop and really have an open
- honest discussion some reasonable steps obviously can be can be uh taken we need
- a balanced discussion but we also part of that discussion is not what more rules to add but looking at the existing
- rules and how they contribute to the problem sarbanes oxy is an example of Regulation that was done in a very
- reactive way and that probably in in many ways cause more harm than good many of the provisions of sarban oxy only
- reward accounting firm and law firms many what I call legitimate firms that don't that doesn't include law firms um
- Now list on the London aim precisely because of the enormous complexities um that sarban oxy cause especially for
- small midcap firms um and sbin hly also creates I think an enormous sense of of secur a sense of security and there's
- there's a lot of parallels between these events uh today and then I was at treasury ad minist uh at that time I
- advised the Federal Open Market Committee and the financial VY uh regulatory panel at at the time Congress
- had other ideas though they had to they had to make a statement so first they issued a subpoena to of my box including
- every in email that included the word Enron and and other people in the administration's inboxes but then they
- decided Well we really need to pass this very tough law this law Sor Oxley was very reactionary and it was overstepping
- at the time the logic but that we had though was that it was okay to go too far because what we could always do if
- we went too far is we could always unwind later it was better to be safe than sorry what is what we kept on um uh
- uh saying and so what we have now is we have a law that has very high complexity
- very high compliance cost that clearly hurts in my opinion shareholders of small and midcap firms in particular and
- it's not true that those e it's now easy to unwind those parts now and the reason
- why is because once you make a bad law a whole cottage industry of accountants and legal forms ously is created to
- support that law and they hire a lobbyist and they they argue for continuing that law cuz that's how they
- get fees the small midcap in Minnesota doesn't have a chance and so we're not going to see much unraveling of sarbanes
- oxy even though it clearly was an overreaction uh uh uh to the problem so I I'm afraid of the same type of
- overaction happening today and we need to be I think very careful and 15 seconds I think the f one thing I would
- do is I would impose instead of having Congress design a law like with sarban Oxley let's create a panel and of
- experts much like we did when we Congress couldn't actually pull the trigger and require the expense of the
- stock options that was too political you had too many people from Blue States um
- who are supposed to be anti- business but in this case they were they they favored um um bad accounting and so they
- they uh what Congress did is they set up a separate panel that actually eventually did it sometimes we need to
- have that cover and so my my suggestion is that we it be very suspicious of anything that Congress Rush rushes out
- after the first session um next year and we we need to uh proceed very carefully
- and with great purpose thanks well it's um probably not optimal to follow uh four star speakers um and uh uh so I'm
- going to doing a lot of editing on the Fly I guess I would add one even more depressing detail to Kent sm's speech
- the glass deagle act you may recall was passed in the depression the early days of the depression in fact and after a
- mere two years uh Senator Carter glass went to the floor of the Senate and and uh recanted and wished that they would
- uh in fact roll it back well it didn't happen until Graham leech Bley in 1997 so it can take a a very very long time
- to unw unwind bad legislation what I'm going to do is take you through um a lot more rapidly than
- um uh I had meant because um a lot of this material has been covered but I wanted to give you a little bit of my
- the background of uh what I saw as the cause and um why I'm so concerned about uh what the consequences may be um
- securitization was as many people have mentioned actually modeled on the uh actions of the government sponsored
- entities even before they were government sponsored entities um they were in fact government Enterprises they
- were spun off by uh lynon Johnson who wanted to pay for guns and butter and thought if he could put these uh
- entities off balance sheet which Congress has certainly liked then he could have his policies and not pay for
- them and uh that has been a winning solution with Congress for a very long time well when you thought about how you
- would replicate that with private securitizations the key challenge was how you substituted for the government
- guarantee against credit risk you had to have some means of making up for the fact that the government was not going
- to guarantee private securitizations um and there were essentially three ways of doing that one
- was to develop very good statistical models that would tell you how much of a buffer you had to create in order to
- make some of the Securities in a securitization equivalent to uh a a able a whatever you liked but usually
- investment grade risk um this was uh also buttressed by ratings from the statistical ratings organizations
- Moody's Fitch S&P as we've heard um and um uh Kent's Judgment of of their performance I think has um certainly
- shown up in in recent times although they've really done a rather good job uh on corporates until very recently
- although he's quite right that they're never uh ahead of markets it's always a lag and uh uh never really um forward
- looking at all um and then finally if you were really really worried you'd want to have some monoline insurance
- backing up the credit risk so that you could be very very sure that your security was actually worth what it was
- rated to be the result was um an absolute explosion of uh Innovations um we had R&B's cdos CDO squared a asset
- commercial paper sivs SIV lights and went on and on and we developed a huge off-balance sheet banking sh system
- private that amounts to about $ 111 trillion um it helped feed what was a regulatory induced and this sort of
- feeds into Kent's story as well a regulatory induced demand for very high quality assets The Regulators uh in many
- cases required institutions to hold at least investment grade and sometimes triaa rated Securities well it turns out
- there not that very that many AAA rated corporations in the world and so by securitization you could synthesize AAA
- rated Securities by essentially developing a structure that would give you the equivalent in terms of default
- um and uh that was uh used even with subprime mortgages where no one of the mortgages would have been remotely uh
- labeled AAA but through the magic of securitization you could easily transform as much as
- 85% of them into AAA this just gives you a a quick overview of the structure um but it could get uh hideously complex
- very quickly I took it out to CDO squared where you're taking the lower tranches and retrenching and retrenching
- them but noticing each time you're ending up with some AAA tranches and I could have gone out to CD Cubes but
- that's enough to give you an idea that the people who are buying in products either had to do a hell of a lot of
- homework to find out what was underlying it or simply we're just looking at the ratings um it became a very very
- important source of income to um lcf I is is U the kind of uh language that the bank of England and IMF use for the most
- important banks in the world there about 16 of them and you can read the peus and
- chartreuse blocks as being a sort of proxy for the fees they were making on securitization so it became a really
- important source of income and it's one of the reasons we've seen investment Banks collapse so readily um they were
- so dependent on this source of income which has dried up and may have dyed up for the foreseeable future that uh they
- really are going to have to reinvent themselves all of this came to a halt when uh they were confronted with the
- brute fact that they were really dealing with uh assets that weren't nearly as good as they thought they were uh keep
- your eye on the left screen if I could figure out how to use the um but I can't uh anyhow take a look at the subprime
- section um we should have a laser pointer uh that uh I haven't really quite figured out but the blue was
- thought to be the worst that could ever happen uh 2000 was just before the recession in this kind of lending uh for
- reasons that can't described you expect the peak default rate to be about 3 years after the loan was issued because
- in sub prime lending the custom is to give a teaser rate that's very very low and then at the third year you jump it
- up sometimes with a four or 500 basis point spread above lior so you go to a very from a very very low rate to a very
- very high rate after three years and that's where you expect to see Peak defaults um the idea was not that
- anybody was ever going to pay those High rates but that house prices would rise so rapidly that by the time you got to
- that point you could refinance and keep going and that was the context of what was basically 75 years of upward price
- movements well notice that in the more recent vintages um 2005 as dick Marson pointed
- out was sort of a turning point that nobody seemed to recognize 2006 and 2007 especially you were seeing delinquency
- rates that exceeded the peak rate that you thought was the worst possible within months which meant that some
- people were walking away from the houses without ever having made a payment um that led to um a uh breakdown and it
- was very clear that there was a huge breakdown in underwriting standards at many different levels and it undermined
- the three pillars of that under that were the uh foundation for support for private securitizations and that was
- statistical ratings models ratings agencies and monoline insurance all three collapsed uh first the ratings
- models the um Institution that had the strongest incentives to build the best models were those that were underwriting
- the most of this debt and they were also the institutions that showed the largest
- losses and showed them first and they showed them them repeatedly which indicated that not only did they not get
- it right first time the first time they couldn't get it right the second or third time either uh bear Stern which
- was one of the leaders of the pack had two hedge funds that blew up uh City Group maril Lynch UBS uh on on and on um
- had repeated write Downs that were basically because they hadn't modeled things appropriately then it came to the
- ratings agencies well people were accustomed to thinking about corporate ratings the very worst year in corporate
- rating history was 2001 the yellow represents Three Notch downgrades um which is pretty severe but
- notice that in the corporate world 2001 being where we lost Enron and WorldCom there were really negligible Three Notch
- downgrades except in the below investment grade uh range which everybody knew was very volatile and was
- not very surprising but look at what happened in the 2007 uh 2008 and it's only very it's I guess of 1312 2008 to
- the subprime backed Securities look at the Triple B category in particular 68% of those were downgraded Three Notch
- which took them from investment grade to below investment grade which meant that
- many of the institutions that were holding them had to get rid of them now you might think looking at this that
- they did a much better job at triaa but it simply reveals a flaw in their in the
- way in which they approached it in these nested Securities you had to sort of start at the bottom and work up until
- you got to the AAA to know just how bad it was uh these have now been selling for uh 50 60 cents on the dollar and so
- didn't really fair much better and as soon as monol line Insurance looked like it was going to have to pay up um the
- stock prices of monoline insurers collapsed and the credit default uh spreads went up to a th basis points um
- the IMF has something very clever uh called a heat diagram that shows how quickly the crisis spread and um in this
- diagram it's good to be green that means you're within one standard deviation of
- the way you're usually priced if you're yellow it's not so good you're within one to four standard deviations of the
- way you're usually priced but uh if you're red it's really terrible you're being priced within four standard
- deviations of the normal and what you see is the pattern of exposure it began with subprime and it really began um
- dick noted that that that one really should have known about it in 2005 but it was completely unambiguous in
- February 2007 when HSBC made a full account of its subprime losses and its American subsidiary household finance
- and if you kept dancing as Charles Prince did after that you were simply not paying attention or you had a very
- severe case of cognitive dissonance um it spread to Banks uh it continued of course with subprime and then as we
- found more and more Banks were involved Banks and other financial institutions became involved then all sorts of
- instruments that that relied on the three pillars of privatization either they relied on
- ratings or they relied on monoline insurance like municipal bonds or they relied on um a statistical models for
- their value for a long time there was a discussion of decoupling that the emerging markets were going to be able
- to manage on their own that they had self- sustained demand and you had China and and uh India that were sort of
- leading the way and I think Jeremy's shown you how that's unfortunately ended the wrong way way it should have been
- apparent in August 2007 that this was a crisis of decapitalization there were major losses that were uh absolutely
- apparent although not revealed um and there were losses because of holding some of these Securities some of these
- institutions were dumb enough to eat eat their own cooking uh and there were losses from honoring implicit guarantees
- uh that were backing up off-balance sheet commitment to this this whole private uh system of uh off-balance
- sheet banking there were also losses of pipelines of assets that could no longer
- be taken to the market and securitized that was basically the northern Rock story and um as we saw it was a very
- important source of Revenue that that simply had disappeared from future earnings which um is one of the points
- that Jeremy was making about how you think about what the price of a stock should be um the capital challenge was
- not only to replace it and Dick showed that they've really not been uh keeping up with the amount they've had to write
- down um but it was also stockpiling capital and that's one of the reasons the recovery is usually so slow because
- uh the market starts to demand a whole lot more Capital than Regulators do um and the unknown of course is how much of
- the off balance sheet stuff is ultimately going to have to be brought back on the balance sheet the variations
- in disclosure across countries have been very harmful because this is an integrated Global Market with very
- different disclosure practices the SEC requires quarterly disclosure Europe um is more principles based uh less
- prescriptive um the CFO can exercise professional judgment about the scale and timing of lost recognitions which is
- one of the reasons that you saw a lot of shod and Freud in in Europe until they all panicked in in August because they
- they took their time in letting out the bad news uh but the upshot is that the same asset can be valued quite
- differently in different institutions the peacemeal release of increasingly larger losses was a really
- bad strategy if indeed one could call it that it raised questions about the the Integrity of financial reporting and it
- really in the end raised questions about whether management understood its own its own risk
- positions um the fed I'm not quite sure what happened to our framing here but uh
- the bail out of bear was where things got really panicky and it's because um the Fed was really afraid of submitting
- what they considered to be a very large very opaque institution that they had no
- oversight of to um B the process of resolution um and the reason is that one of the the common tools of bankruptcy
- courts everywhere is to exercise stays and stays can be fatal in markets that trade literally 247
- where people have to worry about their positions and and how they're going to end up um so the the real concern was
- that it could have fatal damage to the primary dealer Market well in the meantime the man the government managed
- to bail out Freddy and Fanny uh and when it got to Layman uh a number of people thought it was obvious that they would
- have to bail out Layman because Layman was at least twice as big as bear and probably much more complicated uh and
- indeed if you're talking about the deserving insolvent l had actually tried harder than bear to to keep itself from
- the brink um but they didn't um in the wake of the fanny and Freddy uh uh bailouts they seemed to want to show
- that there was some limit to their willing to subsidize um and the FED had had examiners in all four of the
- remaining investment Banks daily since then and felt they could predict um uh what the consequences could be
- Unfortunately they didn't uh they didn't realize that it was held by um major uh
- money market mutual funds they didn't realize that Layman had comingled uh customers money with its own money in
- London where lots of hedge funds were relying on uh access to their Prime brokerage accounts and couldn't get it
- and um so that is and I I've agreed with all the panelists that was really um the
- time that things turned to Terror um by an intervention policy that seemed increasingly ad hoc and desperate you
- saw that that central banks Were You could argue if you were trying to make the best possible case for the central
- bank that it was their old favorite policy of constructive ambiguity which I've never believed in but I would argue
- instead it was really destructive ambiguity because nobody knew who would be next um this is a cartoon from The
- Economist that um is of course the Humpty Dumpty fairy tale and uh one of the king's horses in one of the King's
- Men is saying it appears this uh is having a fairy tale ending you may remember it didn't end well for Humpty
- Dumpty uh you can see AIG teetering on the brink and at the rest you see Fanny and Layman and so forth uh with the
- sulter behind Layman saying shares and glue should be rising high but there was Terror throughout the market because you
- really couldn't predict what the government might do next markets react really negatively to uncertainty you had
- a massive flight to Quality and to simplicity there were huge outflows from what some
- people believe are the safest of funds next to treasury bills institutional money funds and we saw that uh the
- reserve primary fund and put putam fund actually uh had to close and uh that led
- to real terror in the marketplace uh it was a loss of confidence in the financial system the punch line there is
- can I interest you in a faith-based deposit um which began to show signs of panic where you have a man here saying
- give me all my money or else uh to a a situation where Banks became increasingly desperate for liquidity
- that you began to see in uh interbank markets with with huge uh markups now I I would have a disagreement I think with
- um some of the interpretations you've heard of uh the interbank rate spread uh but we'll we'll hold that to later this
- is simply showing how incredibly um Innovative the FED has been taking all sorts of collateral uh from all sorts of
- people for all sorts of terms um without um until very recently having much impact at all on conditions and I think
- it's fundamentally because they were trying to deal with what was really a solvency shock and should have been
- apparent as a solvy shock by supplying more liquidity and that just doesn't work this is what's happened to the
- fed's balance sheet notice that it's almost doubled and it's still going up because just today they announced they
- were going to have a new facility for money market mutual funds um more broadly the problem has been excessive
- leverage and it's been mainly centered in the household sector and um in the financial sector which and where it's
- really quadrupled um with a Year's inventory of unsold homes it's inevitable that we're
- going to have larger losses and uh more deleveraging um deleveraging has had all
- sorts of financial institutions even hedge funds where you can see the green line going down precipitately um it has
- even hit Main Street um where uh uh what used to be the Friendly Loan company has
- become the go to Hill loan company and sadly as we all know it's hit the financial sector really really hard uh
- and it's not just the financial sector it's it's others as well um the problem of course is that the treasury insisted
- on uh interpreting this as a liquidity problem as recently as the tarp fund with this bizarre $700 billion program
- to buy taxic toxic asset or toxic um assets um uh there's another cartoon that I skipped that showed them bearing
- them and it was a bizarre political gesture uh for some reason they seem to think it would be easier to sell as
- buying toxic assets from the people who owned them and had created them than to talk about actually doing something for
- homeowners or for um uh rebuilding the institutions um Congress originally rejected it but when Ben banki told them
- that we wouldn't have an economy if they didn't pass it they came up with something uh in addition to production
- for makers of wooden arrows and rum and and a monthly subsidy for bicyclists um they actually came up with some pretty
- good programs um and one of them is the treasury that can now invest 250 billion
- in Bank preferred sh shares uh 125 of it has already been allocated uh the remaining
- 125 has to be applied for by the middle of next fund next uh month uh the FED can purchase a commercial paper now uh
- starting October 27th which is a market you could seriously start about making you could seriously think about making
- more liquid there's no way to revive the market for Junk Securities and so that was misguided from the start the F FDIC
- has also been hyperactive they've raised Insurance to 250,000 on um uh regular deposits from
- 100,000 with with utterly no discussion about it they've offered unlimited deposit uh Insurance on non-interest
- bearing accounts that businesses hold and they're also going to start guaranteeing subordinated debt for three
- years so if there was ever any hope of having Market discipline in the system it's pretty much gone um and um the
- European hm this has cut pretty badly but should say the uee the European Union has uh acted with surprising speed
- and deceptive unanimity um and you can see the kinds of bailouts they've been doing it looks the same but it's it's
- not quite the same um this is um sort of led to worldwide round of of coordinated
- government guarantees and subsidies that have have made moral hazard really rampant and have really I think made it
- very difficult to see where we go from here um punchline here is now we just have to sit back and wait for the FED to
- Veil us out well where are all these ad hoc measures taking us um deep government involvement um in the banking
- system and it's not and there's really no sense of how they're going to exit or any vision of where they should be going
- you have quasi ownership um of banks with very few protections for taxpayers the US is pouring in perverted stock but
- with no cost to existing shareholders um and uh no push to write down or actually
- reveal the Bad Assets uh which the Europeans at least have done we're ending up with a tiered banking system
- where the nine favored banks are like gsse with all of the problems that we faced with the gses and and very few of
- the controls um and the liquidity programs have basically been nothing but for barrance they've been putting off
- problems that have been growing not shrinking um Housing Finance is is an open question nobody knows how we're
- going to do it in the future but it's very clear that the government's playing a bigger and bigger role um and it is
- going to be a bigger and bigger liability on the B on the government's balance sheet which could in fact uh
- ultimately affect its ratings um one of the key questions is how far house prices will fall uh the average um we
- have uh some reason to believe that there's a third wave of defaults on Equity loans and Prime loans and then
- the real economy effects are just sitting in luckily we're sitting on a market that's not nearly as bad as most
- people think uh actually 25 million people have have paid off their houses and um 55 million have mortgages that uh
- and of those 51 are paying on time it's really only 4 million that are um behind
- and uh only 2% of those are in foreclosure as opposed to 50% in the Great Depression um I think one of the
- key questions is how you um U restore faith in securitization because private securitization amounts to almost 12
- trillion and there's just not enough capital in the world to put that back on institutions balance sheets so we have
- to think of some way to uh make it more transparent and more possible um and as you can see new issues of private
- securitizations have virtually disappeared um the key policy challenge I think that really nobody has discussed
- and Marty will be glad to hear these uh long awaited words in conclusion I think
- the really really tough problem facing us all is trying to figure out how um we can make the world safe for even the
- largest most uh uh the failure of even the largest most interconnected institutions it's not Beyond possibility
- but nobody seems to be working on it in terms of remedying the economic situation yesterday uh chairman Ben
- banki uh came out uh in favor of additional fiscal stimulus do you think that's appropriate at this juncture U
- and uh it it Unleashed a rather harsh response by Wall Street Journal today actually saying that uh this this was
- akin to his endorsement of Obama that he should have in their words begged off of
- any pronouncement on the fiscal side in fact even stating that in past prior to past elections fed Federal Reserve
- chairman would even beg off of even exercising monetary policy so should he have begged off and uh and and what
- should in your view uh be done in the area of either fiscal or monetary policy well let me comment
- that um I think he could be right uh I think fourth quarter looks horrendous the one we're in U
- um the estimates for GDP growth are now minus 2 to minus three for the this quarter that's one of the sharpest
- declines I think since uh Carter put credit card controls on um maybe it's too late to get uh a tax refund to boost
- holiday spending um that's what you'd really uh like to do um uh it did seem to work in the um uh second quarter and
- we had a fairly decent growth on GDP uh but I don't know whether we could get it
- in the hands of consumers fast enough uh anyway that's my opinion I actually agree with uh Jeremy
- uh but let me say that I I don't think the Fed chair should talk about fiscal policy I think Greenspan was wrong to
- talk about endorse the Bush tax cuts didn't quite endorse them but he certainly encouraged them and I think
- banki should focus on monetary policy the central bank really has to keep credibility with respect to bank
- regulation and monetary policy and there are enough other people who can talk about the need for for uh a stimulus
- package but I agree entirely with Jeremy that um we need a stimulus package sooner rather than later uh how it's
- designed will be a different issue um but I expect that as soon as the election is over uh the Congress will be
- back in session and we'll have something on the president's desk uh very soon uh
- president may not like it so it's a question of compromise to see what they actually do in terms of what to
- stimulate just just sending people $1,000 um an awful lot that doesn't get spent so perhaps we can do it a little
- more imaginatively this time but I I think there'll definitely be a stimulus package yeah I don't think you need to
- count on the uh chairman of the FED for encouragement to Congress to spend more money um and I I really do take Dick's
- Point very seriously I I think the fed's credibility is enormously important and
- I think they're really in danger of losing it um a lot of the reform packages have talked about giving them
- oversight of the entire Financial system and de facto they've more or less assumed it but the regulatory record is
- spotty at best uh it's certainly uneven it's unpredictable they've not done a good job of explaining what they're
- trying to do and if they really were the Architects as one has heard of the tarp
- plan to um buy that uh toxic debt from the people who created it um I think there they real
- questions about uh whether they don't have enough on their plate already to uh uh you think did you think the Fed was
- the architect and not Paulson I had heard that was the case sounds like a pulson plan to me well I think they both
- have to agree before they go out but I have been to seminars at the FED where people go through exercises where they
- believe that they can actually price the stuff and um the assumptions you can if
- you make if you're willing to make assumptions about future cash flows and the appropriate discount rate but the
- range of those assumptions can be huge um and uh I think that if they did not actually set out the plan they certainly
- gave him encouraging encouragement by uh indicating that now we know it's the Paulson plan because he clearly didn't
- know how to price this stuff he's Outsourcing it he's Outsourcing and he has friends who tell that for a lot of
- money I guess I would just make two quick points I think the role issue that we have to face as a long-term economy
- is that we are in dire need of fundamental tax reform and the problem with doing a little rebates here a
- little rebates there is it postpones the big discussion we have some of the highest effective tax rates on capital
- income in the world um we need fundamental tax reform and we use up our black powder we just sent up debate
- checks I think we need to have a serious discussion go beyond the simple short run let me push back on the panelist on
- 1 point2 and that is this idea of credibility of the FED it's not obvious to me that that's so important and I
- realize that I'm saying something that's completely the opposite but one way you
- could think about you know credibility it's predictability and that predictability can sometimes lead to
- moral hazard I think sometimes this idea of a mixed strategy where the government
- is less predictable about who it's going to bail out and how can actually have some feedbacks on
- dealing with moral hazard and so I think we the fact that it let some banks sink
- and some banks survive people are criticized and saying well that's a terrible thing it was inconsistent not
- obvious on an ongoing basis that's really the the bad strategy because now when I'm a bank and I can do stupid
- stuff it's not obvious where the if I'm going to be the one bailing out getting getting bailed out or not oh I
- absolutely agree and that's why I think the policy of uh constructive ambiguity it is is fundamentally unworkable
- because we usually can predict and we in fact have a very rigorous system for figuring out which banks we should bail
- out and which we shouldn't and what's distressing about the way all of this has happened is that if we had made the
- list of the nine biggest Banks two months before we did it would have included Washington Mutual and wacovia
- and we have no reason to believe that the nine on the list now are fundamentally that much stronger in fact
- if you want to see how just how unreliable public information about these institutions is think of the fact
- that just two weeks before viovia became insolvent Morgan Stanley one of the uh firms with the reputation for being able
- to Value anything was willing to sell itself to a firm that became bankrupt two two months later the the disclosure
- that we have is simply completely inadequate for the kind of business these banks are doing is there a
- question over on this side uh what changes would you anticipate in the hedge fund industry
- both in terms of Regulation as well as trading strategies of profitability I guess I'll I'll tackle that um I think
- that's the big unknown in terms of whether or not uh the new regulations will be extended to hedge funds um they
- um on there there's some real difficulties in conceiving exactly how they would be regulated um it's an
- international market um so I think we we'll we'll really have to wait and see what happens with the respect to
- regulation um it's uh there's going to be a lot of discussion of to to what extent should the traditional banking
- regulation be extended to other types of financial institutions I really personally doubt whether or not it will
- be extended to hedge funds um let me be a little cynical uh who are some of the biggest
- contributors to the incoming Administration the real test of the administration in with respect to hedge
- funds which is going to be very interesting as far as I'm concerned is is it going to be
- possible to actually impose income taxes on the income earned by hedge funds and
- private Equity Partners under the current law what happens is the income not the
- capital at risk but the income the carried interest is taxed at 15% rather than at the ordinary 35% 5%
- income tax rate an interesting question will be in the new Administration will they actually decide to tax the people
- who have donated so much money to them that's going to be interesting that's going to be a test litness test of
- whether or not they're serious about changing the income distribution in the United States my guess is they won't
- touch that thing but we'll see we'll see next year and the following year will the new Administration tax carried
- interest at ordinary income tax rates I would add uh one point or I guess three points to that one I think that
- leveraged strategies are um pretty much doomed for this the short to medium term
- um Prime Brokers are much much tighter than they used to be it's very very hard to leverage up in the way that that
- hedge funds once did so those that were relying heavily on Leverage I think are going to be in a lot of trouble on the
- other hand I think hedge funds that specialize in distressed debt have just incredible opportunities before them and
- probably will do remarkably well I guess I'm a little more optimistic that they won't be regulated um and I think the
- very fact that investment Banks now are all nestled in more heavily regulated Banks means that a lot of the top talent
- are probably going to leave for hedge funds and hedge funds are going to end up being something like the new
- investment Banks um not with the scale but but with much of the innovation and much of the uh um uh kind of uh uh
- interesting business that was once done by investment Banks I I think uh what's interesting is that you know a year ago
- people said what's going to explode if there is going to be an explosion uh you know it was the hedge funds they're you
- know totally unregulated $2 trillion of assets at their Peak uh and and the interesting thing is they didn't I mean
- yes a few of them G G down of course um uh but in general um now the aggregate returns a year to date are down about
- half the S&P which means their beta is about 1/ half it's which is a little bit higher than what they sometimes
- advertise themselves out but if you take a blended average that's not all you know that's not all that bad and and
- really um you know there hasn't been that much finger pointing as one might expect at the hedge funds causing any of
- this because they didn't uh they did short things faster which should go down and did go down to some extent but uh
- outside of that um you know they they've actually stayed pretty clean in this mess uh I think which interestingly the
- the G7 meeting that preceded the one that took place just this last fall um had labeled that as the main threat to
- the financial system and if you looked at their involvement in this market they were actually big bu ERS of the CDO
- Equity tranches so they were holding the riskiest pieces of these things but they
- tended to do much better with them than the people who actually originated them and the reason is that the hedge funds
- did their homework they they priced them appropriately they knew when to hedge them they um moved them quickly and um
- you found other institutions were just really sitting on it okay yeah uh question in the
- middle yeah um sorry light of the current crisis and also the entitlement problems that Professor sm's touched
- upon um what is the chance that the riskiness of t- bills will be changing in the future that the the riskiness of
- t- bills that the treasury bills will be changing what do you mean by the risk there there is never any risk on
- the T bills r that they won't be risk- free anymore in the future but they only promis to pay Federal Reserve notes and
- there's an unlimited supply of Federal Reserve notes from the that so there cannot be any risk I I guess the
- question me Bills he means bonds he means the longer term it doesn't matter CA any risk on that in nominal terms
- either well nominal terms yeah sure then you're talking about risk of inflation okay yeah yeah I mean that's the real
- but then that's the question I mean sorry I guess the question is about the default of the US government in the most
- you're talking about a hyperinflation or a massive inflation of some sort or explicit theault
- well both can happen I mean there's no what there's no way they're going to default on the
- nominal debt they might they might default on the on the tips inflation indexed bonds that's that's a
- theoretical possibility which actually got raised as the tips yields went up to 3% and people were wondering my God can
- the government really pay these things off or not um but I think I think the question was what's say is this all this
- debt going to lead to inflation and I think especially all this liquidity as as Professor Herring you know showed the
- balance sheet has doubled even more than doubled I think it's absolutely essential I I think that's a good thing
- you there's a liquidity crisis everyone wants liquid safe assets the central bank is there to provide them but as
- soon as confidence returns they have to withdraw this liquidity um there's ABS absolutely no question the good thing
- that happened yesterday is that the the 90-day t- rate went above 1% for the first time since the Leman bankruptcy
- which means there isn't like a panic into bills uh which is a good sign actually uh that that there's an
- alleviation of of some of that uh anxiety uh that we have uh uh in the system but if they don't withdraw
- liquidity then you're going to have a lot of liquidity laying around that will find its way into prices later on but we
- have to trust that the FED is going to do the right thing uh which is withdraw that liquidity as trust is restored in
- the markets incidentally I uh wanted to offer my alternative uh interpretation of the Ted spread or the the spread
- between the liore and the the treasury bill rate um with all of the uh array of of special facilities that nearly all
- the central banks have to take in almost any kind of collateral that is remotely
- good um it's quite possible that what you're seeing in in the liore market is only those banks that don't have good
- collateral to deal more cheaply at the fed and so it doesn't mean what it used to mean it may simply be a reflection of
- unease about counterparty risk which is well warranted in this world where we well the liar is unsecured that's true
- it's uncollateralized but it it's the fear that these big Banks could go on I you know if if you know Morgan Stanley
- WAMU and all these others can suddenly go under AIG you begin to is any Bank completely safe you know if there's only
- a 1 2 3% probability that they're going to go under uh all of a sudden that gets
- added to the uh but the good quality banks are not going there for but if but you can look at the bankers Association
- and look at the at the the rate quote from all the banks and they were all about the same the American Banks the
- three Americans were a little lower because probably they did have fed funds access with some of these Europeans
- didn't have but they were all high there wasn't a big difference in in the rat they were
- borrowing at it though well I I don't know and that was how but that that means it's even it it should be
- discarded I mean you should you should price off a Fed funds Target yeah that I wouldn't disagree yeah because it means
- something different than it used to be yeah absolutely okay question now over on this side yeah I was just wondering I
- mean how much of this I mean the crisis is an accounting fiction I mean if banks
- are able to migrate their asset back Securities from trading books to I guess hold to Value um how much of this would
- have been avoided and how much of this going forward um would be mitigated in my opinion none of it I
- mean it it it it Market to Market is not the cause of this crisis um this crisis is because Banks
- overloaded and leveraged and and insurance companies in AIG and insured risky mortgage and housing related debt
- that they thought or hoped was not risky um and and the way you know it isn't Mark to Market accounting is
- because when the FED shopped these firms around no one wanted them I mean forget
- about what you can apply any counting you wanted to here's the assets here's liabilities no one would take
- them doesn't you know use whatever counting you think is right but it is true that nearly every CEO who's gone
- down with one of these firms has blamed two things marketto Market accounting short yeah and uh I think you're quite
- right that neither one of them has had anything at all to do with the problem no very good uh sir question yes stand
- here first I would like to thank the panel for the insights provided my question is are the steps being uh taken
- by the fed and government in the last 6 weeks addressing the root cause of the problem that is the lowering property
- prices unless somebody addresses the lowering property prices the housing cycle nothing would actually happen
- Jeremy actually mentioned the same thing we are actually facing a liquidity problem but once liquidity is provided
- the problem that comes into the scene is fear of solvency unless housing cycle is
- uh put on its space nothing else nothing would actually happen that's my VI the the the problem is there's a lot of
- fixes of proposals out there it's too slow right now it it it it cannot they're so complex they cannot be done
- with a stroke of a pen we're all going to Value these at 80 or 70 and the government will take the remainder or
- whatever um and and and to actually raise housing prices I mean Gody would need inflation and and all sorts of
- subsidies to housing and that's you don't I don't know know if you want that and remember that that house prices are
- really in some sense an intergenerational transfer there are lots of people who are now buying houses
- who could not previously afford them or who were too prudent to overextend themselves to buy them yes my point on
- that is can the government actually sell these foreclosed houses at maybe 50 cents a dollar to people meaning people
- I mean here are people with good cred score by giving some sort of confidence this would actually liquidate the Banks
- directly by the people's money not by the government's money and the government would actually be helping the
- people not the big companies that's what but that's what's happening in private negotiations
- between Banks and and and the Borrowers is that there is tens of thousands of short sales going on right now where
- someone underwater in their mortgage is getting permission from the bank to sell
- it uh underwater to a new borrower um that's that's already happening now whether there should be some overall
- structure the government to help people get a framework for it because it's sort
- of an ad hoc basis right now is is probably a good question but that's what's happening taking that just a bit
- further I think the way the government usually does this is part of the problem they usually do it by encouraging people
- to over leverage so if you have an FHA mortgage or if you have uh something for Fanny or Freddy what they basically do
- is allow you to take a more leverage loan than than you actually should if they really want to help people own
- homes and keep them they really should be subsidizing their Equity stake in the home and uh so far Congress hasn't
- wanted to face up to that because that would mean allocating the funds and actually having to uh pay for it on the
- out of taxes but uh if we really wanted to do it right I think that's what we should do and have a much more stable
- system I should point out that um um there's an additional problem that Jeremy and I have talked about um
- directly which is the mortgages which have been securitized which is a large proportion of the mortgages in that case
- um there's no one that you can negotiate with because the mortgages are are split
- up in so many tches and they're owned by so many different people technically it's a very difficult thing for the even
- if we had a government program that said let's go in and buy these mortgages uh what exactly how do how do we actually
- do this yet um if we have one bank we can go to the bank and say Let's Make a Deal Let's Make a Deal uh we're going to
- have the owner pay something for the house and you won't have an abandoned house that's something that's feasible
- but uh when they're securitized you you have to realize how much securitization has changed even this simple problem of
- subsidizing mortgages there was a serious attempt in Congress uh to broaden the scope for um the um agents
- that were servicing these mortgages to renegotiate them and it was pretty much stopped dead in its tracks by uh a
- number of investors who said look if you tamper with this again we're never again
- investing in securitized mortgages that you'll change the payment priorities that we were counting on you're
- expropriating what were our property rights and um so it didn't really get very far think we have time for one or two
- more more questions if they're quick questions and responses is there a has microphone been given to anybody in the
- middle okay hi uh thanks for your thoughts um given given sort of the real erosion in in wealth particularly in the
- part of the American Consumer um and starting to think about you know the next steps of this thing which is sort
- of a a consumer Le recession globally um what steps from uh a perspective Pro prescriptive or restorative standpoint
- can the government take to step in I guess um act as that sort of you know I guess buyer of Last Resort for lack of a
- better term and this is a really difficult question I mean you're a big question
- people are asking um you know is the savings rate going to suddenly rise now because with with you know the days of
- easy borrowing and lending are over the consequences of over leverage are are are now very
- apparent um you know what happens if the household in the US suddenly goes to a two for 6% savings rate like we had in
- the 90s or even higher as we had even before um that that's a big downward shock uh to aggregate
- demand um and I mean and and it's I mean the only thing that I can see and not that I like it but you're going to have
- to use you know tax uh tax policy or fiscal policy of some sort to to try to offset some of
- that shock I mean it's interesting to look at what happened in Japan and uh because
- they tried to do that with you know some success but um we would end up with even
- a bigger debt at the end but maybe we' keep the economy moving a little bit further I would like to know what other
- panelists think about that if if they've thought about that issue well in fact we have a huge amount
- of empirical evidence this is um not a unique problem we've had housing created financial disasters uh in at least 100
- countries around the world and the world bank has actually done a lot of pretty serious research on what works and what
- doesn't and what seems to work best is to um take your write Downs early on to try to um uh separate the good assets
- from the Bad Assets to sell off the Bad Assets even if they're at very low prices and get them back into the
- economy and um you have sort of it's in a sense a sort of shock treatment but it
- seems to um lead to Greater speed in recovery um and uh less of a a fall in per capita income over
- time okay uh is one more question is the microphone over here yes uh hi we have a
- very large uh fiscal deficit right now and I was wondering what role like we're Bor borrowing so much from China what
- role does that play if any in the um or what role will it play um in the current
- economic crisis well I think it's just natural um in a recession that the fiscal deficit deteriorates quite
- marketly last year's fiscal deficit strangely enough was not very large uh it had been coming down during most of
- the years the Bush Administration after initially Rising sharply with the tax cuts uh last year
- the uh deficit fiscal deficit Federal fiscal deficit as a percentage GDP was only
- 1.2% uh this year it's going to balloon like crazy it's going to be even worse next year and that's a cyclical movement
- that always happens during recession and what happens after the recession is revenues tax revenues start to rise
- government expenditures uh involved with the recession start to decline and the fiscal situation improves there's a
- longer run deficit problem which is the only what I worry about I don't worry about the the cycal deficit what's the
- big deal we have a a very substantial lent uh borrowing capacity in the federal government what I worry about is
- the longer term and that's due to the entitlements and the Aging population and we all know that that's very serious
- problem if I were advising the new president what I would say is focus on that ignore the short-term fiscal
- problems but try to do something with entitlement reform the last few presidents have ignored it um and are
- future fiscal situation is going to be very serious sometime later in the next decade uh Social Security revenues fall
- short of Social Security expenditures and the medical medical sit situation in this country is is horrendous the
- government expenditures on medical care they're going to grow as my generation retires um is going to get more and more
- serious we have the baby boom population getting close to retirement um it's going to get worse and worse and worse
- this is worse in other industrial countries but you know only but comparison um that's the fiscal deficit
- problem we have it's not the current cyclical deficit problem that'll go away with the recovery what about the current
- deficit current account deficit current account deficit is an absolutely different question and and I I I refrain
- from answering the question about savings because I'm actually in favor of a substantially higher savings rate in
- this country that's the one thing that could have a substantial impact on the current account deficit and um I don't
- know whether I'll believe it will come but at some point the American Consumer is going to have to save more uh and
- that's really going to turn around the current account deficit nothing like a credit crunch to do that that's right
- hopefully it will do it we'll see I mean I certainly hear you know a lot of rhetoric during the last few years about
- the Chinese buying our debt I mean keep in mind that's a good thing I mean a couple years ago when everybody's
- worried about the fixed exchange rate when I was in China talking to their equivalent of SEC treasury secretary I
- personally thank them for buying our our debt at inflated prices it's a it's a nice little transfer to the US Treasury
- I mean what would you rather have not high demand for our debt I mean that would have mean higher interest rates
- that we' have to pay so this is this is a good thing in terms of the entitlement
- problem I I think we all in agreement that's the big train wreck I mean and that's something that we have to deal
- with the one thing I guess um I I would in terms of the previous question that dealt with that that really I think
- still answered is what could potentially happen I think it's quite possible we could have very high inflation rates we
- could have um a default in real terms through inflation monetization of of our debt I think it's inevitable that
- Congress typically will wait till the crisis is eminent in this case however it that will be simply way too late uh
- every year I mean if they if we talk about accounting and accounting standards the US accounting Federal
- accounting uh budget it um is is completely fraudulent accounting system I mean it's it basically makes Enron
- accounting look at pristine I I remember mentioned that in Congressional testimony both Republicans and Democrats
- no one followed up because you know Democrats want to spend more money Republicans want to do tax cuts
- everybody is an agreement with a fraud on accounting scheme in Washington I mean if you measured the deficit
- correctly it wouldn't be $400 billion or $5500 billion would be about $2.5 trillion if you did it right and the the
- fact of the matter is we this is this is the serious problem and the one or two trillion dollars that we spend on this
- uh subprime mess it's it's in the tracking era of any estimat um associated with the with the entitlement
- shortfalls i i i sometime point out the only time anyone is going to worry about
- the deficit is if interest rates start Rising as long as there's an appetite for the debt you'll never get any action
- ever okay well final word Yeah final word you got it well uh one of the true benefits of
- being at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School is that we have faculty like the four here uh the
- representative of the kinds of colleagues I interact with and you take courses from uh it's a it's a real
- privilege to have you share your wisdom and knowledge and expertise on uh economic and financial matters that are
- the most critical of our time so thank you very much for your time and generosity
- [Applause] for more information please visit knowledge. won. up.edu [Music]
Brief Summary
Panelists discuss the global economic crisis, focusing on the housing market collapse and Federal Reserve responses.
Key points
- Understanding the Housing Market. The housing crisis began in 2005, but banks continued to invest in mortgage-backed securities.
- The Role of the Federal Reserve. The Fed's actions during the crisis are crucial, but will they be enough to stabilize the economy?
- The Liquidity Trap. The liquidity trap means even zero interest rates can't stimulate lending.
- Warren Buffett's Investment Strategy. Warren Buffett buys stocks at lower prices, making them attractive for ordinary investors.
- A Bigger Crisis Ahead. The entitlement problems in the U.S. pose a much larger crisis than the subprime issue.
- Government Regulation's Role. Government regulation can create a false sense of security, leading to more problems.
Episode highlights
- Understanding the Housing MarketThe housing crisis began in 2005, but banks continued to invest in mortgage-backed securities.“Isn't it amazing that the crisis began in November 2005?”4:30Oct 23, 2008
- The Role of the Federal ReserveThe Fed's actions during the crisis are crucial, but will they be enough to stabilize the economy?“Will plan B work?”14:35Oct 23, 2008
- The Liquidity TrapThe liquidity trap means even zero interest rates can't stimulate lending.“The liquidity trap is scary; even zero rates can't induce lending.”25:11Oct 23, 2008
- Warren Buffett's Investment StrategyWarren Buffett buys stocks at lower prices, making them attractive for ordinary investors.“Warren Buffett bought stocks at prices cheaper than he bought.”37:21Oct 23, 2008
- A Bigger Crisis AheadThe entitlement problems in the U.S. pose a much larger crisis than the subprime issue.“A train wreck is coming, the subprime mess is not the train wreck.”46:43Oct 23, 2008
- Government Regulation's RoleGovernment regulation can create a false sense of security, leading to more problems.“Don't simply assume markets are bad therefore we need government intervention.”53:09Oct 23, 2008
- The Collapse of Investment BanksInvestment banks became overly dependent on a source of income that dried up, leading to their collapse.“They were so dependent on this source of income.”1:02:33Oct 23, 2008
- The Panic of 2008The government faced a crisis of confidence as it struggled to manage failing banks.“Things turned to terror by an intervention policy that seemed increasingly ad hoc.”1:13:21Oct 23, 2008
Episode quotes
Tension
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