The Euro Zone of Denial Hits the Wall

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The Eurozone's efforts to fence in Greece's debt problems have consistently lagged events. Last week's summit -- the latest in a long series -- addresses many key issues, but skeptics say few critical details were resolved and potential pitfalls still lie immediately ahead. The agreement also falls short of addressing longer-term root issues -- underlying trade imbalances and an ultimate "backstop" role for the European Central Bank, some critics argue.Another big worry: Creditors could lose all confidence in Europe's ability to fix these problems, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that leads to a collapse in Europe's banking system and other parts of the global economy, including U.S. financial markets. So, does the summit offer a sustainable path to stability or another "muddle-through" solution, as many expect? To help understand the big picture, Knowledge@Wharton spoke with Wharton finance professor Franklin Allen and Wharton management professor Mauro Guillen about causes and cures, barriers to long-term solutions and the cultural differences that always lie under the surface. While the interviews were conducted the day before the summit, key provisions were already broadly understood in advance and are covered in the discussion. After the outline of the agreement was released, Guillen noted the outcomes "are not a surprise. The details need to be worked out, but at least we know for sure the general form of the solution. For me, an intriguing aspect is the role that outsiders, for example, China, might play. Still, this is a problem only the Europeans can solve." Meantime, by Friday, confidence in the grand deal looked shaky as the cost for Italy to issue bonds to cover its debts had soared to euro-era highs. 📂 Finance & Accounting

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  1. [Music] [Music] welcome everyone to knowledge at Wharton for this discussion of the European debt
  2. crisis with us today we have two Wharton professors Franklin Allen professor and
  3. Maro Gan who is a management Professor thanks for joining us this morning happy to be here thank you Europe has become a
  4. financial soap opera every week There's a new plan or a plan to have a plan to to rescue uh the the economies from what
  5. is a a very deep debt crisis or potential debt crisis and one of the questions that seems obvious is how did
  6. they get to this point but more generally marrow how can in such a small economy as Greece create such huge
  7. Global continental and global economic problems yes so you alluded to the issue of governance and of course uh this is a
  8. big problem in a place where part of the world where you have 27 countries sitting at the table and uh even very
  9. tiny countries can actually cause a lot of trouble in terms of reaching a decision but more directly to your
  10. question about uh about Greece I guess it's all about the interconnections and it's all about the fact that uh the
  11. currency the common currency was launched um you know a little bit more than uh 10
  12. years ago and um uh the stakes are very high uh because obviously contagion could spread to uh you know other parts
  13. of Europe especially to slightly larger economies in the southern periphery like
  14. uh Spain and and Italy and so it is a big deal uh what's going on in Greece even though the economy is relatively
  15. small it's also a big deal because uh it has the potential of affecting banks in
  16. other parts of Europe that's the other important issue here which is that uh some of the biggest holders of these
  17. government bonds in Europe Are banks domestic Banks and Banks from other European countries and so the uh the
  18. systemic you know um consequences of uh not fixing the problems in the really the three countries that have gotten
  19. into trouble so far deep into trouble uh Greece Portugal and Ireland can have uh
  20. very wide uh implications not only for Europe but also for the rest of the global economy so there there's oh
  21. please I agree with everything that Mora said I I I also think that the the policy makers made a fundamental mistake
  22. back in May of 2010 they should have let Greece default at that stage it was a manageable problem the banks would have
  23. had a problem in Germany and France but the governments would have been on top of it they could have afforded to deal
  24. with it and they didn't they they made the wrong judgment that this was a small episode that could be contained and then
  25. a few years from now when things were growing again and everything was fine they could deal with with Greece but
  26. what's in fact happened is it's spread and and the real problem is is not so much the three that have already gone
  27. it's now Italy Spain is along the way but I I think Spain is a much much more hopeful case but it's really it's the
  28. problems in Italy now that the problem so it's interesting that um I people understand the interconnectedness idea
  29. people tend to understand the contagion idea um but could you just focus for a moment on the idea that I mean Greece is
  30. a small economy and why couldn't that wound be cauterized in some way just just fixed up which is I believe what
  31. you're saying could have happened last May that opportunity passed what change what events made it so that you couldn't
  32. contain it to Greece which would for people who don't follow it closely would see seem like a doable thing it's a
  33. small economy let's throw some money at it and and make this problem go away yeah I mean essentially what you have is
  34. so so so countries in many parts of the world but this is Cally the case in Europe are um you know governments are
  35. deeply into debt and of course the maturities of the debts are different right and so you get to a point in which
  36. uh you know the markets just don't want to give more money for some of these countries to roll over their debts at an
  37. interest rate that is reasonable right and this is happening of course also in the midst of a recession so so
  38. everybody's under pressure government's Under Pressure tax revenue is down and you have all of these problems all at
  39. once and as Franklin just noted um you know you can always bail out countries right uh but that of course always has
  40. many problems in the sense that well you have to persuade the uh people who are going to put the money on the table that
  41. that's a a good thing to do and you don't want the countries that are bailed out to think that they're always going
  42. to be bailed out right so it has those problems theard exactly exactly and then on top of that there is the issue as I
  43. mentioned earlier that Banks are of course up to their throats in terms of these uh bonds so Franklin I think it's
  44. correct in saying that um a little bit over a year ago we could have said let's uh you know offer the Greeks a a deal
  45. right so you have to return only whatever 60 cents on the Euro or 50 cents on the Euro and some European
  46. Banks French and German for the most part would have a little bit more more trouble uh but uh yeah if if if if it
  47. were circumscribed to just the Greek Banks then we could uh the Greek uh debt then we could have dealt with that right
  48. another matter of course is the Greek Banks which also own a lot of U Greek government debt but we could have done
  49. that right instead we've gone the other route and then of course the travels have multiplied along the way right and
  50. essentially we find ourselves now in a situation in which everybody has doubts in Europe and outside of Europe as to
  51. what is the correct course of action but our past decisions over the last couple
  52. of years or so are placing a lot of constraints on what can be done and then of course the politicians in Europe are
  53. just you know not agreeing to anything the latest Summit uh has uh I think demonstrated that once
  54. again and um the longer of course the problem persists the more tensions and the more frictions and uh the markets of
  55. course are deeply unsettled because they see that there's no end to the uh to The
  56. Saga right that you described at the beginning of uh Summits that U lead to nowhere and no big decision is
  57. made my the problem is there's now no easy solution because each of the possible Solutions are ruled out so one
  58. solution is to print money the ECB could go out buy up2 trillion EUR of debt much
  59. the same way the FED did in the US and that would probably contain it because of the history of Germany and the 1923
  60. viar inflation they're dead set against that it's it's in the Treaty of Mast they can't do it it's built into the ECB
  61. that they shouldn't do it because they think it's going to be inflationary which goes back to to the 20s or 30s
  62. yeah so that their view of Central Banking is central banks are there to fight inflation if they take any kind of
  63. unorthodox action then there's a risk of something like 1923 or maybe not as Extreme as that but
  64. something like that in that direction may occur so that's ruled out another version is that they come together as
  65. one European Zone and they have a joint fiscal system and they have a Eurozone Bond but the problem for that is that
  66. most countries are not ready for that kind of integration at this stage they simply don't have the political
  67. institutions they need to control that and a good example of that is that when Germany and France violated the growth
  68. and stability pack they made sure that nobody was penalized the French and the Germans themselves so they themselves
  69. put it to an end the notion that these these kinds of mechanisms could work and then what they're trying to do is is to
  70. go between all these different Alternatives which don't have enough money to them so what's happening at the
  71. moment is this financial engineering which makes what happened in the US in the subprime mortgage or or any of those
  72. events look look tamed by compar making it so complicated it seem we don't have the final details but the
  73. leaks seem to make it so complicated that's very difficult to see how it's going to play out in the next few days
  74. yeah you're referring to the um uh fund that they're putting together yeah the EFS and all of the rules right as to how
  75. to use it right in the future so well whether they're going to go the insurance route and have these 20%
  76. guarantees on new issues of Euro Zone bonds and and all lots of illegal issues like how many of the bonds have negative
  77. pledge Clauses which means that everybody has to get that that's one way the French wanted to go the way of
  78. having a bank create the FSN as a bank with that as capital and then they would borrow from the ECB which is complicated
  79. way of printing money but it's basically going the printing money route it's going around the treaty right it's going
  80. around around that so that that's the problem we've got into such a complicated situation because of these
  81. restrictions on on the different sides and the final one which is the German Constitution is
  82. quite clear that they don't want a transfer of sovereignty which any of these other issues would involve and so
  83. you know now Angela Merkel has to go back to the bundestag they're can have a full vote in the bundestag after they've
  84. come up with the deal and we'll see whether they go for that or not so we have suddenly gone from Greece having a
  85. few problems to talk of I mean the latest that I see is a one $ 1.4 trillion facility potentially which
  86. already people are saying that's still not enough which is what what you were talking about so just to go back to root
  87. causes for a moment Greece got into trouble because the government overspent Andor it was not very good at collecting
  88. revenues is that right I mean just not to oversimplify but how did Greece get into
  89. trouble well they lied basically so their statistics Department didn't keep track of what the the national debt
  90. was they cooked the books they cooked the books and uh they suddenly when they' had a change of government
  91. realized they had much more debt than than they had previously thought and I think if anybody had really
  92. understood on the outside that these debt levels were in fact where they were we would have seen a very different
  93. trajectory because people would have stopped lending a lot sooner how does that happen how does any
  94. country which is in international borrowing markets at some level what is that correct I mean they're taking on
  95. sovereign debt someone's lending that money to them through bonds presumably people are doing due diligence
  96. presumably these are smart people presumably they can they they they can read the books of Greece um but they
  97. didn't or they couldn't so what how did that for me that's one of the um um you know great questions about the last 10
  98. years or so uh and uh I personally can't think of any other answer than that the
  99. uh the lenders were perhaps too willing to lend to countries like Greece Portugal Ireland remember that the
  100. Assumption was that the Euro was there to stay so there was no currency risk right uh and um the uh the yield uh was
  101. not as high as it is today obviously right relative to the German um Bond but uh it was above the German Bond right
  102. there was a little bit of a uh of a premium there so you know people you know interest rates were very low right
  103. around the world uh Franklin has uh you know studied that very well and uh so there was very few places where you
  104. could get a what they thought was a risk-free you know uh investment right that paid you know much much better
  105. right uh than the German Bond right and so or the or us treasury bills for that matter and so people flock to investors
  106. flock to um to Greece and to to buy you know Greek uh bonds and Irish bonds and Portuguese bonds because they were a
  107. reasonably good investment and the Assumption was it was safe and of course now we realize that it wasn't as safe as
  108. people thought right uh do you want to add to that I think there's there's a very important technical issue which is
  109. how did the Greek statistics agency have so much political interference that something like this could happen because
  110. in most countries if anything like that happened many people would have gone to jail I don't think that that's happened
  111. in Greece and I think that this is a big part of the difference in the institutions between northern and
  112. southern Europe which is at the heart of the problem between politically because
  113. Southern Europeans and I think Spain is very different here but particularly in Greece and
  114. Italy there's a social compact of some kind that the rich don't pay taxes that very very High tax rates but it's okay
  115. to lie and cheat and have multiple systems whereby you know if you go to Italy and you go to the doctors there's
  116. two prices you can pay you can pay the price where they pay taxes or they can play the back Market in cash and that's
  117. that is at the heart of the problem as I say I think Spain is very different after the maybe a little bit but but but
  118. but it is a general problem and this speaks of course Very powerfully to the issue of north or to South and economies
  119. in Europe that continue to be very competitive right uh globally and you know Germany
  120. uh the Netherlands Austria and so on and then economies on the Mediterranean Rim
  121. that U you know essentially have lost competitiveness and they weren't that competitive to begin with and so you're
  122. a member of the uh Rich club right uh but your productivity and your competitiveness external competitiveness
  123. doesn't really qualify you as a member of that club so the EUR was built on a series of assumptions right was the
  124. problem with the lack of fiscal Unity but it's also this assumption that oh everybody's going to uh you know be able
  125. to move in the same direction becoming more competitive more productive and so on so forth and this really hasn't
  126. happened uh so I think there is a an increasingly wide you know wide gap between the North and the South uh goes
  127. all the way back to also the quality of Institutions absolutely so there was a fundamental difference that was going to
  128. inevitably make it difficult to AB try to both these two absolutely regions together and a good example of this is
  129. that the the Greek Finance Minister a few weeks ago said they were going to publish a list of the people who haven't
  130. been paying their taxes properly now first of all that that's never actually come about as far as they know yet but
  131. but most importantly of all in most countries these people would be going to jail they wouldn't be having their name
  132. in the newspaper absolutely the other the other thing to keep in mind here and there was
  133. recently in the press a chart on this is that uh over the last 10 years since the
  134. introduction of the Euro uh you know Germany which was a little bit scared about the consequences of all of these
  135. and uh remember in the 1990s they had trouble uh with their competitiveness right they were losing ground because
  136. they were burdened by the U Union uh with East Germany and so on so forth they you know it was actually the social
  137. Democrats it was a left leaning PR labor kind of government uh uh Shredder was the the chancellor who actually um
  138. introduced a very important re forms to try to keep costs in Germany down so that the German manufacturing economy in
  139. particular would still be competitive and you see that over the last 10 years manufacturing costs in Germany have been
  140. pretty much flat right whereas in Greece Portugal Spain Ireland they have increased by 35 to 40% over um 10
  141. years uh so it's not only that Germany already was more competitive than these other countries that has become even
  142. more so over the last 10 years that's the problem right uh longterm I think that's a big big problem in addition to
  143. the shortterm you know Financial issues and dead issues that uh that the continent is is suffering from so just
  144. to go back to the fundamentals again for a moment we've got Greece cooking the books uh with uh various bureaucrats
  145. being complicit however however they pull that off so in effect have a country doing liar loans the way we had
  146. mortgages in the US they were just just accepting people with no incomes said they had an income and these were
  147. accepted and and rolled up into Securities that were sold um but even given that let's say there was rot at at
  148. the center of the Greek statistical bureau there's still it's still hard to understand uh if you're not watching
  149. closely how that could lead to the kinds of problems we have today and it seems that in order for that to happen one has
  150. understands that that there's a weakness in the European banking system generally
  151. that allows something like gree's problems to spread quickly to all those banks in other words it's not just that
  152. they're interconnected is it is it also that they're that they aren't so liquid and maybe some of them are even
  153. insolvent if they were to mark down um all of their liabilities to to to Market values so so you've got the Greek
  154. problem but isn't it all also that there's a huge weakness throughout many European banks that allows this smaller
  155. problem to spread uh so quickly and deeply as Maro was alluding at the beginning there are a lot of problems
  156. this is not just Greece in Ireland they had a massive property bubble Spain they
  157. had a property bubble Portugal they didn't but they had a very slow growth lack of competitiveness
  158. problem and then it ity is is the big problem that's the one that you can't save and they basically have a a
  159. political problem which is bisone has now what three of three major cases against him which range from paying an
  160. underage prostitute to have sex to corrupting his lawyer to all these kinds of things where they can't remove him so
  161. that when they have a a problem like they're having now which is they need to credibly show that when there's a shock
  162. they can go out and raise taxes and and get rid of a deficit so that the debt doesn't get out of control and they
  163. can't do that and so that's their basic problem in my view and we see that over the weekend with sarosi and Merkel both
  164. pointedly pressurizing bisone to do something and that their political system can't respond so I think that
  165. that's a big part of the problem on the banking side a large part of the issue is that
  166. the Basel agreements and all banking regulation says the debt of oecd countries is risk-free and even though
  167. we know that that's not true it they're just about to default what whatever you however one puts it in Greece there's
  168. still this fantasy there so they are not they're not accepting their reality on the ground and this is you know we had
  169. last year in the summer the European banking Authority did the stress test the Irish Banks got wonderful scores
  170. fine no problems few weeks later they have to put in 32% of Irish GDP into the banks to recapitalize them you think
  171. that they would learn that it's not a good idea to fix these tests but we went through the same thing this year they do
  172. the they do the stress test dexia gets a wonderful score CU it's got mostly Sor and Deb bust and it just had to be
  173. failed out and and this is a problem now they've redone it you know we went from
  174. Christine lagard who was the French finance minister at the beginning of July who knew everything about the
  175. French banks I presume she then moves to the IMF six weeks later she's making a speech in Jackson Hall that the European
  176. banks are under capitalized all the European leaders are going no no they're not then a few weeks later oh yes they
  177. are but we need a 100 the IMF is still saying 200 billion but it's this denial so in the current
  178. round of stress tests which they redid after dexia they just did the sovereign debt haircuts they didn't look at any
  179. adverse macroeconomic stress so they're still engaged in this complete game of denial yeah uh the the did would you
  180. like to add something you were no no no no I mean the only thing perhaps to add is that on top of all of that uh as you
  181. know deposit institutions most banking banks in Europe are deposit institutions right I mean they may do investment
  182. banking but the deposit institutions and as such uh you know they need to U hold
  183. reserves in cash or Securities and uh of course uh you know they would prefer to
  184. hold them insecurities that pay money and again the Greek debt was paying you know reasonable interest rate right at
  185. the time when uh other you know safe Investments were very difficult to uh to find and uh so so so so again I mean the
  186. banks themselves were also you know fools in the sense of thinking right that they could part all of that money
  187. in something that was safe right and of course The Regulators you know the the central banks were asking them to hold
  188. that money in things that presumably were safe and that included uh Greek bonds right so what I think we're both
  189. trying to say is that uh the whole way of thinking right uh the mindset right uh needs to change right uh so there are
  190. practical kinds of things that need to change but it's also the whole mindset right that that well like GRE government
  191. bonds is not the same as a German Bond and still oecd you know and National Regulators were treating it for the last
  192. 10 years as if it were essentially the same thing right and that uh obviously is is pure fiction well that's
  193. interesting what would have to change what what kind of cultural and economic and financial thinking would have to
  194. change how would it have to change in order to get to a more sustainable place Place uh well I think all of the above
  195. right entally all of the things order but uh I guess the uh the most important thing is um from my point of view or one
  196. place to begin is you know to recognize that I mean because of the the the currency
  197. because of the uh uh Authority that issues them because of the uh the track record of that
  198. Authority different asset classes and different bonds and different uh have different levels of risk right and I
  199. don't think the system that we have in place which of course includes all sorts of participants it includes private
  200. actors it includes governments it includes uh rating agencies it includes everybody they've come to a situation in
  201. which they can truly assess that risk with you know in a way that they can provide to the markets they can provide
  202. to everybody information about the uh you know the the uh the quality of those you know
  203. bonds and Assets in general in a way that then decision makers can do their job right I think we're not there uh
  204. that by the way I think it's also a problem here in the United States but it's just uh it's too confusing and we
  205. still haven't figured out exactly what are the consequences from the last three years or four years as to how you know
  206. we need what we need to change not not only in terms of Regulation but also in terms of thinking about you know risk
  207. and how to think about these different asset classes uh but uh Franklin you you know far more about this no that's my uh
  208. but that's my take on it right that we haven't really put our arms around the issue of how to price risk and how to
  209. think about risk right I think you're exactly right Mara I think it's a very complicated risk because with sovereign
  210. debt if you can go out and raise taxes or cut expenditure when you have a shock then the sovereign debt is quite safe so
  211. end of the Napoleonic Wars UK had about 250% of GDP in debt having fought Wars for for many many years against Napoleon
  212. and they were able to deal with that quite well because people knew that whenever there would be an issue they
  213. would just simply go out and do what whatever was needed they would do and the political classes would come behind
  214. them they wouldn't have a fight and I think you know one of the interesting countries in this
  215. whole episode is the UK because they're really the only country which has sat down in a serious way and said where are
  216. we what have we got to do to make things work and they came up with a very auster
  217. plan they rais taxes they've done lots of things if you compare that with what's happening in France for example
  218. France is in trouble at the moment because there's a real issue about whether if they have a shock they can
  219. actually go out and raise taxes so we we you know SOS he wanted to put in the debt break on the Constitution well he
  220. couldn't do that because he lost the majority in the Senate they wanted to have tax Rises to
  221. increase the or to reduce the deficit and increase their viability one of the things they they
  222. suggested was increasing taxes on theme parks turns out one of the ministers has
  223. asteris the G theme park in his constituency so immediately that got pushed back and within within hours
  224. almost and this is the kind of thing that you we see the same thing in Italy the dragy and um and trishe write the
  225. letter making it conditional to buy the bonds as long as the Italian government came through
  226. so tronte came up with a fairly sensible package over the first weekend well by the time 10 days had passed there had
  227. been so much push back that that had basically gone down to well we're going to do do away with tax evasion and then
  228. they had to go through the same thing the night before with with the Central Bank calling them up and saying don't do
  229. it and now we're going through it again with Merkel and sarosi yeah there's one thing that I would like to add more from
  230. a uh kind of political perspective here which is that I think there's two other very important deficits in Europe right
  231. now one is there's a deficit in terms of the politicians and how they're handling
  232. themselves right so they're not really exercising the kind of leadership that one would want right and Franklin just
  233. mentioned three or four examples of how they propose something and then they they look at the political costs and
  234. then they they you know they back down from that then the second one I think is public opinion uh you see Europe is you
  235. know in spite of all of these troubles is a part of the world where people live well right standards of living are
  236. relatively high and of course some people are suffering especially those who are unemployed but even those uh
  237. because in Europe the family plays such an important role in terms of helping you know when somebody in the in the
  238. family is unemployed and there's a strong strong social safety net and there's a strong social safety so the
  239. welfare state and there also the family networks and so on and so forth so I think you know in in Europe the
  240. politicians don't feel the uh the urge to actually take radical action uh or the kind of radical action that I think
  241. the situation you know would require uh because there's no pressure really from public opinion right and public opinion
  242. there's a lot of inertia they don't want anything radical and at the end of the day uh the problems at least uh as felt
  243. by people right Ordinary People are not that big people can still eat and they can go to the movies and they can enjoy
  244. life uh now of course this could you know if if the problem persists Europe could go into a situation in which
  245. there's actually a big problem right much bigger than what we have now for example if the banking system in one or
  246. more of these countries collapses and uh so uh I think you know things are not good but things are not as catastrophic
  247. as you know they they could be we're somewhere in between so the politicians are not very motivated you know to act
  248. and public opinion itself you see there are no major riots right other than the occasional one in Greece because they
  249. dislike you know the next round of measures and then of course the the the austerity measures get watered down so
  250. it's kind of this uh you know no man's land somewhere in between where there's not enough not enough bad things are
  251. happening so that then you know people feel well we need to really you know uh tackle the the situation and uh and then
  252. overcome the problems easier to kick the down the road to 's going on I agree with you exactly Mar
  253. I think it's the politicians don't quite understand what the downside is so there
  254. are many scenarios for example Greece decides to leave the Arizone because the group that is being hurt very badly is
  255. the youth in Greece and they that's a Lost Generation and at some point they'd be much better off to go the Argentina
  256. route but as soon as they do that as soon as they leave this Euro Zone then people in Italy are suddenly going to
  257. realize that their money can Harve in value overnight and then there's going to be massive Capital flight to Northern
  258. Europe and have to put in capital controls but then we have a real risk of the banking system in Europe really
  259. coming under pressure and they don't have the fiscal resources to deal with it so this is a a catastrophic kind of
  260. event which you know is of 1930s proportions and we seem to be moving towards it because
  261. they're not willing to take the the the measures that they need to to prevent that and this is what for me is so scary
  262. about the situation uh so is there a way for Greece to withdraw say temporarily from the Euro Zone to get its house in
  263. order um under a plan that would include them rejoining at some point later um that could be managed in an
  264. orderly way without the contagion and panic that you just described well there's two there's two scenarios which
  265. is what the politicians are calling the orderly default and then there's the disorderly default so let me just finish
  266. off on the disorderly default so Friday night comes the markets close in the US Greece passes a law late at night that
  267. one Euro equals one drma in all domestic law contracts now they're going to have
  268. to fight lots of lawsuits and so on but basically they'll probably win those and
  269. then since 80% or around that of their sovereign debt is domestic law and I presume most of their commercial
  270. contracts and the the debt with the banks is that they'll effectively lower the debt burden
  271. significantly and they'll start growing because you can go on holiday to Greece now for half the price PR to Spain or
  272. Italy or France so they'll be fine but there'll be this catastrophe in the rest of Europe the other way is that the EU
  273. the ECB the French the Germans essentially they're running everything at the moment would come up with a
  274. negotiated solution about how much the Greek debt is written down and the Greeks are are doing a wonderful job of
  275. in my view of negotiating that they get more of a write down because they have this option
  276. of going outside and causing Havoc for the rest of of Europe well everyone seemed to agree that the write down or
  277. the haircut as they call it would be 21% back in July there was an agreement it was signed in Blood and suddenly we're
  278. talking about 60% well first thing is you have to be very careful about these numbers because
  279. they depend a lot about what the discount rates are and so on so Barkley's capital for example came up
  280. with an analysis which shows it was not 21% it was actually 5% and the current one they keep talking about these
  281. numbers and what they mean I don't think we understand is the official sector also going to take that kind of haircut
  282. is the is the EU is the ECB going to take that or is it just the private Banks they just put this number if it's
  283. just the private sector 60% is not enough in my view so in other words they could offer
  284. I mean they could restructure different um parts of their debt in different ways
  285. depending on their matties also depending on who owns them and so on so forth so all of these needs to be
  286. discussed I mean when you're now whether the across the board average you know this can or haircat is 60% or 40% or it
  287. depends on you know a large number of variables they have this favorite tactic because it is very complicated but they
  288. their their desire is to make things so complicated that most people people have
  289. no idea what's actually being said and it's working so you have uh these potential
  290. discounts we they call it a restructuring basically you're breaking a contract but everyone's agreeing to
  291. break the contract um and not call at breaking the contract uh is that right well my
  292. own understanding is that it seems unlikely to me that that everybody's going to voluntarily agree
  293. so there was a deadline about four or five weeks ago where they were supposed to get 90% agreement so the days leading
  294. up to that Friday then suddenly the Greek government started say we don't actually need 90% we need 80% and then
  295. Friday came I was waiting for the news the next day it never came they never got the agreement that they needed to to
  296. do that and if you're a a Dutch pension fund for example my understanding is you
  297. have a fiduciary duty to do the best for your pensioners not to to give away money to to the to whoever the Greeks
  298. government does it don't all of these tactics and change ups and the complication that you're talking about
  299. at some point backfire for example um Greece agreed to a 21 or or Greeks wanted its creditors to agree to a 21%
  300. haircut Greece agreed that if they did that then then Greece would adhere to certain things you point out it really
  301. wasn't 21% it may have been as low as 5% but but whatever nominally it was 21% that's just a couple of months ago
  302. now we're talking about nominally 60% if I'm an owner of Italian bonds let's say
  303. I'm thinking wait a second they agreed to 21% what if Italy wants me to agree to 21% and I agree to 21% is 3 weeks
  304. later 3 months later it's going to be 60% now you're you've already started the contagion you've already started the
  305. breakdown in confidence and um I think it was Martin wolf in the financial times said that the biggest threat right
  306. now is the threat of a self-fulfilling prophecy so it's it's it's the case of a bank that is essentially solvent but if
  307. the rumors are spread wide enough that it's not solvent there's a run on the bank and now the bank is not solvent
  308. even though um it it was at the start so isn't there this threat or that or the risk that that the the very way that
  309. they're handling it breaks down confidence to the point that you get exactly the result that you're trying to
  310. avoid absolutely you want to contain the problem as quickly as possible fix that
  311. problem before this is the way we started this conversation before it spreads to other other parts it would
  312. have been better a year and a half ago to uh address the uh the Greek problem before uh you know it spread to uh to
  313. other places around uh Europe uh this is I think something that we can all agree
  314. on right uh it would have been much better to go that path but um the uh decision makers in Europe uh were not
  315. ready to uh take that step and they as frankly noted at the beginning they took a different path right trying to bail
  316. out Greece as opposed to trying to address the root of the problem right there right so
  317. um what what are the potential paths to sustainability here what are the risks what is the
  318. likelihood that one of those paths if there's more than one will be the one that gets
  319. taken well my view is they have to be looking over the edge of the cliff and seeing that there is a desperate
  320. situation in front of them and once they do that then leaders have to step up so
  321. you know in Italy Mario Monty would be a wonderful prime minister in this situation if he had a govern of national
  322. Unity he could make the kinds of changes that they need but the real risk is they fall over the cliff before they
  323. get to that point and these these crises move so quickly that there's a real risk
  324. that they're going to be falling over the cliff but hopefully at some point we will begin to get some leadership and I
  325. think it's really in Italy you know Merkel was talking to the president Napolitano who's very widely respected
  326. person but the focus of the crisis is really in Italy they need to have a change of
  327. government that that's that's the one single thing in my view that gives us a hope of getting on the sustainable path
  328. because they they can be solvent if they simply tax and spend in in a in a reasonable way and start bringing down
  329. their debt the other problems I think you know there countries like Portugal are going to have problems but these are
  330. small countries it's the big one that's the big problem I I think Spain is manageable too yeah except that the
  331. latest uh uh government deficit figures are not uh wonderful they have actually exceeded their targets uh but I agree I
  332. mean it is really the the bigger economies in the southern periphery that uh that we should all be concerned about
  333. uh I I would also like to add just a quick comment about the other side of the economy so the real economy
  334. obviously if you know for whatever reason and I don't know exactly how this could happen in the present context but
  335. GDP figures start to improve in Europe that's going to give everybody a little bit more Breathing Room except that of
  336. course you never know whether that Breathing Room per Franklin's comment is actually going to tell the politicians
  337. or the policy makers oh we can actually modle through this pressure off yeah right so um you know I'm of two minds
  338. when I you know of course I would prefer for example the real economy figures to
  339. to improve but at the same time if they improve too quickly right let me put it that way it may actually reduce the uh
  340. the appetite for for True reform and for through action on the on the financial front so it's a kind of a catch 22 right
  341. I mean I don't know what to say kind of situation in the sense that uh I'm hoping for the best but uh as Franklin
  342. said I mean they really need to realize how close most of these economies are to
  343. the cliff right and uh once they come to that realization then maybe we will start seeing some some action here and
  344. talking about the real economy or the real economies uh you've got what seems to some an inherent contradiction on the
  345. one hand you've got a potential financial crisis which is exasperated by poor economic performance and on the
  346. other hand you have government actions in many of these countries um where austerity measures
  347. are are being enforced or or or forced onto countries um how does this idea of expansionary contraction work I'm a
  348. little bit confused about how you slow down economic activity in the hopes that you're going to grow out of your problem
  349. I get that the idea is that you cleanse the system somehow and you come out of it stronger but is this the right time
  350. or the wrong time to be trying to cleanse the system in that way well it's not a good place to start
  351. out on that program because you're exactly right you know you have this contradic which is if you cut government
  352. expenditure it's probably going to slow down the economy and then it's going to be much more difficult to grow out of it
  353. but the problem is that if you just go and keep borrowing money and and hoping that demand will somehow pick up you run
  354. the real risk of running into a wall and what I think is was the big mistake was
  355. that governments went to much too high debt levels I think as soon as you start getting above you may 40 50% you've got
  356. to start saying now is the time maybe for us to put our house in order and make sure because once you get to 70 80%
  357. then you're exactly in this bind and I think that's one of the big lessons for governments we need to keep debt much
  358. much lower going forward Maro it may be that Spain is the poster child here because
  359. Spain uh they may have even been in Surplus when when the fiscal when the financial crisis hit so no one was
  360. running their economy better than Spain in the sense of of of uh being prudent I
  361. don't think their long-term debt was all that high I don't know exactly where it
  362. was but compared to places like Greece and so forth um and now you just mentioned that uh the deficit they're
  363. not hitting their deficit numbers um so Spain did everything right they would have been they would have been the the
  364. picture in the in the foyer of the IMF if you walked in um and yet they're they're getting slammed and now they're
  365. taking on this austerity and the results seem to be that the economy is going down
  366. so there's there's two different kinds of countries countries that had government debt excess but what about
  367. those countries that were actually being run on the surface you're I think correct uh that um you know the micro
  368. picture looked like uh you know pretty good in 2005 2006 just before the uh the storm hit however uh there were some
  369. underlying weaknesses and uh we uh fully understood the consequences of that uh in ' 08 and 09 right and I'm talking
  370. about Spain so you know a lot of the boom and a lot of the uh extra Revenue that the government was getting that
  371. enabled it to actually balance the budget have a mod Surplus and in ' 05 and ' 06 it was actually paying down the
  372. uh the debt right so it was reducing the stock of debt all of that was built on a
  373. uh Chimera which was that uh real estate prices would uh you know the real estate
  374. boom will would continue forever and remember that uh at the time um you know 13 14% of GDP uh had to do with uh new
  375. construction right and the entire banking system right uh participated in that boom and now you know the most
  376. important problems in fact have to do with the uh with the aftermath of the collapse in the uh in the real estate
  377. sector so on the surface you're absolutely correct and I think many very good decisions were made at the time but
  378. at the same time the whole thing was predicated on the Assumption right that uh there would be no no problem in the
  379. real estate sector and in the construction sector and so of course the Day of Reckoning came and even though
  380. prices haven't collapsed as much as in other parts of the uh of the world like in the US or other parts of Europe like
  381. Ireland right most notably it is still you know the collapse has been big enough to you know put everything at
  382. risk including the real economy including unemployment of course which has gone up uh above 20% again and uh
  383. and so yeah it was a uh it was a uh a great situation but it was based on Clay foundations not on solid you know
  384. foundations and uh and the country is paying a price right now it's interesting to see how the root causes
  385. differed from country to Country so in Greece for example it was government over borrowing and government excess in
  386. Spain it was actually the banks were over lending it it's actually the the private sector that overdid the lending
  387. and then when the problems blew up well they didn't quite blow up in Spain the way they did in Greece but they're still
  388. very serious now the government's left to sort of clean up the mess which is what happened in in other countries also
  389. I think that's what makes it such a complicated problem because there it's it's so you know Portugal's another
  390. interesting case because Portugal didn't have a real estate Boom the real prices
  391. had been pretty flat what happened there was that young people started going to Brazil and Angola and other places which
  392. were growing fast and so then Portuguese firms weren't as competitive because all
  393. the good people were leaving and they just had very slow growth but they continue to suck in money to have this
  394. lifestyle and and so that they they have a difficult problem I would say but it's
  395. very different from Spain and Ireland yeah so once once size fits all solution won't work and then you have 27
  396. countries of which maybe 15 are in trouble right or perhaps more uh of which five are in deep trouble right one
  397. of them being Italy which is the big uh elephant in the room right everybody wants to know what what's going to
  398. happen there and uh it's complex each country is complicated and then when you you know sit down at the table and see
  399. well we have to address the problems of all of these countries simultaneously and uh the the root
  400. causes and the person uh situation is so different it is a uh it is a difficult uh so there's a lot of worry that gets
  401. expressed around the idea of a country defaulting and um clearly if if Greece were to default or pull out of the Euro
  402. it would have the catastrophic consequences potentially that that we talked about earlier but you mentioned
  403. something interesting which was the case of Argentina about 10 years ago which had pegged its currency to the dollar um
  404. and then it got into trouble and uh it decided it that it wasn't going to pay back its creditors and everyone talked
  405. about what an entire disaster this would be for Argentina as it turned out they after the fault they did have a
  406. very deep but it was a very short recession relatively speaking and Argentina has actually grown twice as
  407. fast as Brazil which is the poster child for emerging markets over the last 10 years um so from Argentina's point of
  408. view it seems to have worked out pretty well um whether or not that's an option for a
  409. Greece or some other country is an open question but but if you're sitting in Greece and you're in charge of things
  410. don't you at least have to look at Argentina and say am I willing to am I willing to put my country through a
  411. devaluation of wages that my view just to put it simple simple simple terms is that it would only work if uh the
  412. Chinese suddenly become very fond of Olives you see the reason why Argentina has been doing so great is because that
  413. the most important export commodity is soybeans right and there's this huge demand of soybeans in Brazil for cattle
  414. feed but primarily in China this has really helped them uh grow that you know this fast uh what has also helped them
  415. by the way is that they have this uh free trade agreement with Brazil and as Brazilian inflation has gone up
  416. Argentine made Goods have become more competitive also because the argentines have a devalue currency whereas the real
  417. has been raising in value so the argentines have this have had these two things going their way over the last
  418. five or six years one is exports of uh raw M of raw materials and agricultural Commodities to China and secondly um you
  419. know a big booming Market in Brazil at a time when Brazilian firms uh are being you know uh hurt by a loss of
  420. competitiveness relative to Argentinian firms right uh but Greece uh you know Franklin mentioned tourism uh just a few
  421. minutes ago that could be one way for them to pursue the Argentine r out right but you need to be able to sell
  422. something right for which there is high demand and Rising prices so again the analogy could be olives I doubt though
  423. that China is going to develop so quickly a taste for olives and by the way Greece is not the only producing
  424. country in the world that could hurt Spain's economy right so so that's one cute way of putting what the situ I mean
  425. I don't think Argentina should be should become the example right and there are good reasons why Argentina has done so
  426. well that have nothing to do with their economic policies that have more to do with
  427. a favorable uh Global situation for them right but so I I would take a slightly different position I think um Argentina
  428. has done lots of things that are crazy too so it would be in some ways difficult to imagine more mismanagement
  429. within within the country in for for the last 100 years last 100 years but but particularly under the uh the last 10
  430. years and the counteract or the the alternative scenario in Greece is so bad I mean they've going to shrink
  431. now it's down to minus 5.5% this year they shrank last year they're probably going to shrink next
  432. year and maybe the year after that they're going to have all these austerity Cuts kicking in even more
  433. savagely than they have done it's probably going to be at least a decade and possibly 15 to 20 years before they
  434. get back to where they were at 2006 I agree what politician wants to shoulder that burden it's and there's you know
  435. the social cost is tremendous there's a whole generation maybe two generations that will never really have proper
  436. employment Greece is an interesting country I'd always thought of it as being very very
  437. poor and lagging behind but actually today in j a GDP per capita it's it's in PPP it's about the same as Italy and
  438. Spain so they did grow I think if you went back 50 60 years ago they were significantly poorer than Italy for
  439. example and so they have caught up so they do they do have some productive advantages they're very good in tourism
  440. that could obviously become very competitive quickly but they're also one of the leading shippers in the world I
  441. mean the shipping industry although all the ships are based in the Marshall Islands most of the services and things
  442. are arranged in Greece and that they're very good at that they're also very good
  443. at uh generic drugs apparently a significant proportion of European gener generic drugs are produced in in Greece
  444. and so they do have some advantages it's really the government it's the private sector is not so bad it's the government
  445. that's terribly right but but in order to pursue the Argentine route they would also need to just get out of the Euro
  446. and also get that uh that boost from comp so you're assuming I'm assuming that they do that they actually get out
  447. of they get out the door they get rid of their debt and then you know they get rid of the the debt bur and do that and
  448. I don't I think agree with marrow won't be like Argentina but I think it's probably a lot better than this
  449. alternative scenario so let's talk about another real life example because a lot
  450. of times in economics you have to talk in abstracts because you can't conduct catastrophic experiments with countries
  451. very often but sometimes they happen anyway Iceland's another example small country different than Argentina however
  452. um the banks Overland they got in trouble um and they ended up defaulting on their deck that the government of
  453. Iceland um basically said we're not going to assume the debt of the banks which is the opposite of what Ireland
  454. did uh fast forward to today Iceland is recovering their employment is up in other words they suffered much less than
  455. Ireland has which has gone by the book and has had uh I I think GDP there dropped by 14% at one point um and um I
  456. I know some some of the numbers in Ireland look a little bit better more lately but I've also read that that
  457. that's a temporary blip and and so there's there's two examples where where different routs were chosen what's
  458. what's your view did did Iceland do the right thing did Ireland do the wrong thing um not that it's so simple but if
  459. you could put those two examples in context it would be very helpful so I was in in ruic two weeks ago at a
  460. conference and we had uh car well who was a professor at um Trinity College who made this this comparison and did it
  461. very well and you know the the joke at the beginning was that there was one letter difference and six months in
  462. terms of timing and the notion was that Ireland was in such a better position and now as you as you pointed out in
  463. fact it's completely the opposite Iceland is doing fine you go there there's no signs of of
  464. of of a crisis people are are doing fine they're growing again they basically cut
  465. loose on the banks let the bank's default and this I think is is a very good lesson for Europe This bailout
  466. route is actually the one that's disaster because they took the government down the Icelandic government
  467. is okay and I think they're going to come out of it fine yeah do two points on this I think the bailout
  468. mentality has gone perhaps too far right and that we need to you know think about
  469. other ways right to to overcome problems of course the other important issue to keep in mind just uh uh you know to make
  470. sure that we're on the same page is that the letter that is different in the two
  471. countries names of course that one of them belongs into the Euro Zone and the other one had more which also adds I
  472. think to the so Iceland had more policy options at it disposal but I totally agree with Franklin that they did not
  473. make the mistake of thinking that they could bail out banks that were absolutely oversized for the for the uh
  474. for the uh uh for what Iceland is that is to say they have grown way too big right by making essentially loans and
  475. taking deposits from outside of the country right over the boom years actually I want to close that same Loop
  476. the the the idea of the Euro Iceland didn't have the euro to deal with and when you talked about the UK doing
  477. better and having made some good choices it too didn't have the euro to deal with
  478. so it didn't have the straight jacket that Portugal Spain Greece have in that they can't devalue which would be of
  479. course the classical way to get yourself out of a bad situation you can make your
  480. own decisions as opposed to having to sit at the table yeah uh and also you don't have to think about what might be
  481. the implications of your decisions for 26 other you know members or well in the case of the Euro 16 other members right
  482. of the of the common currency uh so that that that changes a lot of things but but but I think the fact remains that
  483. they chose not to bail out the banks right and that was a as as it turns out was a uh seems to have been a a very
  484. good uh decision and it didn't cause the catastrophe that people argue they they
  485. defaulted on the bonds which you know in my view the Irish should have done long
  486. ago but are now being prevented from doing by the ECB in the EU so and and in Ireland um which decided to take over
  487. the bad debts of the banks but the size of those debts correct me if I'm wrong aren't the size of those debts a couple
  488. times the size of the Irish GDP I mean they're they're they're huge and they're the kind of thing that could take
  489. decades to pay off and um well I I it's a little bit more complicated then because Ireland had essentially a
  490. sovereign wealth fund which offset that so they've already basically spent that money in offsetting some of the debt so
  491. then the issue is how much far a price is going to fall which the what you were raising for Spain and in Ireland if it
  492. starts growing again who knows where where property prices will go but these situations can
  493. transform so it could be very Bleak but also Ireland is a competitive country they have what levels of GDP per capital
  494. was much closer really to the US than to most European countries I I wouldn't be
  495. surprised if Ireland made it all right well let's try to wrap things up here we're we're on the edge of the cliff
  496. we're looking we're looking over uh and there's sort of a race going on as to whether the politicians can patch things
  497. up before um there's a self-fulfilling prophecy of some sort and and things completely fall apart um probably there
  498. there's no one in Europe that wants to see that happen probably most people in Europe want to see the Euro Zone stay
  499. together um but these these pressures are like tectonic plates something's got to give what do you think is
  500. most likely to happen um and over what period not to put you on the spot too much
  501. but what and you can have alternate scenarios but I I I'm curious just to keep it simple I think the European
  502. leaders are going to persist H you know in their attempt to um uh you know fix things by Crea you
  503. know by by creating these uh facility right this fund with a set of rules there and uh the markets are going to
  504. maybe partially believe that that's going to work right um if nothing else gets in the way maybe it will work uh
  505. but some of the underlying problems will will still be there right and uh as we've been um I think mentioning
  506. repeatedly a key thing is what happens in Italy right what happens in Spain also I think but uh because if things
  507. take a turn for the worst in either one of those two countries or both that that
  508. would mean well I think immediately that the the the current plan wouldn't work wouldn't be sufficient right and um so I
  509. think there's going to be quite a bit of modling through yeah uh you know that would be my that's my expectation
  510. there's going to be a lot of muddling through because again even though Outsiders looking to Europe see that
  511. several of these countries or the entire you know Euro zone is very close to the
  512. cliff I don't think that's the perception by the politicians yet right that would be my take on on that
  513. continued that question ability to muddle through somehow some way yeah okay so I would be a little bit more
  514. pessimistic and I think that they will continue to try to moddle through I think as I say if if Italy was
  515. to look over the cliff and get its act together which it can undoubtedly do has many many strengths as a wonderful
  516. country in many ways if they could do that and get rid of these political problems that that are at the core of
  517. their problems then then we can move forward and you know we can hope for more growth but
  518. there is a real risk of some kind of self-fulfilling contagion or some problem which happens too quickly for
  519. them to deal with because you know if it happens over a period of weeks then the
  520. politician can say wow you know we're in a terrible situation we've got to raise
  521. taxes we got to do all these things we really need to pull together and come through this and and then they can do it
  522. but but the real problem is that it may happen too quickly this is something that can play out in a few days when
  523. things go bad quickly and I think that that's the real risk but hopefully they'll muddle through I mean that's
  524. what they think is going to happen let's hope they're right and as far as fundamental causes I mean one underlying
  525. fundamental problem that seems to me is is this huge trade imbalance between the
  526. North and the South and the north is running big trade surpluses with the South which speaks to the the lack of
  527. competitiveness in the South how does that get redressed how how do you solve that you've I mean that is other than as
  528. as I think we've alluded to that you you deflate the southern economies in a way
  529. that means lower wages and and slower growth for painful austerity measures in other words is is there some other back
  530. to the straight jacket right I mean the common currency essentially I mean that's one comment makes it very
  531. difficult for these countries to uh right to um rebalance and uh but secondly of course
  532. um you know the immediate concern for politicians policy makers is how to address all of these you know financial
  533. problems right but medium run long run uh there's more fundamental policies that need to be uh put in place in order
  534. to increase the competitiveness of the those of those countries I I mentioned earlier that over the last 10 years
  535. German manufacturing costs have stayed flat whereas those in the uh periphery of Europe have increased by 35 to 40%
  536. over a period of 10 years and uh it's not that they're improving and they're not improving fast enough is that
  537. actually they're losing ground relative to other countries in the world and Franklin has been mentioned repeatedly
  538. that many of these peripheral countries have per capita incomes that are very close right to places like Germany or
  539. well Ireland before the crisis was above the UK and so on and so forth uh so you
  540. cannot compete right uh you cannot hope to compete in a world in which you're already relatively Rich right if you
  541. don't make now Investments and if you don't uh introduce policy that will help you improve your productivity and your
  542. competitiveness so it's a very difficult problem I mean most of the attention now
  543. I would say all of the attention is focused on the shortterm problem right but there's a more fundamental you know
  544. longer run and we haven't talked about the emerging economies here right which is the other issue when it comes to
  545. competitiveness that is to say that it's not just keeping a pace with Germany it's also that other emerging economies
  546. are you know growing and that they're accumulating skills and uh and they're investing in R&D and uh unfortunately
  547. southern Europe is I think um Stuck in the Middle right so they they they're not as good as Germany and then the
  548. emerging economies are getting so much better that uh I think it's is going to be very problematic for them uh you know
  549. in the next 10 to 15 to 20 years to negotiate that uh that situation there uh they're caught in the middle
  550. right I think you know we we're spending a lot on on economic factors because clearly that's the shortterm issue but
  551. you know I think we've talked a little bit about this today but there is within Europe fundamental re differences and
  552. there's a reason why the first half of the 20th century they killed tens of millions of people each other and all
  553. over the world and you know we've made so much progress since then from from the first world war and the second world
  554. war but there still are huge differences both you know we've been talking about them but just the way people think about
  555. the world and the way they think about the work life balance you know in northern Europe there's not much to do
  556. except work if you live in Spain or Italy there's a lot to do and you can go enjoy family family go to the beach take
  557. the whole of August off you know there's not much point in doing that if you live
  558. in in the UK for example because it rains all the time but you know these are these are fundamental differences
  559. but the institutions are just very different the social compacts between the rich and the poor how the societies
  560. run the view of things like whether you should pay your taxes these are all very
  561. big differences and my own view is that probably the Euro Zone in its current form is
  562. a jump too far what Europe needs to do is just spend another 20 30 years grow together get a common view of the world
  563. because Europeans focus on their differences but you know if you compare their them with the Chinese or they're
  564. so similar we basically use the the same alphabet in 80% of the continent the other part it's not that much difference
  565. the languages are not that far apart the cultures are very similar in many many ways and the things that they
  566. killed each other over for hundreds of years like the difference between Catholics and Protestant these are not
  567. very big in the big scheme of things and I think they just need to realize that and grow together and then they can
  568. start having much more integration you've talked in the past about the idea I haven't heard much about lately but
  569. the idea of having a two speed Euro where there there would be a different level for southern countries uh than
  570. than for Northern countries is that one way to help to bridge this Gap some one way or another I think we'll probably
  571. move to that whether that means Greece and Italy leave the Euro zone or whether there's some other kind of breakup but
  572. as I say unless we have some changes of the kind we've talked I I it's difficult
  573. to see the Euro Zone in its current form lasting that that much longer something's got to change dramatically
  574. in my view yeah and so far the politicians are thinking about more integration but of course they they
  575. cannot agree as to what that would be so they're trying to essentially you know escape from the
  576. current situation by you know intensifying the uh deepening the union but uh precisely when you attempt to do
  577. that that's when all of the differences relevant differences reemerge right so that's very much the German view what
  578. the German view is you all become like us in Germany and everybody be fine because nobody run deficits and all
  579. those kinds of things but they don't think about that in the rest of Europe so so what would the likely effects be
  580. on the US and the world economy um if we have something catastrophic happen in Europe or if there is a muddle through
  581. out come I'd like to ask each of you are we talking about another Global event like 2008 at a
  582. minimum I think at at a minimum it's that kind of event with the situation being such that
  583. governments can't step in so you know for example what would happen in the us if we
  584. started having problems in the banking system I find it very difficult to believe that Congress would pass any
  585. kind of major funding of buyouts of banks which would mean the FED would have to do it but that also they're
  586. coming under political pressure too so it's a very worrying situation globally and and this of course is
  587. why the other leaders keep calling the European lead the Continental European and saying you've got to do something
  588. about it because otherwise we're all going to be in trouble and it it is Extreme
  589. worrying also on the on the side of the real economy I mean still Europe is a very large Market it is a very important
  590. market for American firms and keep in mind that many of them now are actually um reporting very large profits because
  591. they're making they they're still making money in Europe and with the Euro being
  592. so strong relative to the dollar you know they can report in dollar terms like outside profits especially consumer
  593. goods companies American consumer goods comp help make their goods competitive absolutely so uh so if uh if uh Europe
  594. were to implode uh there would be a financial effect that would you know reverberate around the world but also
  595. you know again a lot of American firms right now they're making very good money in Europe and that could uh you know
  596. disappear isn't it true that China sells more to Europe than it does to the US so
  597. obviously a huge effect for China yeah and that's one of the reasons that they're having a lot of problems at the
  598. moment so that I think they're very worried about that and uh isn't it the case that China has been helping a
  599. little bit here and can we expect that they may out of self-interest offer additional
  600. help my own view is they may offer a little but they'll they'll ask for something in return and I don't think
  601. we've got to that point yet where that that it's clear what what the trade would be I mean the Chinese are
  602. certainly at this point not interested in buying European debt right I mean they you know who would like to to do
  603. that obviously I think they have a keen interest in buying other types of assets
  604. especially assets linked to production or distribution uh but as you know uh each
  605. time that a major Chinese company wants to buy something in Europe or United States all of the alarms could go off
  606. right uh so the Chinese would would be very much like to uh you know invest money poor money but I don't think they
  607. would you know go for uh government securities they they would like to pursue other other ways of helping
  608. uh but I don't think uh Europe is ready and for that matter I don't think the US
  609. is ready for that either right now so let me ask each of you to sum up the discussion today and what you see
  610. happening going forward would well the um uh on the optimistic side of things um you know I
  611. think that uh the uh eventually enough pressure will build up on European decision makers uh uh so that they you
  612. know take action uh to uh you know you know terms of coming up with a with something that is credible right as to
  613. how to deal with the Greek tragedy right and how to deal with the other other issues uh We've also discussed uh you
  614. know bigger problems in bigger economies that that could have bigger consequences
  615. right for for not just Europe but but also the rest of the world whatever happens in Italy today or tomorrow uh
  616. with this potential no confidence vote on bone or just that his government collaps ABS due to lack of parliamentary
  617. support I think could be a turning point uh whether it's a turning point for the
  618. you know for the better for the worst that remains to be seen in part remains you know it depends on who is the new
  619. prime minister and what kind of a coalition he or she he most likely is able to uh to build and what kind of uh
  620. you know support they get in terms of pushing austerity measures right so that's that's really really important
  621. and by way of summary I think it's also important to keep in mind that that this
  622. is not just the European problem so we just talked about that uh This truly is I think a global problem uh you need to
  623. let the Europeans figure it out but I think any help that other you know important players in the world can offer
  624. uh in terms of encouraging them to address the issues is very important because um if a catastrophe actually
  625. materializes in Europe that's going to reduce everybody's standards of living in the short run and it's going to cause
  626. a lot of problems financially around the world so I think it's very important not
  627. to um you know think that if the European something happens to Europe oh that's going to be better for us because
  628. then you know hey we can say that we're in better shape than them it's going to come back to haunt us uh very quickly in
  629. fact so I would I would agree with what Morrow said you know I think hopefully they'll muddle through
  630. they they've done it a lot now it's quite likely that'll continue for a while but there there are these downside
  631. risks I think the real Focus now is on Italy one of the very encouraging things over the last few weeks is that whereas
  632. previously there was complete denial that there was anything of a problem in Italy that's now really become the
  633. center of attention within Europe and hopefully they can sort that out there are many other problems around
  634. the world I think it's very important we don't forget that our own soap opera is
  635. just about to start up again we're now what 28 28 days from from the November 23rd
  636. deadline when we're supposed to have these Cuts in place that doesn't seem to be going well is my understanding and
  637. then we have um difficult to believe given how much we see politicians on the television at the moment but we've got
  638. got another year to the next election which is going to be full-time politics and it's in many ways a lot of the same
  639. issues about how much money should we spend what's the role of the government how much debt should we have so these
  640. are problems that are big it's not just Europe it's many places in the world we shouldn't forget our own
  641. problems thank you very much for this discussion and maybe we can follow up and see where things are in a couple
  642. months or so thank [Music] you [Music]

Brief Summary

Wharton professors discuss the European debt crisis, focusing on Greece's impact on Italy and broader economic implications.

Key points

  • The European Debt Crisis Unfolds. A deep dive into the interconnectedness of European economies and the implications of Greece's debt crisis.
  • Greece's Financial Mismanagement. Exploring how Greece's government overspent and mismanaged its debt, leading to a financial crisis.
  • The Role of European Banks. Discussion on the weaknesses in the European banking system that allowed Greece's problems to spread.
  • Changing Mindsets in Banking. The mindset in banking must shift to recognize different levels of risk across asset classes.
  • Political Leadership Deficits. European politicians are not exercising the leadership needed to tackle economic issues effectively.
  • Addressing Problems Early. Delaying action on the Greek problem has led to broader issues in Europe.

Episode highlights

Tension

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