Wharton Faculty Teach-In October 21, 2008

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Wharton Faculty Teach-In October 21, 2008

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  1. [Music] this podcast is brought to you by knowledge at Warton please visit knowledge. won. up.edu for more
  2. information I'd like to add my welcome uh to the fourth uh teach in on the global economic crisis uh thanks to Tom
  3. Robertson and vice uh Andy Jane for sponsoring the event um and also to the panel members who were just introduced
  4. uh it's not hyperb to say that the world is a different place today than when we
  5. started the semester only about seven weeks ago uh the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve have bailed out and in
  6. some instances taken ownership positions in the largest uh mortgage insurance and
  7. banking institutions in the country there are large investment banks that uh either cease to exist or no longer exist
  8. in the same form they've become Bank holding companies with substantially different leverage
  9. limitations uh asset Market volatility has led us to be relieved on days when movement is only about 3 or 4% rather
  10. than 8 or 11 uh even those not actively involved in uh financial markets are horrified when they open their 401K
  11. envelopes or they choose not to open them uh hoping that uh stocks in fact really will be right for the long run uh
  12. we Face the Spectre of a serious economic downturn uh with a policy Arsenal that's already challenged the
  13. federal funds Target rate for the FED is already near a historic low it's at 1 and a half% it's it's only gotten down
  14. to to 1% before and we're at record budget deficits even before we factor in the uh bailout package which is yet to
  15. be implemented so fiscal policy and monetary policy already strained and we're facing uh a spectre of a a fairly
  16. significant downturn uh there have been unprecedented coordinated Global responses uh to the credit Market issues
  17. uh central banks uh have taken efforts to increase liquidity and lower interest rates of course we're in the midst of a
  18. presidential election and though we uh do not intend to make any partisan statements there certainly are
  19. challenges for whoever should Prevail in two weeks from now uh so this afternoon
  20. the four panel members will uh provide some insights on a number of things uh including um the causes of the current
  21. crisis measures that are presently being taken to alleviate the crisis uh remaining challenges to both financial
  22. markets and the real economy and their effects on us and then implications for further policy measures including the
  23. possibility of regulatory issues uh to prevent recurrences um the each panelist will
  24. have 10 to 12 minutes to make a statement after which they'll be able to discuss uh the the statement just made
  25. uh after the four uh panelists have finished with their remarks we'll open the floor to questions and there will be
  26. floor mics run around and so you just raise your hand to indicate your interest in asking a question obviously
  27. make your questions succinct don't make a speech asking for uh saying is that right at the end otherwise you'll force
  28. me to use my incredible Powers as moderator uh but with that I think we will go ahead and start with Professor
  29. Richard marsten well thanks a lot Mart uh I'd like to begin by saying that Tom Robertson was wrong it wasn't Wharton
  30. that caused the crisis but according to the financial times this morning it was Harvard Business School it's definitive
  31. they were having their anniversary celebration and Drew fa uh who is the president of Harvard and used to be a
  32. professor of History here she actually said um you know you ought to change your model it shouldn't be for you to do
  33. well in the world but to do well for the world and I think that's interesting that Tom actually uh talked about
  34. something similar um this financial crisis is spread everywhere um what I want to do is is just begin to talk
  35. about it and then we have uh three of my colleagues to uh talk about other aspects of it and I thought I would
  36. begin by talking about Where it All Began you know it sort of helps to uh identify the beginning of the crisis um
  37. this time it was in the mortgage market so what I want to do is I want to show you four charts about housing and um I
  38. think they'll be a little surprising the first one is um about when the housing crisis
  39. began began in November 200 five is that amazing because that's confusing to me because during 2006 and
  40. into 2007 maril Lynch and City group and Bank of America etc etc etc were adding to
  41. their mortgage back Securities were they unaware that housing had already peaked
  42. and it was on a downhill slide where it was it's now 62% below where it was before bit of a puzzle you know bit of a
  43. puzzle um are they so insulated in New York you know they don't have very good Communications there there's so many
  44. Towers it's difficult to get cell phones so so possibly they didn't know about the housing crisis in America but but
  45. somehow um as a result they took a lot of positions even in 2006 into 2007 second chart what has happened to house
  46. prices since that time well you can see the these are these are wonderful indices from uh case and Schiller uh Bob
  47. Schiller used to be a professor here um what it does it shows you that uh the pain is distributed unevenly across the
  48. country if you're from New York you're from Boston you're from Chicago there's been relatively little decline in prices
  49. only 10 or 11% uh but in some regions of the country it's been awful absolutely awful and that's where an awful lot of
  50. the pain in the Securities Market is originating California Florida as well as of course Phoenix and
  51. Las Vegas the sad case is Detroit because they never saw a rise in the house price in the beginning to begin
  52. with and yet they're down so far um so that's the second chart my third and fourth chart address the issue of how
  53. soon is the housing market going to turn around well actually I'm a pessimist but I must admit I only have
  54. one data point when you run regressions you probably try to have a whole bunch of
  55. data points but I only have one I can only look at the last housing crisis the last time we had a boom in housing and
  56. ask how soon did the housing price reach bottom and I'm going to look at California on the one hand we reached
  57. the peak in 1989 when did it turn around sometime around 95 96 997 all right now of course there's
  58. special things going on in California there's always special things going on in California so we have to say uh let's
  59. move to the other side of the country with my final graph and it shows you basically whoops it shows you New York
  60. and you can see very similar story reached the peak in 1988 didn't reach bottom until about 6 s years later there
  61. are those who say well housing has to turn around before the economy turns around let me say I hope that's not true
  62. I hope the economy turns around long before housing because I think it's going to be a while before housing turns
  63. around I I told you I only had one data point but I think it's a relevant data point we'll we'll wait and see whether
  64. or not housing prices will reach bottom sooner rather than later I think it's going to be later so then we began with
  65. a financial crisis because of the mortgage back Securities originating in housing they started to
  66. go bad and that generated the financial crisis I'm of the belief that that Financial Risk spreads were down so low
  67. that we probably would have gotten a financial crisis of some sort from some other source if it had not been in
  68. housing but it happened to be in housing so we began the crisis and you know the
  69. details of the crisis what I want to focus on is just a couple of things number one has the FED done its job well
  70. let's think about what what is a central bank supposed to do in a financial crisis I think there are three things
  71. they're supposed to do number one you're supposed to lower interest rates the FED
  72. did its job lowered interest rates they were five and a quarter or somewhere before last and now they're 1 and a
  73. half% in fact if I were on the Federal Reserve board I would vote against any further declines the problem in America
  74. is not the level of the FED funds rate it's the fact that you can't get a loan anyways and if you do get loan is going
  75. to be at a much higher interest rate than the FED funds rate so the fed's done its job in terms of interest rates
  76. second function is to make sure that the banks have lot lots of liquidity that's
  77. for the discount window what the FED does and every Central Bank does is it accepts Securities in exchange for
  78. treasury bills and the treasury bills are like cash well let me tell you they've had to do a lot of that let's
  79. begin with by showing you the spread of liore over treasuries that's the interbank offer rate in in London it's
  80. the it's the barometer of interbank lending in the dollar market and let me tell you back in August a year ago it
  81. looked pretty Grim now normally the spread of into bank interest rates is about half a percent above treasuries
  82. half a percent but last August a year ago it went way high at that point the European Central Bank and the US Central
  83. Bank stepped in provided a lot of liquidity they had to do it again at the year end they had to do it again when be
  84. turns failed in March they had to do it again in July when Fanny May and Freddy Mack got into trouble and you can see it
  85. um quite a bit of Crisis now at this point um you have to recognize the fed's doing its job in fact it's been it's had
  86. to be pretty Innovative what it's had to do is actually accept a lot of Securities that it normally doesn't
  87. accept because they're too risky in order to provide liquidity to the banks so it's done its job but the third role
  88. is the mo most controversial the central bank is supposed to save the largest banks the banks that are
  89. so-called too big to fail back in the 1980s that would have meant that the FED would have saved City Bank or chase or
  90. chemical bank or JP Morgan or Bank of America and perhaps a few others the FED is never specific about how many banks
  91. it will save but it saves the big Banks because they're too big to fail they threaten the
  92. system it's going to do it this time the only problem is that the world has changed the old model was based on the
  93. idea that Banks would accept deposits and make loans so if you save the big Banks you wouldn't necessarily have to
  94. save the investment Banks you had to save the big Banks it would stabilize the system and we'd live happily ever
  95. after the problem is that in the meantime securitization has occurred and what has happened is the banks no longer
  96. hold on to their mortgages no longer hold on to their loans to a large extent what they do is they package them
  97. together in bonds sell them off you know that already so things have changed that
  98. means that the risk that the bank is holding is the same risk that is being held by pension plans by insurance
  99. companies by investment Banks and so on so the the concept of too big to fail has changed and now we realize that the
  100. treasury and the FED now Define AIG and insurance company is being too big to fail that's what we found out
  101. four weeks ago you know by the way the treasury and the FED decided that Leman Brothers wasn't too big to fail
  102. and I guess that's the one big mistake they've made I must admit at the time I thought it was the right decision but
  103. they should have saved lhan brothers because later that week let me say it delicately later that week the week of
  104. September 15th remember that date September 15th the week of September 15th all hell broke loose this is the
  105. liore rate and what happened to the lior rate that week in fact Wednesday afternoon Thursday morning of that week
  106. the 17th and 18th of September I think were the scariest two days in financial markets in my career they were
  107. absolutely scary and then sometime in the afternoon Thursday afternoon word got out was leaked out
  108. that maybe the treasury was going to have a bailout package the market started to CL calm down and you know
  109. things were looking good by the end of the week but then of course over the next couple weeks we had to watch
  110. Congress I mean Congress it's watching Congress is like going through a salami Factory I'm told that somebody who goes
  111. through a salami Factory becomes a vegetarian for the rest of their lives let me tell you it was ugly and in the
  112. meantime a lot of other things H happened let me tell you uh let's see Washington Mutual had to be taken over
  113. uh wacovia had to be taken over the market fell 20% boy oh boy and so the treasury had to go
  114. what I term to plan B Plan B when do you go to plan B when you realize plan a is
  115. not going to work and what did plan B involve well what it involved was the following problem the banks had kept
  116. borrowing and borrowing and getting one Capital injection after another and it wasn't
  117. enough in the second column you can see an estimate by Morgan Stanley a week ago
  118. on how much each of the banks had lost and on the far column you can see the capital injections if you add up the
  119. numbers at the bottom what you find is there's a bit of a gap in other words under the best of circumstances the
  120. banks were deficient they needed some Capital injections and so once again the treasury in the FED came to the rescue
  121. and let me summarize what they did what this chart does is it shows you the nine
  122. largest banks with Maryland still separate from Bank of America the capital injection by the treasury in the
  123. form of preferred shares and we'll talk more about that later on and then finally in the last column the actual
  124. Equity value of the of that particular firm right at the time of the injection what you can see boy this is a big
  125. Equity injection let me tell you it's a big Equity injection and uh the natural question to ask would be uh will
  126. plan B work that's a natural question isn't it let me distinguish between meanings of the word work will the plan
  127. work in the sense that uh the banks will be sufficiently capitalized well let me
  128. tell you the treasury is on the plan now if they're not sufficiently capitalized
  129. we'll come up with more money that's clear so in that sense the plan will work these banks will not go under
  130. there'll be other banks that the treasury I hope and the FED I hope will allow to fail because not all the banks
  131. should stay in business and I think dick Herring will talk about more about that
  132. later on but uh let me tell you these nine banks are not going to fail the treasury is determined to keep them open
  133. so it will work in that sense but the larger question is will it help the economy and that's the question of
  134. whether or not these banks will start lending again and that's the the answer to that question we don't know the
  135. answer we don't know what's going to happen what I suspect is the answer is at least initially no they will not
  136. start lending again and for that reason I think we're going to have a fairly serious
  137. recession how bad a recession it's going to be a worse recession than the last time it's going to be a recession with a
  138. lot of loss of jobs let me show you the latest consensus forecast private consensus as well as the IMF forecast
  139. for next year for the the United States the European monetary Union U UK as well
  140. as Japan the industrial world is going into recession I personally believe my colleagues may not agree with me that
  141. the US economy went into recession in September because the NBR looks at monthly data and the monthly data for
  142. September were pretty ugly but we won't know for sure until they meet another 12
  143. months from now in any case it looks Grim short term it's going to be Grim for those of you on the job market um I
  144. I think we're going to have to worry about just how deep the recession is going to be and I'm waiting to hear from
  145. Jeremy what he thinks about that um it's interesting that we've done what we can
  146. but the problem is the banks are impaired regardless of how much Capital injection they get they're impaired and
  147. as a result they will not be lending as much as they did before and I think we have to face that what will the job
  148. situation be like well I can't tell you except to say that so far the loss of jobs has been minor compared with last
  149. time expect worse times ahead uh this is the last recession you can see in the rectangle is the actual timing of the
  150. recession and notice that even after the recession ended in November 2001 we lost
  151. a lot of jobs after that some months we lost 200,000 jobs so don't expect this job picture to turn around make your
  152. plans make your placement plans accordingly uh to try to try to work around this uh terrible job markets that
  153. we're going to be facing um maybe it won't be any worse than last time but last time I remember uh Wharton students
  154. had a lot of trouble with the job market I want to end leave plenty of time for my colleagues but I want to end with a
  155. um with a political chart political chart where does that fit in here well I want to begin by quoting the chief um
  156. strategist of the Bill Clinton campaign in 1992 you know his name James Carville he's
  157. now famous um he actually believed that the economy was the key to the election we were officially out of recession at
  158. the time but uh it looked like we were still in recession and most Americans thought we were still in recession and
  159. so he forced the entire campaign to focus on the economy with a phrase It's the economy
  160. stupid and he hung the sign in the campaign headquarters and in fact I think that was the key to Bill Clinton
  161. winning the election what about this time well what I'd like to do is share with you the timing of the rebound of
  162. Obama in the campaign the way I'm going to do it is by using Futures contracts intrade.com intrade.com has Futures
  163. contracts on Obama winning the presidency the prices I'm going to show you are cents on a dollar so if it's 50
  164. cents on a dollar it's a 5050 race okay at the beginning of the week when Leman Brothers was
  165. about to fail AIG was going to be taken over and as I said indelicately all hell
  166. broke loose in the financial markets this was the price of Obama it's a coincidence of
  167. course it's a coincidence that on September 15th we we reached the bottom of the Obama
  168. presidency according to the Futures market and ever since that time it's been up and up and up let me give you my
  169. interpretation of my panelists can disagree with me I actually think what happened is the economy turned very sour
  170. the average American became very worried about the economy and it's natural to blame the current Administration for the
  171. economy that's always the case that was the case with Jimmy Carter's Administration it was the case with H
  172. W's Administration and I think it's the case with the Republicans this year so I'll end on this note isn't that a
  173. dramatic graph there's probably some other explanations of course there's more than one thing affecting the
  174. election but you probably think it's because of all the other things in the election think at least of the
  175. possibility that the financial crisis is what is going to lead Obama to become the next president thank you you know I
  176. agree totally with uh dick on on the um Leman bankruptcy on the 15th um and uh I think that's when
  177. we held the first panel was right on that day or uh or the day before that day day after that day the day after
  178. that day that was and and and it turned out that that is a it turned a a a hugely a pivotal day um uh I didn't
  179. imagine how much uh uh debt Leman debt was out there uh I mean I was shocked when you know the bankruptcy courts
  180. finally you know looked at it and you said something like you know $800 billion doll worth of debts now some of
  181. those were covered definitely with assets but it just it just completely um dwarfed anything else uh a very
  182. important rate um uh and and and and and uh Professor Maron mentioned was the liore rate rate um it's I'm not going to
  183. go it's rather interesting that the rate is actually determined in in London by the British Bankers
  184. Association uh by surveying 16 Banks and their cost of funds over various time periods in various currencies although
  185. the dollar has usually been the key one only three of the 16 banks are American Banks which has some significance also
  186. uh JP Morgan City group and and Bank of America uh lior rate are huge in terms of basing loan rates to uh not as much
  187. as individuals individuals have Prime rates which are it's it's it's it's quite interesting uh the difference is
  188. more marked now uh but in terms of commercial firms industrial firm big businesses borrowing uh at uh some
  189. spread over usually three-month Liber sometimes one month uh lior rates uh you have trillions ions of dollars of loans
  190. that are actually based on on liore and um oops let me get over and this is the um this is the graph over here I don't
  191. know if this also has a um does it have a uh there we go it does have a laser pointer uh this is going back a couple
  192. of years normally Li this is the graph of liore against the FED funds Target I I think
  193. it's more important uh Richard talked about it against treasury bills but the FED funds Target is directly
  194. controllable and actually treasury bills have sort of disconnected also and normally it's it runs 1015 basis points
  195. this is precrisis this was the crisis last year in August again in October it's it it went outward but then there
  196. was a period of three months where it stayed at a very stable 50 basis points above uh the FED funds Target the FED
  197. funds Target was 2% uh and the liore rate was two and a half now that is that's a large spread
  198. but it it's a doable spread and it was a very stable spread this is September 15th and you can just absolutely see
  199. what happened the spread widen to 337 basis points I I bet if you ask any money manager 6 months earlier could
  200. that ever happen they say that is impossible that could never happen that you get that increase now the
  201. significance of that increase is is is absolutely huge um because people's loans are based on
  202. liore and the spread is going up when the FED lowered by 50 basis points as they did about two weeks ago in a
  203. concerted action of central banks it was completely drowned out by the effect of
  204. the widening of the spread so in essence instead of it it did not have any effect
  205. of lowering the cost of capital to anybody based on liore uh it did have an effect if you're
  206. based on the prime rate because the prime rate is strictly TI is strictly tied to the FED funds Target at 3
  207. percentage points above the FED funds Target uh so that moved in the right direction but the liore did not move in
  208. um uh the direction and this actually causes a situation that we used to only teach in history books something
  209. called the liquidity trap because the liquidity trap which goes back to can's is even if the
  210. Central Bank lowers to zero it is not low enough to induce uh uh either lending or borrowing uh the cost of
  211. capital is not going down to the firms and the Central Bank can't cannot go anywhere below zero and that that is
  212. that was really kind of scary in the sense that my goodness the FED is moving and the borrowing rates are moving in uh
  213. the opposite direction many times we really had ever seen this before was in the Great Depression in the US situation
  214. and around the world actually kan's wrote about it in the UK and in Japan after their bubble burst in 1990 and
  215. they also went down to zero rates and also could not get uh the banks uh lending um now I want to talk a little
  216. bit about uh the the plan of action uh the the equity injections that are were done under the pson plan and
  217. have been done in Europe um there's an old expression you can lead a horse to water but you can't
  218. force them to drink um you can give Banks Capital but you cannot force them to lend uh the there's a lot of people who
  219. think the only problem with lending was that they were short of capital well that was one problem but not the only
  220. problem the other problem was that they feared for the solvency of who they are lending to uh you know you could you
  221. could give me Capital you can give me borrowing rates at zero but if I think there's a 10% probability the person I'm
  222. lending to is going to go bankrupt I'm not going to lend to them uh and I don't care how much Capital you
  223. give to me I'm not going to lend to them I think too little attention has been paid to that question uh I I did
  224. remember Paulson went out and said uh uh we we want the banks to lend you know like you know that's that that
  225. exhortation is going to let them make them lend uh that's not necessarily going to going to be the case um let let
  226. me say something else and then I'm going to go through a couple other things when the central banks lowered by
  227. 50 basis points and that did not help I think that really scared the equity market like it hadn't been scared
  228. in in decades the central bank is finally out of options lost power you can go down to zero and that's not going
  229. to help and that is uh kind of a panic situation because you always felt the FED could come to your rescue and what
  230. was happening with live B rising at the same time fed funds Target was falling was exactly the opposite again an
  231. absolutely unprecedented situation um I was actually proposing some other things
  232. that could be done and may still have to be done if the situation gets worse again um how about rebasing liary to the
  233. FED funds rate like the prime rate is uh the bank maybe the Federal Reserve could
  234. go in and said hey we're if you if the banks rebase to Fed funds Target instead of Li will will guarantee the lines of
  235. credit or some such inducement to get them to do so and then you can guarantee the cost of capital is going down maybe
  236. back up interbank borrowing now there has been some of that among the European Banks not really here in the US uh one
  237. of the problems is Banks fear other banks are going to go under and that's one reason the liore which is the
  238. interbank borrowing rate has gone up so much the FED could guarantee in bank borrowings to some extent and lower uh
  239. lower those costs guarantee private lending the bank Federal Reserve has already set up a commercial paper
  240. facility uh the first time in its history that is going to uh guarantee uh these the smooth turnover per of
  241. commercial paper to non-financial firms never done it to non-financial firms at all remember the broker dealers
  242. and the investment Banks were all classified as Financial firms uh um um maybe the government will have to
  243. guarantee certain commercial paper and lines of credit these are Extreme Measures I'm saying there's measures
  244. that can in fact uh be taken uh later on and then of course there always the question if stock market doesn't stop
  245. falling you can always buy stock index Futures actually there is precedent there are countries who have done that
  246. uh as a way to support uh the stock market now obviously if you're going to do uh any of the guarantee on lending
  247. backing it up you've got to take an equity position and and in fact the FED has taken Equity positions in in these
  248. uh uh uh uh infusions uh warrants on the purchase of uh the common price uh common shares but my main point is that
  249. there are there are other measures these are emergency me measures uh I I I felt
  250. that people were slip were falling into the the chasm of the FED is out of options and there are other options
  251. emergency options the FED in fact can take care of um I'm going to talk about the markets a little
  252. bit uh stock market and its valuation as a result of the plunge around the world
  253. uh this is a a Bloomberg screen I just took it this morning it is the PE ratios of the major markets around the
  254. world and the final three columns the uh third column from the right is the price
  255. earnings ratio on the basis of the last 12 months of reported earnings current year estimate is on the basis of 2008
  256. estimated earnings next year is 2009 um the average historical PE ratio of the US market is around 15 just to
  257. give you a little bit of a benchmark on what the valuations uh are today they they are
  258. extraordinarily low now I know your earnings are going down and I'm going to address that in in just a moment but as
  259. you can see on the basis of the Dow the SNP uh 12 uh 1012 this year and next year NASDAQ is a little bit higher uh
  260. the Toronto is uh 10 and8 Mexican Bola is 10 and N take a look at Europe that that's the middle grouping there I've
  261. never seen Europe so low the Europe stock 50 is uh is seven across the board even on when you do it on the basis of
  262. the last 12 months of earnings and going forward on earnings um and you can see markets is
  263. as far down as four and five PE ratios we the last time we got down to single digit PE ratios in the market was the
  264. 1970s that was the last time that we had actually gotten down this low in the market and we had a very bad situation
  265. there because there we had a lot of inflation and we had instead of low interest rates we had extraordinarily
  266. High interest rates where someone could buy a treasury bill and bond and guarantee themselves 15% interest take a
  267. look at the third group in Asia um I don't know I'm going to have to ask uh uh dick marsten about this I don't I've
  268. never seen the Nick selling an 11 and 12 times earnings um it's usually at 25 even
  269. after the bubble burst usually at 25 and 30 hangen is nine uh 10 the Shanghai index that Shanghai index a year ago was
  270. selling at 55 times earnings it's at 15 today uh the S&P that's the Australian index 8 9 10 11
  271. times earnings The Straits times is the Singapore index it's around the world now what
  272. about the objection yeah but we're in a recession earnings are going down as fast as stock price some people even say
  273. faster I think we have to look a little bit at how you would value stocks um this is the quarterly earnings of the
  274. S&P over the last approximately 15 years and uh with this is the recession of 1991 this is a recession of 2001 now
  275. we're in the the downshift right over here um uh this is the regression trend line people who talk about earnings
  276. going down down have to remember stock prices are not just based on the next 12 months of earnings in fact when you say
  277. that a stock has a 15 PE ratio you're saying it's worth 15 times the ongoing earnings only 115th or
  278. 6% of a Stock's price on average is the earnings of the next 12 months 94% is after that you have to look to the long
  279. run unless you think we're going to be be in a permanent recession for the next you know 10 or 15 years which hasn't
  280. been the case um I have 3 minutes left I will I will get done uh at that time um
  281. let me just mention the red line over there uh is now at a trend line of $23 this is quarterly earnings on the S&P
  282. 500 so I'm kind of giving you the trend uh this morning the P the S&P was at $981 $92 share is a PE ratio of
  283. 10.7 now based on normalized earnings as I say um you don't often get down that low that's an earnings yield of between
  284. 9 and 10% uh going forward um I think extremely attractive here now let me give you a 40-year graph of the stock
  285. market um this is the S&P 500 over the last 40 years going all the way back to 1970 it's a regression line
  286. with one and two standard deviations uh off the regression line um if you as I do I do believe in mean
  287. reversion in long-term stock returns so that there you know you deviate in the short run but you eventually return to
  288. the to the mean uh we see getting down to the the green line in 1970s uh 1982 which was at uh was
  289. actually at the bottom of the greatest bull market in US history uh over the next 20 years you also see by the way
  290. that in 2000 right over here in the bubble we were uh above the two-standard deviation uh and at risk uh let me
  291. mention that at the bottom where we were two weeks ago you see the fallof right there we were three and a half standard
  292. deviations below never had been that low in the last five decades below uh the mean um you know that doesn't guarantee
  293. that you're going to get back there that fast but certainly it is saying that uh
  294. unless unless our economy is permanently going to fall apart which I don't believe is going to be the case um and
  295. we can talk about later about whether we you know how longterm and serious this is compared to the 30s or even the
  296. Japanese situation um uh the uh the case for equities is pretty is pretty uh persuasive and let me say one last
  297. sentence um I think we all recognize Warren Buffett as a great investor and um there's not very many
  298. times that an ordinary investor can buy a stock that he buys at a price cheaper than he
  299. bought but about three weeks ago he bought into General Electric um he bought into Goldman Sachs uh and took
  300. warrants and options on that at strike prices that are below that are above the current price of those two stocks um and
  301. which means the ordinary investor can now actually get into the market even as as it's risen and it's you know it's up
  302. about 10% or 15% almost from it's its low uh at a price that uh Warren Buffett uh uh got in at a higher price so uh he
  303. has a long-term look and he thinks there as low as they were in the 1970s I say they're as low as they were in the 70s
  304. if not even lower uh and are attractive um for uh investors thank you we uh know
  305. we're in a little bit of trouble when Jeremy quotes canes favorably and so but I I agree with him that stocks are
  306. probably at this point not a bad investment for for the long run um I'm going to shift focus a little bit um
  307. more towards thinking about uh government regulation and how people behave in this current market and I
  308. don't have any overheads for my little diet tribe here and so but let me kind of uh start off by with some modesty and
  309. that is we're in many ways all shooting from the hip here and so there's lots of
  310. information that's kind of unfolding over time and certainly I'll likely we can't 30% of what I say within
  311. 6 months from now as more information gets released even by next weekend but at this point like I'm the academic I'll
  312. speak with great force and uh pretend like I'm have great Authority and know what I'm talking about here um in terms
  313. of uh let me go through basically I think three points here that I'm I'm trying to cover first is I think people
  314. do in fact contrary to what lot of Comas will say act stupid even when their own money is on the line
  315. so that's kind of my first point and so in many ways I'm uh traditional uh rational expectations Economist but I
  316. think people do in fact make fundamental errors and I will go through some of that but whereas Joe stiglet and others
  317. would Trace these problems to principal agent problems within the firm I'm going
  318. to argue and therefore he would argue for more government regulation we need government regulation to protect people
  319. from their themselves and their mistakes I'm going to argue just the opposite I think government regulation in fact is
  320. encouraging people to act very stupid and government regulation itself instead of we thinking that we need more
  321. government regulation we ought to really be rethinking a lot of the government regulation that we currently have and
  322. that's kind of uh wrapping up with my my third Point whereas where a lot of people are calling for more government
  323. regulations I I'm going to argue that bad regulations are actually much worse than no regulations when people
  324. understand their own assets are on the line so let me the first point about people acting very stupid I I think uh
  325. the usual belief in the economics of course is people are rational I basically agree with that um because if
  326. people are are really dumb then smart people can come along and Arbitrage away their money and figure out how to take
  327. their money from them and that's not going to be some like people who last and sustain for a very long time the
  328. last big mistake that the market supposedly made was in the year 2000 and after the do bust and it was actually
  329. not clear that people investors in year 1999 with high PE ratios were actually in fact making a mistake um that they
  330. were actually being irrational at that point in particular one can always tell stories about how Bubbles are really not
  331. bubbles some people even defend that the Dutch tulet bubbles were not really bubbles that there were reasons behind
  332. it that made total sense I'm not going to go that far but if you believe that the 2000.com bus was was so easily
  333. predictable most of those lots of those assets were publicly traded you should be shorting those assets and made a lot
  334. of money so I think lots of claims that people make after the fact that the 2000
  335. problem was largely foreseeable is just kind of ego and um a lot of hindsight uh
  336. but in the current market I think lots of the default rates uh on the in the current situation were in fact very
  337. foreseeable it it was well known at the time lots of the loans were going to reset and and in particular given the
  338. underwriting standards that evolve over time with no doc loans with negative arm
  339. loans where people aren't even making the full interest payments that a lot of people were going to be in really bad
  340. shape and in fact I was first made made aware of this problem a couple years ago
  341. spending lots of time in the San Francisco Bay Area a lot of my friends were telling me about these great deals
  342. that they're getting in their mortgages and um with the three and fiveyear resets with the loan where the interest
  343. rates suddenly go up and that would be kind of them little warnings and saying it's kind of crazy you can't really
  344. afford that what's going to happen 3 to 5 years and they'll say oh no no there's
  345. no problem at all even if I have to sell in three to five years of course I'm going to make a big capital gains and
  346. you know I'll be making a lot of money maybe I'll find a flight place I can actually afford now that's not a bad
  347. strategy if you're the only one playing that game but if everybody's playing that game that's obviously a fallacy of
  348. composition prices are going to go down but the difference between now and then is that it's a little harder in the sub
  349. crime case for smart people to clear the market as easily in particular um while
  350. it's true some smart people took bets in terms of the subprime problem and with some there's some limited um trading
  351. instruments and and it's also true lots of the banks could have issued fewer asset back Securities it's hard to
  352. directly short another person's home price in particular in other words if I think your home price is is too high
  353. it's there's not much I can really do about it to to short that that that price and uh yeah there's other
  354. instruments I can trade that are correlated with that risk and I can maybe U make some money off that but
  355. there's no reason to believe that home prices overall were going to be were going to be efficient that there is some
  356. market clearing mechanism and so lots of the asset back Securities the CMOS and others were basically pooling these
  357. loans and it was well known that they were highly leveraged and exposed to even very small default rates and they
  358. allowed Equity holders to make loans on barreled money and sell off the loans make more loans of proceeds and so forth
  359. so Banks and Brokers became Originators of debt but they are no longer bearing the risk associated with the
  360. underwriting and this leads to an obvious moral hazard problem whenever you divorce the underwriting from the U
  361. from the risk risk-taking at first glance you would wonder why would anybody buy these packages of Securities
  362. um given that they should be huge hugely full of junk given that people are underwriting aren't bearing the risk
  363. well this is where the r agencies came in the rating agencies were supposed to be the control for moral hazard in
  364. particular junk stuff was going to get priced lower and because it get got a lower rating better stuff would get a
  365. higher rating therefore priced better the markets were supposed to be efficient again the rating so the rating
  366. agencies played a very crucial role in all this but what they basically did is that they rated too much based on what's
  367. called a preferences of the underline Securities that is they would divide these things up into different tranches
  368. and basically say if if you're first in line will give these a AAA if you're second in line will give this a little
  369. bit of lower rating and so forth that strategy that trick usually works pretty well when you're talking about stuff
  370. that's uh a lot of risk subject to firm specific risk but it doesn't work so well when we're talking about stuff
  371. that's heavily based on system systemic risk and where it doesn't really matter if you're first or ninth in in in line
  372. and the the fact of the matter is S&P and moody moody the two main rating agencies had pretty lousy models and
  373. certainly there will be a lot of discussion about how they face conflicts of interest and how they are paid and so
  374. forth economists would generally argue they care about their reputation that that conflict of interests should not um
  375. be be such a problem I I I think there there are issues there but a central mistake that investors played in all of
  376. this was that they were trusting the rating agencies way too much there there are endowments Pension funds and many
  377. others who basically looked at the looked at these um asset backed debt said hey they're the highest rating not
  378. really understanding why they were had they were paying a 10020 basis points more than the other AAA ratings and so
  379. they would buy this stuff and the rating agencies really just play the role of providing cover and they were more more
  380. than willing to do that for for our price going forward there's another crisis emerging it's much bigger than
  381. the subprime one and that's the entitlement problems that the United States facing uh in terms of our social
  382. security Medicare and Medicaid programs um you think the one or two trillion dollars that the government will spend
  383. on subprime M that's a lot of money we Face a present VAR shortfall in those Pro those entitlement programs about $70
  384. trillion a much bigger problem so a train wreck is coming the subprime mess is not the train wreck but but there is
  385. it's more like an appetizer to mix my metaphors for a much bigger train wreck that's that's on its way and right now
  386. the rating agencies are once again doing a lousy job by looking at a simply explicit paper that that that's printed
  387. and not looking at uh the the implicit debt the second main point I want to get across is I actually think instead of
  388. talking saying people are myopic we need more government regulation government regulation itself is a cause of lots of
  389. myopia in particular I think instead of thinking about government regulation meaning is to save people from
  390. themselves we all think about how government regul really gives a false sense of confidence
  391. and and relaxation five examples really quickly here the first one is mortgages it was Freddy and Fanny were
  392. always a ticking Time Bomb it it was it was obvious that this problem was going to happen why Congress basically used
  393. Freddy and Fanny to basic and as well as other Community Development programs to
  394. try to increase the amount of home ownership somehow home ownership do the neighborhood Network effects was a good
  395. thing we wanted to promote this thing the the problem is fenny and Franny were technically private Market vehicles and
  396. they were privatized some time some time ago they weren't explicit obligations of
  397. the US government but it was well known that they were moral obligations the federal government would come in members
  398. of Congress talked about this and that's a basically the worst possible setup that you can have a private entity out
  399. there that is has an implicit guarantee associated with it but you have no way of controlling Its Behavior there you're
  400. just begging for lots of lots of moral ha there was nothing that was being priced into their actions the way to
  401. think about regulation it's like a good game of tennis a good play of tennis in tennis you want to play aggressively at
  402. the net or you want to be pretty relaxed and play at the Baseline you never want
  403. to play in between and regulations really have to be that way either you're going to be aggressive you're going to
  404. do it right or you're going to play at the Baseline and be pretty minimalistic about it but you don't play in between
  405. and this is a clear example where the government's playing in between and everything got screwed up
  406. California saw it this the same way I I was teaching at Stanford at the time California decided to deregulate
  407. electricity but they didn't really want to deregulate all the way so they kind of went halfway in the middle and so
  408. because they wanted lower prices but they still wanted government control what did we have we had rolling the gym
  409. multiple times the lights would go out I mean rolling blackouts and so forth because the government regulation wasn't
  410. at the net wasn't at the Baseline another example of poor tennis play was basically how the FDIC Works following
  411. um the deregulation of the glass deagle act in 1999 in particular the FDC of course you
  412. know guarantees Banks deposits and it it requires therefore Bank Reserves and it's which is a function of the loans
  413. that are outstanding in made but after the deregulation Banks were able to take off
  414. some of those loans off its balance sheets with securitization they were able to reduce the amount of um assets
  415. that they needed to hold in their balance sheets but using complicated transactions they were still
  416. fundamentally exposed to a lot of the risk and so the the bottom line there is again the government has this guarantee
  417. it's not properly regulating it's kind of plain again in the middle I also think the government screws up in how it
  418. validates rating agencies in particular federal government rules around commercial paper money market accounts
  419. and so forth give a legal authority to select National rating agencies S&P Moody and and I think they just get too
  420. much government backing too much valid um the fact of the matter is rating agencies stink Moody stinks S&P stinks
  421. they basically are good at predicting Sol insolvency risk about 24 hours before it happens they they basically
  422. are terrible in predicting insolvency risk at the time Dimension that's actually useful for writing contracts
  423. there and why would you give such validation to such incompetent institutions and so I think we should
  424. really have more capital m in this area more information more and being exchanged and certainly allow more
  425. contracts being uh designed on more sources of of information and speaking of information I I told you I was going
  426. to be in my Soap Box sarbanes oxay sarbanes Oxley I think is a is a bill I was part of the administration when we
  427. wrote that bill it gives a a tremendous Source uh uh a sense of a false sense of
  428. accountability and a sense of uh accomplishment it has whole provisions on risk management but the the
  429. provisions of sarban oxy for risk management are extraordinarily weak and they really provide nothing other than a
  430. a a false sense of confidence I agree in my last example here I agree that September 15th was a was a big day but I
  431. also want to say that just don't look at the reduction in stock market prices and
  432. say there's a role for government here I want to turn it around and say government plays a role in causing some
  433. of those things too treasury in the FED itself I think produced a sense of urgency that was was interpreted by the
  434. market is having some inside information keep a mark As Jeremy pointed out markets are forward looking I was also
  435. often been asked by reporters during the last couple weeks was Leman and AIG were
  436. they really all in that bad of shape and my honest answer is I don't know because
  437. the thing about these 144a placements and other contracts is that we really don't know their exposure until they
  438. they declare bankruptcy that's kind of the irony of of of all this we don't really know how bad in shape they they
  439. were until until that happens I think Treasury and the FED played a kind of a role of of a signaling by saying there's
  440. a big urgency there's a big problem the market said they have inside information
  441. there must be a big problem there must be an urgency here and so did they do the right thing my inclination is maybe
  442. they did do some the right thing but don't simply look at stock prices and say we needed government intervention
  443. sometimes government intervention creates its own need and we we need to in fact um ask ourselves and these are
  444. some of the comments that might be amending in six months as more information comes out but we can't just
  445. simply assume markets are bad therefore we need government sometimes it can it can also work um the other direction so
  446. in the last two minutes let me ask the kind of the question so what do we need to do going
  447. forward and there will be certain lots of especially with the new the new Congress and new president um trying to
  448. discuss and their first inclination in fact the writings on the wall always talking about we need more
  449. regulation my first suggestion is let's first pause stop and really have an open
  450. honest discussion some reasonable steps obviously can be can be uh taken we need
  451. a balanced discussion but we also part of that discussion is not what more rules to add but looking at the existing
  452. rules and how they contribute to the problem sarbanes oxy is an example of Regulation that was done in a very
  453. reactive way and that probably in in many ways cause more harm than good many of the provisions of sarban oxy only
  454. reward accounting firm and law firms many what I call legitimate firms that don't that doesn't include law firms um
  455. Now list on the London aim precisely because of the enormous complexities um that sarban oxy cause especially for
  456. small midcap firms um and sbin hly also creates I think an enormous sense of of secur a sense of security and there's
  457. there's a lot of parallels between these events uh today and then I was at treasury ad minist uh at that time I
  458. advised the Federal Open Market Committee and the financial VY uh regulatory panel at at the time Congress
  459. had other ideas though they had to they had to make a statement so first they issued a subpoena to of my box including
  460. every in email that included the word Enron and and other people in the administration's inboxes but then they
  461. decided Well we really need to pass this very tough law this law Sor Oxley was very reactionary and it was overstepping
  462. at the time the logic but that we had though was that it was okay to go too far because what we could always do if
  463. we went too far is we could always unwind later it was better to be safe than sorry what is what we kept on um uh
  464. uh saying and so what we have now is we have a law that has very high complexity
  465. very high compliance cost that clearly hurts in my opinion shareholders of small and midcap firms in particular and
  466. it's not true that those e it's now easy to unwind those parts now and the reason
  467. why is because once you make a bad law a whole cottage industry of accountants and legal forms ously is created to
  468. support that law and they hire a lobbyist and they they argue for continuing that law cuz that's how they
  469. get fees the small midcap in Minnesota doesn't have a chance and so we're not going to see much unraveling of sarbanes
  470. oxy even though it clearly was an overreaction uh uh uh to the problem so I I'm afraid of the same type of
  471. overaction happening today and we need to be I think very careful and 15 seconds I think the f one thing I would
  472. do is I would impose instead of having Congress design a law like with sarban Oxley let's create a panel and of
  473. experts much like we did when we Congress couldn't actually pull the trigger and require the expense of the
  474. stock options that was too political you had too many people from Blue States um
  475. who are supposed to be anti- business but in this case they were they they favored um um bad accounting and so they
  476. they uh what Congress did is they set up a separate panel that actually eventually did it sometimes we need to
  477. have that cover and so my my suggestion is that we it be very suspicious of anything that Congress Rush rushes out
  478. after the first session um next year and we we need to uh proceed very carefully
  479. and with great purpose thanks well it's um probably not optimal to follow uh four star speakers um and uh uh so I'm
  480. going to doing a lot of editing on the Fly I guess I would add one even more depressing detail to Kent sm's speech
  481. the glass deagle act you may recall was passed in the depression the early days of the depression in fact and after a
  482. mere two years uh Senator Carter glass went to the floor of the Senate and and uh recanted and wished that they would
  483. uh in fact roll it back well it didn't happen until Graham leech Bley in 1997 so it can take a a very very long time
  484. to unw unwind bad legislation what I'm going to do is take you through um a lot more rapidly than
  485. um uh I had meant because um a lot of this material has been covered but I wanted to give you a little bit of my
  486. the background of uh what I saw as the cause and um why I'm so concerned about uh what the consequences may be um
  487. securitization was as many people have mentioned actually modeled on the uh actions of the government sponsored
  488. entities even before they were government sponsored entities um they were in fact government Enterprises they
  489. were spun off by uh lynon Johnson who wanted to pay for guns and butter and thought if he could put these uh
  490. entities off balance sheet which Congress has certainly liked then he could have his policies and not pay for
  491. them and uh that has been a winning solution with Congress for a very long time well when you thought about how you
  492. would replicate that with private securitizations the key challenge was how you substituted for the government
  493. guarantee against credit risk you had to have some means of making up for the fact that the government was not going
  494. to guarantee private securitizations um and there were essentially three ways of doing that one
  495. was to develop very good statistical models that would tell you how much of a buffer you had to create in order to
  496. make some of the Securities in a securitization equivalent to uh a a able a whatever you liked but usually
  497. investment grade risk um this was uh also buttressed by ratings from the statistical ratings organizations
  498. Moody's Fitch S&P as we've heard um and um uh Kent's Judgment of of their performance I think has um certainly
  499. shown up in in recent times although they've really done a rather good job uh on corporates until very recently
  500. although he's quite right that they're never uh ahead of markets it's always a lag and uh uh never really um forward
  501. looking at all um and then finally if you were really really worried you'd want to have some monoline insurance
  502. backing up the credit risk so that you could be very very sure that your security was actually worth what it was
  503. rated to be the result was um an absolute explosion of uh Innovations um we had R&B's cdos CDO squared a asset
  504. commercial paper sivs SIV lights and went on and on and we developed a huge off-balance sheet banking sh system
  505. private that amounts to about $ 111 trillion um it helped feed what was a regulatory induced and this sort of
  506. feeds into Kent's story as well a regulatory induced demand for very high quality assets The Regulators uh in many
  507. cases required institutions to hold at least investment grade and sometimes triaa rated Securities well it turns out
  508. there not that very that many AAA rated corporations in the world and so by securitization you could synthesize AAA
  509. rated Securities by essentially developing a structure that would give you the equivalent in terms of default
  510. um and uh that was uh used even with subprime mortgages where no one of the mortgages would have been remotely uh
  511. labeled AAA but through the magic of securitization you could easily transform as much as
  512. 85% of them into AAA this just gives you a a quick overview of the structure um but it could get uh hideously complex
  513. very quickly I took it out to CDO squared where you're taking the lower tranches and retrenching and retrenching
  514. them but noticing each time you're ending up with some AAA tranches and I could have gone out to CD Cubes but
  515. that's enough to give you an idea that the people who are buying in products either had to do a hell of a lot of
  516. homework to find out what was underlying it or simply we're just looking at the ratings um it became a very very
  517. important source of income to um lcf I is is U the kind of uh language that the bank of England and IMF use for the most
  518. important banks in the world there about 16 of them and you can read the peus and
  519. chartreuse blocks as being a sort of proxy for the fees they were making on securitization so it became a really
  520. important source of income and it's one of the reasons we've seen investment Banks collapse so readily um they were
  521. so dependent on this source of income which has dried up and may have dyed up for the foreseeable future that uh they
  522. really are going to have to reinvent themselves all of this came to a halt when uh they were confronted with the
  523. brute fact that they were really dealing with uh assets that weren't nearly as good as they thought they were uh keep
  524. your eye on the left screen if I could figure out how to use the um but I can't uh anyhow take a look at the subprime
  525. section um we should have a laser pointer uh that uh I haven't really quite figured out but the blue was
  526. thought to be the worst that could ever happen uh 2000 was just before the recession in this kind of lending uh for
  527. reasons that can't described you expect the peak default rate to be about 3 years after the loan was issued because
  528. in sub prime lending the custom is to give a teaser rate that's very very low and then at the third year you jump it
  529. up sometimes with a four or 500 basis point spread above lior so you go to a very from a very very low rate to a very
  530. very high rate after three years and that's where you expect to see Peak defaults um the idea was not that
  531. anybody was ever going to pay those High rates but that house prices would rise so rapidly that by the time you got to
  532. that point you could refinance and keep going and that was the context of what was basically 75 years of upward price
  533. movements well notice that in the more recent vintages um 2005 as dick Marson pointed
  534. out was sort of a turning point that nobody seemed to recognize 2006 and 2007 especially you were seeing delinquency
  535. rates that exceeded the peak rate that you thought was the worst possible within months which meant that some
  536. people were walking away from the houses without ever having made a payment um that led to um a uh breakdown and it
  537. was very clear that there was a huge breakdown in underwriting standards at many different levels and it undermined
  538. the three pillars of that under that were the uh foundation for support for private securitizations and that was
  539. statistical ratings models ratings agencies and monoline insurance all three collapsed uh first the ratings
  540. models the um Institution that had the strongest incentives to build the best models were those that were underwriting
  541. the most of this debt and they were also the institutions that showed the largest
  542. losses and showed them first and they showed them them repeatedly which indicated that not only did they not get
  543. it right first time the first time they couldn't get it right the second or third time either uh bear Stern which
  544. was one of the leaders of the pack had two hedge funds that blew up uh City Group maril Lynch UBS uh on on and on um
  545. had repeated write Downs that were basically because they hadn't modeled things appropriately then it came to the
  546. ratings agencies well people were accustomed to thinking about corporate ratings the very worst year in corporate
  547. rating history was 2001 the yellow represents Three Notch downgrades um which is pretty severe but
  548. notice that in the corporate world 2001 being where we lost Enron and WorldCom there were really negligible Three Notch
  549. downgrades except in the below investment grade uh range which everybody knew was very volatile and was
  550. not very surprising but look at what happened in the 2007 uh 2008 and it's only very it's I guess of 1312 2008 to
  551. the subprime backed Securities look at the Triple B category in particular 68% of those were downgraded Three Notch
  552. which took them from investment grade to below investment grade which meant that
  553. many of the institutions that were holding them had to get rid of them now you might think looking at this that
  554. they did a much better job at triaa but it simply reveals a flaw in their in the
  555. way in which they approached it in these nested Securities you had to sort of start at the bottom and work up until
  556. you got to the AAA to know just how bad it was uh these have now been selling for uh 50 60 cents on the dollar and so
  557. didn't really fair much better and as soon as monol line Insurance looked like it was going to have to pay up um the
  558. stock prices of monoline insurers collapsed and the credit default uh spreads went up to a th basis points um
  559. the IMF has something very clever uh called a heat diagram that shows how quickly the crisis spread and um in this
  560. diagram it's good to be green that means you're within one standard deviation of
  561. the way you're usually priced if you're yellow it's not so good you're within one to four standard deviations of the
  562. way you're usually priced but uh if you're red it's really terrible you're being priced within four standard
  563. deviations of the normal and what you see is the pattern of exposure it began with subprime and it really began um
  564. dick noted that that that one really should have known about it in 2005 but it was completely unambiguous in
  565. February 2007 when HSBC made a full account of its subprime losses and its American subsidiary household finance
  566. and if you kept dancing as Charles Prince did after that you were simply not paying attention or you had a very
  567. severe case of cognitive dissonance um it spread to Banks uh it continued of course with subprime and then as we
  568. found more and more Banks were involved Banks and other financial institutions became involved then all sorts of
  569. instruments that that relied on the three pillars of privatization either they relied on
  570. ratings or they relied on monoline insurance like municipal bonds or they relied on um a statistical models for
  571. their value for a long time there was a discussion of decoupling that the emerging markets were going to be able
  572. to manage on their own that they had self- sustained demand and you had China and and uh India that were sort of
  573. leading the way and I think Jeremy's shown you how that's unfortunately ended the wrong way way it should have been
  574. apparent in August 2007 that this was a crisis of decapitalization there were major losses that were uh absolutely
  575. apparent although not revealed um and there were losses because of holding some of these Securities some of these
  576. institutions were dumb enough to eat eat their own cooking uh and there were losses from honoring implicit guarantees
  577. uh that were backing up off-balance sheet commitment to this this whole private uh system of uh off-balance
  578. sheet banking there were also losses of pipelines of assets that could no longer
  579. be taken to the market and securitized that was basically the northern Rock story and um as we saw it was a very
  580. important source of Revenue that that simply had disappeared from future earnings which um is one of the points
  581. that Jeremy was making about how you think about what the price of a stock should be um the capital challenge was
  582. not only to replace it and Dick showed that they've really not been uh keeping up with the amount they've had to write
  583. down um but it was also stockpiling capital and that's one of the reasons the recovery is usually so slow because
  584. uh the market starts to demand a whole lot more Capital than Regulators do um and the unknown of course is how much of
  585. the off balance sheet stuff is ultimately going to have to be brought back on the balance sheet the variations
  586. in disclosure across countries have been very harmful because this is an integrated Global Market with very
  587. different disclosure practices the SEC requires quarterly disclosure Europe um is more principles based uh less
  588. prescriptive um the CFO can exercise professional judgment about the scale and timing of lost recognitions which is
  589. one of the reasons that you saw a lot of shod and Freud in in Europe until they all panicked in in August because they
  590. they took their time in letting out the bad news uh but the upshot is that the same asset can be valued quite
  591. differently in different institutions the peacemeal release of increasingly larger losses was a really
  592. bad strategy if indeed one could call it that it raised questions about the the Integrity of financial reporting and it
  593. really in the end raised questions about whether management understood its own its own risk
  594. positions um the fed I'm not quite sure what happened to our framing here but uh
  595. the bail out of bear was where things got really panicky and it's because um the Fed was really afraid of submitting
  596. what they considered to be a very large very opaque institution that they had no
  597. oversight of to um B the process of resolution um and the reason is that one of the the common tools of bankruptcy
  598. courts everywhere is to exercise stays and stays can be fatal in markets that trade literally 247
  599. where people have to worry about their positions and and how they're going to end up um so the the real concern was
  600. that it could have fatal damage to the primary dealer Market well in the meantime the man the government managed
  601. to bail out Freddy and Fanny uh and when it got to Layman uh a number of people thought it was obvious that they would
  602. have to bail out Layman because Layman was at least twice as big as bear and probably much more complicated uh and
  603. indeed if you're talking about the deserving insolvent l had actually tried harder than bear to to keep itself from
  604. the brink um but they didn't um in the wake of the fanny and Freddy uh uh bailouts they seemed to want to show
  605. that there was some limit to their willing to subsidize um and the FED had had examiners in all four of the
  606. remaining investment Banks daily since then and felt they could predict um uh what the consequences could be
  607. Unfortunately they didn't uh they didn't realize that it was held by um major uh
  608. money market mutual funds they didn't realize that Layman had comingled uh customers money with its own money in
  609. London where lots of hedge funds were relying on uh access to their Prime brokerage accounts and couldn't get it
  610. and um so that is and I I've agreed with all the panelists that was really um the
  611. time that things turned to Terror um by an intervention policy that seemed increasingly ad hoc and desperate you
  612. saw that that central banks Were You could argue if you were trying to make the best possible case for the central
  613. bank that it was their old favorite policy of constructive ambiguity which I've never believed in but I would argue
  614. instead it was really destructive ambiguity because nobody knew who would be next um this is a cartoon from The
  615. Economist that um is of course the Humpty Dumpty fairy tale and uh one of the king's horses in one of the King's
  616. Men is saying it appears this uh is having a fairy tale ending you may remember it didn't end well for Humpty
  617. Dumpty uh you can see AIG teetering on the brink and at the rest you see Fanny and Layman and so forth uh with the
  618. sulter behind Layman saying shares and glue should be rising high but there was Terror throughout the market because you
  619. really couldn't predict what the government might do next markets react really negatively to uncertainty you had
  620. a massive flight to Quality and to simplicity there were huge outflows from what some
  621. people believe are the safest of funds next to treasury bills institutional money funds and we saw that uh the
  622. reserve primary fund and put putam fund actually uh had to close and uh that led
  623. to real terror in the marketplace uh it was a loss of confidence in the financial system the punch line there is
  624. can I interest you in a faith-based deposit um which began to show signs of panic where you have a man here saying
  625. give me all my money or else uh to a a situation where Banks became increasingly desperate for liquidity
  626. that you began to see in uh interbank markets with with huge uh markups now I I would have a disagreement I think with
  627. um some of the interpretations you've heard of uh the interbank rate spread uh but we'll we'll hold that to later this
  628. is simply showing how incredibly um Innovative the FED has been taking all sorts of collateral uh from all sorts of
  629. people for all sorts of terms um without um until very recently having much impact at all on conditions and I think
  630. it's fundamentally because they were trying to deal with what was really a solvency shock and should have been
  631. apparent as a solvy shock by supplying more liquidity and that just doesn't work this is what's happened to the
  632. fed's balance sheet notice that it's almost doubled and it's still going up because just today they announced they
  633. were going to have a new facility for money market mutual funds um more broadly the problem has been excessive
  634. leverage and it's been mainly centered in the household sector and um in the financial sector which and where it's
  635. really quadrupled um with a Year's inventory of unsold homes it's inevitable that we're
  636. going to have larger losses and uh more deleveraging um deleveraging has had all
  637. sorts of financial institutions even hedge funds where you can see the green line going down precipitately um it has
  638. even hit Main Street um where uh uh what used to be the Friendly Loan company has
  639. become the go to Hill loan company and sadly as we all know it's hit the financial sector really really hard uh
  640. and it's not just the financial sector it's it's others as well um the problem of course is that the treasury insisted
  641. on uh interpreting this as a liquidity problem as recently as the tarp fund with this bizarre $700 billion program
  642. to buy taxic toxic asset or toxic um assets um uh there's another cartoon that I skipped that showed them bearing
  643. them and it was a bizarre political gesture uh for some reason they seem to think it would be easier to sell as
  644. buying toxic assets from the people who owned them and had created them than to talk about actually doing something for
  645. homeowners or for um uh rebuilding the institutions um Congress originally rejected it but when Ben banki told them
  646. that we wouldn't have an economy if they didn't pass it they came up with something uh in addition to production
  647. for makers of wooden arrows and rum and and a monthly subsidy for bicyclists um they actually came up with some pretty
  648. good programs um and one of them is the treasury that can now invest 250 billion
  649. in Bank preferred sh shares uh 125 of it has already been allocated uh the remaining
  650. 125 has to be applied for by the middle of next fund next uh month uh the FED can purchase a commercial paper now uh
  651. starting October 27th which is a market you could seriously start about making you could seriously think about making
  652. more liquid there's no way to revive the market for Junk Securities and so that was misguided from the start the F FDIC
  653. has also been hyperactive they've raised Insurance to 250,000 on um uh regular deposits from
  654. 100,000 with with utterly no discussion about it they've offered unlimited deposit uh Insurance on non-interest
  655. bearing accounts that businesses hold and they're also going to start guaranteeing subordinated debt for three
  656. years so if there was ever any hope of having Market discipline in the system it's pretty much gone um and um the
  657. European hm this has cut pretty badly but should say the uee the European Union has uh acted with surprising speed
  658. and deceptive unanimity um and you can see the kinds of bailouts they've been doing it looks the same but it's it's
  659. not quite the same um this is um sort of led to worldwide round of of coordinated
  660. government guarantees and subsidies that have have made moral hazard really rampant and have really I think made it
  661. very difficult to see where we go from here um punchline here is now we just have to sit back and wait for the FED to
  662. Veil us out well where are all these ad hoc measures taking us um deep government involvement um in the banking
  663. system and it's not and there's really no sense of how they're going to exit or any vision of where they should be going
  664. you have quasi ownership um of banks with very few protections for taxpayers the US is pouring in perverted stock but
  665. with no cost to existing shareholders um and uh no push to write down or actually
  666. reveal the Bad Assets uh which the Europeans at least have done we're ending up with a tiered banking system
  667. where the nine favored banks are like gsse with all of the problems that we faced with the gses and and very few of
  668. the controls um and the liquidity programs have basically been nothing but for barrance they've been putting off
  669. problems that have been growing not shrinking um Housing Finance is is an open question nobody knows how we're
  670. going to do it in the future but it's very clear that the government's playing a bigger and bigger role um and it is
  671. going to be a bigger and bigger liability on the B on the government's balance sheet which could in fact uh
  672. ultimately affect its ratings um one of the key questions is how far house prices will fall uh the average um we
  673. have uh some reason to believe that there's a third wave of defaults on Equity loans and Prime loans and then
  674. the real economy effects are just sitting in luckily we're sitting on a market that's not nearly as bad as most
  675. people think uh actually 25 million people have have paid off their houses and um 55 million have mortgages that uh
  676. and of those 51 are paying on time it's really only 4 million that are um behind
  677. and uh only 2% of those are in foreclosure as opposed to 50% in the Great Depression um I think one of the
  678. key questions is how you um U restore faith in securitization because private securitization amounts to almost 12
  679. trillion and there's just not enough capital in the world to put that back on institutions balance sheets so we have
  680. to think of some way to uh make it more transparent and more possible um and as you can see new issues of private
  681. securitizations have virtually disappeared um the key policy challenge I think that really nobody has discussed
  682. and Marty will be glad to hear these uh long awaited words in conclusion I think
  683. the really really tough problem facing us all is trying to figure out how um we can make the world safe for even the
  684. largest most uh uh the failure of even the largest most interconnected institutions it's not Beyond possibility
  685. but nobody seems to be working on it in terms of remedying the economic situation yesterday uh chairman Ben
  686. banki uh came out uh in favor of additional fiscal stimulus do you think that's appropriate at this juncture U
  687. and uh it it Unleashed a rather harsh response by Wall Street Journal today actually saying that uh this this was
  688. akin to his endorsement of Obama that he should have in their words begged off of
  689. any pronouncement on the fiscal side in fact even stating that in past prior to past elections fed Federal Reserve
  690. chairman would even beg off of even exercising monetary policy so should he have begged off and uh and and what
  691. should in your view uh be done in the area of either fiscal or monetary policy well let me comment
  692. that um I think he could be right uh I think fourth quarter looks horrendous the one we're in U
  693. um the estimates for GDP growth are now minus 2 to minus three for the this quarter that's one of the sharpest
  694. declines I think since uh Carter put credit card controls on um maybe it's too late to get uh a tax refund to boost
  695. holiday spending um that's what you'd really uh like to do um uh it did seem to work in the um uh second quarter and
  696. we had a fairly decent growth on GDP uh but I don't know whether we could get it
  697. in the hands of consumers fast enough uh anyway that's my opinion I actually agree with uh Jeremy
  698. uh but let me say that I I don't think the Fed chair should talk about fiscal policy I think Greenspan was wrong to
  699. talk about endorse the Bush tax cuts didn't quite endorse them but he certainly encouraged them and I think
  700. banki should focus on monetary policy the central bank really has to keep credibility with respect to bank
  701. regulation and monetary policy and there are enough other people who can talk about the need for for uh a stimulus
  702. package but I agree entirely with Jeremy that um we need a stimulus package sooner rather than later uh how it's
  703. designed will be a different issue um but I expect that as soon as the election is over uh the Congress will be
  704. back in session and we'll have something on the president's desk uh very soon uh
  705. president may not like it so it's a question of compromise to see what they actually do in terms of what to
  706. stimulate just just sending people $1,000 um an awful lot that doesn't get spent so perhaps we can do it a little
  707. more imaginatively this time but I I think there'll definitely be a stimulus package yeah I don't think you need to
  708. count on the uh chairman of the FED for encouragement to Congress to spend more money um and I I really do take Dick's
  709. Point very seriously I I think the fed's credibility is enormously important and
  710. I think they're really in danger of losing it um a lot of the reform packages have talked about giving them
  711. oversight of the entire Financial system and de facto they've more or less assumed it but the regulatory record is
  712. spotty at best uh it's certainly uneven it's unpredictable they've not done a good job of explaining what they're
  713. trying to do and if they really were the Architects as one has heard of the tarp
  714. plan to um buy that uh toxic debt from the people who created it um I think there they real
  715. questions about uh whether they don't have enough on their plate already to uh uh you think did you think the Fed was
  716. the architect and not Paulson I had heard that was the case sounds like a pulson plan to me well I think they both
  717. have to agree before they go out but I have been to seminars at the FED where people go through exercises where they
  718. believe that they can actually price the stuff and um the assumptions you can if
  719. you make if you're willing to make assumptions about future cash flows and the appropriate discount rate but the
  720. range of those assumptions can be huge um and uh I think that if they did not actually set out the plan they certainly
  721. gave him encouraging encouragement by uh indicating that now we know it's the Paulson plan because he clearly didn't
  722. know how to price this stuff he's Outsourcing it he's Outsourcing and he has friends who tell that for a lot of
  723. money I guess I would just make two quick points I think the role issue that we have to face as a long-term economy
  724. is that we are in dire need of fundamental tax reform and the problem with doing a little rebates here a
  725. little rebates there is it postpones the big discussion we have some of the highest effective tax rates on capital
  726. income in the world um we need fundamental tax reform and we use up our black powder we just sent up debate
  727. checks I think we need to have a serious discussion go beyond the simple short run let me push back on the panelist on
  728. 1 point2 and that is this idea of credibility of the FED it's not obvious to me that that's so important and I
  729. realize that I'm saying something that's completely the opposite but one way you
  730. could think about you know credibility it's predictability and that predictability can sometimes lead to
  731. moral hazard I think sometimes this idea of a mixed strategy where the government
  732. is less predictable about who it's going to bail out and how can actually have some feedbacks on
  733. dealing with moral hazard and so I think we the fact that it let some banks sink
  734. and some banks survive people are criticized and saying well that's a terrible thing it was inconsistent not
  735. obvious on an ongoing basis that's really the the bad strategy because now when I'm a bank and I can do stupid
  736. stuff it's not obvious where the if I'm going to be the one bailing out getting getting bailed out or not oh I
  737. absolutely agree and that's why I think the policy of uh constructive ambiguity it is is fundamentally unworkable
  738. because we usually can predict and we in fact have a very rigorous system for figuring out which banks we should bail
  739. out and which we shouldn't and what's distressing about the way all of this has happened is that if we had made the
  740. list of the nine biggest Banks two months before we did it would have included Washington Mutual and wacovia
  741. and we have no reason to believe that the nine on the list now are fundamentally that much stronger in fact
  742. if you want to see how just how unreliable public information about these institutions is think of the fact
  743. that just two weeks before viovia became insolvent Morgan Stanley one of the uh firms with the reputation for being able
  744. to Value anything was willing to sell itself to a firm that became bankrupt two two months later the the disclosure
  745. that we have is simply completely inadequate for the kind of business these banks are doing is there a
  746. question over on this side uh what changes would you anticipate in the hedge fund industry
  747. both in terms of Regulation as well as trading strategies of profitability I guess I'll I'll tackle that um I think
  748. that's the big unknown in terms of whether or not uh the new regulations will be extended to hedge funds um they
  749. um on there there's some real difficulties in conceiving exactly how they would be regulated um it's an
  750. international market um so I think we we'll we'll really have to wait and see what happens with the respect to
  751. regulation um it's uh there's going to be a lot of discussion of to to what extent should the traditional banking
  752. regulation be extended to other types of financial institutions I really personally doubt whether or not it will
  753. be extended to hedge funds um let me be a little cynical uh who are some of the biggest
  754. contributors to the incoming Administration the real test of the administration in with respect to hedge
  755. funds which is going to be very interesting as far as I'm concerned is is it going to be
  756. possible to actually impose income taxes on the income earned by hedge funds and
  757. private Equity Partners under the current law what happens is the income not the
  758. capital at risk but the income the carried interest is taxed at 15% rather than at the ordinary 35% 5%
  759. income tax rate an interesting question will be in the new Administration will they actually decide to tax the people
  760. who have donated so much money to them that's going to be interesting that's going to be a test litness test of
  761. whether or not they're serious about changing the income distribution in the United States my guess is they won't
  762. touch that thing but we'll see we'll see next year and the following year will the new Administration tax carried
  763. interest at ordinary income tax rates I would add uh one point or I guess three points to that one I think that
  764. leveraged strategies are um pretty much doomed for this the short to medium term
  765. um Prime Brokers are much much tighter than they used to be it's very very hard to leverage up in the way that that
  766. hedge funds once did so those that were relying heavily on Leverage I think are going to be in a lot of trouble on the
  767. other hand I think hedge funds that specialize in distressed debt have just incredible opportunities before them and
  768. probably will do remarkably well I guess I'm a little more optimistic that they won't be regulated um and I think the
  769. very fact that investment Banks now are all nestled in more heavily regulated Banks means that a lot of the top talent
  770. are probably going to leave for hedge funds and hedge funds are going to end up being something like the new
  771. investment Banks um not with the scale but but with much of the innovation and much of the uh um uh kind of uh uh
  772. interesting business that was once done by investment Banks I I think uh what's interesting is that you know a year ago
  773. people said what's going to explode if there is going to be an explosion uh you know it was the hedge funds they're you
  774. know totally unregulated $2 trillion of assets at their Peak uh and and the interesting thing is they didn't I mean
  775. yes a few of them G G down of course um uh but in general um now the aggregate returns a year to date are down about
  776. half the S&P which means their beta is about 1/ half it's which is a little bit higher than what they sometimes
  777. advertise themselves out but if you take a blended average that's not all you know that's not all that bad and and
  778. really um you know there hasn't been that much finger pointing as one might expect at the hedge funds causing any of
  779. this because they didn't uh they did short things faster which should go down and did go down to some extent but uh
  780. outside of that um you know they they've actually stayed pretty clean in this mess uh I think which interestingly the
  781. the G7 meeting that preceded the one that took place just this last fall um had labeled that as the main threat to
  782. the financial system and if you looked at their involvement in this market they were actually big bu ERS of the CDO
  783. Equity tranches so they were holding the riskiest pieces of these things but they
  784. tended to do much better with them than the people who actually originated them and the reason is that the hedge funds
  785. did their homework they they priced them appropriately they knew when to hedge them they um moved them quickly and um
  786. you found other institutions were just really sitting on it okay yeah uh question in the
  787. middle yeah um sorry light of the current crisis and also the entitlement problems that Professor sm's touched
  788. upon um what is the chance that the riskiness of t- bills will be changing in the future that the the riskiness of
  789. t- bills that the treasury bills will be changing what do you mean by the risk there there is never any risk on
  790. the T bills r that they won't be risk- free anymore in the future but they only promis to pay Federal Reserve notes and
  791. there's an unlimited supply of Federal Reserve notes from the that so there cannot be any risk I I guess the
  792. question me Bills he means bonds he means the longer term it doesn't matter CA any risk on that in nominal terms
  793. either well nominal terms yeah sure then you're talking about risk of inflation okay yeah yeah I mean that's the real
  794. but then that's the question I mean sorry I guess the question is about the default of the US government in the most
  795. you're talking about a hyperinflation or a massive inflation of some sort or explicit theault
  796. well both can happen I mean there's no what there's no way they're going to default on the
  797. nominal debt they might they might default on the on the tips inflation indexed bonds that's that's a
  798. theoretical possibility which actually got raised as the tips yields went up to 3% and people were wondering my God can
  799. the government really pay these things off or not um but I think I think the question was what's say is this all this
  800. debt going to lead to inflation and I think especially all this liquidity as as Professor Herring you know showed the
  801. balance sheet has doubled even more than doubled I think it's absolutely essential I I think that's a good thing
  802. you there's a liquidity crisis everyone wants liquid safe assets the central bank is there to provide them but as
  803. soon as confidence returns they have to withdraw this liquidity um there's ABS absolutely no question the good thing
  804. that happened yesterday is that the the 90-day t- rate went above 1% for the first time since the Leman bankruptcy
  805. which means there isn't like a panic into bills uh which is a good sign actually uh that that there's an
  806. alleviation of of some of that uh anxiety uh that we have uh uh in the system but if they don't withdraw
  807. liquidity then you're going to have a lot of liquidity laying around that will find its way into prices later on but we
  808. have to trust that the FED is going to do the right thing uh which is withdraw that liquidity as trust is restored in
  809. the markets incidentally I uh wanted to offer my alternative uh interpretation of the Ted spread or the the spread
  810. between the liore and the the treasury bill rate um with all of the uh array of of special facilities that nearly all
  811. the central banks have to take in almost any kind of collateral that is remotely
  812. good um it's quite possible that what you're seeing in in the liore market is only those banks that don't have good
  813. collateral to deal more cheaply at the fed and so it doesn't mean what it used to mean it may simply be a reflection of
  814. unease about counterparty risk which is well warranted in this world where we well the liar is unsecured that's true
  815. it's uncollateralized but it it's the fear that these big Banks could go on I you know if if you know Morgan Stanley
  816. WAMU and all these others can suddenly go under AIG you begin to is any Bank completely safe you know if there's only
  817. a 1 2 3% probability that they're going to go under uh all of a sudden that gets
  818. added to the uh but the good quality banks are not going there for but if but you can look at the bankers Association
  819. and look at the at the the rate quote from all the banks and they were all about the same the American Banks the
  820. three Americans were a little lower because probably they did have fed funds access with some of these Europeans
  821. didn't have but they were all high there wasn't a big difference in in the rat they were
  822. borrowing at it though well I I don't know and that was how but that that means it's even it it should be
  823. discarded I mean you should you should price off a Fed funds Target yeah that I wouldn't disagree yeah because it means
  824. something different than it used to be yeah absolutely okay question now over on this side yeah I was just wondering I
  825. mean how much of this I mean the crisis is an accounting fiction I mean if banks
  826. are able to migrate their asset back Securities from trading books to I guess hold to Value um how much of this would
  827. have been avoided and how much of this going forward um would be mitigated in my opinion none of it I
  828. mean it it it it Market to Market is not the cause of this crisis um this crisis is because Banks
  829. overloaded and leveraged and and insurance companies in AIG and insured risky mortgage and housing related debt
  830. that they thought or hoped was not risky um and and the way you know it isn't Mark to Market accounting is
  831. because when the FED shopped these firms around no one wanted them I mean forget
  832. about what you can apply any counting you wanted to here's the assets here's liabilities no one would take
  833. them doesn't you know use whatever counting you think is right but it is true that nearly every CEO who's gone
  834. down with one of these firms has blamed two things marketto Market accounting short yeah and uh I think you're quite
  835. right that neither one of them has had anything at all to do with the problem no very good uh sir question yes stand
  836. here first I would like to thank the panel for the insights provided my question is are the steps being uh taken
  837. by the fed and government in the last 6 weeks addressing the root cause of the problem that is the lowering property
  838. prices unless somebody addresses the lowering property prices the housing cycle nothing would actually happen
  839. Jeremy actually mentioned the same thing we are actually facing a liquidity problem but once liquidity is provided
  840. the problem that comes into the scene is fear of solvency unless housing cycle is
  841. uh put on its space nothing else nothing would actually happen that's my VI the the the problem is there's a lot of
  842. fixes of proposals out there it's too slow right now it it it it cannot they're so complex they cannot be done
  843. with a stroke of a pen we're all going to Value these at 80 or 70 and the government will take the remainder or
  844. whatever um and and and to actually raise housing prices I mean Gody would need inflation and and all sorts of
  845. subsidies to housing and that's you don't I don't know know if you want that and remember that that house prices are
  846. really in some sense an intergenerational transfer there are lots of people who are now buying houses
  847. who could not previously afford them or who were too prudent to overextend themselves to buy them yes my point on
  848. that is can the government actually sell these foreclosed houses at maybe 50 cents a dollar to people meaning people
  849. I mean here are people with good cred score by giving some sort of confidence this would actually liquidate the Banks
  850. directly by the people's money not by the government's money and the government would actually be helping the
  851. people not the big companies that's what but that's what's happening in private negotiations
  852. between Banks and and and the Borrowers is that there is tens of thousands of short sales going on right now where
  853. someone underwater in their mortgage is getting permission from the bank to sell
  854. it uh underwater to a new borrower um that's that's already happening now whether there should be some overall
  855. structure the government to help people get a framework for it because it's sort
  856. of an ad hoc basis right now is is probably a good question but that's what's happening taking that just a bit
  857. further I think the way the government usually does this is part of the problem they usually do it by encouraging people
  858. to over leverage so if you have an FHA mortgage or if you have uh something for Fanny or Freddy what they basically do
  859. is allow you to take a more leverage loan than than you actually should if they really want to help people own
  860. homes and keep them they really should be subsidizing their Equity stake in the home and uh so far Congress hasn't
  861. wanted to face up to that because that would mean allocating the funds and actually having to uh pay for it on the
  862. out of taxes but uh if we really wanted to do it right I think that's what we should do and have a much more stable
  863. system I should point out that um um there's an additional problem that Jeremy and I have talked about um
  864. directly which is the mortgages which have been securitized which is a large proportion of the mortgages in that case
  865. um there's no one that you can negotiate with because the mortgages are are split
  866. up in so many tches and they're owned by so many different people technically it's a very difficult thing for the even
  867. if we had a government program that said let's go in and buy these mortgages uh what exactly how do how do we actually
  868. do this yet um if we have one bank we can go to the bank and say Let's Make a Deal Let's Make a Deal uh we're going to
  869. have the owner pay something for the house and you won't have an abandoned house that's something that's feasible
  870. but uh when they're securitized you you have to realize how much securitization has changed even this simple problem of
  871. subsidizing mortgages there was a serious attempt in Congress uh to broaden the scope for um the um agents
  872. that were servicing these mortgages to renegotiate them and it was pretty much stopped dead in its tracks by uh a
  873. number of investors who said look if you tamper with this again we're never again
  874. investing in securitized mortgages that you'll change the payment priorities that we were counting on you're
  875. expropriating what were our property rights and um so it didn't really get very far think we have time for one or two
  876. more more questions if they're quick questions and responses is there a has microphone been given to anybody in the
  877. middle okay hi uh thanks for your thoughts um given given sort of the real erosion in in wealth particularly in the
  878. part of the American Consumer um and starting to think about you know the next steps of this thing which is sort
  879. of a a consumer Le recession globally um what steps from uh a perspective Pro prescriptive or restorative standpoint
  880. can the government take to step in I guess um act as that sort of you know I guess buyer of Last Resort for lack of a
  881. better term and this is a really difficult question I mean you're a big question
  882. people are asking um you know is the savings rate going to suddenly rise now because with with you know the days of
  883. easy borrowing and lending are over the consequences of over leverage are are are now very
  884. apparent um you know what happens if the household in the US suddenly goes to a two for 6% savings rate like we had in
  885. the 90s or even higher as we had even before um that that's a big downward shock uh to aggregate
  886. demand um and I mean and and it's I mean the only thing that I can see and not that I like it but you're going to have
  887. to use you know tax uh tax policy or fiscal policy of some sort to to try to offset some of
  888. that shock I mean it's interesting to look at what happened in Japan and uh because
  889. they tried to do that with you know some success but um we would end up with even
  890. a bigger debt at the end but maybe we' keep the economy moving a little bit further I would like to know what other
  891. panelists think about that if if they've thought about that issue well in fact we have a huge amount
  892. of empirical evidence this is um not a unique problem we've had housing created financial disasters uh in at least 100
  893. countries around the world and the world bank has actually done a lot of pretty serious research on what works and what
  894. doesn't and what seems to work best is to um take your write Downs early on to try to um uh separate the good assets
  895. from the Bad Assets to sell off the Bad Assets even if they're at very low prices and get them back into the
  896. economy and um you have sort of it's in a sense a sort of shock treatment but it
  897. seems to um lead to Greater speed in recovery um and uh less of a a fall in per capita income over
  898. time okay uh is one more question is the microphone over here yes uh hi we have a
  899. very large uh fiscal deficit right now and I was wondering what role like we're Bor borrowing so much from China what
  900. role does that play if any in the um or what role will it play um in the current
  901. economic crisis well I think it's just natural um in a recession that the fiscal deficit deteriorates quite
  902. marketly last year's fiscal deficit strangely enough was not very large uh it had been coming down during most of
  903. the years the Bush Administration after initially Rising sharply with the tax cuts uh last year
  904. the uh deficit fiscal deficit Federal fiscal deficit as a percentage GDP was only
  905. 1.2% uh this year it's going to balloon like crazy it's going to be even worse next year and that's a cyclical movement
  906. that always happens during recession and what happens after the recession is revenues tax revenues start to rise
  907. government expenditures uh involved with the recession start to decline and the fiscal situation improves there's a
  908. longer run deficit problem which is the only what I worry about I don't worry about the the cycal deficit what's the
  909. big deal we have a a very substantial lent uh borrowing capacity in the federal government what I worry about is
  910. the longer term and that's due to the entitlements and the Aging population and we all know that that's very serious
  911. problem if I were advising the new president what I would say is focus on that ignore the short-term fiscal
  912. problems but try to do something with entitlement reform the last few presidents have ignored it um and are
  913. future fiscal situation is going to be very serious sometime later in the next decade uh Social Security revenues fall
  914. short of Social Security expenditures and the medical medical sit situation in this country is is horrendous the
  915. government expenditures on medical care they're going to grow as my generation retires um is going to get more and more
  916. serious we have the baby boom population getting close to retirement um it's going to get worse and worse and worse
  917. this is worse in other industrial countries but you know only but comparison um that's the fiscal deficit
  918. problem we have it's not the current cyclical deficit problem that'll go away with the recovery what about the current
  919. deficit current account deficit current account deficit is an absolutely different question and and I I I refrain
  920. from answering the question about savings because I'm actually in favor of a substantially higher savings rate in
  921. this country that's the one thing that could have a substantial impact on the current account deficit and um I don't
  922. know whether I'll believe it will come but at some point the American Consumer is going to have to save more uh and
  923. that's really going to turn around the current account deficit nothing like a credit crunch to do that that's right
  924. hopefully it will do it we'll see I mean I certainly hear you know a lot of rhetoric during the last few years about
  925. the Chinese buying our debt I mean keep in mind that's a good thing I mean a couple years ago when everybody's
  926. worried about the fixed exchange rate when I was in China talking to their equivalent of SEC treasury secretary I
  927. personally thank them for buying our our debt at inflated prices it's a it's a nice little transfer to the US Treasury
  928. I mean what would you rather have not high demand for our debt I mean that would have mean higher interest rates
  929. that we' have to pay so this is this is a good thing in terms of the entitlement
  930. problem I I think we all in agreement that's the big train wreck I mean and that's something that we have to deal
  931. with the one thing I guess um I I would in terms of the previous question that dealt with that that really I think
  932. still answered is what could potentially happen I think it's quite possible we could have very high inflation rates we
  933. could have um a default in real terms through inflation monetization of of our debt I think it's inevitable that
  934. Congress typically will wait till the crisis is eminent in this case however it that will be simply way too late uh
  935. every year I mean if they if we talk about accounting and accounting standards the US accounting Federal
  936. accounting uh budget it um is is completely fraudulent accounting system I mean it's it basically makes Enron
  937. accounting look at pristine I I remember mentioned that in Congressional testimony both Republicans and Democrats
  938. no one followed up because you know Democrats want to spend more money Republicans want to do tax cuts
  939. everybody is an agreement with a fraud on accounting scheme in Washington I mean if you measured the deficit
  940. correctly it wouldn't be $400 billion or $5500 billion would be about $2.5 trillion if you did it right and the the
  941. fact of the matter is we this is this is the serious problem and the one or two trillion dollars that we spend on this
  942. uh subprime mess it's it's in the tracking era of any estimat um associated with the with the entitlement
  943. shortfalls i i i sometime point out the only time anyone is going to worry about
  944. the deficit is if interest rates start Rising as long as there's an appetite for the debt you'll never get any action
  945. ever okay well final word Yeah final word you got it well uh one of the true benefits of
  946. being at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School is that we have faculty like the four here uh the
  947. representative of the kinds of colleagues I interact with and you take courses from uh it's a it's a real
  948. privilege to have you share your wisdom and knowledge and expertise on uh economic and financial matters that are
  949. the most critical of our time so thank you very much for your time and generosity
  950. [Applause] for more information please visit knowledge. won. up.edu [Music]

Brief Summary

Panelists discuss the global economic crisis, focusing on the housing market collapse and Federal Reserve responses.

Key points

  • Understanding the Housing Market. The housing crisis began in 2005, but banks continued to invest in mortgage-backed securities.
  • The Role of the Federal Reserve. The Fed's actions during the crisis are crucial, but will they be enough to stabilize the economy?
  • The Liquidity Trap. The liquidity trap means even zero interest rates can't stimulate lending.
  • Warren Buffett's Investment Strategy. Warren Buffett buys stocks at lower prices, making them attractive for ordinary investors.
  • A Bigger Crisis Ahead. The entitlement problems in the U.S. pose a much larger crisis than the subprime issue.
  • Government Regulation's Role. Government regulation can create a false sense of security, leading to more problems.

Episode highlights

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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