The JOBS Act and IPOs

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📂 Finance & Accounting 🏷️ Research

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  1. what we do in the in our in our research paper is we look at the ipo market so firms that aren't publicly traded yet uh
  2. but are going public on the new york stock exchange or the or the nasdaq and we look at the price that they go
  3. public at and sort of their future returns and the volatility or risk associated with those
  4. companies and then we correlate those measures with the amount of disclosure that the firm
  5. has at the time of its if it's of its ipo so there was a recent rule that came out
  6. back in 2012 called the jobs act and the jobs act allowed firms to reduce the amount of information that they
  7. provide to investors so you know a lot of your your viewers your readers are probably familiar with
  8. you know sec filings you've got to file an sec financial statements all these all these
  9. sorts of accounting accounting statements what the jobs act does is it reduces the
  10. amount of information that the firm is required to provide to the equity market before going public
  11. and a natural question is when you reduce the amount of information are you increasing sort of
  12. the risk of the company how do investors respond to that and so we try and answer
  13. that answer that question by looking at to see what actually happens after the regulation
  14. what we end up finding in the in the study is that after the jobs act the ipos that are going public are
  15. actually substantially riskier so if you just think about imagining a world in which the sec requires all of
  16. the ipos to go through a screening process and issue these mandatory disclosures
  17. and then the legislative branch of government comes along and says well you know let's
  18. actually sort of scale that back let's only require them to do two years worth of screening as opposed to the prior
  19. three years so you can imagine that that's going to have the effect of potentially bringing
  20. different companies to the market so the analogy would be you know you go to a used car lot
  21. and suppose the government requires that when you purchase the used car the car dealer has to give you basically a spec
  22. sheet on what the car's you know been doing what the car's life was and then the government comes along and says well
  23. we're not going to require that anymore car dealers can do it voluntarily so now when you go to the car dealer
  24. there's some you know some cars have the spec sheet and other cars don't have the
  25. spec sheet what do you infer about the cars that don't offer you or the car dealers that
  26. don't offer you the spec sheet and so this is what we call a lemons problem where you have sort of companies that
  27. aren't disclosing as much anymore and the question is why are they not disclosing much anymore because now
  28. you've taken a mandatory rule and you've made it and you've made it voluntary and
  29. we find that those companies that don't disclose you know are indeed much much uh much riskier
  30. and so that's sort of the sort of the key punchline of the study is when you observe a firm scale back its disclosure
  31. they're doing that for a reason and investors sort of become more uncertain and that generates risk for
  32. the company we were actually surprised by the magnitude of the effect that we saw um
  33. you know there's really two two schools of thought when it comes to you know reduction in disclosure one school of
  34. thought is that you know government requirements and regulations for disclosure are burdensome on firms and
  35. so they're excessively costly you have to hire lawyers you have to hire accountants you have to hire auditors
  36. you know to go over and to scrutinize your financial statements and the purpose of the jobs act at least
  37. the stated purpose by the proponents was to reduce that cost and to allow more small businesses
  38. to go public because now they don't have to pay as much fees to lawyers and to accountants and to
  39. and so we expected to see some effect because you're going to see smaller firms entering the ipo market and
  40. naturally those smaller firms will be riskier but we were surprised at the magnitude
  41. of the effect that we found for even very large firms so it wasn't just the small firms that were taking advantage
  42. of these provisions it was also the you know the firms well with a billion dollars in revenue and even there we
  43. found a substantial uh substantial effect on the order to uh on the order of six to 12 percent uh change in in
  44. what we call ipo under pricing uh and uh i think a five percent uh shift in equity volatility which is you know in
  45. the grand scheme of things that's a substantial uh substantial cost of the company even though it's not explicit
  46. so you know back to my uh to my earlier uh you know remark about the the used car
  47. lot now you have a situation where the used car salesman is two cars both red same
  48. makes same model one comes with the disclosure of its history one doesn't the used car salesman can't sell the car
  49. that doesn't come with the disclosure for the same price as the car that comes with the disclosure so he marks the
  50. price of the car without the disclosure down and so what we're measuring in our study is how much
  51. the bankers mark down the price of firms that don't have the disclosure and that
  52. looks like between a six and 12 percent discount and that's a substantial amount
  53. when you're thinking about a multi-million dollar company so that's a specific cost of the jobs act even
  54. though it's not an explicit cost it's not you know saving money on underwriters well i think until our study there
  55. hadn't really been any evidence on what the effect of the jobs act was on the amount that or the amount that the firm
  56. could raise on under pricing or on volatility and so if you actually look at what the ceos are saying in the
  57. popular press a lot of ceos are coming out in favor of it especially the the tech
  58. companies so twitter was uh was one company who took advantage of this and what they're saying is you know it's
  59. saving us lots of money in terms of you know we don't have to hire lawyers we don't have to hire accountants we don't
  60. have to have people prepare the you know as many years of financial statements and so we can save in terms of the
  61. explicit costs of preparing our disclosures with the sec the problem with that sort of reasoning
  62. is is it ignores the implicit costs right so if i have these two cars and they're both red they're both the same
  63. make and the same model one comes with a disclosure of the car's history the other one doesn't i can't
  64. sell the car that doesn't come with the disclosure for the same price so i could sell both cars for 5 000 that
  65. one car i can't sell for 5000 because it doesn't come with a disclosure i can only sell it for 4 500. so that you can
  66. think of as the difference between those two is a 500 implicit cost so what we're finding is is that while
  67. the jobs act is saving money on uh sort of preparation costs and is allowing smaller firms to go public
  68. because those firms no longer have these burdensome explicit costs it's actually
  69. increasing the indirect costs because firms can't go ipo for the same prices that they could have before they can't
  70. raise as much money when they disclose less and so that creates an indirect cost
  71. that i think many practitioners and many managers aren't necessarily taking into
  72. account when they're making the trade-off about should they reduce their disclosure under the jobs act
  73. so let's take the the company first um so what the company's concerned about is presumably the company wants to maximize
  74. its ipo offer price they want to get they want to sell the company for as much as they possibly can on the public
  75. market so let's take let's just assume that that's the objectives of the managers and that they're benevolent and
  76. that's what they're trying to do so what we find is that the discount that investors apply to firms who are
  77. taking advantage of these reduced disclosure regulations is about a six to eight percent discount and you know
  78. sometimes it even goes as high as 12. so for example if a firm is going public perhaps it might be able to raise 100
  79. let's say hypothetically 100 million dollars in its ipo with a six to eight percent discount
  80. it's only going to be able to raise say 92 or 94 of that which means it will only be able to raise say 92 million
  81. so the indirect cost of the reduced disclosure for that firm is about eight million
  82. dollars you know between six and twelve let's just pick eight because it's in the middle so they have to trade off
  83. that eight million dollar discount that investors apply against the savings that they get from
  84. you know not having to prepare additional disclosures right so you know add up all of the
  85. costs that you would pay for additional year of audited financial statements for
  86. additional year of you know litigation protection from your lawyers and whatnot and see if it comes out to about you
  87. know between six to 12 percent of what you think your market value should be that's under the story of the firm or
  88. the managers being benevolent and having shareholders interests in mind and trying to sell the firm for the highest
  89. price another story which is more cynical is that one of the reduced disclosures
  90. is that they the firm no longer has to disclose the compensation of the top five executives it just has to disclose
  91. compensation for three executives so another thing that the firm can do under this sort of legislation is that
  92. you know it can reduce the amount of information that it provides to the market about compensation
  93. so on the one hand that might shield the firm from sort of um unjust public criticism of how lucrative the
  94. compensation deal is which could be a good thing but if that compensation is excess compensation if
  95. the ceo and the top five guys are being paid too much the market wouldn't actually know that at the time that the
  96. that the firm goes goes public so from the company's perspective if they're trying to maximize their offer price
  97. they need to trade off the explicit cost which is the savings and the litigation
  98. the accountants and whatnot versus the indirect cost and our paper is really about the indirect cost which is this
  99. somewhere between six and twelve percent discount so that's sort of what they need to uh to take into account so
  100. that's a new cost of going public that wasn't there uh previously for the investors side let's we could
  101. think about this as there being sort of two broad types of investor investors sophisticated investors and
  102. unsophisticated investors let's take unsophisticated investors first these are the people who
  103. um you know maybe they have a cursory knowledge of financial statements and accounting information if that
  104. and one can argue whether unsophisticated investors should even be taking part in the ipo or not but let's
  105. just assume that there are some unsophisticated investors who are sort of investing in ipos we certainly saw
  106. that during the during the tech bubble of the of the 2000s these investors are getting less
  107. information from the firm so relative to the sophisticated investors we think that they're actually worse off
  108. because the sophisticated investors can make up for any lack in public information by collecting private
  109. information whereas unsophisticated investors they can't go out there and collect private information you can
  110. think of you know like your grandmother or your mom or your dad being one of these sort
  111. of unsophisticated unsophisticated investors with rudimentary understanding they may or may not even realize that
  112. the amount of public disclosure that the firm is providing has shrunk what that means is that the
  113. sophisticated investors let's talk about you know the big investment banks the the
  114. underwriters they can get all of the information that they want from uh you know from either
  115. other sources or from the firm so their information set we think is generally unchanged whereas what's
  116. changing is the information set of the unsophisticated investor and this is one reason why we think the
  117. sec was pushing back on on making these new rules that congress mandated them to
  118. do because the sdc's mission is really to protect the individual investor and anytime you have a reduction in the
  119. amount of public information individual investors generally do generally do worse this is why we had
  120. these rules in the first place to you know mandate firms to disclose as much as they could so let's go back to
  121. the car example you've got an auto mechanic who's going to the you know to the car dealership
  122. lot he's your sophisticated investor he sees the two cars they're the same makes
  123. same model same color sees one with the disclosure sees the other one without the disclosure right
  124. he can detect without the disclosure whether that that from that car that doesn't have the disclosure is actually
  125. a good car or not whereas you know if i go to the used car car a lot i would not be able to tell the
  126. difference between a good car and a bad car i'm going to rely on the disclosure to tell me that so sophisticated
  127. investors don't rely on the disclosures as much as the unsophisticated investors
  128. and so sophisticated investors aren't hurt as much when the disclosure gets removed
  129. i want to be clear the jobs act has many many different titles and covers more than just disclosure by ipo firms it
  130. does a lot of different things it you know changes the rules for crowdsourcing and crowdfunding of of
  131. projects and so there's a lot of different faces of the jobs act that we don't really examine we just picked out
  132. this sort of one provision or one title of the jobs act and examined that's that
  133. its effect so i don't want to say that you know the entirety of the act um is necessarily harmful or or
  134. beneficial we're just picking one little aspect of the act and looking at how that affected the sort of the ipo market
  135. and documenting that there are perhaps unintended consequences or maybe even intended consequences of
  136. the uh of the act what's next i think is you know the act has been relatively new uh
  137. so the body of literature is just starting there's only one published paper on the
  138. jobs act you know i have this paper and there's a couple others that are that are just starting up
  139. but you know anytime you have a firm that reduces or chooses to reduce the amount of information it provides
  140. whether it be about its compensation arrangements with its executives whether it be about its accounting performance
  141. whether it be about you know management discussion and analysis you know that's going to have a ripple effect on all
  142. kinds of other intermediaries that rely on public information so are now credit rating agencies going to have to you
  143. know to rely on different sets of information are equity analysts going to have to rely on
  144. different sets of information so you know we just looked at you could think of like the market consequences
  145. how it gets into price and how it gets into volatility but we haven't actually looked at well how does it affect all of
  146. these different intermediaries that are relying on the firm's disclosures and public information and
  147. so i think that's where sort of the next step would be for examining sort of the
  148. first two titles of the of the jobs act which is what we do which is about a reduction a reduction in disclosure
  149. you

Brief Summary

The episode examines how the JOBS Act's reduced disclosure requirements increase risks for IPOs and impact investor decisions.

Key points

  • Impact of the Jobs Act. The Jobs Act reduced disclosure requirements for IPOs, leading to riskier companies.
  • The Lemons Problem. Reduced disclosure creates uncertainty for investors, likened to buying a used car without a history.
  • Cost of Reduced Disclosure. Companies face significant indirect costs due to reduced disclosure, impacting their IPO pricing.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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