The JOBS Act and IPOs
Ask about Knowledge at Wharton
Episode Description
📂 Finance & Accounting 🏷️ Research
Read the full transcriptHide the full transcript
- what we do in the in our in our research paper is we look at the ipo market so firms that aren't publicly traded yet uh
- but are going public on the new york stock exchange or the or the nasdaq and we look at the price that they go
- public at and sort of their future returns and the volatility or risk associated with those
- companies and then we correlate those measures with the amount of disclosure that the firm
- has at the time of its if it's of its ipo so there was a recent rule that came out
- back in 2012 called the jobs act and the jobs act allowed firms to reduce the amount of information that they
- provide to investors so you know a lot of your your viewers your readers are probably familiar with
- you know sec filings you've got to file an sec financial statements all these all these
- sorts of accounting accounting statements what the jobs act does is it reduces the
- amount of information that the firm is required to provide to the equity market before going public
- and a natural question is when you reduce the amount of information are you increasing sort of
- the risk of the company how do investors respond to that and so we try and answer
- that answer that question by looking at to see what actually happens after the regulation
- what we end up finding in the in the study is that after the jobs act the ipos that are going public are
- actually substantially riskier so if you just think about imagining a world in which the sec requires all of
- the ipos to go through a screening process and issue these mandatory disclosures
- and then the legislative branch of government comes along and says well you know let's
- actually sort of scale that back let's only require them to do two years worth of screening as opposed to the prior
- three years so you can imagine that that's going to have the effect of potentially bringing
- different companies to the market so the analogy would be you know you go to a used car lot
- and suppose the government requires that when you purchase the used car the car dealer has to give you basically a spec
- sheet on what the car's you know been doing what the car's life was and then the government comes along and says well
- we're not going to require that anymore car dealers can do it voluntarily so now when you go to the car dealer
- there's some you know some cars have the spec sheet and other cars don't have the
- spec sheet what do you infer about the cars that don't offer you or the car dealers that
- don't offer you the spec sheet and so this is what we call a lemons problem where you have sort of companies that
- aren't disclosing as much anymore and the question is why are they not disclosing much anymore because now
- you've taken a mandatory rule and you've made it and you've made it voluntary and
- we find that those companies that don't disclose you know are indeed much much uh much riskier
- and so that's sort of the sort of the key punchline of the study is when you observe a firm scale back its disclosure
- they're doing that for a reason and investors sort of become more uncertain and that generates risk for
- the company we were actually surprised by the magnitude of the effect that we saw um
- you know there's really two two schools of thought when it comes to you know reduction in disclosure one school of
- thought is that you know government requirements and regulations for disclosure are burdensome on firms and
- so they're excessively costly you have to hire lawyers you have to hire accountants you have to hire auditors
- you know to go over and to scrutinize your financial statements and the purpose of the jobs act at least
- the stated purpose by the proponents was to reduce that cost and to allow more small businesses
- to go public because now they don't have to pay as much fees to lawyers and to accountants and to
- and so we expected to see some effect because you're going to see smaller firms entering the ipo market and
- naturally those smaller firms will be riskier but we were surprised at the magnitude
- of the effect that we found for even very large firms so it wasn't just the small firms that were taking advantage
- of these provisions it was also the you know the firms well with a billion dollars in revenue and even there we
- found a substantial uh substantial effect on the order to uh on the order of six to 12 percent uh change in in
- what we call ipo under pricing uh and uh i think a five percent uh shift in equity volatility which is you know in
- the grand scheme of things that's a substantial uh substantial cost of the company even though it's not explicit
- so you know back to my uh to my earlier uh you know remark about the the used car
- lot now you have a situation where the used car salesman is two cars both red same
- makes same model one comes with the disclosure of its history one doesn't the used car salesman can't sell the car
- that doesn't come with the disclosure for the same price as the car that comes with the disclosure so he marks the
- price of the car without the disclosure down and so what we're measuring in our study is how much
- the bankers mark down the price of firms that don't have the disclosure and that
- looks like between a six and 12 percent discount and that's a substantial amount
- when you're thinking about a multi-million dollar company so that's a specific cost of the jobs act even
- though it's not an explicit cost it's not you know saving money on underwriters well i think until our study there
- hadn't really been any evidence on what the effect of the jobs act was on the amount that or the amount that the firm
- could raise on under pricing or on volatility and so if you actually look at what the ceos are saying in the
- popular press a lot of ceos are coming out in favor of it especially the the tech
- companies so twitter was uh was one company who took advantage of this and what they're saying is you know it's
- saving us lots of money in terms of you know we don't have to hire lawyers we don't have to hire accountants we don't
- have to have people prepare the you know as many years of financial statements and so we can save in terms of the
- explicit costs of preparing our disclosures with the sec the problem with that sort of reasoning
- is is it ignores the implicit costs right so if i have these two cars and they're both red they're both the same
- make and the same model one comes with a disclosure of the car's history the other one doesn't i can't
- sell the car that doesn't come with the disclosure for the same price so i could sell both cars for 5 000 that
- one car i can't sell for 5000 because it doesn't come with a disclosure i can only sell it for 4 500. so that you can
- think of as the difference between those two is a 500 implicit cost so what we're finding is is that while
- the jobs act is saving money on uh sort of preparation costs and is allowing smaller firms to go public
- because those firms no longer have these burdensome explicit costs it's actually
- increasing the indirect costs because firms can't go ipo for the same prices that they could have before they can't
- raise as much money when they disclose less and so that creates an indirect cost
- that i think many practitioners and many managers aren't necessarily taking into
- account when they're making the trade-off about should they reduce their disclosure under the jobs act
- so let's take the the company first um so what the company's concerned about is presumably the company wants to maximize
- its ipo offer price they want to get they want to sell the company for as much as they possibly can on the public
- market so let's take let's just assume that that's the objectives of the managers and that they're benevolent and
- that's what they're trying to do so what we find is that the discount that investors apply to firms who are
- taking advantage of these reduced disclosure regulations is about a six to eight percent discount and you know
- sometimes it even goes as high as 12. so for example if a firm is going public perhaps it might be able to raise 100
- let's say hypothetically 100 million dollars in its ipo with a six to eight percent discount
- it's only going to be able to raise say 92 or 94 of that which means it will only be able to raise say 92 million
- so the indirect cost of the reduced disclosure for that firm is about eight million
- dollars you know between six and twelve let's just pick eight because it's in the middle so they have to trade off
- that eight million dollar discount that investors apply against the savings that they get from
- you know not having to prepare additional disclosures right so you know add up all of the
- costs that you would pay for additional year of audited financial statements for
- additional year of you know litigation protection from your lawyers and whatnot and see if it comes out to about you
- know between six to 12 percent of what you think your market value should be that's under the story of the firm or
- the managers being benevolent and having shareholders interests in mind and trying to sell the firm for the highest
- price another story which is more cynical is that one of the reduced disclosures
- is that they the firm no longer has to disclose the compensation of the top five executives it just has to disclose
- compensation for three executives so another thing that the firm can do under this sort of legislation is that
- you know it can reduce the amount of information that it provides to the market about compensation
- so on the one hand that might shield the firm from sort of um unjust public criticism of how lucrative the
- compensation deal is which could be a good thing but if that compensation is excess compensation if
- the ceo and the top five guys are being paid too much the market wouldn't actually know that at the time that the
- that the firm goes goes public so from the company's perspective if they're trying to maximize their offer price
- they need to trade off the explicit cost which is the savings and the litigation
- the accountants and whatnot versus the indirect cost and our paper is really about the indirect cost which is this
- somewhere between six and twelve percent discount so that's sort of what they need to uh to take into account so
- that's a new cost of going public that wasn't there uh previously for the investors side let's we could
- think about this as there being sort of two broad types of investor investors sophisticated investors and
- unsophisticated investors let's take unsophisticated investors first these are the people who
- um you know maybe they have a cursory knowledge of financial statements and accounting information if that
- and one can argue whether unsophisticated investors should even be taking part in the ipo or not but let's
- just assume that there are some unsophisticated investors who are sort of investing in ipos we certainly saw
- that during the during the tech bubble of the of the 2000s these investors are getting less
- information from the firm so relative to the sophisticated investors we think that they're actually worse off
- because the sophisticated investors can make up for any lack in public information by collecting private
- information whereas unsophisticated investors they can't go out there and collect private information you can
- think of you know like your grandmother or your mom or your dad being one of these sort
- of unsophisticated unsophisticated investors with rudimentary understanding they may or may not even realize that
- the amount of public disclosure that the firm is providing has shrunk what that means is that the
- sophisticated investors let's talk about you know the big investment banks the the
- underwriters they can get all of the information that they want from uh you know from either
- other sources or from the firm so their information set we think is generally unchanged whereas what's
- changing is the information set of the unsophisticated investor and this is one reason why we think the
- sec was pushing back on on making these new rules that congress mandated them to
- do because the sdc's mission is really to protect the individual investor and anytime you have a reduction in the
- amount of public information individual investors generally do generally do worse this is why we had
- these rules in the first place to you know mandate firms to disclose as much as they could so let's go back to
- the car example you've got an auto mechanic who's going to the you know to the car dealership
- lot he's your sophisticated investor he sees the two cars they're the same makes
- same model same color sees one with the disclosure sees the other one without the disclosure right
- he can detect without the disclosure whether that that from that car that doesn't have the disclosure is actually
- a good car or not whereas you know if i go to the used car car a lot i would not be able to tell the
- difference between a good car and a bad car i'm going to rely on the disclosure to tell me that so sophisticated
- investors don't rely on the disclosures as much as the unsophisticated investors
- and so sophisticated investors aren't hurt as much when the disclosure gets removed
- i want to be clear the jobs act has many many different titles and covers more than just disclosure by ipo firms it
- does a lot of different things it you know changes the rules for crowdsourcing and crowdfunding of of
- projects and so there's a lot of different faces of the jobs act that we don't really examine we just picked out
- this sort of one provision or one title of the jobs act and examined that's that
- its effect so i don't want to say that you know the entirety of the act um is necessarily harmful or or
- beneficial we're just picking one little aspect of the act and looking at how that affected the sort of the ipo market
- and documenting that there are perhaps unintended consequences or maybe even intended consequences of
- the uh of the act what's next i think is you know the act has been relatively new uh
- so the body of literature is just starting there's only one published paper on the
- jobs act you know i have this paper and there's a couple others that are that are just starting up
- but you know anytime you have a firm that reduces or chooses to reduce the amount of information it provides
- whether it be about its compensation arrangements with its executives whether it be about its accounting performance
- whether it be about you know management discussion and analysis you know that's going to have a ripple effect on all
- kinds of other intermediaries that rely on public information so are now credit rating agencies going to have to you
- know to rely on different sets of information are equity analysts going to have to rely on
- different sets of information so you know we just looked at you could think of like the market consequences
- how it gets into price and how it gets into volatility but we haven't actually looked at well how does it affect all of
- these different intermediaries that are relying on the firm's disclosures and public information and
- so i think that's where sort of the next step would be for examining sort of the
- first two titles of the of the jobs act which is what we do which is about a reduction a reduction in disclosure
- you
Brief Summary
The episode examines how the JOBS Act's reduced disclosure requirements increase risks for IPOs and impact investor decisions.
Key points
- Impact of the Jobs Act. The Jobs Act reduced disclosure requirements for IPOs, leading to riskier companies.
- The Lemons Problem. Reduced disclosure creates uncertainty for investors, likened to buying a used car without a history.
- Cost of Reduced Disclosure. Companies face significant indirect costs due to reduced disclosure, impacting their IPO pricing.
Episode highlights
- Impact of the Jobs ActThe Jobs Act reduced disclosure requirements for IPOs, leading to riskier companies.“After the Jobs Act, the IPOs that are going public are actually substantially riskier.”1:33Jun 25, 2015
- The Lemons ProblemReduced disclosure creates uncertainty for investors, likened to buying a used car without a history.“This is what we call a lemons problem.”2:45Jun 25, 2015
- Cost of Reduced DisclosureCompanies face significant indirect costs due to reduced disclosure, impacting their IPO pricing.“The discount that investors apply is about six to eight percent.”7:49Jun 25, 2015
Tension
45/ 100Some tension





