In What Form Will the Eurozone Emerge from the Crisis?

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Wharton finance professor Franklin Allen delivers a keynote address on the uncertain future of the eurozone at the Wharton Global Alumni Forum held in Milan, Italy on May 17 and 18.

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  1. it's a great honor for me to speak after Mr Perera I think that the change in government last November in Italy was a
  2. tremendously positive development was extremely positive for Italy Mr Pacer outlined the policies that they're
  3. going to follow which are a big improvement over the ones previously because there wasn't much growth
  4. previously and hopefully we will now get that I think also though it was a tremendous positive development for the
  5. Euro Zone and the EU as a whole because the government now in Italy brings a sense of sanity and
  6. discourse which is much better than it was before in the whole European union now I'm going to talk about the
  7. crisis uh this is a based on work with Victor ngi who graduated last Monday from
  8. Wharton and the t is in what form will the EUR Zone emerge from the crisis now the headline story in the
  9. internet version of uh the European edition of the financial times this morning is about a speech that the
  10. British Prime Minister David Cameron is going to give this afternoon and apparently what he's going
  11. to say is that the Euro zone is heading for disaster unless it makes a move to quickly go
  12. towards full political and economic union now my own view is that I don't think we're ready for a full economic
  13. and political union in Europe yet people still think of them first and themselves first and foremost as being
  14. French or Italian or Spanish or whatever country they come from now I think maybe
  15. 20 to 30 years time people may start thinking of themselves as being Europeans first and then the country
  16. that they come from as their second identity but I'm much more optimistic than Mr Cameron about the survival of
  17. the Euro Zone I think though the way that events are developing the Euro zone is changing
  18. in a very positive way and it's putting in place the mechanisms it needs to survive in the long run until in 20 to
  19. 30 years time we can fully Implement a complete fiscal and monetary union now when they originally designed
  20. the Eurozone they realized that there would be an issue about fiscal responsibility and so they put in place
  21. the stability and growth PCT which had rules about what governments could and couldn't
  22. do now the two major rules were to do with government finance and they required that the deficit to GDP ratio
  23. must be close or under 3% except for crises times government debt the ratio that they
  24. allowed for that was 60% now they also had a number of other restrictions on inflation rates exchange
  25. rates and long-term interest rates which countries had to satisfy in order to join the
  26. Euro but it's those two that are the most important now what this graph shows is
  27. the three years prior to the start of the Euro Zone and it's the government surplus or deficit for those three years
  28. the blue is 1996 the red is 1997 and the green is 1998 now you can see that countries made
  29. big efforts to get their deficits under the limit Greece moved down Italy also and
  30. Belgium too by the time we got there countries were either very close to the 3% or
  31. underneath now what this shows is the gross government debt to GDP for again the three years prior to the entry of
  32. the Euro zone now three countries stand out as not satisfying it there Belgium which at
  33. that time had over 120% to start with Greece around 100% and Italy also at around
  34. 120% clearly they weren't satisfying the obligations of the stability and growth
  35. pact so what they did was to change it so as long as you were moving in the right direction then things would be
  36. okay and you could join now Greece because of of the problems it had the notion was that they would have to delay
  37. so instead of joining in 1999 they joined in 2001 now if we take a longer term view
  38. what what was happening well these are three countries that are the poster Childs for fiscal rectitude in the
  39. current environment at that time and we can see that Ireland Luxembourg and Finland all
  40. went from to to strong surpluses as the date of the start of the Euro occurred now Luxembourg we won't talk
  41. much about them again they have fantastic record and have always satisfied the stability and growth
  42. pact here we have Belgium Germany Spain Netherlands and Austria now you can see that Belgium
  43. they had a deficit and they got it in in in under control and most of the countries did
  44. now the interesting one is Germany Germany is the red line because of the reunification they
  45. had to run deficits in the 1990s they got that under control and got to a surplus by
  46. 2000 but then you can see that their deficit went went below the minus 3% so they were in violation of the stability
  47. and growth pact if we look Greece France Italy and Portugal Greece clearly has a problem
  48. it's been in violation most of that period up to 2007 the other interesting one here is
  49. France which also violated the Surplus restriction of three minus 3% they also went to 4% we'll come back
  50. to that in a minute if we look at government debt over this period this is Belgium Greece
  51. and Italy you can see that Belgium did a very good job of bringing its debt down
  52. Greece did not do such a good job Italy like Belgium brought it down here we see Ireland Spain
  53. Netherlands and Finland they did a good job of coming below the the 60% now here we see Germany and France
  54. again and what you can see is that they were under the 60% to start with and they drifted up and then as we went into
  55. the early 2000s they went farther above that's when they were running these deficits so again France and Germany
  56. broke the rules now as they broke the rules the commission started to implement the
  57. procedures in the stability and growth pack and they started to ask them to make
  58. adjustments now Germany avoided a formal excessive deposit procedure by making an
  59. agreement with the commission but the commission did bring an action against France now November
  60. 2003 they presented the evidence to the Council of um Finance ministers and at that point the French
  61. and the Germans undertook political moves to persuade the other members of the council not to impose penalties on
  62. them and that was really a a in my view a big mistake because it reduced the effectiveness of the stability and
  63. growth pact so they in fact ended up suspending The Pact and no country was penalized France and Germany weren't
  64. penalizing none of the other countries that had violated temporarily 2005 they reformed the pack
  65. they loosened the Escape causes they lengthened the deadlines and they ex allowed longer adjustment
  66. periods now if we go back before the 2007 crisis is all the countries except Luxembourg
  67. and Ireland VI violated the 3% deficit Rule now a number of countries as we saw including France and Germany also
  68. violated the 60% but again no countries were penalized for violations now clearly the convergence
  69. criteria the fact you had to meet them to get into the Euro meant that countries did change their fiscal acts
  70. and they got much better situations but once the Euro was established that pressure effectively diminished and
  71. there are studies which show that there doesn't seem to be any marginal effect of the stability and growth pact if you
  72. compare these countries with other oecd countries now once the crisis started then of course we were in exceptional
  73. circumstances and most countries violated both rules now interestingly there are
  74. currently only four countries in the EU that fully satisfy the stability and growth pact
  75. criteria Estonia is one of them Luxembourg is another Finland and Sweden now of course Sweden isn't a member of
  76. the Euro zone so we just have those three two other countries current ly satisfy the criteria they didn't until
  77. recently and so they're still under excessive deficit procedures and that's Bulgaria and
  78. Denmark so it seems that you either have to be a rich Scandinavian country or you
  79. have to be a former communist country if you're going to satisfy these criteria the important point though is
  80. hardly any of the countries satisfy it and yet no countries have been penalized so just to summarize the
  81. stability and growth pact I think is a very good idea the political mechanisms haven't worked very well and I think you
  82. know it's important to have them there but I don't think we can rely completely on
  83. that now what about the market so economists love the market and and how did it do in this
  84. period well here we see the period leading up to the euro Zone and you can see that there was tremendous variation
  85. in interest rates across Europe now by the time we got to 1999 they had pretty much
  86. converged now from 1999 with the exception of Greece which is the red line remember they didn't
  87. join until 2001 because they didn't satisfy the criteria well enough in 1999 but since that period what we've
  88. seen is very tight spreads 20 30 40 basis points was the biggest spread between the different Count's
  89. bonds now we often talk about efficient markets and how good markets are at predicting the future but one of the
  90. very interesting things is they didn't predict the future in this case many people remarked on the fact that it was
  91. quite interesting that Greece had a 20 or 30 basis point differential to German BNS but the belief was that that was
  92. okay now as we can see what's happened since 2009 is we've seen a big Divergence not quite as much as we had
  93. before but a significant difference so the market did didn't work and I think one of the issues there is why not I
  94. think what happened is that they believed the official sector that there was no chance that anything bad could
  95. happen and also this was a very much of this was what the period the economists call the great moderation and things
  96. were working fairly well for much of it now 201 they introduced some more reforms
  97. this is colloquially known known as the sixpack I'm not sure how many Europeans know exactly what a sixpack is but
  98. nevertheless that's what it's called and this is EU secondary law so it's law that they pass in Brussels which applies
  99. to the uh EU EU and this has various components of fiscal policy so they strengthened the budgetary surveillance
  100. they speeded up and clarified the implementation of the excessive death procedure and so on they also were
  101. worried about macroeconomic imbalances because it isn't just fiscal Pro profac that's the problem arguably
  102. in Greece that's the issue but if you think about Ireland and Spain these are countries which were extremely good in
  103. terms of the stability and growth PCT and yet they had these big shocks and got into
  104. trouble so the part of the six-pack is to monitor macroeconomic imbalances they also introduced
  105. sanctions and penalties that were larger than before they changed the way the decisions were
  106. made about that so before the council ecoin had to vote positively to impose sanctions
  107. now if the commission recommends sanctions they have to vote it down so it goes ahead unless there's a majority
  108. against it that's called this reverse qualified majority voting and we'll see how that
  109. works the macroeconomic imbalance procedure unfortunately it's taking something of a long time they introduced
  110. this mechanism they just released few weeks ago the first alert mechanism report based on 2010 indicators
  111. unfortunately the crisis move much faster than this then we have the fiscal compact
  112. treaty and what that is again is more of the same now what countries have to do is to put a balanced budget rule in
  113. their constitution they have to then if they go above 60% start moving towards the
  114. 60% at 12th per year and then if you're in excessive deficit procedure you have to put in a
  115. plan with with the commission now the problem is that the stability and growth pact didn't work no countries
  116. were penalized and what the current strategy is is to do more of the same but have
  117. more penalties and so on but I think we need more than that as I say I think these are good moves but they clearly
  118. aren't enough on their own and I think the basic problem is that the shocks are much much larger than people expected
  119. when they designed the Euro Zone as I said we were going through a period known as by macroeconomists as the great
  120. moderation we didn't see big recessions we didn't see big macroeconomic problems
  121. and so the kind of things that happened in Ireland and Spain with massive Bubbles and then fiscal problems were
  122. not anticipated and the problem is that the adjustment within the Euro Zone particularly for many countries which
  123. have wage adjustment which isn't very fast which have income distributions determined in a in a fairly centralized
  124. manner they don't adjust quickly and that's what's caused a lot of the problems that Mr pacero was talking
  125. about earlier and you know Spain is is one example here it has got this very high
  126. 24.4% unemployment rate and perhaps most distressing of all 51.1% among youths and that is the real
  127. problem I think that we face in Europe that we need to do something about that now what alternative strategies are
  128. there out there what else can we do now one of the things that we could do is to have transfers between
  129. countries now at the moment what we have is loans the bailouts are loans they are
  130. expected to be paid back with interest but one way of doing things would be to have
  131. transfers Spain for example through no fault of its own had this massive bubble I don't think people there were doing
  132. anything that was wrong it just got caught up in an economic tsunami so maybe we could have a transfer from
  133. countries which weren't as badly caught up and help Spain through it now the problem is that we don't have full
  134. political and economic Union we aren't willing particularly in the AAA countries to have transfers of that kind
  135. so I think that will come in 20 to 30 years and that would be a good thing it's a way of ensuring against these
  136. very extreme shocks and of course we have that somewhat in the US we do have a federal system which transfers across
  137. States if California ever goes bankrupt though I will never vote for a government that transfers money from the
  138. federal government to California if it's Mississippi or arkans thought that's fine but the rich ones we don't
  139. shouldn't be transferring to them now what are the Alternatives well Victor and I suggest is we need two
  140. mechanisms which when countries get into very desperate trouble will help them get out of
  141. these now it's interesting because I think both of these mechanisms are beginning to come about the two are s
  142. devault within the Euro Zone we've seen that we had that in March with Greece contrary to many people's
  143. predictions it wasn't a catastrophe in fact it went through very smoothly there wasn't much drama and the reason for
  144. that I think was it was widely anticipated and I think the second one which is also important is to have
  145. temporary and I want to stress the word temporary exit from the Euro Zone and then once a country has recovered
  146. economically started growing it can re-enter when it satisfies the stability and growth pact
  147. criteria and I think what this would do would be to add to what the official sector has come up with the treaties and
  148. so on and it would allow the market to provide incentives to countries although markets haven't done a great job in the
  149. last 10 years in predicting what what's happened I think they're very quick Learners and people will start to
  150. monitor the fiscal policies and the macroeconomic balances much more carefully so as I said Sovereign default
  151. worked pretty well with Greece the unfortunate thing was they didn't do it soon enough if in May
  152. 2010 they defaulted the same way on the private sector they would have limitated
  153. about 75% of the debt burden they would have had a real chance of growing out of
  154. the problem now that's what the IMF usually does unfortunately I think the politics dsk was already thinking about
  155. the French election and so they didn't force that on the EU and I think that's a Pity but I think this is a useful
  156. mechanism to have if a country has a big shock through no fault of its own then this is one way of getting back to a
  157. growth situation more quickly so for example at the moment I think Ireland will get
  158. through this but it would be a help if they could default on the senior Bank debt at the beginning the ECB said no no
  159. don't do that it's going to cause catastrophe but these defaults in Greece haven't done that and I think it would
  160. be the same in Ireland they wouldn't and Ireland would have a lower debt and would have a a somewhat better chance of
  161. of getting out but as I say I think they have a very good chance of emerging now temporary exit from the
  162. Euro Zone I think that in some countries we have this desperate problem of unemployment and particularly youth
  163. unemployment and the wages aren't adjusting if anything wages in many of these countries with high unemployment
  164. are still going up and creating less competitiveness now I think the initial view was that austerity problem
  165. austerity policies would solve the problem because if you cut government spending increase taxes to put
  166. governments Back in Balance then that would show that the longterm was okay and the country would start growing and
  167. the economists the macroeconomists had models which had market clearing which showed that that would be happening
  168. unfortunately that's not the way it's turned out in some of these countries in Greece is the the most prominent example
  169. the austerity is simply making things worse as you cut government expenditure the economy shrinks and government
  170. revenues go down and so on now it's very interesting there are many growth strategies
  171. and these are structural forms of the kind that that we've been discussing in Europe for a while they tend to take a
  172. while though things like Market reforms take a few years educ uh labor reforms take a bit longer education takes even
  173. longer than that now the one policy which does usually provide growth is a long change to the exchange rate Argentina is
  174. the classic example of this Argentina had a fixed exchange rate with regard to the dollar and you can
  175. see that they started to go into a recession in the late '90s and that got pretty bad in '
  176. 01 they then dropped the peg to the dollar they shrunk for a few more months but then they started growing and
  177. growing very quickly and they've grown at about 8% since then they're now up to about 60% above where they were a decade
  178. to go and they soon passed where they started so in the two or three years they were above where they
  179. started now you may say but don't they fix the inflation numbers in in Argentina well my understanding is they
  180. do at least a little bit but even if you measure in terms of US Dollars using market exchange rates you get a similar
  181. kind of phenomenon now people say well Argentina was different it was a growing World
  182. economy so what are some other examples well if you compare South Korea and Japan what you see is that South Korea
  183. with an exchange rate adjustment during the crisis despite having an economy very much like Japan managed to start
  184. growing pretty quickly Japan because it's a safe haven currency didn't have that luxury and they aren't above where
  185. they were in 2007 they're still about 3 or 4% below so this is South Korea you can see the
  186. blue line is GDP they got badly hit after Leman but the exchange rate adjusted then they started growing
  187. they're now about 15% above Japan if you look they're still not where they were as I say they're about 97
  188. 98% even today 5 years later what are some of the other countries well if you go back to the 199
  189. 90s and look at the crisis then many countries followed this strategy of default and depreciation of the exchange
  190. rate and had long periods of high growth South Korea at that stage did the same thing they had a very sharp recession
  191. that lasted for about a year or two one to two years and they started growing they've grown at 6% a year since
  192. then Indonesia its banking syst system was devastated most banks basically collapsed they then defaulted and had an
  193. exchange rate adjustment they started growing at 5% for about the same for nine years or
  194. so Russia same kind of thing 7% now people often say that for example if Greece was to follow this strategy
  195. then it wouldn't be as successful because it has a low GDP to uh sorry low exports to GDP p ratio but
  196. many countries have expanded that and been very successful so for example India even without an exchange rate had
  197. its exports to GDP ratio double in the 1990s and then again in the 2000s it started from a place not that different
  198. from gree's the gold standard there's a nice paper by Barry ier green and Jeffrey saxs in the mid
  199. 80s and what they argued was that in fact fact the countries that left the gold standard in the 1930s did pretty
  200. well it's the same effect they were able to get over the effects of the Great Depression and start growing now the
  201. popular wisdom is that they was a begger Thy Neighbor policy but that what they argue is that although there was a
  202. negative effect on those countries around them it may well have been worse if they hadn't done the exchange rate
  203. trange and their conclusion is that more devaluation would have helped us get it
  204. through the Great Depression more easily my view on this is the basic problem is that relative prices are
  205. wrong if we can adjust those then we can do much better and we can improve things
  206. substantially contagion this is the big problem this is what the official sector
  207. says you know if we do these changes we're going to have these terrible problems of contagion with the Greek
  208. default we didn't because people anticipated it I think the same thing is true currently with
  209. the possible exit of Greece from the Euro Zone Investment Bank reports are putting about a 75% probability on that
  210. everybody's beginning to take actions to hedge against those kinds of risks if Greece leaves it will be somewhat
  211. chaotic but just like countri leaving the gold standard in the 1930s we can cope with that and the big thing is that
  212. within a year or two I believe Greece would start to grow again and it was the best and most effective policy for
  213. solving these terrible unemployment problems particularly among youths and as I say
  214. it's temporary there's no reason why they can't go out in 5 10 years whatever time it takes them to get back to
  215. economic health to rejoin Jo so let me conclude I think the moves that we've seen are very
  216. positive but they're not enough we need to go farther and in particular when we have very large shocks we need to have a
  217. mechanism that allows countries to start growing again quickly and I think with those we will
  218. see the Euro survive as I say they're coming about and I am very optimistic about the future of the year I think
  219. that we can keep it on track and in 20 to 30 years we can go towards the full political and economic Union but at the
  220. moment it's a little premature to do that let me stop [Applause] there

Brief Summary

The episode discusses Italy's new government, Euro Zone challenges, and the need for reforms in economic policies and the Stability and Growth Pact.

Key points

  • Positive Developments in Italy. The change in government last November is seen as a tremendously positive development for Italy and the Euro Zone.
  • Cameron's Warning. British Prime Minister David Cameron warns that the Euro zone is heading for disaster without urgent reforms.
  • Youth Unemployment Crisis. Spain faces a staggering youth unemployment rate of 51.1%, highlighting a major issue in Europe.
  • Greece's Economic Recovery. Despite chaos, Greece could see growth again after leaving the Euro Zone.
  • Optimism for the Euro's Future. A call for action to ensure the Euro's survival and growth.

Tension

45/ 100Some tension

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