The Social Security Deadline Congress Cannot Ignore

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ABOUT THE EPISODE Social Security's trust fund could run out within the next decade. Without reform, that could mean automatic benefit cuts for retirees.

Kent Smetters, Faculty Director of The Penn Wharton Budget Model, breaks down the policy choices facing Social Security, from tax increases and benefit changes to a gradual increase in the retirement age. He explains why getting the accounting right is essential, how different reforms affect economic growth, and why delay makes the challenge harder to solve.

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  1. Well, the concerns around the depletion of the Social Security Trust Fund continue to grow.
  2. The belief is that without doing anything, the fund will run out sometime around 2032 or
  3. 2033 and will force a cut in benefits that retirees receive. But there are several reform package concepts that
  4. could avoid depletion, and that would be through potentially the end of the century.
  5. Kent Smetters is Faculty Director at the Penn Wharton Budget Model. His organization is taking a deeper dive into
  6. the impacts of these packages, and he joins us right now to discuss. Kent, great to catch up again.
  7. How are you, sir? Good. How are you, Ben? It's always a pleasure. I'm doing well, thank you.
  8. I don't think we've heard a lot about these reform ideas, so maybe you can give us some background on how they are all
  9. kind of coming about and what they would potentially mean for the future. Yeah. So as you pointed out, the Social Security
  10. Trust Fund will deplete in about six to seven years. So Penn Wharton Budget Model and the Social
  11. Security Actuaries do independent calculations of this. And even though our methods are very different,
  12. we both reached around the same conclusion that is about six to seven years. And so as a result, what happens when
  13. the trust fund depletes is that by law, benefits can only be paid equal to an amount of monthly payroll tax revenue that comes
  14. in. And so if your grandma is currently getting the benefit, her benefit will be reduced by
  15. about 15 percent in about six to seven years. And then over time, that haircut, that reduction
  16. gets even bigger. And so over the next 75 years, that's the normal window we look at for Social
  17. Security analysis. The benefits will reduce to about 60 percent of their current what's called scheduled law benefits.
  18. And so this payable benefit, which is what the law says has to be actually happen,
  19. will be only 60 percent of the scheduled benefits that people are used to. And so as a result of that, you
  20. know, people are starting to think through different potential reform options. And hopefully it won't be like 1983 where
  21. we wait just a couple of months before trust fund depletion. What are some of the concepts that are
  22. being put out there as ways to kind of counteract the path of where the Social Security trust fund is going right now so
  23. that you can turn around and obviously keep it fully funded as this research looks at
  24. well towards the end of the century? Yeah, unfortunately, in D.C. right now, you
  25. know, it's a little talk about this and so forth, but it's not really a lot of action that's happening.
  26. And so I am concerned about our delayed action happening. But nonetheless, fundamentally, what we show is that
  27. you basically have, you know, a range of options still available today. And they can vary from, you know, traditionally
  28. most people call more liberal leaning options of more tax increases. And we don't label them liberal, but that's
  29. essentially what our package, you know, what we letter A, B and so forth kind of
  30. look at is more revenue. And then you have the more conservative options that we also look at are what we
  31. label as E and F and so forth. And these typically are using more benefit reductions.
  32. And all of them, what they do is that they solve, first of all, they prevent the trust from depleting.
  33. They also solve what's called the 75 year actuarial problem. But they have very different impacts on the
  34. economy. And the reason is, is that this is the big, you know, problem right now is
  35. that the way the government currently accounts for social security, health care programs like Medicare and
  36. other big entitlement programs just isn't proper accounting. And so they do a very different than
  37. what a company would have to do. And as a result, you can actually look like you're solving social security on every metric,
  38. you know, that you would care about for social security and fundamentally do absolutely nothing.
  39. And so the game ability here is this massive. And that's actually the first step in the
  40. whole process is actually stop. Let's stop talking about options. Let's actually get the accounting right so that
  41. the liabilities, the obligations are truly being booked correctly. By the way, the government does actually represent
  42. these. It's during a completely side book set of books, you know, and so they know what
  43. the right metrics are, but they're not all merged together into one conversation.
  44. How do we get to that point? And as you said, in Washington, it's not really, you know, any part of the discussion
  45. right now. These are usually topics that can continually get the can kicked down the road.
  46. And we probably won't see anything on this, unfortunately, probably till we pass the end of
  47. the decade, I would think. Probably. I mean, that's what history history has shown.
  48. The difference with 1983 when our last big reform is, you know, tax rates were a
  49. bit lower than we had some room to actually negotiate on taxes and benefits. And those were genuine reforms that happened in
  50. 1983. You know, what's happened today is that there's a lot of gimmicks. And so the most popular plan right now
  51. in Congress is known as the 2100 Act. It actually has more co-sponsors, over 200
  52. co-sponsors than any other social security plan. And it basically does nothing. Yeah, it looks like it does something.
  53. And that's because it actually appears to make social security look good. But actually is in fact, it even looks
  54. like it reduces Treasury debt. But fundamentally, economically, it actually does nothing in
  55. terms of dealing with this large financial burdens that were passed in the future generations.
  56. And so it's all comes down to let's get the accounting right first. Basically, if we did this type of accounting
  57. in the private sector, you would literally go to jail, it'd be accounting fraud.
  58. Now, the way that the accounting in a private company would be done is a little bit different.
  59. They have to focus on what's called shutdown liabilities. They can't assume that they're going to live
  60. forever. A government can actually be a little bit more relaxed that way. They don't have to focus on a shutdown.
  61. But still, the accounting is so bogus on how the government works right now that until
  62. you fix the accounting, we can't really have a rational discussion. But as you said, there would be a
  63. potential impact on the debt. And you talk about in the report about the impact on the GDP to debt ratio
  64. that you can see from some of these reforms. That's right. So for the bottom line is that things
  65. that tend to rely more on tax increases tend not to be as favorable for economic
  66. growth as those things that rely on more on curtailing the growth and benefits. So for example, we're not going to immediately
  67. increase the retirement age from, say, 67 to 70, which would be, by the way, consistent
  68. with how longevity has increased over the last couple decades. But you could imagine that slowly phasing in
  69. over time. And so maybe for everybody below age 50, something to that effect. And even then, if you're 49, you're not
  70. waiting to age 70. It's like 67 plus two months, something slowly phasing in. And those types of reforms tend to have
  71. much bigger positive impacts on the economy over time. And so things that rely more on taxes,
  72. they can solve the problem, but they also tend to be not great for economic growth.
  73. Those who rely on benefits, they can be a little bit harsher to earlier generations, but
  74. create a lot more economic growth and help future generations. But at the same time, we could actually
  75. have a mixture of some combination of everything and some kind of happy middle ground.
  76. And so part of the problem is that the user response is, oh, the reason why the taxes don't look good is because you're
  77. just assuming that people stop working with the labor supply elasticity. And that's actually just wrong.
  78. This is actually going to happen even without those assumptions about how much people are going
  79. to work less and so forth. It simply comes back to the accounting. Once we actually account for the fact that
  80. Social Security and Medicare themselves actually create debt very similar to treasury debt and the debt
  81. in these programs is about two and a half times bigger than treasury debt. And it's by the way, it's even harder
  82. to change because in Social Security and Medicare and so forth, that this debt, this is
  83. what we call implicit debt, is actually indexed inflation. So it's like treasury debt, but all in
  84. the form of real bonds like treasury inflation protected securities. And so when we think about it that
  85. way, if we were to put all that on one big balance sheet, then we could have a rational discussion about tradeoffs.
  86. But until then, what we're going to be doing is we're going to just be shifting accounts here and shifting what looks like less
  87. burden on the official debt and more burden on this implicit debt and never really solving
  88. a problem. I'll finish up on this. You mentioned a moment ago about the retirement
  89. age. Is it your expectation that we will see over a period of time that retirement age
  90. go from 67 to 70 as part of this build out of what we need to see occur with Social Security over a period
  91. of time? Probably, yes. And the reason why is that if you look back to the beginning of Social Security,
  92. most people did not even live to the normal retirement age. Now that was understood at that point that
  93. more and more people would hit the normal retirement age over time because life expectancy, they
  94. understood was going to increase. And so it was understood that more money would be needed for the program over time.
  95. But it's also understood that the retirement age itself would eventually be adjusted and so forth.
  96. The fact of the matter is we did adjust the retirement age for decades all the way up until 1983.
  97. And even then, it was a slow adjustment from like age 65 to age 67 with some weird flat regions and some speculation on
  98. how that happened with particular staffers. The claim is that they calculated when their
  99. retirement age is going to happen. They don't want to increase so much, whatever.
  100. Putting the conspiracy theories aside, we barely increased it. If we were doing something more close to
  101. life expectancy, like in some other countries, the retirement age already would be at least age
  102. 70. So we're kind of behind the curve in that way. And that actually is something that could be
  103. phasing really slowly over time and not be that painful, give people a lot of expectations
  104. about what's going to happen. And that could play a monster role in solving the problem.
  105. Some of the ways that people are coming up with trying to solve this problem about
  106. changing the indexation formulas and things like that. The problem with those things is that we've
  107. done that in the past. They're never sustainable. Politically, they're just not sustainable.
  108. Whereas the retirement age, once you get it up, it is actually pretty much sustainable.
  109. Even other countries have shown this as well. And so it's about creating those expectations well
  110. in advance. Kent, great to talk to you as always. For those people that would like to read
  111. more about these different ideas, you can go to the Penn Wharton Budget Model website and
  112. take a look at them. Kent, great to have you again. Thank you. Awesome. Great to be back.
  113. Kent Smedders, Faculty Director at the Penn Wharton Budget Model.

Brief Summary

Kent Smetters says Social Security faces benefit cuts within seven years, and argues honest accounting and gradual retirement-age increases are key to reform.

Key points

  • The looming benefit cut. Without action, the Trust Fund is projected to deplete in six to seven years. Benefits would initially fall by about 15 percent, with payable benefits eventually reaching about 60 percent of scheduled levels.
  • A popular plan that does nothing?. Kent Smetters says the 2100 Act appears to improve Social Security’s finances, but does not actually address the underlying burden on future generations.
  • Fix the books before debating fixes. Smetters argues that government accounting obscures Social Security and Medicare’s implicit debt. Until those obligations are properly accounted for together, he says, reform debates risk shifting burdens rather than sol
  • Retirement age and longevity. Smetters expects the retirement age may rise over time, arguing that gradual changes tied to longer life expectancy could help address the funding gap while giving people advance notice.

Tension

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